Court Rulings

The plaintiff town brought this action against the defendant, W Co., seeking to collect unpaid personal property taxes it had imposed on slot machines that W Co. owned and leased for use at a casino. Thereafter, the Indian tribe that owned the casino filed an action in federal court against the town, among others, challenging the town's authority to impose personal property taxes on the slot machines. After a federal appeals court determined that the town did have authority to impose taxes, the town and W Co. entered into a stipulation regarding the unpaid taxes, interest, penalties, and attorney's fees in the present action. The town and W Co., however, disputed whether the trial court in the present action could also find W Co. liable for the attorney's fees the town incurred in defending the federal action in which W Co. was not a party, and, therefore, they filed cross motions for summary judgment as to liability only on that issue. The trial court granted the town's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the town was entitled to the attorney's fees it had incurred in defending the federal action pursuant to the statute (§ 12-161a) that requires a property owner to pay the attorney's fees of a municipality in an action brought to collect delinquent personal property taxes when the fees are ''as a result of and directly related to'' the collection proceeding. W Co. appealed to this court, which granted the town's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, W Co., on the granting of certification, appealed to our Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the case to this court with direction to deny the town's motion to dismiss and for further proceed- ings. On remand, held that the trial court improperly granted the town's motion for summary judgment because it improperly applied an expan- sive interpretation of § 12-161a to characterize the attorney's fees incurred i

Summary judgment for defendant properly granted. The filing of an eviction action for nonpayment of rent due under a lease is per se not retaliatory under Ohio law. R.C. 5321.03(A)(1).

lease termination serious or repeated violation of material term due process

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court resolving certain postjudgment motions that the parties had filed. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion to modify his alimony obligation and ordered that the modification apply retroactively. The dissolution court had granted the defendant's motion to open the dissolution judgment and issued substitute financial orders. This court thereafter reversed the dissolution court's granting of the motion to open and remanded the matter to the trial court with direction to reinstate the original financial orders. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the defen- dant had failed to pay her certain amounts set forth in the dissolution court's original financial orders. The trial court declined to find the defendant in contempt and determined that the effective date for the running of interest on the amounts at issue was the date on which the parties' appeals to this court were finally determined. The court subsequently granted the defendant's motion to modify alimony, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. The trial court thereafter determined that it lacked jurisdiction over a motion that the plaintiff had filed requesting that the court order the defendant to endorse certain insur- ance checks for damage to the parties' former marital home. The court also denied another motion for contempt that the plaintiff filed regarding documents necessary to transfer to the defendant the plaintiff's interest in certain companies that the parties owned, and the plaintiff filed an amended appeal with this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to modify his alimony obligation and determining that the defen- dant had established a substantial change in circumstances due to his lower earning capacity: that

The plaintiff, D Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property of the defendant J. Thereafter, M Co. was substituted as the plaintiff and J was defaulted for failure to plead. The trial court subsequently rendered judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of M Co., from which J appealed to this court. On appeal, J claimed, inter alia, that D Co. lacked standing to commence this action because at the time it commenced this action it did not hold the note and had no interest in the note. Held that because the resolution of J's jurisdictional claim was dependent on disputed factual findings that could not be resolved due to an inadequate appellate record, and because that claim implicated the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, this court was unable to review the merits of the appeal and the matter was remanded for a determination of the jurisdictional issue and for further proceedings according to law; in order to resolve J's standing challenge, this court had to determine if D Co. was the holder of the note or had the authority to enforce the note on behalf of another party in interest at the time this action was commenced, but the only indication in the record that the court reviewed the note was in its order granting M Co.'s motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure, in which it stated, in one sentence, that the original note and mortgage documents had been reviewed and were found to be in order, that statement was called into question by M Co. in its brief to this court, and, thus, this court was unable to verify what was in fact presented to and reviewed by the trial court, as there were no other findings in the record made by the trial court pertaining to standing, or even a copy of the note or a lost note affidavit referenced by M Co., nor did either party present this court with any transcript of any proceeding during which the court may have made findings or explained what it reviewed, and although D Co. attached to its motion to su

The plaintiff town brought this action against the defendant, W Co., seeking to collect unpaid personal property taxes it had imposed on slot machines that W Co. owned and leased for use at a casino. Thereafter, the Indian tribe that owned the casino filed an action in federal court against the town, among others, challenging the town's authority to impose personal property taxes on the slot machines. After a federal appeals court determined that the town did have authority to impose taxes, the town and W Co. entered into a stipulation regarding the unpaid taxes, interest, penalties, and attorney's fees in the present action. The town and W Co., however, disputed whether the trial court in the present action could also find W Co. liable for the attorney's fees the town incurred in defending the federal action in which W Co. was not a party, and, therefore, they filed cross motions for summary judgment as to liability only on that issue. The trial court granted the town's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the town was entitled to the attorney's fees it had incurred in defending the federal action pursuant to the statute (§ 12-161a) that requires a property owner to pay the attorney's fees of a municipality in an action brought to collect delinquent personal property taxes when the fees are ''as a result of and directly related to'' the collection proceeding. W Co. appealed to this court, which granted the town's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, W Co., on the granting of certification, appealed to our Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the case to this court with direction to deny the town's motion to dismiss and for further proceed- ings. On remand, held that the trial court improperly granted the town's motion for summary judgment because it improperly applied an expan- sive interpretation of § 12-161a to characterize the attorney's fees incurred i

