Retaliation Cases

Carol A. Warfield vs. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc., & others. Suffolk. March 5, 2009. July 27, 2009. Present: Marshall, C.J., Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Cordy, Botsford, & Gants, JJ. Federal Arbitration Act. Massachusetts Arbitration Act. Anti-Discrimination Law, Arbitration, Employment. Contract, Arbitration. Employment, Discrimination. Practice, Civil, Interlocutory appeal. Public Policy. An employment contract containing an agreement by the employee to limit or waive any of the rights or remedies conferred by G. L. c. 15 IB is enforceable only if such an agreement is stated in clear and unmistakable terms. [394-401] In a civil action brought in Superior Court alleging gender-based employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of G. L. c. 151B, the judge properly denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, brought on the ground that the plaintiff’s employment agreement (agreement) mandated arbitration of all her claims, where neither the arbitration clause, which provided for the arbitration of any dispute “arising out of or in connection with this [ajgreement or its negotiations,” nor any of the other provisions contained in the agreement reflected the parties’ clear intent to subject statutory discrimination claims to arbitration. [401-402] Cowin, J., dissenting. Common-law claims that were integrally connected to an employee’s claims under G. L. c. 151B were required to be tried in the same action, despite the fact that the common-law claims were covered by an arbitration clause contained in an employment agreement. [403-404] Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 7, 2008. Motions to dismiss and to compel arbitration were heard by Isaac Borenstein, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. John F. Welsh (Jennifer Belli with him) for Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. Tracey E. Spruce for Harvard Medical Faculty Physicians at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. Richard D. Glovsky for Josef E. Fischer. Ellen J. Zucker (Laura R. Studen with her) for the plaintiff. Ben Robbins, Martin J. Newhouse, & Jo Ann Shotwell Kaplan, for New England Legal Foundation & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Patricia A. Washienko, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Paul F. Levy; Harvard Medical Faculty Physicians at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc.; and Josef E. Fischer. Botsford, J. The plaintiff, Carol A. Warfield, the former chief of anesthesiology at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. (BIDMC), filed this action in the Superior Court against her employers, alleging gender-based discrimination and retaliation in violation of G. L. c. 151B, and factually related common-law claims. BIDMC and the other defendants moved to dismiss Warfield’s complaint and compel arbitration on the ground that the employment agreement she signed soon after she became chief of anesthesiology mandated arbitration of all her claims. A judge in the Superior Court denied the motions, and the defendants filed this interlocutory appeal. We conclude that Warfield’s statutory discrimination claims do not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the employment agreement, and that she may proceed with her discrimination action in the Superior Court. Because her additional claims are wholly intertwined with her statutory discrimination claims, principles of judicial economy dictate that they be tried in the same action. 1. Facts. We recite only the facts relevant to the current dispute. Warfield, an anesthesiologist employed by Harvard Medical Faculty Physicians at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. (HMFP), has been an anesthesiologist on the medical staff of BIDMC since 1980. On March 27, 2000, Warfield entered into an employment agreement with BIDMC and HMFP in which she agreed to serve in the capacity of anesthesiologist-in-chief for BIDMC (agreement). The agreement provides that Warfield’s duties as anesthesiologist-in-chief would commence on January 1, 2000, and sets forth, inter alia, her duties as chief, her compensation and benefits in that position, and circumstances in which she could be terminated for cause and without cause. The agreement further provides that Warfield remained an employee of HMFP, and that she was bound by the separate articles, bylaws, rules, guidelines, regulations, procedures, and standards of BIDMC, HMFP, and Harvard Medical School that were not part of the agreement. The agreement additionally provides that it supersedes “any and all previous discussions, understandings or agreements between the Physician, HMFP, and/or the Hospital relating to the subject matter hereof or any other employment or contracting relationship between Dr. Warfield and HMFP or the Hospital.” Section 17 of the agreement, titled Arbitration, provides: “Arbitration. Any claim, controversy or dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or its negotiations shall be settled by arbitration. Each party hereto shall designate an independent arbitrator and these two[] arbitrators shall select a third independent arbitrator who shall be chairperson of the panel. The arbitrators shall then conduct the arbitration at a mutually acceptable site and a majority shall render a decision as to the matter in dispute, which decision shall be binding on the parties hereto. Each party shall bear the expense of its own arbitrator and an equal share of the expense of the third arbitrator. To the extent not otherwise hereinabove provided, the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. The full rules of discovery shall apply to any such proceeding. “In