Court Rulings

In 2012, the defendant City of Providence passed an ordinance suspending the annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) to the pension benefits for retired members of the Providence police and fire departments (the 2012 Pension Ordinance) the suspension would be in place until the then-underfunded pension fund achieved a 70 percent funding level. The City's consultants projected that the pension fund could reach a 70 percent funding level in 2036. Retiree groups and union groups initiated litigation to bar enforcement of the new ordinance. After engaging in court-ordered mediation, most retirees agreed to a settlement which allowed for a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefit. Several dozen plaintiffs opted out of the settlement agreement, however, and instead pursued their civil claims through the litigation process. The opt-out plaintiffs' claims for violation of the Takings Clause and promissory estoppel were dismissed on the City's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and violation of the Contract Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions went to trial. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial justice ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had not proven their claims, and entered judgment in favor of the City on all counts of the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment, arguing that the trial justice erred by finding in favor of the City on their Contract Clause claim and by granting summary judgment prior to trial in favor of the City on their claims for violation of the Takings Clause and for promissory estoppel. The plaintiffs also argued that some of them were absolutely immunized from any changes to their COLAs because of prior judicial adjudications. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment with respect to each plaintiff who had also been a plaintiff in prior litigation regarding their COLA benefits which had ended with either a consent judgment or an individual settlem

CIVIL – Boardman Home Rule Resolution ("HRR") 99-02, Section 3, (C)(4) weeds Canada thistle civil citation bench trial matters of law reviewed de novo manifest weight of the evidence the Ohio Administrative Code defines prohibited "noxious weeds" but HRR 99-02 does not the civil citation filed against Appellee alleges violations under HRR 99-02 nowhere within the citation does Appellant maintain that Appellee is in violation under the Ohio Administrative Code HRR 99-02 does not reference and incorporate the Ohio Administrative Code Appellee is not required to look elsewhere, beyond the parameters of HRR 99-02 the trial court did not err as a matter of law in finding that Appellee is not in violation of HRR 99-02, Section 3, (C)(4) and the evidence supports the court's decision.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Defendants Calvin Smith and Hayden Bowen for attempted first degree murder in counts one and three and for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in counts two and four. Each Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the failure of the State to name a specific victim in counts one and three violated their right against double jeopardy. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed all counts of the indictment. The State appeals as of right from the trial court's dismissal of Defendants' indictment, arguing that the trial court improperly dismissed the indictment based on the weight of the evidence and that the indictment provided sufficient protection against double jeopardy. After a thorough review, the judgments of the criminal court are reversed, the indictment is reinstated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The plaintiffs, a retired firefighter and two retired police officers, had reached settlements with the City of Providence in 2004, regarding the cost of living adjustments (COLAs) provided for in their respective collective bargaining agreements. The settlements were embodied as consent judgments in the Superior Court. Thereafter, the City enacted an ordinance that suspended the plaintiffs' COLAs, and the plaintiffs sued to enforce the consent judgments and hold the City in contempt of the same. Both the City and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for the City and denied summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed. Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that a consent judgment cannot "be overruled or otherwise modified by city ordinance[.]" Thus, the plaintiffs contended, the hearing justice erred when she found that the ordinance modified the plaintiffs' rights under the consent judgments and that such finding violated separation of powers principles. The City countered that separation of powers principles would have been violated if the Superior Court had found the City in contempt because, according to the City, courts cannot restrain municipal bodies from exercising their legislative powers. The Supreme Court held that, to the extent that the ordinance purported to nullify the consent judgments, it violated separation-of-powers principles embodied in the Rhode Island constitution. The Supreme Court therefore held that the hearing justice erred in granting the City's cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to these plaintiffs and vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2011, the defendant City of Providence passed an ordinance that would terminate City-paid health care benefits for retirees from the Providence police department and fire department who were eligible for federal Medicare benefits (the 2011 Medicare Ordinance). A group of retirees and two unions initiated litigation to bar enforcement of the new ordinance. After engaging in court-ordered mediation, most retirees agreed to a settlement in which the retirees would enroll in Medicare upon achieving the age of eligibility and the City would pay for certain costs associated with Medicare coverage, including penalties incurred from late enrollment in various Medicare supplemental programs such as Parts B and D. Several dozen retirees opted out of the settlement agreement, however, and instead pursued their civil claims through the litigation process. The opt-out plaintiffs' claims for violation of the Takings Clause and for promissory estoppel were dismissed on the City's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and violation of the Contract Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions went to trial. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial justice ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had not proved their claims, and entered judgment in favor of the City on all counts of plaintiffs' complaints. The plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment, arguing that the trial justice erred by dismissing their claim for breach of contract, dismissing their claim for violation of the Contract Clauses of the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions, granting summary judgment in favor of the City on their claim that the 2011 Medicare Ordinance violated the Takings Clauses of the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions, and granting the City's motion for summary judgment regarding their claim for promissory estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with respect to the claims for breach of contract, violation of the Tak

