Court Rulings

Defendant, Shelton Stone Goss, was convicted by a Tipton County Jury of attempted second degree murder, aggravated burglary, five counts of burglary of a vehicle, two counts of theft under $500, one count of theft over $500, one count of theft over $1,000, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony to wit: attempted second degree murder of Joshua Halleron, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony: to wit: aggravated burglary of the Halleron residence. He received an effective fourteen-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Trevor H. Taylor, pled guilty to three separate sales of cocaine. Corresponding guilty pleas to delivery of cocaine were merged with the sale of cocaine convictions. The negotiated plea agreement set a sentence of three years for each conviction, to be served concurrently with each other for an effective sentence of three years. The manner of service of the sentence was left to the determination of the trial court at a separate sentencing hearing. The trial court ordered the entire sentence to be served by incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying "probation or other appropriate alternative sentencing." After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant filed a complaint after he was terminated from his employment with the Bradley County, Tennessee Sheriff's Department. The complaint alleges a violation of procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, breach of contract, and violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 38-8-304. The County filed a motion for summary judgment on various grounds and a second motion to dismiss on the basis that Appellant's claims were barred by the one year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the County's motion for summary judgment and by separate order granted the County's motion to dismiss on the basis that the one year statute of limitations applied. We affirm.

This is a post-foreclosure unlawful detainer action in which Orion Federal Credit Union, after purchasing the property at foreclosure, was awarded a judgment for possession of the property by the general sessions court. The prior owner refused to surrender the property and appealed the judgment for possession to the circuit court. Orion filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was granted. The trial court also issued Orion a writ of immediate possession, and Orion took possession of the property. The prior owner appeals the trial court's grant of the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because we have determined the case is moot, we dismiss.

These consolidated appeals arose from a decision of the Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of the City of Providence (the board) to reduce the pension benefits of Frank E. Corrente (Corrente) following multiple federal convictions, pursuant to the Honorable Service Ordinance (HSO), Chapter 17, Article VI, Sec. 17-189.1 of the City of Providence Code of Ordinances (as enacted in 1999). The board brought an action in the Superior Court to confirm its decision. Corrente also sought confirmation of the board's decision, but requested a tax credit on the pension benefits that he had received but was required to return to the board. The Mayor of the City of Providence (the mayor) and the City of Providence (the city) intervened in the action and challenged the board's decision to reduce, rather than revoke, Corrente's pension benefits. A justice of the Superior Court confirmed the board's decision and remanded the issue of the tax credit to the board. The board denied Corrente's request for a tax credit and the Superior Court declined to overrule this decision. The following appeals were before the Supreme Court: (1) Corrente's appeal from the Superior Court's judgment denying his request for a tax credit (2) the intervenors' appeal that challenged the board's decision to reduce, rather than revoke, Corrente's pension benefits and (3) the board's cross-appeal from the Superior Court's decision that allowed the mayor and the city to intervene under Rule 24(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the Superior Court justice appropriately reviewed the board's decision to deny Corrente's request for a tax credit (2) the board's decision to reduce Corrente's pension benefits was not arbitrary, capricious, or affected by other errors or law and (3) the Superior Court justice did not err or abuse his discretion in allowing the mayor and the city to intervene. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's

The plaintiff, Sevan (Bjorklund) Cappuccilli, appealed to the Supreme Court following a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendants, David A. Carcieri, M.D., d/b/a Medical Office of David A. Carcieri, M.D., and Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island. The plaintiff's claim against the defendants derives from a vein injury she alleged occurred during an emergency cesarean section at Women & Infants. The jury ultimately returned a verdict for the defendants. The trial justice denied the plaintiff's subsequent motion for new trial, concluding that reasonable minds could differ. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that the trial justice failed to weigh the credibility of the evidence in deciding the motion. The plaintiff also argued that the trial justice improperly excluded evidence from trial. The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the trial justice failed to make a credibility determination in deciding the motion for new trial. The Court also determined that the plaintiff's arguments regarding the excluded evidence were unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

QUESTIONS: 1. Is Sandra Meraz unlawfully serving as a board trustee of the Deer Creek Storm Water District because she was appointed to fill a vacancy by the remaining members of the district board, rather than by the Tulare County Board of Supervisors? 2. Is Kayode Kadara unlawfully serving as a board trustee of the Deer Creek Storm Water District because he is not a "freeholder" of land within the district? CONCLUSIONS: 1. Leave to sue in quo warranto is GRANTED to determine whether Sandra Meraz is unlawfully serving as a board trustee of the Deer Creek Storm Water District because she was appointed to fill a vacancy by the remaining members of the district board, rather than by the Tulare County Board of Supervisors. 2. Leave to sue in quo warranto is DENIED to determine whether Kayode Kadara is unlawfully serving as a board trustee of the Deer Creek Storm Water District because he is not a "freeholder" of land within the district.

Magistrate's decision adopted. The magistrate properly stated the pertinent facts and applied the appropriate law to find that relator had demonstrated that the doctor's report on which the Industrial Commission's hearing officer had relied exclusively in awarding permanent total disability benefits was so internally inconsistent as to whether the injured worker was capable of sustained remunerative employment or was permanently and totally disabled that it did not constitute some evidence to support the PTD award. Limited writ of mandamus granted, ordering the commission to vacate its decision denying reconsideration and, in a manner consistent with this decision, to hold a new hearing and enter a new order that adjudicates the PTD application having corrected the deficiencies described in the decision.

This appeal arises out Husband's petition to reduce his alimony in futuro obligation and Wife's motion for criminal contempt for Husband's failure to pay his alimony obligation in full. Wife opposed the modification of alimony on two grounds: (1) the 2007 Marital Settlement Agreement was not modifiable and (2) there had been no material change in circumstances. The trial court held that the alimony in futuro provision was modifiable and, based on a finding that Husband had proven a material change in circumstances, reduced Husband's alimony obligation. The court then calculated Husband's alimony arrearage for 2015 based on his income in 2007, not on his income as stated on his W-2 for 2015, which was greater. The court also dismissed the contempt petition upon a finding that Wife failed to prove the essential elements. Wife appeals, contending the trial court erred (1) by dismissing her motion for criminal contempt (2) by finding that the trial court had the authority to modify alimony (3) by finding that a substantial and material change in circumstances warranted a modification and (4) by failing to properly calculate Husband's alimony arrearage for 2015. We have determined that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes us from reviewing the trial court's decision to dismiss the contempt petition therefore, we affirm the dismissal of the criminal contempt petition. As for Husband's petition to modify alimony in futuro, we affirm the trial court's determination that the alimony in futuro provision was modifiable however, we have determined that there is no factual basis to support a finding that Husband proved a substantial and material change in circumstances. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision to decrease Husband's alimony obligation and remand with instructions to reinstate the alimony award as stated in the final divorce decree. Because the alimony arrearage judgment was based on the reduced al