Retaliation Cases

O’NEILL v HOME IV CARE, INC Docket Nos. 226428, 228162. Submitted January 9, 2002, at Detroit. Decided February 5, 2002, at 9:10 am. Leave to appeal sought. Mary O’Neill brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court against Home I.V. Care, Inc., and others, alleging that the defendants violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seq., in terminating the plaintiffs employment after she reported the defendants’ wage practices to state and federal authorities. Mediation resulted in an evaluation in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants accepted, and the plaintiff rejected, the evaluation. A jury returned a lesser verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted to the court a proposed judgment that added to the jury verdict an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to the wpa and prejudgment interest. The defendants objected to the proposed judgment, arguing that any award of attorney fees that results in the plaintiff’s receiving a judgment high enough to avoid sanctions for her rejection of the mediation evaluation would defeat the purpose of mediation. The plaintiff filed a motion to settle the judgment. The defendants moved for an award of attorney fees and costs as mediation sanctions. At the hearing on the plaintiffs motion, the court, Robert L. Templin, J., over the plaintiff’s objection, decided to also hear the defendants’ motion. The court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiff should not be allowed to avoid mediation sanctions and thus awarded attorney fees in an amount that ensured that the judgment was less favorable to the plaintiff than the mediation evaluation. After conducting a subsequent hearing on the reasonableness of the defendants’ request for an award of attorney fees and costs as mediation sanctions, the court made the requested award. The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held,-. 1. The trial court abused its discretion by taking into consideration the mediation evaluation and sanctions in determining the plaintiff’s award of attorney fees and costs under the wpa. In deciding whether a plaintiff in an action under the wpa should be awarded costs and attorney fees, a court must limit its consideration to the purpose of the wpa (which is to remove barriers to an employee who seeks to report a violation of law, thereby protecting the integrity of the law and the public at large), the purpose of the attorney fee and cost provisions (which is to encourage whistleblowers discriminated against by their employers to seek legal redress, to ensure them access to the courts, and to prevent employer retaliation against them), and factors relevant to the reasonableness of the attorney fee request. 2. The award of mediation sanctions to the defendants is vacated without prejudice. The case is remanded to a different judge for redetermination of an award of costs and attorney fees to the plaintiff. If the resulting judgment for the plaintiff is less favorable than the mediation evaluation, the defendants can again seek attorney fees and costs as mediation sanctions. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. Master and Servant — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act — Mediation. A court, in deciding whether to award costs and attorney fees to a plaintiff who prevails against the plaintiff’s employer at trial in an action under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act after rejecting a mediation evaluation in the plaintifFs favor, may not consider the effect the award would have on the plaintiff’s liability for mediation sanctions; the court must limit its consideration to the purpose of the act, the purpose of the cost and attorney fee provisions of the act, and factors relevant to the reasonableness of the attorney fee request (MCL 15.364; MCR 2.403). Chapman & Associates (by Ronald W. Chapman and Brian J. Richtarcik), for the plaintiff. Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, PL.C. (by Megan P. Norris and Philip B. Phillips), for the defendants. Before: Hood, P.J., and Murphy and Markey, JJ. Murphy, J. Plaintiff Mary O’Neill appeals as of right from an order awarding her attorney fees, costs, and interest pursuant to MCL 15.364, § 4 of the Whistle-blowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seq. Plaintiff disputes the amount of the award. Plaintiff also appeals as of right from a subsequent order awarding defendants attorney fees and costs as mediation sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.403(0). We reverse and remand for a proper determination of plaintiffs attorney fees and costs pursuant to MCL 15.364, and we vacate, without prejudice, the award of mediation sanctions to defendants. Plaintiff was terminated from her job with defendants after she alerted the United States and Michigan Departments of Labor to defendants’ wage practices. Plaintiff filed a complaint, and subsequent amended complaints, alleging that she was terminated in violation of the wpa. Plaintiff also alleged retaliatory discharge against public policy and age discrimination in violation of the Michigan civil rights act (cra), MCL 37.2101 et seq. The lower court record indicates that both the retaliatory discharge and age discrimination claims were summarily dismissed. The case was submitted to mediation that resulted in a mediation evaluation of $30,000 in favor of plaintiff. Defendants accepted, and plaintiff rejected, the mediation evaluation. A four-day jury trial was held on plaintiff’s wpa claim, and the jury found in her favor, awarding plaintiff $20,245 in economic