Retaliation Cases

PEÑA v INGHAM COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION Docket No. 231482. Submitted January 8, 2003, at Lansing. Decided February 11, 2003, at 9:00 A.M. Leave to appeal sought. Joseph G. Peña brought an action in the Ingham Circuit Court against the Ingham County Road Commission, his employer, alleging that workplace harassment based on his race or national, origin resulted in a hostile work environment and that he was subjected to adverse employment action as retaliation for filing a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., about the harassment. The court, Carolyn Stell, J., denied the defendant’s motion for summary disposition and, following a jury trial, entered judgment on a jury verdict and award of present and future damages for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the defendant from introducing any evidence of abusive or vulgar language used by the plaintiff or any evidence of his confrontations with coworkers and with one member of the public. Evidence of use of vulgar and profane language in the workplace by a plaintiff claiming a hostile work environment can be relevant to determining the existence of a hostile work environment, depending on the type of language, its frequency, and the context in which it is stated. Here, however, the trial court correctly determined that it would be more prejudicial than probative to allow the defendant to present evidence of the plaintiff’s minimal use of profanities and two instances of heated interactions with coworkers and one member of the public because such evidence could have caused the jury to conclude that it was permissible to engage in illegal workplace harassment or discrimination. 2. The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for summary disposition of the retaliation claim. A prima facie case of retaliation can be established with evidence that the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity, that this was known by the defendant, that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff, and that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. An adverse employment action typically takes the form of an ultimate employment decision, such as termination of employment or demotion. Here, the plaintiffs allegations that he was investigated by the defendant for worker’s compensation fraud, that he was isolated at work, and that a supervisor ridiculed him for filing his lawsuit do not establish that the defendant took an adverse employment action in retaliation for the plaintiffs lawsuit. 3. The defendant, by not moving for remittitur or a new trial and by failing to object to the plaintiffs request for jury instructions on future damages, has failed to preserve for appellate review the claim that the award of future damages was excessive. There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the award of future damages. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of an order dismissing the retaliation claim. 1. Civil Rights — Civil Rights Act — Employment Discrimination — Harassment — Evidence. Evidence of harassing conduct by a plaintiff claiming a violation of his civil rights because of a hostile work environment, if such conduct is not similar to that complained of by the plaintiff, is irrelevant and not admissible in the plaintiffs action (MCL 37.2101 et seq.~). 2. Civil Rights — Civil Rights Act — Employment Discrimination — Retaliation. A prima facie case of employer retaliation against an employee’s filing of a complaint under the Civil Rights Act is established with proof that the employee was engaged in protected activity, that this was known by the employer, that the employer took an employment action adverse to the employee, and that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action (MCL 37.2701[a]). 3. Civil Rights — Civil Rights Act — Employment Discrimination — Retaliation — Adverse Employment Action. An adverse employment action taken by an employer in retaliation for an employee’s filing of a complaint under the Civil Rights Act typically takes the form of termination of employment or demotion (MCL 37.2701 [a]). Fett & Linderman, P.C. (by James K. Fett and Marla A. Linderman), for the plaintiff. Michael R. Kluck & Associates (by Michael R. Kluck) for the defendant. Before: Murray, P.J., and Sawyer and Fitzgerald, JJ. Murray, P.J. Defendant appeals of right from the final judgment entered in favor of plaintiff on his discrimination and retaliation claims brought under the Civil Rights Act (cra), MCL 37.2101 et seq. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. I. material facts and proceedings Because of the limited nature of the issues properly presented on appeal, we provide the reader with only a brief summary of the material facts and proceedings that led to the jury verdict. Plaintiff commenced his employment with defendant in October 1987. Plaintiff continues to be employed by defendant and is currently a class-four highway worker. The amended complaint filed by plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of his race or national origin, to disparate treatment, and to retaliation. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that from the inception of his employment he has been on the receiving end of numerous derogatory and discriminatory remarks directed at his national origin, and that when he opposed this alleged harassment (including by the filing of this lawsuit), defendant took adverse employment action against him. Defendant sought pretrial dismissal of plaintiffs claims on the basis that a hostile work environment did not exist, and plaintiff had not suffered an adverse employment action. Defendant’s motion for summary disposition was denied by the trial court. At trial, plaintiff presented testimony regarding the repeated national-origin slurs that had been directed at him over the course' of his thirteen years of employment. Specifically, plaintiff and other employees testified that plaintiff was called a “wetback,” “spic,” “beaner,” “f — ing Mexican” and “pickle plucker” by coworkers and supervisors alike on an almost daily basis throughout the course of his employment. Defendant did not deny that these words were at times utilized by its workers. However, defendant presented testimony that this was simply good natured “shop talk,” that plaintiff had good working relations with the supervisors and coworkers he now complains of, and that at some point the slurs ended. The jury apparently accepted plaintiffs version of the facts, because it returned a verdict finding defendant liable for both a hostile work environment and for retaliating against plaintiff. The jury awarded $650,000 in “damages to date” while awarding him an additional $650,000 for “future damages.” The verdict form did not differentiate between the amount awarded for the harassment claim and the amount awarded for the retaliation claim. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court committed three errors that require reversal, namely: (1) that it was denied a fair trial by the trial court’s decision to exclude from evidence plaintiff’s own workplace conduct; (2) that plaintiff’s retaliation claim should have been summarily dismissed because plaintiff had not suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that the trial court should have set aside the future damages award because it was excessive in light of the evidence and was punitive in nature. For the forthcoming reasons, we agree with defendant that plaintiffs retaliation claim should have been summarily dismissed. Defendant’s remaining arguments, however, do not gamer our support. H. ANALYSIS A. THE TRIAL COURT’S EVIDENTIARY DECISION “A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Barrett v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 325; 628 NW2d 63 (2001). Establishing an abuse of discretion is, however, quite difficult, for an abuse will only be found “when the decision is ‘so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.’ ” Dacon v Transue, 441 Mich 315, 329; 490 NW2d 369 (1992), quoting Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959). Because such an abuse will usually occur only in extreme cases, Barrett, supra at 325, it is only stating the obvious to say that an abuse of discretion will normally not be found when addressing a close evidentiary question. Hilgendorf v Saint John Hosp & Medical Ctr, 245 Mich App 670, 707 n 49; 630 NW2d 356 (2001), quoting People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 289; 531 NW2d 659 (1995), quoting People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 322; 319 NW2d 518 (1982) (“ ‘ “The decision upon a close evidentiary question by definition ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion.” ’ ”). Before the originally scheduled trial date, plaintiff filed a motion in limine. By way of that motion, plaintiff sought to exclude evidence that he was short-tempered, and that he had conflicts with members of the public and with his coworkers. During oral argument on the motion, plaintiff indicated that through his motion in limine he was not seeking to preclude evidence that he utilized ethnic or racial slurs in the workplace. Instead, plaintiff argued that any evidence of coworker confrontations, or abusive and vulgar (but not discriminatory) language should be excluded. After hearing arguments, the trial court entered an order allowing defendant to introduce any evidence that plaintiff utilized racial or ethnic slurs, but precluding defendant from introducing any evidence of abusive or vulgar language utilized by plaintiff or any evidence of his coworker or citizen confrontations, unless plaintiff asserted at trial that he was unlawfully denied a promotion. Citing both state and federal law, defendant argues that the trial court should not have prevented it from showing to the jury that plaintiff utilized foul language and made threats of harm to coworkers and to one member of the public. In particular, defendant claims support for this proposition in Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368; 501 NW2d 155 (1993), Henson v Dundee, 682 F2d 897 (CA 11, 1982), Scusa v Nestle USA Co Inc, 181 F3d 958 (CA 8, 1999), and Morgan v Hertz Corp, 542 F Supp 123 (WD Term, 1981). None of these cases, however, supports the specific argument made by defendant. Rather, they support the trial court’s decision. In Radtke, our Supreme Court held that in determining whether a work environment is illegally hostile, it must be gauged by a reasonable person’s standard viewing the “totality of circumstances.” Radtke, supra at 394. This does not mean, as defendant would have us hold, that everything affecting plaintiff’s employment is relevant and admissible in a harassment case. Rather, we have previously held that what is relevant is evidence that plaintiff himself engaged in the type of conduct similar to that at issue in the case. In Grow v W A Thomas Co, 236 Mich App 696, 706; 601 NW2d 426 (1999), we held in a sexual harassment case that evidence of the plaintiff’s own sexual conduct at work was relevant in determining whether the conduct complained of (also sexual in nature) was “unwelcome” or “hostile”: Defendants presented evidence in support of their claim that plaintiff often engaged in sexual conduct herself. Plaintiff’s own conduct was therefore relevant to the question whether Arguette’s alleged acts were “unwelcome." See, e.g., Balletti v Sun-Sentinel Co, 909 F Supp 1539, 1547 (SD Fla, 1995) (“Where a plaintiff’s action in the work place shows that she was a willing and frequent participant in the conduct at issue, courts are less likely to find that the conduct was ‘unwelcome’ or ‘hostile.’ ”) [.] However, plaintiffs participation in sexual behavior or comments, standing alone, does not necessarily defeat a claim of hostile work environment. To the contrary, it is merely a factor to consider when determining whether the conduct or comments at issue were “unwelcome.” Accordingly, in a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff’s engaging in conduct similar to that complained of is relevant to a proper determination whether the plaintiff was subjected to an unlawfully hostile work environment. Grow, supra. This same conclusion has been reached by the federal courts that have considered this issue under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e et seq. See, e.g., Gross v Burggraf Constr Co, 53 F3d 1531, 1537-1538 (CA 10, 1995); Hocevar v Purdue Frederick Co, 223 F3d 721, 729-730 (CA 8, 2000); Burns v McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc, 989 F2d 959, 962-963 (CA 8, 1993); Barta v Honolulu, 169 FRD 132 (D Hawaii, 1996); Herchenroeder v Johns Hopkins Univ Applied Physics Laboratory, 171 FRD 179, 182 (D Md, 1997). The rationale of these cases is a logical one: if the plaintiff himself sees fit to utilize discriminatory language or commit discriminating acts in the workplace, the jury should be apprised of that fact to determine how that plaintiff would reasonably perceive his work environment when he is the recipient of the same or similar conduct. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 69; 106 S Ct 2399; 91 L Ed 2d 49 (1986) (“While ‘voluntariness’ in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim, it does not follow that a complainant’s sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant.”). The trial court adhered to this rule in deciding plaintiff’s motion in limine. As noted, the trial court ruled that defendant could present evidence that plaintiff engaged in the type of behavior at issue in this case. Thus, defendant was free to inform the jury that plaintiff utilized such terms as “wetback” and “Mexican” when referring to others in the workplace. Defendant asserts, however, that the trial court should have also allowed evidence of plaintiff calling one of his supervisors a “fat f — ,” and that plaintiff, on several occasions, exhibited an aggressive attitude with his coworkers and the public. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding such evidence as being more prejudicial than probative. MRE 403. Although it is true that the events in the workplace are to be reviewed under the “totality of the circumstances,” Radtke, supra, defendant has offered no case that holds that a jury must be allowed to consider a plaintiff’s aggressive demeanor or use of foul language at work when that aggressiveness does not include conduct similar to that at issue in the case, i.e., it does not include any indication that plaintiff, while at work, engaged in discriminatory conduct himself. In the cases dealing with vulgar and rude language utilized by a plaintiff bringing a hostile work environment action — most of which seem to fall in the category of sexual harassment — courts have concluded that the weight or admissibility of the statements depends on the circumstances of each particular case. Judge Posner, writing for the court in Galloway v Gen Motors Source Parts Operations, 78 F3d 1164, 1167 (CA 7, 1996), abrogated on other grounds, Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp v Morgan, 536 US 101; 122 S Ct 2061; 153 L Ed 2d 106 (2002), held that the use of foul language by a plaintiff and its effect on the work environment at issue in the case depends in large measure on how and when the language is used. As a result, and depending on the circumstances of each case, sometimes the plaintiff’s use of foul language, when coupled with rather nonoffensive language used by the defendant, causes there to be no dispute about the lack of a hostile work environment, see Gleason v Messirow Financial Inc, 118 F3d 1134, 1146 (CA 7, 1997) (affirming summary judgment), and Hocevar v Purdue Fredrick Co, 223 F3d 721, 736-737 (CA 8, 2000) (also upholding summary judgment), while in other cases the evidence is of such a character that it should be submitted to the jury for resolution. Horney v Westfield Gage Co, 211 F Supp 2d 291, 308-310 (D Mass, 2002). What must be focused on, however, is a plaintiffs conduct at work, not conduct outside work. Burns v McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc, 989 F2d 959, 963 (CA 8, 1993). We agree with the foregoing decisions and conclude that evidence of a plaintiff’s use of vulgar and profane language (as opposed to discriminatory language dealt with earlier) in the workplace can be relevant to determining the existence of a hostile work environment if the circumstances so warrant, i.e., it would depend on the type of language, its frequency, and the context in which it is stated. Turning to the case at hand, although evidence that plaintiff called his supervisor a “fat f — ” presents a close question because