Board of Education

The plaintiff employer appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities sustaining a disability discrimination complaint filed by the defendant employee, L, and awarding L, inter alia, back pay and emotional distress damages. L, who is hearing impaired, was hired by the plaintiff in 2012 and assigned to a secretarial position in its education personnel department. She worked directly for the human resources assistant, M, and performed many of the same tasks as him and covered his duties when he was absent from the office. As a result of her hearing impairment, L tended to speak loudly, and, on occasion, coworkers had raised concerns to T, the department's interim director, about the volume of her voice. In addition, S, who worked in the civil service personnel department, had inquired whether there was something wrong with L and had told M that he thought that L was loud and unprofessional. In 2014, M informed L that he intended to retire the following year. M encouraged L to apply for his position, began teaching her any duties of the position that she was not already performing, and strongly supported her candidacy. In August, 2015, the position was posted online, and L submitted an application. L met the qualifications listed in the posting. Two weeks later, S had the job posting removed and revised because he felt that he had a vested interest in assuring that the position was filled correctly. S interviewed prospective candidates for the position. Six candidates were interviewed for the position and two, P and J, were hired. L was not granted an interview because S concluded that she did not satisfy the revised minimum requirement of four years of human resources experience set forth in the revised job posting. After M retired, L became the interim human resources assistant until P's employment com- menced. In her complaint, L claimed that the plaintiff had discriminated against her on the basis of her

The defendants, an employer and its third-party administrator appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which reversed in part the Workers' Compensation Commissioner's decision approving a form 36 filed by the defendants. During the course of his employment as a custodian, the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury and entered into two voluntary agreements with his employer. The plaintiff thereafter sustained another injury and two voluntary agree- ments were approved with respect to that injury. Subsequently, the defendants filed a form 36 seeking to discontinue or to reduce the plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits, asserting that the plaintiff had a work capacity and had reached maximum medical improvement. After formal hearings on the form 36 and on the plaintiff's entitlement to total disability benefits pursuant to statute (§ 31-307), the commissioner approved the form 36. The plaintiff appealed to the board, claiming inter alia, that the commissioner incorrectly concluded that further medical care of his compensable injuries would be palliative when that issue was not noticed for or litigated during the formal hearings. The plaintiff further claimed that the commissioner applied an improper standard in determining that his current disability was the result of preexisting, noncompensable injuries and, thus, not compensable under § 31-307. The board concluded that substantial evidence supported the commis- sioner's decision approving the form 36. The board, however, stated that it was persuaded that the manner in which the commissioner addressed this evidence impaired the plaintiff's right to a fair hearing. Accordingly, the board vacated the majority of the commissioner's con- clusions and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The board subsequently denied the plaintiff's motion for articulation or reconsider- ation in which he argued that a de novo trial before a different commis- sioner was required on remand, a

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, disability discrimination pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.) and for interference with the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.) following the termination of her employment. The plaintiff was first hired by the defendant in 1995 but her position was eliminated and she was termi- nated in June, 2015. The plaintiff was rehired for a new position in August, 2015, and was subject to a probationary period for her first 120 days at work. In September, 2015, the plaintiff injured her left knee and lower back while at work. The plaintiff was placed on modified work duty but was eventually placed on an indefinite leave of absence and remained on leave until October, 2015. She missed additional work in November, 2015, after she experienced a flare-up of her knee injury. All of the time that she missed from work was considered workers' compensation leave by the defendant. The plaintiff received two negative performance evaluations in January and February, 2016, based solely on her performance while she was at work. The plaintiff was terminated for her poor job performance in March, 2016. During the trial on the plaintiff's complaint, the trial court declined to instruct the jury on the plaintiff's FMLA interference claim, concluding that there was no evidence to support the claim that the plaintiff made an FMLA request to the defendant. On the plaintiff's remaining claims, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly declined to charge the jury with regard to the plaintiff's claim of interference with the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: the plaintiff failed to satisfy the preliminary requirement for the court to consider her interference claim, namely, that she made an initial showing