Court Rulings

In this domestic relations matter, Anita L. Thornton (Wife) appeals the family court's final divorce decree, arguing the family court erred in (1) identifying, valuing, and apportioning marital assets and debts (2) miscalculating Wife's child support obligation (3) awarding primary custody of the parties' two children to Michael P. Thornton (Husband) (4) failing to find Wife prejudiced by a "structural" error related to a hearing on her petition to enforce visitation (5) relying too heavily on the guardian ad litem's (GAL) conclusions (6) relying on the forensic consultant, Dr. Marc Harari's conclusions, which were based on information provided by the GAL (7) granting Husband a divorce on the ground of adultery (8) failing to find a conflict of interest regarding a personal relationship between Husband and an employee of the Dorchester County Clerk of Court and (9) requiring the parties to pay their own attorney's fees, requiring Wife to pay a greater percentage of the GAL's fees and Dr. Harari's fees, and requiring Wife to pay the private investigator's fees. We affirm as modified.

Termination of a career State employee Warren analysis.

attorney's fees, State employee grievance

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court resolving a postjudgment motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff. The parties' separation agreement included payment of alimony to the plaintiff calculated from the defendant's gross income of base pay and performance based bonuses, and a provision stating that income shall not include stock that may be awarded to either party. In 2011, the defendant was hired by a company that was acquired by V Co., and he accepted a position with V Co. that included a retention plan, which included short-term incentives, long-term incentives, including both restricted stock units that would be payable in the form of stock and performance stock units that would be payable in the form of cash, and a severance package. In August, 2015, the defendant's employment with V Co. was terminated, and he received a severance payment, after which he found higher paying employment and adjusted his alimony payment accordingly. In July, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant failed to amend support based on the total reported for his income. There were three court rulings as to this motion, the last of which declined to find the defendant in contempt but ordered, inter alia, the defendant to include all past long- term incentive payments and the severance payment from V Co. in the calculation of gross income and to recalculate past alimony owed to the plaintiff. From that decision, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly interpreted a provision in the parties' separation agreement governing alimony to require that restricted stock units and performance stock units received from the defendant's employer be included within the alimony calculation. Held: 1. The trial court erred in ordering the defendant to include all past and future restricted stock unit p

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for defamation from the defendant, who filed a counterclaim for breach of the parties' separation agreement, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff was in arrears on his obligation to pay unallocated alimony and child support. Thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew his complaint, the parties stipulated to the amount due on the counterclaim, and the trial court rendered judgment on the counter- claim in accordance with the parties' stipulation. The defendant subse- quently applied for, and was granted, a property execution on the con- tents of a storage unit rented in the name of the plaintiff's father, and filed a claim for a determination of interests in the disputed property. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the plaintiff owned the contents of the storage unit but that a variety of items in the storage unit were exempt from property execution pursuant to statute (§ 52-352b). On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court erred in determining, sua sponte, that certain property was statutorily exempt from execution; pursuant to the plain language of the applicable statute (§ 52-361b [d]), a judgment debtor may claim an exemption by returning a signed exemption claim form indicating the property claimed to be exempt, and because § 51-361b (d) makes clear that if a judgment debtor chooses to claim an exemption, the judgment debtor must return the exemption claim form, which the plaintiff here failed to do, the statutory procedures provided for in § 52- 361b (d), which provide for notice, a stay of the property execution and a hearing to determine the rights to the disputed property, were not triggered. 2. Even if the plaintiff could assert a claim of exemption over the levied property without filing the necessary form, the plaintiff failed to seek a determination that the property was exempt, and, thus, the trial court should not have exempted any of the items from execution because i

The plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the estate of K, sought to recover damages pursuant to the Connecticut Product Liability Act (§ 52-572m et seq.) in connection with a fatal workplace accident. The plaintiff alleged that K had sustained fatal injuries when the bucket of an excava- tor became dislodged and fell on him while he was acting within the scope of his employment. The defendants, the designer and manufac- turer, the distributor, and a prior owner of the excavator, filed motions for summary judgment, claiming, inter alia, that the plaintiff's claims against them were barred by the act's ten year statute of repose (§ 52- 577a [a]). While those motions were pending, the legislature passed an amendment to § 52-577a (P.A. 17-97) removing certain statutory language that previously had prevented employees entitled to workers' compensa- tion from invoking an exception to the ten year statute of repose set forth in § 52-577a (a) for product liability claims. Following that amendment, employees, like other claimants, could avoid the ten year statute of repose by demonstrating that the harm occurred during the useful safe life of the product. In granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that P.A. 17-97 was not retroactive and that the plaintiff's action was barred by the preamendment version of § 52-577a because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had possession of or control over the excavator or the part that attached the bucket thereto in the ten years prior to the plaintiff's commencement of the present action. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. Held that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, this court having concluded that P.A. 17-97 applied retroactively: although the plaintiff was initially unable to raise the issue of retroactivity in opposing summary judgment because P.A. 17-97