his supervisor responded by calling plaintiff a derogatory and discriminatory name, we believe that under the facts of this particular case, the trial court set reasonable guidelines with regard to what was more prejudicial than probative, MRE 403. The trial court’s ruling allowed the jury to know plaintiff had used national-origin slurs in the workplace so it could determine if similar language was “unwelcome” or created a “hostile” discriminatory atmosphere, yet kept defendant from bringing forward a few incidents that perhaps showed that plaintiff occasionally used profanities. Evidence of plaintiff’s minimal use of profanities, and that he had a couple of heated interactions with coworkers and one with the public over thirteen years of employment, could have caused the jury to conclude that it was permissible to constantly utilize language prohibited by law in the workplace (discriminatory statements), as was shown to have occurred in this case, simply because plaintiff occasionally utilized profanities that, though inappropriate, are not necessarily illegal. The trial court decided such evidence was more prejudicial than probative, and although we may have ruled differently in the first instance, we cannot conclude that such a decision was an abuse of discretion. Hilgendorf, supra. B. PLAINTIFF’S RETALIATION CLAIM Defendant also asserts that the trial court should have dismissed plaintiffs retaliation claim because plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether he was subjected to an adverse employment action by the time the motion was heard by the trial court. On this point, we agree with defendant. In Kelly-Stehney & Assoc, Inc v MacDonald's Industrial Products, Inc, 254 Mich App 608, 611-612; 658 NW2d 494 (2003), we set forth the standard of review for our Court to apply when considering the propriety of the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10): A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 163; 645 NW2d 643 (2002). A motion for summary disposition should be granted when, except in regard to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue in regard to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116 (C)(10), (G)(4); Veenstra, supra at 164. hi deciding a motion brought under this subsection, the trial court must consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Veenstra, supra at 164. The moving party has the initial burden of supporting its position with documentary evidence, but once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establ

CAROLYN G. SALTER, Plaintiff v. E & J HEALTHCARE, INC., d/b/a GREYSTONE MANOR, Defendants No. COA02-88 (Filed 21 January 2003) 1. Employer and Employee— wrongful discharge — voluntariness — failure to sign letter Plaintiff employee was terminated from her employment and did not voluntarily resign from her employment even though she failed to sign a letter given to her by defendant employer on 23 August 1999 giving plaintiff the options of signing the letter requiring her to take a leave of absence while her foot was injured with the hope that her job would be open when she returned or the option of not signing the letter and be fired. 2. Employer and Employee— wrongful discharge — retaliation for filing workers’ compensation claim The trial court did not err in a wrongful discharge action by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant employer even though plaintiff employee contends there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant took retaliatory action against her in violation of N.C.G.S. § 95-240 based on plaintiff filing a workers’ compensation claim, because: (1) there is no close temporal connection between plaintiffs instituting a workers’ compensation claim and her termination; (2) plaintiff offers little more than mere speculation that defendant gave her a letter requiring her to sign the letter and take a leave of absence or be terminated based on her filing a workers’ compensation claim; (3) plaintiff was allowed to return to work after filing her workers’ compensation claim, and defendant filed all necessary paperwork for plaintiff to receive benefits and plaintiff received them; and (4) it was not until the second injury occurred and plaintiff was out of work for a full week following a sustained period of light duty was she offered the letter, and plaintiff’s assertions that one of defendant’s employees was less than cordial does not raise a triable material issue of fact. 3. Employer and Employee— wrongful discharge — public policy violation — advocacy of Adult Care Home Residents’ Bill of Rights The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant employer on plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under N.C.G.S. § 131D-21 based on plaintiff’s contention that she was fired due to her activities in advocating the rights of patients at defendant’s nursing homes under the Adult Care Home Residents’ Bill of Rights, because: (1) there is no causal connection between plaintiff’s alleged advocation and her termination; and (2) there must be something more than mere speculation that an employee was fired for an improper purpose. 4. Employer and Employee— wrongful discharge — public policy violation — filing of workers’ compensation claim The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant employer on plaintiff employee’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under N.C.G.S. § 97-1 based on plaintiff’s filing of a workers’ compensation claim, because there must be something more than mere speculation that an employee was fired for an improper purpose. Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 2 November 2001 by Judge Jack A. Thompson at the 15 October 2001 Civil Term of Robeson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 September 2002. Distefano & Erca, by Alison A. Erca, for plaintiff appellant. Stopper & Sticks, LLP, by William L. Hopper, for defendant appellee. McCullough, Judge. Plaintiff Carolyn G. Salter appeals from an order granting summary judgment to defendant E & J Healthcare, Inc., d/b/a/ Greystone Manor entered 2 November 2001. Plaintiff filed suit on 12 July 2000 setting forth three claims: (1) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-1; (2) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131D-19; and (3) retaliatory discharge in violation of the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (REDA). The facts surrounding the parties and the complaint follow. Defendant operates four rest home facilities in eastern North Carolina. One of these facilities is Greystone Manor, located in Red Springs, Robeson County. Plaintiff holds a B.S. Degree in Psychology with a minor in gerontology. Plaintiff had been employed by defendant at the Greystone Manor as the activities coordinator since late 1996 or early 1997. She was also a member of the management team and did public relations for the facility. While at work on 2 June 1999, plaintiff was exiting some offices when she slipped and fell on a wet floor. As a result of the fall, plaintiff broke her foot. While at the hospital following the accident, plaintiff attempted to give her insurance information to the hospital. She was informed by the hospital staff that she would be covered by workers’ compensation, and that the hospital had no use for her own insurance information. Thus, it was at this time that plaintiff apparently learned that she was entitled to workers’ compensation from defendant. The facts surrounding plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim differ between the parties. Plaintiff contends that on 3 June 1999, she returned to work and began filling out workers’ compensation forms. In her deposition, plaintiff testified that her supervisor at Greystone Manor, Frances Ivey, believed that the slip and fall was plaintiff’s fault. Plaintiff further testified that Ms. Ivey informed her “that it was very hard to get workman’s comp, that it was hard to prove and that it was just a hassle; and that it was just going to be a very difficult situation.” In addition, plaintiff alleged in her complaint that Ms. Ivey informed a coworker not to report to the company president that warning signs were not visible at the place where plaintiff fell. Plaintiff accuses Ms. Ivey of having a general aversion to her after the workers’ compensation incident. Frances Ivey denied making any such statements or having any such aversion toward plaintiff. Ms. Ivey testified in her deposition to the fact that she was in charge of filing workers’ compensation claims at Greystone Manor, and that she did in fact fill out the paperwork for plaintiff. Throughout it has never been contested that plaintiff has failed to get all the workers’ compensation to which she was entitled. After plaintiff’s injury, she continued to work at Greystone Manor, although she only performed light duty. Plaintiff has alleged that Ms. Ivey continued to be skeptical of the extent of her injury, while Ms. Ivey denied such. After two and one-half months of light duty, on 16 August 1999, plaintiff reinjured her foot while away from work when she tripped at her home. Her physician prescribed one week of inactivity, spanning from 16 August to 23 August 1999. Plaintiff had a scheduled appointment with her physician on 24 August 1999, and planned to return to work after this appointment. Prior to August 24th, however, plaintiff was summoned to work to pick up her check and discuss some things with Frances Ivey. On 23 August 1999, Ms. Ivey gave plaintiff her check along with a letter that had been faxed to her from defendant’s head office. The letter stated: We acknowledge that you have been out of work for a period of time due to a foot injury. Our company will consider your leave of absence appropriate regarding the nature of the injury. Any leave of absence granted shall be without pay. You will be given first consideration for the position which was left, but cannot guarantee a job when the leave of absence is over. If such is available, you will be reinstated with no loss of seniority or pay status. If such a position is not available, re-instatement at a lessor position with a corresponding decrease in pay may be necessary. Eligibility for re-instatement is solely dependent upon availability of appropriate job openings, and the employer has no obligation beyond this. This release shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties, their successors, assigns, personal representatives, and heirs, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing officers, directors, employees and agents of the Company. Refusal to follow this procedure shall be considered insubordination and immediate dismissal. Plaintiff claimed that Ms. Ivey demanded that she sign the letter, and that refusal to sign it immediately would result in termination. Ms. Ivey, after the fact, claims that the letter was intended for plaintiff to sign and take an unpaid leave of absence until she was able to work full-time. However, plaintiff submits that the letter is clear that she was to take a leave of absence with no assurances of a job when she returned if she signed, or she was to be immediately terminated if she refused to sign. Plaintiff refused to sign the letter. Instead, plaintiff asked to be allowed to remove her belongings from the premises. She was allowed to do so, as long as she told no one what had transpired. Ms. Ivey testified that plaintiff informed her that she had talked to a lawyer about a potential suit and had decided against it, but now had changed her mind after receiving the letter. In addition to her workers’ compensation dispute with defendant’s management, plaintiff also alleged in her complaint that throughout her employment with defendant, she was an advocate for the residents at the facility. According to plaintiff, this caused a great deal of resentment between her and Ms. Ivey, independent from the workers’ compensation incident. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that “Ms. Ivey, by her words and conduct, implied to plaintiff that plaintiff’s advocacy of residents’ rights was a threat to plaintiff’s continued employment with defendant.” Indeed, plaintiff testified that Ms. Ivey informed her that the nursing home business “was all about money and not residents, and if [plaintiff] cared more for the residents, [she] wouldn’t have a future in this business.” It is on all these facts that plaintiff filed her complaint. Defendant filed its answer on 14 September 2000, and its motion for summary judgment on 26 June 2001, on the ground that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. Judge Jack Thompson heard the motion and granted defendant summary judgment on 2 November 2001. Plaintiff appeals on the ground that there are genuine issues of material fact. Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. An issue is genuine where it is supported by substantial evidence. A genuine issue of material fact is of such a nature as to affect the outcome of the action. The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a triable issue of fact. The motion must be denied where the non-moving party shows an actual dispute as to one or more material issues. As a general principle, summary judgment is a drastic remedy which must be used cautiously so that no party is deprived of trial on a disputed factual issue. Johnson v. Trustees of Durham Tech. Cmty. Coll., 139 N.C. App. 676, 680-81, 535 S.E.2d 357, 361 (citations omitted), appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 265, 546 S.E.2d 102 (2000). I. Prior to addressing plaintiff’s causes of action, there is an initial point of contention between the parties as to whether plaintiff voluntarily resigned or was in fact terminated as a result of the events on 23 August 1999. Plaintiff claims that she was terminated because she did not sign the letter, while defendant maintains that plaintiff voluntarily ceased her employment by failing to comply with defendant’s policies. It appears to this Court that the letter given to plaintiff on 23 August 1999 left her with two options: (1) sign the letter, and be put on leave of absence and get better, then hope she can get her job back since it was clearly not promised that it would be held open; or (2) not sign the letter and be fired. While defendant appears to claim that it was prepared to immediately take plaintiff back as a full-time employee as soon as she was ready to return to work, nothing in that letter sustains this assertion. By the letter’s terms and Ms. Ivey’s explanation of the terms, failure to sign meant immediate dismissal. Plaintiff failed to sign. While the decision not to sign was voluntary on her part, defendant was the party who dictated the result here by the language in the letter. Coming into court and now contending that by voluntarily failing to sign the letter plaintiff has somehow foregone any potential rights is disingenuous. .Plaintiff was terminated from her employment with defendant when she did not sign the letter, as dictated by its terms. Thus, we address the balance of plaintiff’s appeal. II. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defendant took retaliatory action against her because she filed a workers’ compensation claim, in violation of REDA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-240, et. seq. (2001). The North Carolina Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (“REDA”), enacted in 1992, prohibits discrimination against an employee who has filed a workers’ compensation claim. In pertinent part, the Act provides: (a) No person shall discriminate or take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee in good faith does or threatens to do any of the following: (1) File a claim or complaint, initiate any inquiry, investigation, inspection, proceeding or other action, or testify or provide information to any person with respect to any of the following: a. Chapter 97 of the General Statutes. REDA replaced North Carolina General Statutes section 97-6.1, the purpose of which was to promote an open environment in which employees could pursue remedies under the Workers’ Compensation Act without fear of retaliation from their employers. The former law merely protected employees against discharge and demotion. By enacting REDA, however, the General Assembly expanded the definition of retaliation to include “the discharge, suspension, demotion, retaliatory relocation of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms, conditions, privileges, and benefits of employment.” In a claim brought pursuant to the former provision, section 97-6.1(a), this Court stated that an employee bears the burden of proof in retaliatory discharge actions. “The statute