Stanley Black & Decker, Inc.

The plaintiff employee sought to recover damages from the defendant employer for personal injuries he sustained while working for the defen- dant. In his complaint, the plaintiff, whose employment duties included painting, alleged, inter alia, that, although he was initially provided a respirator by another employee to prevent excessive inhalation of toxic chemicals from the paint he used, after about one month, D, the defen- dant's safety manager, informed the plaintiff that he was not authorized to use the respirator in the workplace. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had deliberately instructed him to continue to paint in known dangerous conditions, the defendant was aware that his injuries were substantially certain to result from its action, and it had engaged in wilful and serious misconduct. The defendant filed a motion to strike with prejudice on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the exclusivity provision (§ 31-284) of the Workers' Compensation Act (act) (§ 31-275 et seq.), which provides that the act is the exclusive remedy for employees injured in most instances, because the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts that D was the defendant's alter ego such that the defendant could be held liable for D's tortious conduct, and, alternatively, D's actions did not constitute intentional misconduct. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike, concluding that the plaintiff's complaint did not state a legally sufficient cause of action that fell within the intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision of the act. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not allege the level of control required by the instrumentality rule or the unity of ownership interest required by the identity rule to disregard the defendant's corporate structure, but merely attempted to impose liability on the defendant for the alleged intentional acts of D, as a supervisor, on the basis of her appare

This appeal arises from a motion filed by Brian Coblentz ("Employee") to compel Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. ("Employer") to provide medical treatment under the terms of a consent order previously entered by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Employee's motion. Employee has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.