Court Rulings

The Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of tampering with governmental records and three counts of official misconduct after improperly entering jail credits during his employment as lieutenant over corrections in the Benton County Sheriff's Department. After the verdict, the trial court entered a written order granting the Defendant judgments of acquittal on the three counts of official misconduct and dismissing the counts on the basis that any benefit did not accrue to the Defendant. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting the judgments of acquittal. The Defendant asserts that the notice of appeal was untimely and that the trial court properly granted judgments of acquittal. After due consideration, we waive the timely notice of appeal, and we conclude that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the granting of judgments of acquittal and remand for further proceedings.

Contract breach damages. Plaintiff was formerly employed as a professor by defendant, a state university. Plaintiff was denied tenure by defendant. The denial triggered a final year of employment, after which plaintiff's employment was terminated. Plaintiff filed this action for breach of contract. The court found that defendant breached its employment contract with plaintiff by conducting an improper tenure review. The court ordered defendant to conduct a proper tenure review. After the proper tenure review also resulted in the denial of tenure, plaintiff was awarded damages for the period of time between the end of her employment and the completion of the proper tenure review. The parties stipulated to the amount of damages.

The defendants, the City of Woonsocket and the Woonsocket Budget Commission (the WBC), appealed a decision and judgment of the Superior Court that granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, a group of retired Woonsocket police officers. Through prior collective bargaining agreements, the City and the Woonsocket police union negotiated for the City to pay for the entire cost of health care insurance for its police officers and their beneficiaries for life upon their retirement. Soon thereafter, however, the City spiraled into a fiscal disaster and sought the appointment of a budget commission under G.L. 1956 chapter 9 of title 45 to recover from its financial distress. After the WBC was appointed, the WBC took numerous measures to alleviate the financial burdens on the City. At issue in this case, the WBC adopted a resolution that required retired police officers of the City, which included the plaintiffs, to contribute to their health insurance costs. The plaintiffs filed suit against the City and the WBC, and the Superior Court, in effect, permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing the resolution. The defendants appealed, and argued that the trial justice erred by finding the following: (1) that the plaintiffs had a vested contractual right to free lifetime health benefits for themselves and their beneficiaries (2) that the WBC was not empowered with the statutory authority to make changes to the plaintiffs' health care benefits (3) that the WBC violated the Contract Clause of the Rhode Island Constitution when it required the plaintiffs to pay for their health insurance under a new uniform health care plan applicable to all retirees and employees and (4) that the plaintiffs established that they suffered irreparable harm. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial justice that the plaintiffs had a vested contractual right to free lifetime health benefits for themselves and their beneficiaries. However, the Court held that the WBC had the sta

This appeal arises from the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to three state employee defendants. The plaintiff, also a state employee, sued the defendants in their individual and official capacities related to the plaintiff's termination from his employment. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice. The defendants then filed a joint motion for attorneys' fees, relying on Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-113, which permits a state employee to recover attorneys' fees when the employee is the "prevailing party" on claims filed against the employee in the employee's individual capacity. The trial court granted this motion and awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the defendants. This appeal followed. We affirm.

This appeal arises from an action for declaratory judgment as to the ownership of a business, defamation, and tortious interference with business relations. The plaintiff carpet cleaner alleged that the defendant entrepreneur and his wife loaned money to the plaintiff to expand his carpet cleaning business with the condition that the defendants handle the business's finances and bookkeeping. The defendants asserted that they started a new carpet cleaning business and the plaintiff was merely an employee. Following a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court denied the defendants' motion for a new trial and remittitur. On appeal, the defendants contend that the trial judge failed to fulfill his duty as the thirteenth juror and there was no material evidence to support the jury's verdict or award of damages. After reviewing the record, we find the trial judge fulfilled his role as the thirteenth juror and that there was material evidence to support the jury's verdict and award of damages. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment against the defendants.