does not prohibit all discharges of employees who are involved in a workers’ compensation claim, it only prohibits those discharges made because the employee exercises his compensation rights.” Furthermore, our appellate courts indicated in applying the former provision that a plaintiff fails to make out a case of retaliatory action where there is no close temporal connection between the filing of the claim and the alleged retaliatory act. Johnson, 139 N.C. App. at 681-82, 535 S.E.2d at 361 (citations omitted). Plaintiff submits that she had filed a workers’ compensation claim which her employer tried to discourage, and was working light duty and receiving benefits when she was presented with a release of claims to sign, or, alternatively, with dismissal. It is noted that plaintiff has complied with procedural requirements with the N.C. Commission of Labor, as required by REDA. It is undisputed that plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim and received benefits. Plaintiff then returned to work on light duty for two and one-half months. After that period of time, she reinjured her foot away from work, and was out for a week before being given the option of being placed on administrative leave. Several things are wrong with plaintiff’s claim. First, there is no close temporal connection between plaintiff’s instituting a workers’ compensation claim and her termination. Johnson, 139 N.C. App. at 683, 535 S.E.2d at 362 (no close temporal connection between claim and adverse action after one year); Shaffner v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 101 N.C. App. 213, 216, 398 S.E.2d 657, 659 (1990), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 333, 402 S.E.2d 839 (1991) (no close temporal connection between claim, 18 April 1987, and termination, 29 June 1987, approximately two and one-half months). Second, plaintiff offers little more than mere speculation that defendant gave her the letter because she filed a workers’ compensation claim. Nothing in the letter refers to workers’ compensation. Plaintiff was allowed to return to work after filing her workers’ compensation claim. Defendant filed all necessary papers for plaintiff to receive benefits, and plaintiff indeed received them. It was not until the second injury occurred and plaintiff was out of work for a full week following a sustained period of light duty was she offered the letter. To recover, plaintiff “must show that her discharge was caused by her good faith institution of the workers’ compensation proceedings . . . .” Abels v. Renfro Corp., 108 N.C. App. 135, 143, 423 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1992), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 335 N.C. 209, 436 S.E.2d 822 (1993). This she fails to do. Despite plaintiff’s assertions that one of defendant’s employees was less than cordial, her allegations do not raise a triable, material issue of fact. See Brooks v. Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C. App. 226, 237, 382 S.E.2d 874, 882, disc. review denied, 325 N.C. 704, 388 S.E.2d 449 (1989) (“This Court is not unmindful that circumstantial evidence is often the only evidence available to show retaliation against protected activity. Nevertheless, the causal connection must be something more than speculation . . . .”). Thus, summary judgment on plaintiff’s REDA claim is affirmed. III. Plaintiff’s final assignments of error contend that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on its other two causes of action: Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131D-21 (2001); and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-1 (2001). North Carolina is an employment-at-will state. Our Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that in the absence of a contractual agreement between an employer and an employee establishing a definite term of employment, the relationship is presumed to be terminable at the will of either party without regard to the quality of performance of either party.” Limited exceptions have been adopted to this bright-line rule. First, as stated above, parties can remove the at-will presumption by specifying a definite period of employment contractually. Second, federal and state statutes have created exceptions prohibiting employers from discharging employees based on impermissible considerations such as the employee’s age, race, sex, religion, national origin, or disability, or in retaliation for filing certain claims against the employer. Finally, this Court has recognized a public-policy exception to the employment-at-will rule. Public policy is defined as “the principle of law that holds no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.” There is no specific list of what actions constitute a violation of public policy. However, wrongful discharge claims have been recognized in North Carolina where the employee was discharged (1) for refusing to violate the law at the employer[’]s request, (2) for engaging in a legally protected activity, or (3) based on some activity by the employer contrary to law or public policy[.] Ridenhour v. IBM Corp., 132 N.C. App. 563, 568-69, 512 S.E.2d 774, 778 (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 595, 537 S.E.2d 481 (1999). Under this public policy exception, the employee has the burden of pleading and proving that the employee’s dismissal occurred for a reason that violates public policy. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, it must be shown that (1) the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse action, and (3) there exist