damages. Plaintiff submitted a proposed judgment under the seven-day rule, MCR 2.602(B)(3), in which plaintiff sought entry of a judgment incorporating the $20,245 jury verdict and awarding her $48,869 in attorney fees and costs pursuant to MCL 15.364, plus $2,922 in prejudgment interest. Defendants timely objected to the proposed judgment, arguing that the prejudgment interest plaintiff was entitled to amounted to only $1,484. In regards to plaintiff’s attorney fees, defendants argued that plaintiff failed to submit documentation supporting the award, that the request was not reasonable in light of the small jury verdict, and that plaintiff was not the prevailing party under MCR 2.625 because two of the causes of action had been dismissed. Further, defendants argued that plaintiff was not entitled to any fees incurred after rejection of mediation and that to award plaintiff the requested attorney fees would defeat the purpose of mediation sanctions that defendants were rightfully entitled to receive. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion to settle the judgment and for an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in litigating the wpa claim. Plaintiff argued in the motion that the mediation evaluation should not be considered in determining her attorney fees and costs, and that the amounts requested were assessable costs to be added to the jury verdict under MCR 2.403(O)(3). Although a judgment on the jury verdict had yet to be entered, defendants filed a motion for taxation of costs and attorney fees, requesting $1,097 in costs and $40,526 in attorney fees on the basis that they were entitled to mediation sanctions under MCR 2.403(0). A hearing on plaintiff’s motion to settle the judgment and for an award of attorney fees and costs was held, and the trial court decided, over plaintiff’s objection, to also address defendants’ motion for taxation of costs and attorney fees based on the mediation evaluation. The trial court rejected plaintiff’s argument that it should not consider the mediation evaluation and sanctions until a judgment was entered on plaintiff’s motion to settle the judgment, including the calculation of costs and attorney fees to be awarded pursuant to § 4 of the wpa, MCL 15.364. The following colloquy occurred at the hearing regarding plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs: Defense counsel. Now, if the Court is inclined to award costs and attorney fees, that [it] not award costs and attorney fees at a point—at a level where [plaintiff is] able to escape the mediation rules, which are clear. If [plaintiff is] given attorney fees, be it a maximum of one-third of whatever the verdict was or whatever number the Court determines is reasonable[,] [b]e it [$]6, $7,000, it should not be a number that permits [plaintiff] to be 10 percent better than the jury verdict in this case, which allows [plaintiff] to double dip and escape the mediation rules. Even if the verdict was a dollar, [plaintiff] can still do the same thing and I don’t think that is appropriate and defeats the entire purpose of the mediation sanction rules. The Court. Well, I agree with Defendant. What I am going to do is this. We’re going to award to the Plaintiff[,] attorney fees in the amount of $7,000. From this exchange, and others during the hearing, it is clear the trial court based its decision to award only $7,000 in attorney fees on its concern that too large an award would allow plaintiff to avoid mediation sanctions under MCR 2.403(0). The trial court also awarded plaintiff costs of $2,063, plus $1,499 in interest. Adding those amounts to the jury award of $20,245, the trial court calculated the adjusted verdict to be $30,807. After this adjustment, and taking into consideration the $30,000 mediation evaluation, the trial court found that the verdict was not more favorable to plaintiff because $30,807 was less than ten percent above the case evaluation. Therefore, the trial court ordered that defendants were entitled to mediation sanctions. Following a subsequent evidentiary hearing concerning the reasonable amount of attorney fees and costs incurred by defendants after the mediation rejection, the trial court awarded defendants attorney fees and costs in the amount of $48,766 pursuant to MCR 2.403(0). On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in determining the amount of attorney fees and costs that she was entitled to under the wpa, and that the court erred in determining the amount of attorney fees and costs defendants were entitled to under MCR 2.403(G). Specifically, plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award plaintiff all her reasonable attorney fees pursuant to MCL 15.364, erred in wrongly considering mediation sanctions as a factor in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees requested pursuant to MCL 15.364, and erred in considering defendants’ motion for mediation sanctions before entry of the final judgment. We agree with plaintiff that the trial court abused its discretion by taking into consideration the mediation evaluation and sanctions when determining plaintiff’s award of attorney fees and costs under MCL 15.364. In Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 560; 564 NW2d 532 (1997), this Court stated that the decision to award attorney fees under the wpa is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion by rendering a decision when an unbiased person would conclude that there was no justification or excuse for the decision after consideration of the facts relied on by the trial court. Miller v Hensley, 244 Mich App 528, 529; 624 NW2d 582 (2001). MCL 