Harris

Appellant Rhododendron has not identified anywhere in the record where it sought a delay under Civ.R. 56(F) or otherwise alleged prejudice as a result of the trial court's considering the appellees' summary-judgment motion without first resolving a pending motion to compel discovery. This failure by Rhododendron waived the issue. The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of appellee Thomas Bradley Harris on a claim alleging a violation of Ohio's Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The record reveals a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Harris misappropriated a trade secret under R.C. 1331.61(B)(2)(b) by knowingly using \design-history files\ from a company called NovoSource without consent in a way that violated a duty to limit his use of the files. A trier of fact reasonably might find the existence of such a duty based on testimony about an oral agreement between Harris and Andrew Cothrel, the CEO of NovoSource, limiting Harris' use of the files. The record reveals no genuine issue of material fact, however, as to whether appellees Andrew Rynearson or Jack Diamond misappropriated the design-history files by impermissibly using them. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment against appellant Rhododendron on two counts alleging breach of contract. Rhododendron brought the claims as assignee and successor in interest to the rights of NovoSource. But the contracts at issue were not among the NovoSource assets that Rhododendron acquired. The contracts explicitly were excluded from the NovoSource assets that Rhododendron acquired. Finally, the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment against Rhododendron on three other counts. The appellees' summary-judgment motion partially incorporated by reference arguments made in their earlier motion to dismiss counts one, two, and fourteen. But the act of incorporating by reference arguments made in a prior motion to dismiss did not impermissibly \convert\ the motion to dismiss into o

<bold>Libel and Slander — Report of suspected child abuse — presumption of good</bold> <bold>faith — actual malice</bold> <block_quote> Although plaintiff-customer contends defendant-salesperson reported plaintiff's behavior of suspected child abuse or neglect to the Department of Social Services based on retaliatory motives, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing summary judgment in favor of defendants on the slander per se claim because: (1) N.C.G.S. § 7A-543 (now N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-301</cross_reference>) imposes an affirmative duty for anyone with cause to suspect child abuse or neglect to report that conduct; (2) N.C.G.S. § 7A-550 (now N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-309</cross_reference>) provides immunity from liability to those who act in accordance with the reporting statute and presumes the reporter's good faith; and (3) plaintiff did not meet her burden under N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>8C-1</cross_reference>, Rule 301 to show defendant's bad faith or actual malice.</block_quote>