no event, however, shall this Section 17 be deemed to preclude a party hereto from instituting legal action seeking relief in the nature of a restraining order, an injunction or the like in order to protect her or its rights pending the outcome of an arbitration hereunder. With respect to matters submitted to arbitration other than claims for payment of monies due, the parties shall continue to perform their obligations hereunder relative to said matters pending resolution of the dispute by arbitration.” Neither § 17 nor any other provision of the agreement made reference to employment discrimination statutes or claims. In the fall of 2001, BIDMC hired Dr. Josef Fischer to be chief of surgery. In January, 2002, Paul Levy was hired as the president and chief executive officer of BIDMC. Warfield alleges in her complaint that during the next several years, Fischer engaged in a relentless pattern of gender-based discriminatory treatment of her. She also alleges that she repeatedly complained to Levy about Fischer’s treatment, but that no or insufficient action was taken. On July 18, 2007, carrying out a decision made by Levy and BIDMC that Warfield characterizes as “discriminatory and retaliatory in its motivation and defaming in its effect,” Levy terminated Warfield’s appointment as anesthesiologist-in-chief, effective immediately. Warfield further alleges that, since her termination, BIDMC, Levy, and HMFP have “marginalize^]” her by collaborating to push her out of her job as a staff anesthesiologist at BIDMC, and to deny her benefits to which she would have had access, absent the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory treatment. Warfield commenced this action in the Superior Court on March 7, 2008. In her complaint, Warfield alleges claims of gender discrimination under G. L. c. 15IB, § 4 (1), against BIDMC, Levy, and Fischer; retaliation under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4), against all defendants; tortious interference with advantageous or contractual relations against BIDMC, Levy, and Fischer; and defamation against BIDMC, Levy, and Fischer. Her claims of tortious interference with contractual relations are entirely based on the same alleged conduct that gave rise to Warfield’s statutory discrimination complaints. Her claims of defamation are primarily based on the same conduct that gave rise to her statutory claims, although as discussed below, Warfield additionally alleges that the defendants continued to defame her even after her termination as anesthesiologist-in-chief. The defendants moved to dismiss the case and to compel arbitration of Warfield’s claims pursuant to G. L. c. 251, § 2. On September 15, 2008, a judge in the Superior Court denied the defendants’ motions. He concluded that the arbitration clause did not reach Warfield’s claims for gender discrimination and retaliation because the agreement did not govern her employment relationship with BIDMC and HMFP generally, but only the narrow topic of her duties as chief of anesthesiology, and the claims of discrimination fell outside this narrow topic. He also concluded that to the extent Warfield’s claims concerned her termination, they were not arbitrable because the agreement provided specifically that it ended on Warfield’s termination, and therefore the arbitration clause would no longer be in effect. The defendants appealed pursuant to G. L. c. 251, § 18 (a) (1), which grants a right of interlocutory appeal from orders denying an application to compel arbitration. We granted the defendants’ application for direct appellate review. We affirm the order of the Superior Court judge but for different reasons. 2. Discussion. By its express terms, the agreement is governed by Massachusetts law, and thus the Massachusetts Arbitration Act (MAA) applies to it. At the same time, the agreement comes within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2006) (FAA), because it concerns Warfield’s employment as anesthesiologist-in-chief, and the defendants, as hospital-based health care providers, are involved in interstate commerce. See Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 678 (2007). In all relevant respects, the language of the FAA and the MAA providing for enforcement of arbitration provisions are similar, and we have interpreted the cognate provisions in the same manner. Id. at 678-679. The FAA provides in relevant part: “A written provision in . . .a contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Because procedures to compel arbitration under the FAA apply only in Federal courts, we apply the MAA’s procedures. See St. Fleur v. WPI Cable Sys./Mutron, 450 Mass. 345, 351-352 (2008). The MAA authorizes proceedings in the Superior Court to compel arbitration in accordance with the terms of an arbitration agreement, and permits an interlocutory appeal from orders denying an application to compel arbitration. See G. L. c. 251, §§ 2, 18. A defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is treated summarily. See Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass, at 676; G. L. c. 251, § 2. We review the judge’s order de novo. See Commonwealth v. Philip Morris Inc., 448 Mass. 836, 844 (2007). It is settled that the FAA allows for the arbitration of Federal employment discrimination disputes, unless otherwise barred by law. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24-26 (1991); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1999). We have not had occasion to rule on whether employment discrimination claims arising under G. L. c. 15IB are arbitrable, but the parties here correctly assume their arbitrability. The dispute before us concerns only whether the parties have contractually agreed, in the agreement, to submit statutory claims of discrimination to arbitration. See Mugnano-Bornstein v. Crowell, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 347, 350 (1997), quoting Local 285, Serv. Employees Int’l Union v. Nonotuck (Mugnano-Bornstein) Resource Assocs., Inc., 64 F.3d 735, 738 (1st Cir. 1995) (“a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed ... to submit”). We apply general principles of State contract law to determine whether a particular agreement requires arbitration of a claim. Mugnano-Bornstein, supra. See Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 264 (1st Cir. 1998), quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (“As with other issues involving the construction of individual employment contracts, in determining whether a contract requires arbitration, ‘courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts’ ”). See also Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474-476, All (1989) (where contract covered by FAA but choice of law clause provided California law would govern, parties in effect incorporated California arbitration rules into contract; under those rules, arbitration properly stayed even though FAA would not have called for stay). The arbitration clause in the agreement provides that “[a]ny claim, controversy or dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or its negotiations shall be settled by arbitration.” Federal as well as State law and policy favor arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (Federal); Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass, at 676 (Commonwealth). This policy generally instructs us that where a contract has an arbitration clause that is “broad” in its reach, there is a rebuttable presumption that a contract dispute is covered by the clause, and doubts whether a particular dispute comes within the scope of the clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration. See Drywall Sys., Inc. v. ZVI Constr. Co., 435 Mass. 664, 666-667 (2002). See also Commonwealth v. Philip Morris Inc., 448 Mass, at 843-844. Cf. Local No. 1710, Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters v. Chicopee, 430 Mass. 417, 421-422 (1999). In a number of contexts, we have construed the phrase “arising out of” and similar phrases (e.g., “connected to” or “relating to”) in an arbitration clause as constituting “broad” language that invokes the FAA’s (and MAA’s) presumption in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Philip Morris Inc., supra at 844-845 (settlement agreement between Commonwealth and tobacco companies providing for arbitration of disputes “arising out of” or “relating to” calculation of companies’ annual payments required arbitration of claim under agreement); Drywall Sys., Inc. v. ZVI Constr. Co., supra at 666 (construction subcontracts between general contractor and subcontractor providing for arbitration of claims “arising out of or relative to” subcontracts required arbitration of all parties’ construction project claims, including claim under G. L. c. 93A). However, this court has never been called on to interpret the scope of such language when used in an employment agreement’s arbitration clause where the employee raises claims of discrimination under G. L. c. 151B. Cf. Mugnano-Bornstein, 42 Mass. App. Ct. at 351-353. Our State law principles of contract interpretation make clear that considerations of public policy play an important role in the interpretation and enforcement of contracts. See Feeney v. Dell Inc., ante 192, 193 (2009) (Commonwealth’s strong public policy supporting ability of consumers to bring class actions as means of seeking remedy for unfair or deceptive commercial conduct rendered unenforceable sales contract arbitration provision barring class actions). See also, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 431 Mass. 150, 160 (2000); Beacon Hill Civic Ass’n v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 422 Mass. 318, 320-322 (1996). The Commonwealth has an “overriding governmental policy proscribing various types of discrimination, set forth in G. L. c. 151B.” Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Boston Carmen’s Union, Local 589, ante 19, 26, 29 (2009). Section 9 of G. L. c. 151B, the Commonwealth’s antidiscrimination law, states expressly that it is to “be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes, and any law inconsistent with any provision of [c. 151B] shall not apply.” The statute not only establishes substantive rights, but also makes available to an aggrieved party comprehensive administrative as well as judicial avenues of redress for substantive statutory violations. Thurdin v. SEI Boston LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 441-442 (2008). See Ayash v. Dana Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 391-392, cert, denied sub nom. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Ayash, 546 U.S. 927 (2005) (G. L. c. 151B is “comprehensive statute enacted to provide judicial and administrative remedies for destructive acts of discrimination in the workplace”). Consistent with the public policy against workplace discrimination reflected in G. L. c. 151B, we conclude that an employment contract containing an agreement by the employee to limit or waive any of the rights or remedies conferred by G. L. c. 15 IB is enforceable only if such an agreement is stated in clear and unmistakable terms. See Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 130-132 (2001) (plaintiff physician’s gender-based discrimination claims against defendant employer not subject to arbitration under arbitration clause in employment contract where terms of contract not sufficiently clear to constitute waiver of plaintiffs remedies under New Jersey antidiscrimination law). The interpretive rule we state here is not inconsistent with the presumption of arbitrability embedded in the FAA. That presumption signifies that “in applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the [FAA] . . . due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. at 475-476. Accord Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. at 24-25. But the purpose of the FAA was and is “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. at 24. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-220 & n.6 (1985); St. Fleur v. WPI Cable Sys./Mutron, 450 Mass, at 349. The concern was to enforce private agreements to arbitrate according to their terms, not to encourage arbitration of contractual disputes for its own sake. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., supra at 474-475. See also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, supra at 221. Our interpretive rule states only that as a matter of the Commonwealth’s general law of contract, a private agreement that purports to waive or limit — whether in an arbitration clause or on some other contract provision — the employee’s otherwise available right to seek redress for employment discrimination through the remedial paths set out in G. L. c. 151B, must reflect that intent in unambiguous terms. In relation to an arbitration clause, the rule continues to uphold the language and generous spirit of the FAA and the Commonwealth’s own public policy in favor of arbitration agreements: parties to an employment contract are free to agree on arbitration of statutory discrimination claims, and the presumption of arbitrability is in effect. However, parties seeking to provide for arbitration of statutory discrimination claims must, at a minimum, state clearly and specifically that such claims are covered by the contract’s arbitration clause., A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court supports our view that an intent to arbitrate statutory empl

McNEIL v CHARLEVOIX COUNTY Docket No. 134437. Argued January 22, 2009 (Calendar No. 9). Decided July 21, 2009. Kent A. McNeil and other residents or business owners in Charlevoix County brought an action in the Charlevoix Circuit Court against Charlevoix County and Northwest Michigan Community Health Agency (NMCHA), a multicounty district health department organized by Antrim, Charlevoix, Emmet, and Otsego counties. The NMCHA had promulgated a regulation that prohibits smoking in all enclosed public places, requires employers that do not wholly prohibit smoking at an enclosed work site to designate an NMCHA-approved, independently ventilated smoking room, and prohibits an employer from discharging, refusing to hire, or otherwise retaliating against an employee for exercising his or her right to the smoke-free environment created by the regulation. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring the regulation invalid. The court, Richard M. Pajtas, J., denied a motion for summary disposition filed by the plaintiffs, who then appealed. The Court of Appeals, Saad, EJ., and Hoekstra and Smolenski, JJ., affirmed, holding that the NMCHA acted within its authority when it promulgated the regulation at issue, that the regulation was not preempted by the Michigan Clean Indoor Air Act, and that the provision of the regulation that prohibits employers from discharging, refusing to hire, or otherwise retaliating against employees for exercising their right to a smoke-free environment did not violate the public policy of allowing employment terminable at will. 275 Mich App 686 (2007). The plaintiffs applied for leave to appeal, which the Supreme Court granted with respect to those plaintiffs who had standing. 482 Mich 1014 (2008). In an opinion by Justice Weaver, joined by Chief Justice Kelly and Justices Cavanagh and Hathaway, the Supreme Court held: The regulation at issue is authorized by statute and was promulgated in a manner consistent with the statutory requirements. Furthermore, the private cause of action that the regulation creates fits within public policy exceptions to Michigan’s at-will employment doctrine. 1. The NMCHA acted within its authority when it promulgated the regulation at issue. Part 126 of the Public Health Code (PHC), MCL 333.12601 et seq., which governs smoking in public places and is also known as the Michigan Clean Indoor Air Act, expressly provides that the Michigan Department of Community Health may authorize a local health department like the NMCHA to enforce part 126 and the rules promulgated under that part. MCL 333.12613(2). Even if the responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of the restrictions established by part 126 had been exclusively granted to the Department of Community Health, that would not, by itself, deny a local health department the authority to promulgate, implement, and enforce similar regulations of its own making. Part 24 of the PHC, MCL 333.2401 et seq., which governs local health departments like the NMCHA, charges local health departments with the duty to continually and diligently endeavor to prevent disease, prolong life, and promote the public health through organized programs, including those for the prevention and control of environmental health hazards. MCL 333.2433(1). Part 24 also provides that a local health department may adopt regulations to properly safeguard the public health, MCL 333.2435(d), or regulations that are necessary or appropriate to implement or carry out the duties or functions vested by law in the local health department, MCL 333.2441(1). Finally, part 24 provides that a local health department shall implement and enforce laws for which responsibility is vested in the local health department. MCL 333.2441(1). 