In 2012, the defendant City of Providence passed an ordinance suspending the annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) to the pension benefits for retired members of the Providence police and fire departments (the 2012 Pension Ordinance) the suspension would be in place until the then-underfunded pension fund achieved a 70 percent funding level. The City's consultants projected that the pension fund could reach a 70 percent funding level in 2036. Retiree groups and union groups initiated litigation to bar enforcement of the new ordinance. After engaging in court-ordered mediation, most retirees agreed to a settlement which allowed for a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefit. Several dozen plaintiffs opted out of the settlement agreement, however, and instead pursued their civil claims through the litigation process. The opt-out plaintiffs' claims for violation of the Takings Clause and promissory estoppel were dismissed on the City's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and violation of the Contract Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions went to trial. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial justice ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had not proven their claims, and entered judgment in favor of the City on all counts of the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment, arguing that the trial justice erred by finding in favor of the City on their Contract Clause claim and by granting summary judgment prior to trial in favor of the City on their claims for violation of the Takings Clause and for promissory estoppel. The plaintiffs also argued that some of them were absolutely immunized from any changes to their COLAs because of prior judicial adjudications. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment with respect to each plaintiff who had also been a plaintiff in prior litigation regarding their COLA benefits which had ended with either a consent judgment or an individual settlem

A general sessions court entered a one-year order of protection prohibiting the plaintiff from having contact with the defendants, who are the plaintiff's ex-wife and the couple's minor child. The plaintiff failed to appeal the order within ten days as required by statute. Forty-two days later, he filed a document in the chancery court titled "Petition to Enroll and Certify A Foreign Judgment and Appeal in Nature of Writ of Error." The plaintiff attached to his pleading an incomplete copy of the couple's 2008 Texas divorce decree that granted him parenting time with the minor child and asked the chancery court to hold a new hearing and determine whether the general sessions court erred by issuing the order of protection. The plaintiff later filed a motion asking for interim parenting time with the child. The defendants filed a notice of limited appearance, and among other things, asked the chancery court to dismiss the action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. They also requested attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the action, relying on statutes to support these requests. The chancery court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the appeal untimely and the method of appeal obsolete, and also determining that the petition for enrollment was defective on its face because the defendant had attached an incomplete copy of the Texas decree. The chancery court initially denied the defendants' request for attorney's fees and costs but granted their motion to alter or amend and ultimately awarded attorney's fees and costs totaling $25,398.21. The plaintiff appealed, challenging only the award of attorney's fees. The defendants asked for an award of attorney's fees incurred on appeal. Before reaching these issues, however, the Court of Appeals sua sponte held that the chancery court erred by dismissing the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the "writ of error remains an avenue for review o

Grant of summary judgment was proper in employment discrimination case where plaintiff failed to show existence of employment relationship between herself and business where she was assigned to work by contractor.

Former CEO brought an action for libel, false light invasion of privacy, and retaliatory discharge pursuant to the Tennessee Public Protection Act. In this appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), we affirm the trial court.