Court Rulings

The plaintiff board sought to vacate an arbitration award issued in connec- tion with a grievance filed by the defendant union on behalf of a class of teachers, some of whom were assigned to the T school, alleging that the board had violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement by depriving certain teachers of their bargained for weekly preparation periods. Following arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator found that twenty-two teachers at the T school had been routinely deprived of preparation periods as a result of being required to substitute for absent teachers. In his award, the arbitrator ordered that the affected teachers be awarded compensatory damages and that the board cease and desist from depriving the teachers at the T school of their preparation periods. The trial court granted the board's application to vacate the award, denied the union's application to confirm the award and rendered judg- ment thereon, from which the union appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court improperly vacated the arbitration award, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-418 (a) (4)), on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded or so imperfectly executed his powers that a mutual, final and definite award on the subject matter submitted was not made, as the award conformed to the arbitration submission: the unrestricted submission required a determination of whether teachers at the T school were deprived of their preparation periods and, if so, the nature and extent of their remedy, and the award determined that only twenty-two teachers at the T school had been deprived of their preparation periods, awarded the affected teachers compensatory damages and ordered the board to cease and desist from depriving the teachers at the T school of their preparation periods, and, therefore, the award plainly conformed to the submission because it was directly responsive to, and did not exceed the scope of, the submission; moreover, there was no merit to the board's argument

The plaintiff inmate sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in connection with the alleged failure of the defendant state employees to conduct a criminal investigation into abuse that he alleged had been inflicted on him by a correction officer. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacked standing to assert a claim that was based on the alleged failure to conduct a criminal investigation. The defendants also claimed that the plaintiff's claims were barred by sovereign immunity and statutory (§ 4-165) immu- nity. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, conclud- ing that the defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity and immu- nity pursuant to § 4-165, and that the plaintiff lacked standing as to his claim that the defendants failed to investigate the alleged abuse. The trial rendered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that because he had sued all of the defendants in their individual capacities, the trial court improperly con- cluded that they were entitled to sovereign and statutory immunity. Held that the judgment of the trial court was affirmed in part and the appeal was dismissed in part as moot, the plaintiff on appeal having failed to challenge the trial court's determination that he lacked standing to raise certain of his claims as to certain defendants, and because the trial court's memorandum of decision fully addressed the arguments raised in this appeal, this court adopted the trial court's well reasoned decision as a proper statement of the relevant facts and the applicable law on the issues. Argued December 5, 2019—officially released March 17, 2020

The Defendant, Stevie Williamson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class C felony and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-17-1324 (2018) (employment of a firearm), 39-17-1307 (2018) (firearm possession by a convicted felon), 39-13-103 (2018) (reckless endangerment). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty years for attempted second degree murder, fifteen years and twelve years for the firearm convictions, and six years for reckless endangerment, for an effective fifty-three-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by admitting evidence of the Defendant's previous convictions and (2) by imposing consecutive service of the sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.