Court Rulings

summary judgment, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, prima facie case, pretext

This appeal involves a petition for modification of a permanent parenting plan. The initial permanent parenting plan order was entered by the McNairy County General Sessions Court ("trial court") in October 2006. In November 2016, the father filed a petition in the trial court, alleging that a material change in circumstance had occurred due to the mother's having been charged with aggravated statutory rape. The father concomitantly filed a petition requesting a temporary injunction granting him "emergency custody" and suspending the mother's co-parenting time. The mother filed a motion to dismiss the petitions, alleging that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the parties and the child all resided outside of Tennessee. In December 2016, the trial court entered an "Order for Visitation," inter alia, modifying the father's holiday co-parenting time and directing that the mother's co-parenting time be supervised by her stepmother. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the mother's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-217 (2017) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"). The father has appealed. We affirm with one modification to the final judgment to clarify that with the trial court's dismissal of this action, the December 2016 temporary order was no longer of any effect.

CBA provision prohibited union from bringing new grievances similar to previously-denied grievance, but did not prohibit arbitration of already-pending grievance that was purportedly similar. In absence of "express exclusion," "explicit language," or "forceful evidence" from bargaining history indicating intent to reserve issue for trial court, determination of whether two grievances are "similar" was matter for arbitrator, not trial court.

In 1999 Piñon Ridge Mining (Piñon) obtained a permit for a uranium mining operation (the site), releasing the company's predecessor from its permit. The site last produced ore in 1989. In 2014, the Division of Reclamation, Mining, and Safety (the Division) approved an initial period of temporary cessation for the site effective in June 2012. Piñon had not extracted minerals since taking over the site because the depressed market price of uranium made production unprofitable. Piñon filed a request for approval of a second period of temporary cessation for the site in May 2017. Information Network for Responsible Mining, Earthworks, and Sheep Mountain Alliance (collectively, the objectors) objected to the request. The Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Board (the Board) granted the request. The district court affirmed the Board's order. On appeal, the objectors asserted that the district court erred in affirming the Board's order, which ignored the plain language of the Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Act (MLRA) when approving a second period of temporary cessation. Under the MLRA, a mining permit may continue in effect even if the mining operation temporarily ceases production for 180 days or more if the operator files a notice of temporary cessation with the Office of Mined Land Reclamation. Production must be resumed within five years of temporary cessation or the operator must file a report requesting an extension of the temporary cessation period. But temporary cessation may not be continued for more than 10 years without terminating the operation and fully complying with the MLRA's reclamation requirements. Under the MLRA, temporary cessation is a factual status, rather than a legal one. A mine is in temporary cessation status once 180 days have passed without production, even if the Division or the Board has not received or acted upon the required notice. Here, because the site's period of temporary cessation began no later than 1999, production had to resume by 2

The child's mother is deceased and the father was incarcerated in Las Vegas, Nevada. A court appointed the child's aunt and uncle guardians for the child in Utah. The aunt and uncle later filed petitions for kinship adoption and to terminate father's parental rights. Father, who was not represented by counsel, objected to the adoption via written correspondence and requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the child. The court took no action on father's request for a GAL because father did not appear at the termination and adoption hearing. After a brief hearing, the court terminated father's parental rights and entered a final decree of adoption. On appeal, father contended that he was denied his right to counsel because he was incarcerated out-of-state and had no ability to participate in the proceedings. The parental right to raise one's child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Colorado, an indigent parent does not have a statutory right to court-appointed counsel in kinship adoption proceedings. The presumption against a right to counsel is weighed against (1) the private interests at stake, (2) the government's interest, and (3) the risk that the procedures used will lead to an erroneous decision. Here, although father did not formally request counsel, his petition to appoint a GAL indicated that he was a pretrial detainee, indigent, and unable to afford court costs associated with the case. The juvenile court should have considered father's communications as a request for the appointment of trial counsel, or at least asked father if he wanted counsel. In reviewing father's right to counsel, the Court of Appeals concluded that (1) his interests were strong (2) the state's interests in not appointing counsel were weak and (3) the risks of error were significant for father in defending his rights without the assistance of counsel. Therefore, the presumption against the right to co