15.364 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] court may also award the complainant all or a portion of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees, if the court determines that the award is appropriate.” Section 802 of the CRA, MCL 37.2802, contains language nearly identical to that found in MCL 15.364. The Legislature’s use of nearly identical language is meaningful, and we believe it appropriate to consider case law addressing MCL 37.2802 when analyzing the issues regarding MCL 15.364 because there is a lack of relevant case law concerning the wpa. See Anzaldua v Band, 457 Mich 530, 546-548; 578 NW2d 306 (1998). In Grow v W A Thomas Co, 236 Mich App 696, 714-715; 601 NW2d 426 (1999), this Court noted the following factors for consideration when determining attorney fees and costs under the CRA; Where attorney fees are to be awarded, the court must determine the reasonable amount of fees according to various factors, including (1) the skill, time, and labor involved, (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer, (3) the fee customarily charged in that locality for similar services, (4) the amount in question and the results achieved, (5) the expense incurred, (6) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (7) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, (8) the professional standing and experience of the attorney, and (9) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 588; 321 NW2d 653 (1982); Head v Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc, 234 Mich App 94, 114; 593 NW2d 595 (1999). The Grow panel noted that the existence of a contingent fee agreement did not preclude an award of attorney fees under the CRA and that such an arrangement is only one of the factors to be considered in determining a reasonable attorney fee. Grow, supra at 715. Here, the trial court’s focus was on the mediation evaluation and sanctions and not on the relevant factors noted in Grow Moreover, we are of the opinion that the trial court’s focus on mediation in determinmg attorney fees and costs under MCL 15.364 is contrary to the purpose of the wpa as well as the principles pertaining to mediation. Because the wpa is a remedial statute, it is to be liberally construed to favor the persons the Legislature intended to benefit. Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 406; 572 NW2d 210 (1998). In Hopkins v City of Midland, 158 Mich App 361, 374; 404 NW2d 744 (1987), this Court noted that the wpa was enacted to remove barriers to an employee who seeks to report violations of the law, thereby protecting the integrity of the law and the public at large. In Collister v Sunshine Food Stores, Inc, 166 Mich App 272, 274; 419 NW2d 781 (1988), this Court, citing Jenkins v Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich App 785, 801; 369 NW2d 223 (1985), stated that the purpose of the attorney fee and cost provisions of MCL 37.2802 (cra) is to “encourage persons who have been deprived of their civil rights to seek legal redress, to insure victims of employment discrimination access to the courts, and to deter discrimination in the work force.” The Collister panel further ruled that a decision by a court to award or deny attorney fees under the cra must be made in light of that purpose and may not be based on considerations inconsistent with that purpose. Collister, supra at 274. We believe that the purpose of the wpa, noted above, and the concerns regarding access to the courts and prevention of wrongful conduct enunciated in Collister, must be considered in making a determination regarding the award of attorney fees and costs under MCL 15.364. The trial court’s focus on the mediation evaluation, and the effect its ruling concerning attorney fees would have on mediation sanctions, are not proper considerations when viewed in the light of the purpose for which the wpa was enacted. We believe that the appropriate analysis in determining an award of attorney fees and costs under MCL 15.364 involves consideration of the various factors noted in Grow in conjunction with consideration of the purpose of the wpa, guided by the specific language found in MCL 15.364. Our decision is further supported by the rules concerning mediation. Although no court rule or statute specifically prohibits a judge from considering a mediation evaluation, after a jury trial, in determining whether to assess costs and award attorney fees, and in determining the amounts to be awarded, we believe that such a prohibition is implicit from various provisions found in MCE 2.403. MCE 2.403(N)(4) provides that “[i]n a nonjury action, the envelope [containing the mediation evaluation] may not be opened and the parties may not reveal the amount of the evaluation until the judge has rendered judgment.” MCE 2.403(D)(3) provides that “[a] judge may be selected as a member of a case evaluation panel, but may not preside at the trial of any action in which he or she served as a case evaluator.” MCE 2.403(N)(2)(d) precludes a judge from presiding at a nonjury trial if the judge hears a motion challenging a mediation panel’s determination that an action or defense is frivolous. These provisions clearly exist to preclude a judge from considering mediation sanctions before rendering judgment in a bench trial. Similarly, we see no reason why a judge should be allowed to consider mediation sanctions where a jury has rendered a verdict, but where the court has input in determining the amount of the final judgment through an award of attorney fees and costs as specifically provided by the Legislature. The danger is the same: the mediation evaluation