Court Rulings

The plaintiff, who had purchased certain residential real property in New Haven from the defendant, brought an action seeking damages for, inter alia, breach of contract for the defendant's failure under the contract to deliver a property that contained three legal dwelling units. The defendant purchased the property in 1979, and had used it as a three unit residence during his ownership. In 2011, the city building depart- ment sent a letter to the defendant, informing him that the department's records indicated that the property was a two unit residence, and that it may have been altered without approval from the building department. Thereafter, the defendant spoke with the building department's director, and the defendant believed that the matter was resolved. Subsequently, the defendant represented in a real estate listing that the property was a three unit residence and sold the property to the plaintiff in 2015, without informing the plaintiff of the 2011 letter. Thereafter, the plaintiff became aware of the 2011 letter upon inspecting the records of the building department on an unrelated matter. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court erred in finding that the city building department had not made a determination that the plaintiff's property contained only two residential units. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in finding that the city building department had not made a determination regarding the use and occupancy status of the property; contrary to the plaintiff's claim that the building depart- ment had determined that the property contained a two unit residence, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding, as the building department official testified that no determina- tion regarding the number of legal units had been made, no code viola- tions regarding the number of legal units had been communicated to the defendant, and

The Defendant, Jeremy Randall C. Ledbetter, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony and one count of exploitation by displaying sexual acts to a minor, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2018) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-13-529(a) (soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor) (Supp. 2011, Supp. 2012, Supp. 2013), 39-13-529(b)(1) (displaying sexual acts to a minor). The Defendant is serving an effective eighty-one years for the convictions. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the State's election of offenses was inadequate, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a severance, (4) the court erred in admitting evidence, and (5) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal stems from a workplace injury on a construction site. On his first day on the job, Marc Douglas Swindle ("Plaintiff") fell from the roof of a building that was under construction. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was authorized to work on the job site and that he was working in the course and scope of his employment when injured. What is disputed is the identity of his employer: whether he was in the employ of the general contractor or one of the subcontractors. Plaintiff initially filed a claim with the Tennessee Bureau of Workers' Compensation, Court of Workers' Compensation Claims, naming the general contractor as his employer however, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his workers' compensation claim when the general contractor filed a response stating that Plaintiff was not its employee. Thereafter, Plaintiff and his wife filed this tort action in circuit court to recover damages from the general contractor, two of its subcontractors, and the owner of the property for the injuries he sustained at the construction site. Finding it undisputed that Plaintiff's injuries were sustained in the course and scope of his employment, the circuit court held that it was without jurisdiction to consider the tort claims because the workers' compensation exclusive remedy doctrine applied. For these reasons, the court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in the workplace. Mona Word ("Word"), an African-American woman who worked in the Knox County Clerk's Office for 19 years, sued Knox County Clerk Foster D. Arnett, Jr. ("Arnett") in his individual and official capacity, Knox County, Tennessee ("Knox County"), and the Knox County Clerk's Office ("Defendants," collectively) asserting a number of claims, including violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("the THRA"). According to Word, she was denied opportunities for promotion because of her race, and was singled out for discipline because of her race, as well. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the Circuit Court for Knox County ("the Trial Court") granted. Word appealed to this Court. Accepting Word's factual allegations as true as is required at the motion for judgment on the pleadings stage, we hold that Word alleged enough to withstand Defendants' motion with respect to certain of her claims against Knox County and Arnett in his individual capacity. However, we affirm the Trial Court's dismissal of Word's claims against Arnett in his official capacity and the Knox County Clerk's Office, as well as Word's claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The judgment of the Trial Court thus is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.