The plaintiff in this action is a retired employee of the defendant county. She filed a complaint in October 2009, asserting claims of negligence, breach of contract, intentional or negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty related to a county employee's alleged faulty advice and lack of disclosure to her concerning the interplay of her disability benefits policy and her retirement plan. Upon the county's motion, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the county in July 2016, dismissing the plaintiff's claims of misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court subsequently denied the county's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the remaining issues. Following a bench trial in July 2018, the trial court entered a judgment awarding to the plaintiff the amount of $13,985.52. The county timely appealed. Having determined that the trial court's final order does not sufficiently explain the legal basis upon which the money judgment was awarded, we vacate the judgment and remand to the trial court for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining the basis of the judgment or, in the alternative, reconsideration of the judgment.

The trial court granted a default judgment to the plaintiff in March 2009, which judgment invalidated a deed for real property transferred from the plaintiff to her son and daughterin- law. The trial court subsequently set aside the default judgment without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the basis for the ruling. Following a consequent bench trial, the trial court upheld the deed from the plaintiff to her son, although the plaintiff sought to have the deed set aside based on undue influence and fraud. The plaintiff has appealed. Based upon our determination that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order that set aside the default judgment, we vacate both the trial court's final order and the order setting aside the default judgment. We remand this matter to the trial court for entry of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the legal basis of the trial court's decision to set aside the default judgment, or, in the alternative, reconsideration of that judgment.

R.C. was committed to the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo (CMHIP) after being found incompetent to proceed in a criminal case. A CMHIP staff psychiatrist diagnosed R.C. with bipolar disorder mania with psychosis and treated him with Zyprexa. Following R.C.'s assault of a CMHIP staff member, the People filed a petition seeking a court order authorizing the involuntary administration of six other drugs. At the hearing, the staff psychiatrist testified that R.C. was voluntarily taking Zyprexa but he might refuse to continue taking it. The district court granted the petition. On appeal, R.C. argued that insufficient evidence supported the order. An order for involuntary medication administration must be supported by clear and convincing evidence of the four elements set forth in People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985). R.C. contended that the third element of the test, that no less intrusive treatment alternative was available, was not met. He argued that he was voluntarily taking Zyprexa at the time of the hearing, which clearly showed a less intrusive option was available. Here, the psychiatrist's testimony established that continued administration of Zyprexa is a less intrusive treatment alternative than administration of the six medications. Therefore, the record does not support the district court's determination of the third Medina factor. The order was reversed.

This interlocutory appeal involves a discovery dispute. G.G., an eighth-grade student, was expelled from Boyd-Buchanan School after he sent sexually explicit messages to a female student on a social media platform. G.G. and his mother, Jackie Johnson, filed a complaint against Boyd-Buchanan School and other school officials. The trial court dismissed most of plaintiffs' claims. The only remaining claim is plaintiffs' breach of contract claim against the school. During discovery, plaintiffs requested the employment files of various school administrators and extensive information relating to the disciplinary records of non-party students. The school filed a motion for a protective order. The court granted the school's motion in part and denied it in part. The school then requested permission to file an interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted permission to appeal, as did this Court. In this opinion, we clarify the appropriate legal standard for analyzing discovery disputes. We also hold that the trial court abused its discretion by entering an order that would allow plaintiffs to discover information that is irrelevant to their breach of contract claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order granting Boyd-Buchanan School's motion for a protective order in its entirety.

Wrongful death survivorship medical malpractice standard of care causation magistrate Civ.R. 53. Plaintiff was the surviving spouse of a decedent who suffered a pulmonary embolism six days after he was discharged from defendant's hospital. The pulmonary embolism ultimately led to decedent's death, and plaintiff brought a wrongful death and survivorship action under a theory of medical malpractice. Upon considering the testimony of fact witnesses and expert witnesses, the magistrate determined that plaintiff did not prove medical malpractice by a preponderance of the evidence. The magistrate found that defendant's employees did not breach the standard of care when treating decedent, as their treatment was consistent with decedent's symptoms and test results. The magistrate further found that plaintiff failed to prove that the alleged breach of the standard of care—the failure to order an ultrasound to test for deep vein thrombosis—proximately caused decedent's death. The magistrate found insufficient evidence to establish that deep vein thrombosis would have been detected at any point during decedent's hospitalization.