and potential sanctions could influence a judge’s decision and result in a judgment based not on the facts of the case, but on the amount of the evaluation. The importance of secrecy concerning mediation evaluations is clearly reflected in Bennett v Medical Evaluation Specialists, 244 Mich App 227, 228; 624 NW2d 492 (2000), wherein this Court, addressing a situation where counsel improperly revealed a mediation evaluation, held that “when a party intentionally reveals the amount of a mediation evaluation to the trial court during a nonjury trial, the trial court must declare a mistrial and reassign the case to another judge.” The Bennett panel stated that “[o]ne of the main concerns of the mediation rule, as evidenced by certain subsections of MCR 2.403, is judicial impartiality where a mediated case proceeds to trial.” Bennett, supra at 231. We are of the opinion that judicial impartiality dictates that a judge not consider a mediation evaluation, and the potential sanctions, when determining an award of attorney fees and costs, as was done in the present case. Moreover, our review and interpretation of MCR 2.403(O)(8) leads us to conclude that from a procedural standpoint, consideration of a mediation evaluation before entry of judgment is not permissible. MCR 2.403(O)(8) provides that “[a] request for costs under this subrule must be filed and served within 28 days after the entry of the judgment or entry of an order denying a timely motion for a new trial or to set aside the judgment.” The basic principles regarding statutory interpretation also govern when interpreting court rules. Bennett, supra at 230. “ ‘A court rule should be construed in accordance with the ordinary and approved usage of its language in light of the purpose the rule seeks to accomplish.’ ” Id., quoting Bush v Mobil Oil Corp, 223 Mich App 222, 226; 565 NW2d 921 (1997). We believe that the language of MCL 2.403(O)(8) envisions that a judgment must first be entered before a party even makes a request for mediation sanctions, let alone before a judge entertains consideration of the mediation evaluation. Here, defendants improperly invoked the issue of mediation sanctions before the entry of the judgment, and the trial court improperly considered the mediation evaluation and sanctions before the final judgment was entered. We urge our Supreme Court to consider adoption of specific rules to address the problem that arose in the case before us today. Perhaps, mediation evaluations should remain sealed in all cases until a final judgment is entered, and not just in cases where a bench trial is involved, in order to avoid consideration, or the appearance of consideration, of improper factors. Minimally, we believe that it would be prudent to establish a rule that specifically prohibits a judge from considering a mediation evaluation before a final judgment is entered after a jury trial. In light of our decision, we vacate the award of mediation sanctions to defendants, without prejudice, to allow for a proper determination of attorney fees and cour

ARMSTRONG v YPSILANTI CHARTER TOWNSHIP Docket No. 222924. Submitted June 6, 2001, at Lansing. Decided December 7, 2001, at 9:05 am Duke L. Armstrong brought an action in the Washtenaw Circuit Court against Ypsilanti Charter Township and five individual members of the township board, asserting various claims for damages resulting from the individual defendants’ votes to pass a motion that eliminated the line-item funding for the plaintiff’s position as administrative assistant to the township supervisor. The elected township supervisor, who is the sixth member of the township board, voted against the motion. The court, Donald E. Shelton, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the trial judge, and the chief judge of the circuit court, Timothy P. Connors, affirmed that denial. The court entered a judgment and order granting summary disposition in favor of the defendants on several grounds. The plaintiff appealed, and the individual defendants cross appealed from the denial of their motion to quash the plaintiff’s first amended complaint. The Court of Appeals held: 1. The separation of powers doctrine contained in Const 1963, art 3, § 2 applies to state government only and does not apply to township government. 2. Section 9 of the Charter Township Act, MCL 42.9, allows a township board to abolish any position within township government as long as the position is not the offices of the township clerk or the township treasurer. The plaintiff’s position may be abolished by the township board. 3. MCL 42.9 does not requires the township supervisor’s recommendation before a position may be abolished by the township board. 4. The Charter Township Act gives the township board full and absolute control over the township budget and does not provide that the board can reduce appropriations only when there has been a reduction in income. 5. The court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s tort claims against the individual defendants on the basis that the defendants were protected from liability by governmental immunity provided by state and federal law. 6. The court’s ruling on the motions for summary disposition did not evidence deep-seated favoritism or antagonism toward the plaintiff that would support the plaintiff’s claim of actual bias. 7. The trial judge had no economic, pecuniary, or other financial ties to the individual defendants. There were no grounds to support the motion to disqualify the trial judge. Affirmed. 1. Townships — Constitutional Law — Separation of Powers. The separation of powers doctrine in Const 1963, art 3, § 2 applies to state government only, not to local municipal or township government. 