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, sought a second writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his right to due process was violated because his decision to reject the state's plea offer was not made knowingly and voluntarily, and that his trial counsel for bond purposes, E, had rendered ineffective assistance. At the petitioner's arraignment, E filed an appear- ance on the petitioner's behalf for bond purposes only, and, at subse- quent pretrial proceedings, E reiterated that he had appeared for bond purposes only and informed the court that he did not intend to remain in the case and that he would return his retainer to the petitioner's family. Although the trial court discharged E from the case on March 10, 2004, at some point prior to April 9, 2004, E's investigator interviewed two witnesses to the shooting who previously had provided statements to the police implicating the petitioner. On the basis of the investigator's interview notes, E then prepared affidavits for the witnesses in which they purportedly recanted their prior statements and indicated that the police had coerced them to make those statements. The trial court subsequently appointed new counsel, S and K, to represent the peti- tioner, and the witnesses' signed affidavits became part of S and K's criminal trial file. Thereafter, the petitioner rejected a plea offer from the state and the case proceeded to trial, at which the petitioner impeached the two witnesses with their affidavits after they testified for the state, identified the petitioner as the shooter, and denied telling the investigator that they had been coerced by the police into making their prior statements. E thereafter testified for the state, stating that although he had used the investigator's notes to prepare the affidavits, he had made up certain information to fill in narrative gaps. The petitioner alleged in count one of his second habeas petition that h

The plaintiff, an accounting firm, sought to recover damages from the defen- dant G, his wife, the defendant M, and L Co., a limited liability company, for unpaid accounting services. G was the owner and operator of B Co., a liquor store, with which the plaintiff had a long standing service contract. In 2010, G created L Co., of which he was the sole member and, in July 2012, he transferred all of his interest in L Co. to M exclusively. L Co. became the backer for B Co. and M took control over B Co.'s operations. During this change in ownership, the plaintiff billed B Co. for accounting services in June, 2012. After the services went unpaid, the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendants in December, 2012. Thereafter, G died during the action's pendency, and M, as executrix of G's estate, was substituted as a defendant. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff as against L Co., but not against M, individually or as executrix. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly concluded that M could not be held personally liable for the plaintiff's damages pursuant to the theory of successor liability. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that because M failed to obtain approval from the Liquor Control Commission for her acquisition of G's interest in L Co., as required by state regulations, for the time prior to January 8, 2013, when the commission approved the transfer of the interest, M was operating B Co. in her individual capacity from August, 2012, until January, 2013, and was liable to the same extent as L Co. under a theory of successor liability: the plaintiff failed to provide any authority for its position that a party may seek to enforce a liquor control regulation by means of a private cause of action, or its claim that under the applicable statute regulation (§ 30-6-A4), an unapproved transfer of interest in a corporate backer of a liquor permit exposes the transferee to p

Pursuant to the alternative liability doctrine, when the conduct of two or more actors is tortious and it is proven that the plaintiff's injuries have been caused by only one of those actors but it is unclear which one, the burden of proving causation shifts from the plaintiff to each actor to prove that he did not cause those injuries. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defen- dants, three teenagers who had entered an abandoned mill in the town of Somers and discarded multiple cigarette butts without extinguishing them, thereby causing a fire that destroyed the mill and a sewage line in the mill's basement. While the defendants were exploring inside the mill for about forty-five minutes, each of them smoked approximately five cigarettes and discarded their unextinguished cigarettes by tossing them onto the mill's wooden floor. Experts later determined that the likely cause of the fire was the defendants' careless disposal of the cigarettes. After the plaintiff paid the town for the cost of replacing the sewage line, it brought the present subrogation action against the defendants. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff could not prevail on the element of causation because it was unable to establish which of the defendants' cigarettes caused the fire. The trial court also declined the plaintiff's request to apply the alternative liability rule, reasoning that it would have the effect of significantly changing the negligence standards in this state and that adoption of the rule was a policy decision to be made by an appellate court or the legislature, none of which previously had endorsed the rule. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly failed to apply the alternative liability rule in granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Held that the plaintiff should have received the benefit of the alternative liability rule for the purpose o

Claimant is a firefighter for the City and County of Denver (the City). In July 2013, he was diagnosed with cancer, and on July 24, 2013, he advised the City of his cancer diagnosis and asserted his belief that the melanoma was related to or caused by his work as a City firefighter. Claimant filed an application for hearing on October 6, 2017, seeking medical and temporary total disability benefits. The City admitted compensability, but asserted a statute of limitations defense, arguing that the claim was barred because claimant filed his application more than four years after learning of his melanoma and reporting it to the City. A panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) agreed with the City, and the claim was dismissed as time barred. On appeal, claimant contended that the Panel misinterpreted the applicable statute of limitations, CRS § 8-43-103(2). He argued that the City had adequate notice of his intent to pursue compensation through the Division of Workers' Compensation's (Division) assignment of a claim number to the case, the City's filing of certain forms, and his filing of several documents. CRS § 8-43-103(2) requires a claimant seeking workers' compensation to file a "notice claiming compensation" within two years of discovering the work-related nature of the claimant's injuries, or within three years if the claimant can establish a reasonable excuse for late filing and the employer suffered no prejudice as a result. The Division's assignment of a claim number does not satisfy a claimant's obligation to notify the Division and the employer of his or her intent to seek compensation, and none of the documents claimant points to specifies that claimant was seeking compensation as that term is defined in CRS § 8-43-103. Based on claimant's admission that he knew in 2013 that his firefighting duties may have caused his melanoma, he needed to file his claim by 2015 to comply with the two-year statute of limitations, or by 2016 if he could establis