Court Rulings

A Hardin County jury convicted the defendant of two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm (counts 1 and 2), possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (count 3), possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia (count 4), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count 5). On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions in counts 3 and 5 and asserts the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the inference of casual exchange pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-419. Upon our review of the record, we conclude sufficient evidence exists to support the defendant's convictions and the defendant failed to preserve the jury instruction issue for appeal. In reviewing the sentencing determinations of the trial court, however, we note several errors in the completion of the judgment forms for counts 1, 2, 3, and 4. Specifically, there are clerical errors in the felony classifications as marked in counts 1, 2, and 3 (in count 1, the trial court incorrectly classified the conviction as a Class C felony rather than a Class B felony in count 2, the trial court incorrectly classified the conviction as a Class E felony rather than a Class C felony and in count 3, the trial court incorrectly classified the conviction as a Class C felony rather than a Class B felony). Additionally, in merging the defendant's convictions in counts 1 and 2, the trial court failed to impose a sentence for the merged conviction of count 2. Finally, in count 4, the trial court incorrectly sentenced the defendant for a misdemeanor conviction rather than the felony for which he was found guilty, warranting a new sentencing hearing on the same. Consequently, we remand the case to the trial court for sentencing as to counts 2 and 4 and the entry of corrected and completed judgment forms as to counts 1, 2, 3, and 4.

This is another appeal arising from the divorce of Corey Daniel Hopwood ("Father") and Andrea Renea Hopwood ("Mother"). In a previous opinion, we remanded for a new determination concerning the duration and amount of an award to Mother of rehabilitative alimony and the calculation of an award to Mother of attorney's fees attributable only to child custody and child support issues. The Chancery Court for Williamson County ("the Remand Court") addressed these two issues on remand. Father appeals to this Court, arguing in large part that he simply cannot afford to pay what the Remand Court ordered him to pay. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the Remand Court's rulings with respect to rehabilitative alimony and attorney's fees attributable to child support and child custody. However, we modify the Remand Court's judgment to reduce the amount of life insurance Father is required to carry to secure his alimony obligation in light of the reduction of his alimony obligation. We further modify the Remand Court's judgment to eliminate $750 in attorney's fees assessed against Father for filing an improperly-styled motion when he was acting pro se. The judgment of the Remand Court is affirmed as modified.

Commission abused its discretion when it awarded TTD benefits to claimant without making a determination whether claimant abandoned the work force either by accepting the employer's oral, light duty job offer and failing to return to work as agreed or refusing the employer's oral offer of light duty work within claimant's physical capabilities. Objections sustained, writ of mandamus granted, and case remanded to the commission for further proceedings.

Bureau of Workers' Compensation appeals trial court's decision finding injured worker entitled to participate in compensation fund. Worker was company president. Company provided mobile commercial tire changing services. President injured while traveling to breakfast meeting with company employee, commercial tire changer. At meeting, president intended to direct the employee to work at apartments owned by president's separate company. Trial court affirmed where president's injury was received in the course of and arose out of employment. Evidence indicated tire changing business was slow and president was travelling to meet with the employee for morale-boosting breakfast with hope that tire service call would occur. If no call occurred, president intended to direct the employee to work at the apartments. Retaining highly-skilled employees by ensuring full-time wages was a benefit to the tire changing business when business increased in the spring and summer.

This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing a plaintiff-employee's THRA and TPPA claims against his employer. As to the employee's THRA claim, the trial court found that the evidence of harassment and discriminatory conduct was not so severe or pervasive so as to establish a hostile work environment. As to the employee's TPPA claim, the trial court found that the employer had a valid, non-discriminatory reason for termination. Additionally, the trial court found that the employee failed to establish that one of the entities was his employer for purpose of liability under either the THRA or the TPPA. Finding that the employee presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of disputed material fact with regard to his THRA and TPPA claims, we vacate the trial court's order as to these claims and remand the case to the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing a plaintiff-employee's THRA and TPPA claims against his employer. As to the employee's THRA claim, the trial court found that the evidence of harassment and discriminatory conduct was not so severe or pervasive so as to establish a hostile work environment. As to the employee's TPPA claim, the trial court found that the employer had a valid, non-discriminatory reason for termination. Additionally, the trial court found that the employee failed to establish that one of the entities was his employer for purpose of liability under either the THRA or the TPPA. Finding that the employee presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of disputed material fact with regard to his THRA and TPPA claims, we vacate the trial court's order as to these claims and remand the case to the trial court.

The plaintiff appeals the summary judgment dismissal of his claims against the defendant bank for discrimination and breach of fiduciary duty. We affirm the trial court.

This appeal concerns whether a quitclaim deed was forged. Mohammad Naser Chorazghiazad ("Plaintiff") sued Mohammad Chorazghiazad ("Defendant") in the Chancery Court for Wilson County ("the Trial Court") alleging that Defendant took certain of Plaintiff's properties by means of a forged deed ("the Quitclaim Deed"). The Trial Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant had indeed forged the Quitclaim Deed to give himself three additional properties that Plaintiff never agreed to transfer. Defendant appeals to this Court, arguing among other things that the evidence did not rise to the level of clear and convincing necessary to prove forgery. Given the testimony and evidence including the attendant circumstances surrounding the drafting and signing of the Quitclaim Deed, as well as the Trial Court's credibility determinations, we find, as did the Trial Court, that Plaintiff met his burden of proving forgery by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Wanda I. Trinidad, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari with this Court, seeking review of a decision by the Retirement Board of the Employee Retirement System of Providence denying her application for accidental-disability benefits, and we granted her petition. The petitioner contends that the medical examinations establish that she qualifies for accidental-disability benefits instead of ordinary-disability benefits. Moreover, petitioner argues that the board erred in placing more weight on one doctor's opinion than those of two others and therefore erred in denying her application for accidental-disability benefits. The Supreme Court reviewed the board's decision and concluded that, on the facts of this case, the decision was supported by legally competent evidence and that the board was entitled to weigh the opinion of one doctor more heavily than others. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the board denying petitioner accidental-disability retirement benefits.

This is the second appeal in a post-divorce proceeding involving the computation of Wife's portion of Husband's military retirement pay. In the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court's computation and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court assessed the arrearage of retirement pay that had accrued during the pendency of the appeal and awarded Wife her attorney's fees. Husband appeals, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that Wife lacked standing to raise the issue of calculation of military retirement pay Husband also raises numerous other issues related to the propriety of the judgment that was at issue in the first appeal, each party's entitlement to attorney's fees, and the trial court's denial of two motions to recuse itself. We vacate the award of attorney's fees for services rendered in another proceeding, and affirm the judgment in all other respects we award Wife her attorney's fees incurred in this appeal and remand the case for a determination of the amount to be awarded.