2. Townships — Charter Township Boards. Section 9 of the Charter Township Act allows a township board to abolish any position within the township government other than the township clerk and the township treasurer; the township supervisor’s recommendation is not required before a position may be abolished by the township board (MCL 42.9). 3. Townships — Charter Township Boards. A charter township board has full and absolute control over the township’s budget and may reduce appropriations without a showing that there has been a reduction in income (MCL 42.27, 42.28, 42.29). 4. Judges — Disqualification. Judicial rulings, in and of themselves, generally do not constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging judicial bias unless the rulings display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcome the heavy presumption of judicial impartiality. Jeffrey A. McKeever, P.L.C. (by Jeffrey A. McKeever), for the plaintiff. Garan Lucow Miller, PC. (by Rosalind Rochkind and Thomas F. Myers'), for the defendants. Amicus Curiae: Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall, P.C. (by John H. Bauckham), for the Michigan Townships Association. Before: Hood, P.J., and Whitbeck and Meter, JJ. Per Curiam. Plaintiff Duke Armstrong appeals the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants Ypsilanti Charter Township, Ruth Jamnick, Brenda Stumbo, Darcus Sizemore, Karen LovejoyRoe, and William Gagnon. Armstrong also challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to disqualify the trial judge and the later order of the chief judge affirming that denial. Jamnick, Stumbo, Sizemore, Lovejoy-Roe, and Gagnon cross appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to quash Armstrong’s first amended complaint. We affirm. 1. basic facts and procedural history A. OVERVIEW Ypsilanti Township is a charter township, organized under the Charter Township Act. Jamnick, Stumbo, Sizemore, Lovejoy-Roe, and Gagnon are all members of the township board. A sixth member of the township board, although not a defendant here, Wesley Prater, was the elected township supervisor. Armstrong had served as Prater’s administrative assistant since 1991, but on May 30, 1996, the township board, with only Prater voting against the motion, eliminated the line-item funding for Armstrong’s administrative assistant position, thereby effectively eliminating his job. It is undisputed that the elimination of the line-item funding was not part of the normal budgetary cycle; rather it occurred during, instead of before or at the commencement of, the township’s fiscal year. B. ARMSTRONG’S COMPLAINT Armstrong’s first amended complaint contained thirteen counts. Count I asserted a claim based on defamation against the board members. Count n asserted a claim based on violation of the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act. Armstrong claimed that he had been diagnosed with “stress reaction,” which required a temporary medical leave. Count m asserted a violation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act. Armstrong claimed that his age was at least one factor in the decision to terminate his employment. Count iv asserted a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Armstrong claimed that his involvement in the attempted organization of his fellow employees in a labor union was at least one factor in the decision to terminate his employment. Count v was a claim of breach of an implied employment contract. Armstrong claimed that the township’s management made statements to him and other employees that it was the township’s policy not to discharge employees as long as the employees performed their jobs. Count VI asserted wrongful discharge contrary to public policy. Armstrong claimed that during his employment, the township established policies and procedures that created a legitimate expectation that his employment could be terminated only for just cause. Count vil asserted interference with a business relationship. Armstrong claimed that the board members interfered with his business relationship with the township, which relationship had a reasonable likelihood of future economic benefit to him. Count vni asserted the board members were grossly negligent concerning their conduct and treatment of Armstrong, including alleged false accusations and statements made by the board members concerning him. Count IX was a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress concerning defendants’ conduct and treatment of Armstrong during his employment. Count x asserted violation of Armstrong’s constitutional rights. Armstrong claimed that, before his employment was terminated, he engaged in constitutionally protected speech on a matter of public concern by speaking with administrative assistants of various departments regarding forming a union and that his exercise of his constitutional rights was one reason for the termination of his employment. Count XI asserted a separate violation of Armstrong’s constitutional rights. Armstrong claimed that, before depriving him of his constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment, defendants did not conduct a hearing or otherwise afford him either notice of the grounds for the termination of his employment or a meaningful opportunity to respond. Count xn asserted a violation of the Michigan Constitution with respect to due process and fair treatment in investigations. Armstrong claimed that defendants failed to adequately investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding alleged false