Court Rulings

Petitioners seek a contested case hearing in the administrative law court (ALC) to challenge the propriety of state environmental authorizations issued by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) for a project relocating and expanding the passenger cruise facility at the Union Pier Terminal (the Terminal) in downtown Charleston. Petitioners maintain they have standing to seek this hearing as "affected persons" under section 44-1-60(G) of the South Carolina Code (2018). The ALC concluded Petitioners did not have standing and granted summary judgment to Respondents. The ALC terminated discovery and also sanctioned Petitioners for requesting a remand to the DHEC Board. The court of appeals affirmed. Pres. Soc'y of Charleston v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, Op. No. 2017-UP-403 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Oct. 18, 2017). This Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari. Because we find Petitioners have standing, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the matter to the ALC for a contested case hearing. We instruct the ALC to establish a reasonable schedule for the completion of discovery. We also reverse the sanction imposed by the ALC.

Just cause Termination State Employee Law of the Case

Just cause Termination State Employee Law of the Case

The defendant, Bacon Construction Co., Inc., appealed from the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff, NESC, Inc., following a jury trial. Specifically, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying its "Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59, or in the Alternative, Remittitur." The plaintiff cross-appealed from both an order denying its motion for leave to amend its Complaint and an order denying its motion to reconsider the denial of its motion to amend. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence in finding: (1) that the parties agreed to use the figure of 88,800 square feet as the basis for calculating the contract price (2) that the parties agreed to convert a unit-price contract into a lump-sum contract and (3) that Mr. Reuter, an employee of the defendant, had authority to bind the defendant to an agreement regarding square footage. Alternatively, Bacon argued that the trial justice erred in denying its request for a remittitur. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence or clearly err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. The Court concluded that the trial justice properly performed her role as a "super juror" in weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of witnesses before determining that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the parties agreed to use 88,800 square feet as the basis for the contract price. The Court also held that the trial justice appropriately denied the defendant's request for a remittitur because the jury's award of damages was clearly supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

This appeal concerns the validity of an agreed order entered in a proceeding before the Tennessee Board of Equalization in a contested case between Anderson County, Tennessee, and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Inc. The order purported to settle a dispute over the value of dies, jigs, and molds used for manufacturing automobile parts. The attorney for the Tennessee Comptroller's Division of Property Assessments, which intervened in the proceeding, signed the agreed order on behalf of Toyota and the Anderson County Property Assessor "with express permission" of both parties, two months later, the Assessor moved to set the order aside, asserting that he had not agreed to the settlement terms or given the attorney for the Division of Property Assessments permission to sign on his behalf. The administrative judge treated the motion as one for extraordinary relief under the guidance of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 and held an evidentiary hearing. The administrative judge found the testimony of the Division of Property Assessment's attorney was more credible than that of the Anderson County Assessor and denied the motion. The County filed a petition for review with the Chancery Court and the trial court reversed the decision of the administrative law judge, finding that the documentary evidence gave more credibility to the Assessor's testimony. Considering the deference that reviewing courts must give to credibility determinations, we find no basis for reversing the administrative judge's decision to deny Anderson County's motion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case with instructions to remand the case to the Tennessee Board of Equalization for further proceedings.