Retaliation Cases

In each case, the plaintiff minor child, A and B, respectively, and his parents, sought to recover damages from the defendants, the town of Westport, its board of education, the town's superintendent of schools, L, and certain employees of one of the town's middle schools, namely, the principal, S, the vice principal, M, and a physical education teacher, Q, for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of, inter alia, the defendants' negligence in responding to reports of bullying of A and B by their classmates while they attended the middle school. Both cases arose out of the same incident, during which A and B were attacked by other students while in gym class. The plaintiffs filed reports detailing the gym incident and prior incidents of bullying with the school's administration. Thereafter, A and B both had bullying complaints filed against them by other students involved in the gym incident and they received suspen- sions as a result thereof. A few weeks later, A was again bullied by a fellow student. He reported the incident to S, who insisted that he write down his account of what had occurred. When A instead asked to speak with his father, S grabbed his arm in a hostile manner and shook it. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that, in their handling of the bullying incidents, the defendants failed to comply with the safe school climate plan that had previously been implemented at the direction of the board in accordance with the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 10-222d). The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants retaliated against them for filing their bullying complaints by, among other things, issuing sus- pensions to A and B. Additionally, in the first action, the plaintiffs alleged that S assaulted A when she grabbed and shook his arm. The trial court consolidated the cases and granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to all claims except those against S in connection with the first action, as it found that there was

The plaintiff town appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of the defendant State Board of Labor Relations determining that the town had unilaterally changed an established past practice of including extra duty pay in the calculation of pensions for members of the defendant union, M Co., in violation of the Municipal Employees Relations Act (§ 7-467 et seq.). The town established a retirement committee to admin- ister its retirement plan, consisting of three members appointed by the town. In the midst of ongoing negotiations with M Co. for a successor collective bargaining agreement, the retirement committee notified M Co. that it had decided to exclude extra duty pay from pension calcula- tions. M Co. filed a complaint with the labor board, alleging that the town violated the act when the retirement committee unilaterally elimi- nated extra duty pay from pension calculations. The town claimed, inter alia, that the labor board lacked jurisdiction over the complaint because the retirement committee was not a municipal employer under the act as defined by statute (§ 7-467). The labor board issued a finding that the town violated the statute (§ 7-470 (a) (4)) requiring municipal employers to bargain in good faith when the retirement committee excluded extra duty pay from the calculation of pensions. The labor board found, inter alia, that there was a consistent past practice of including extra duty pay in pension calculations that had endured for almost thirty years. It rejected the town's contract defense, concluding that M Co. had not waived its right to bargain over changes to the calculation of future retirement benefits. The labor board applied its well established standard that a waiver must be clear and unmistakable. During the pendency of the town's administrative appeal, the National Labor Relations Board issued a decision in MV Transportation, Inc. (368 N.L.R.B. No. 66), in which it abandoned the clear and unmistakable waiver standard for determining

Pursuant to statute (§ 46a-58 (a)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . for any person to subject, or cause to be subjected, any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States, on account of . . . sex . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (b)), ''upon a finding of a discriminatory employment practice, the [human rights referee] may order the hiring or reinstatement of employees, with or without back pay . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (c)), ''upon a finding of a discriminatory practice prohibited by section 46a-58 . . . the [referee] shall determine the damage suffered by the complainant . . . as a result of such discriminatory practice and shall allow reasonable attorney's fees and costs.'' The named defendant, G, who is employed as a judicial marshal by the plaintiff, the Connecticut Judicial Branch, filed a complaint with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in connec- tion with her allegations that another judicial marshal, M, had subjected her to severe and pervasive sexual harassment while they were stationed together at a particular courthouse. Specifically, G alleged that the branch discriminated against her on the basis of her gender by subjecting her to a hostile work environment, failing to investigate her allegations and to take remedial steps to protect her, and retaliating against her for making her complaint by reassigning her to courthouses farther from her residence. G claimed that the branch's misconduct violated the employment discrimination statute (§ 46a-60), as well as the general antidiscrimination statute, § 46a-58 (a), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), as a predicate for G's claim under § 46a-58 (a), insofar as § 46a-58 (a) includes within its ambit

CIVIL LAW - trial court properly dismissed appellees appellant's claims of forgery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud were barred by res judicata and judicial/prosecutorial immunity interference with civil rights need a state actor right to trial by jury does not extend to determinations of law failed to identify due process, equal protection, ethical violations, and/or demonstrate prejudice.