accusations. Count xttt was a conspiracy claim. Armstrong contended that the tortious conduct asserted in the complaint was done in concert by the board members in order to violate his legal and constitutional rights. In mid-March 1999, the township moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). In early April, the trial court held a hearing on this motion but delayed ruling until a final decision was made on the judicial disqualification matter hereinafter outlined. In late April 1999, the board members filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). In early June 1999, the trial court held a hearing on this motion and took the matter under advisement. C. THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING The trial court addressed and granted both motions for summary disposition in an order and opinion entered on September 29, 1999, stating: Plaintiff... alleges that defendants wrongfully eliminated funding for the Administrative Assistant to the Ypsilanti Township Supervisor, a position which plaintiff held. The four individual defendants were Township board members who voted for the resolution. . . . * * * For his claim against the township, plaintiff argues that the Township Supervisor position is analogous to that of a chief executive position and that [the] board’s action to eliminate funding thereby violates the separation of powers doctrine. He urges the Court to find that the Supervisor is the chief executive with the exclusive authority to abolish plaintiff’s position. The Township of Ypsilanti has adopted the Charter Township Act (“the Act”). Pursuant to that Act, all legislative authority and powers of the township are vested in the township board. MCL 42.5(1). [At this point, the trial court quoted MCL 42.5 and MCL 42.9.] Plaintiff asserts that this section of the statute only allows the board to create a position and does not explicitly grant the board authority to abolish a position. Plaintiff further claims that even if this section is construed to confer authority to abolish a position on the board, that authority would only concomitantly arise at the township supervisor’s recommendation. Plaintiff argues that since in this case the supervisor voted against the elimination of the funding for plaintiff’s position, the board had no authority to do so. The construction of the statute urged by plaintiff is without merit. The legislature clearly provides . . . that the entire elected township board, which by definition includes the supervisor, has the authority to create employment positions at taxpayer expense. That authority is not conferred by the statute on the supervisor. Inherent in the board’s authority to create such a position is its authority to abolish it. The ensuing sentence in this section of the Act fortifies the inteipretation that the board has the power to abolish employment positions in the township. That sentence expressly states that the board may not “abolish” the offices of township clerk or treasurer. The express designation of the offices of township clerk and township treasurer as offices that may not be abolished by the township board is recognition that the legislature intended that the board has the power to abolish other positions not so designated. . . . Plaintiff also claims that the board’s role is to check the power of the supervisor by approving a budget that includes the appropriation of funds for the supervisor’s use. He claims that when [the] board eliminated funding for plaintiff’s position, the board encroached on the executive’s authority. On the contrary, it is the board that has the exclusive authority over budget, appropriation and expenditure for a township under the Act. MCL 42.27, 42.28. There was no usurpation of supervisor authority by the actions of the board in this case. As to plaintiffs tort claims against the individual board members, the defendants assert that they are immune from plaintiffs tort claims under Michigan law. The highest elective officials of all levels of government are immune from tort liability when acting within their authority. Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633 (1984). The same was codified in 1986 [at this point, the trial court quoted MCL 691.1407(5)]. These defendants are clearly the highest elective officials in the township and are immune if they were acting within their authority when they eliminated plaintiffs position. ... As indicated by the analysis of the board’s actions above, the legislature gave the board as a whole the authority to create, combine, and abolish administrative offices as set forth in MCL 42.9. The actions of the individual trustees were therefore within their legislative authority and they are immune from plaintiffs tort actions by virtue of MCL 691.1407(5). D. DISQUALIFICATION OF THE TRIAL COURT The trial court record does not contain a motion to disqualify the judge, but the record does reflect that a hearing was held on such a motion on April 7, 1999. At the hearing, the following discussion ensued: Mr. McKeever (plaintiff’s counsel]: Judge, as we just mentioned at the bench, I found out yesterday that I think four of the individually named defendants were involved with— as well as Mr. Winters was involved in setting up fundraisers for Your Honor, as well as selling tickets and what have you. And because of those facts— The Court: You mean when I ran for the Supreme Court [in 1996]? Mr. McKeever. That’s right, Judge. And I just — as I mentioned at the bench, due to those facts, at my client’s request, I bring this motion for Your Honor to disqualify himself. And as I mentioned previously, I certainly mean no disrespect, Judge. Armstrong submitted his own affidavit, which asserted that the board members “participated in raising election funds for the Honorable Donald E. Shelton.” The trial court denied Armstrong’s motion for disqualification from the bench and stated: Well, there were a number of people, obviously, who were kind enough to assist in the campaign when I ran for the Supreme Court. But, to my knowledge, the successful candidates do not disqualify themselves from hearing cases in which contributors to their campaigns were involved, nor do I think that I’m required to do so, nor do I think it would be appropriate to punish people for participating in the process in that way. More importantly — so I’m going to deny the motion on the basis of any economic interest. More importantly is the question of whether I have any bias in favor of the defendants. I would gather that, if the Township of Ypsilanti were to — or its officials were to take a vote on whether I was generally in favor of them or generally against them in terms of my rulings, it would be a close issue. It probably would be a divided vote, and as it should be. I have not — I don’t have — I don’t hesitate in my rulings to rule against the local governments or their elected officials when I think that justice of the cause requires that. And I would expect that the township officials in this township as well as other municipal bodies would, with chagrin, agree with that. So I’m going to deny the motion to disqualify. If you would like to appeal that before we take up other matters, you can take it to the chief judge. Shortly thereafter, the chief judge of the circuit court held a hearing to review the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for disqualification, ruling: You have to show actual bias or prejudice. Again, you know, this is — I think the only way you’re ever going to avoid this is if you go to something like the Missouri plan. And I’m not saying that’s necessarily the best way, either, because there’s arguments that, then, you don’t have accountability to the general public. So there’s countervailing public policy reasons to go the way that we are. But as long as we have this system, you’re going to have contributors and you’re going to have people who don’t contribute. And the logical extension of your argument is, literally, be — I mean, we might have just a few lawyers left practicing. And I don’t think you’ve been able to demonstrate, sir, based on that record, that there’s actual bias or prejudice; and, therefore, the appeal of Judge Shelton’s decision to me — the appeal is denied. His decision is affirmed. He’s in the best position to say whether his relationship is such that he would not be able to do that. H. SUMMARY DISPOSITION A. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews de novo rulings on motions for summaiy disposition. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. We also review constitutional issues de novo. Whether there has been a violation of the separation of powers doctrine is a question of law, which we also review de novo. B. GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (1) MCR 2.116(C)(7) MCR 2.116(C)(7) provides, in part, that summary disposition is appropriate when a claim is barred because of immunity granted by law. In reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court accepts a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. In determining whether a plaintiffs claim is barred by governmental immunity, this Court must consider all documentary evidence, including any pleadings, depositions, admissions, or any other documentary evidence submitted by the parties. In order to survive a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a plaintiff is required to allege facts in the complaint that justify application “ ‘of an exception to governmental immunity.’ ” (2) MCR 2.116(C)(8) MCR 2.116(C)(8) provides for summary disposition of a claim on the ground that the opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone and all factual allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted as trae as well as any reasonable inferences or conclusions that can be drawn from the facts. (3) MCR 2.116(C)(10) MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides for summary disposition where there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that a trial court “ ‘may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the affidavits or other documentary evidence show that there is no genuine issue in respect to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” In addition, all affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties is viewed “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” C. ARMSTRONG’S ISSUES ON APPEAL Armstrong’s appeal requires us to address three separate, but interrelated, issues. The first issue is whether defendants’ actions violated the separation of powers doctrine. The second issue is whether defendants’ actions violated the Charter Township Act. The third issue is whether defendants were protected by governmental immunity. We will address each of these issues. D. SEPARATION OF POWERS (1) THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE In Hopkins, this Court, discussing the separation of powers doctrine, stated: The Michigan Constitution provides for the separation of the three branches of government as follows: “The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.”[] This separation of powers intends to preserve the independence of the three branches of government. In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mi