2. The provision in the regulation that prohibits an employer from discharging, refusing to hire, or otherwise retaliating against a person for exercising his or her right to a smoke-free environment does not violate the public policy of allowing employment terminable at will by either employer or employee. An at-will employee’s discharge violates public policy if the employee is discharged in violation of an explicit legislative statement prohibiting discharge of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or duty, the employee is discharged for the failure or refusal to violate the law in the course of employment, or the employee is discharged for exercising a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment. Although the regulation at issue is not a legislative enactment or statement, it provides employees with certain specified rights and was, as required by MCL 333.2411(1), approved by the governing bodies of each of the counties served by the NMCHA. Given this and the public policy of minimizing the effects of smoking evinced by the Legislature through its enactment of part 126 and § 12905 of part 129 of the PHC, MCL 333.12905 (which governs smoking in public areas of food service establishments), the regulation’s restriction on an employer’s right to discharge an employee at will is consistent with the aforementioned exceptions. Justice Cavanagh, joined by Chief Justice Kelly, concurring, wrote separately to clarify that the non-retaliation provision of the clean indoor air regulation promulgated by the defendants falls within the public-policy exception to the common-law doctrine of at-will employment for employees acting in accordance with a legally recognized right or duty. He further stated that the sections of the regulation that create a private cause of action were within the broad constitutional and statutory authority granted to county boards of commissioners to pass ordinances that relate to county affairs and do not contravene the general laws of this state. Affirmed. Justice Markman, joined by Justices Corrigan and Young, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed that the NMCHA, acting in conjunction with the local boards of commissioners, has the authority to enact that part of the regulation that restricts smoking at least as stringently as the Michigan Clean Indoor Air Act. He dissented from the majority’s implicit ruling that the part of the regulation that creates a private cause of action against private employers is valid and would hold instead that MCL 46.11© precludes a county board of commissioners from creating a private cause of action against a private entity that alters Michigan’s at-will employment doctrine. He also dissented from the conclusion that the part of the regulation that restricts smoking fits within one of the exceptions to at-will employment recognized in the Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 412 Mich 692 (1982), and generally would not extend the Suchodolski exceptions to include local regulations. He would remand this case to the Court of Appeals to consider whether employees could enforce their rights under the regulation restricting smoking by bringing an action under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. 1. Health — Local Health Departments — Smoking Regulations. A local health department created pursuant to part 24 of the Public Health Code has the authority under that part and part 126, also known as the Michigan Clean Indoor Air Act, to promulgate, implement, and enforce regulations in indoor public places that are at least as stringent as those established by state law (MCL 333.2433[1], 333.2435[d], 333.2441[1], and 333.12613[2]). 2. Health — Local Health Departments — Smoking Regulations. A regulation by a local health department created pursuant to part 24 of the Public Health Code that prohibits smoking in all enclosed public places and requires employers that do not wholly prohibit smoking at an enclosed work site to designate a department-approved smoking room for those of its employees who smoke does not conflict with part 126 of the Public Health Code, also known as the Michigan Clean Indoor Air Act (MCL 333.2401 et seq. and 333.12601 et seq.). 3. Health — Local Health Departments — Smoking Regulations — Employment — At-Will Employment. A regulation by a local health department created pursuant to part 24 of the Public Health Code that prohibits an employer from discharging, refusing to hire, or otherwise retaliating against an employee for exercising his or her right to a smoke-free working environment mandated by the regulation does not violate the public policy of recognizing the right to terminate employment at will (MCL 333.2401 et seq.). Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C. (by Samuel J. Frederick), for Scott Way and Jeff Legato. Young, Graham, Elsenheimer & Wendling, P.C. (by James G. Young and Dennis M. LaBelle), for Northwest Michigan Community Health Agency. Amici Curiae: Cohl, Stoker, Toskey & McGlinchey, P.C. (by Peter A. Cohl and Richard D. McNulty), for the Michigan Association of Counties and the Michigan Association for Local Public Health. Bauckham, Sparks, Lohrstorfer, Thall & Seeber, P.C. (by John H. Bauckham and Robert E. Thall), for the Michigan Townships Association. WEAVER, J. At issue in this case is whether MCL 333.2441(1) authorizes a local health department to create, and a county board of commissioners to approve, regulations that control smoking in the workplace. Additionally at issue is whether such a regulation, providing employees with a private cause of action to seek its enforcement, interferes with Michigan’s at-will employment doctrine. I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION The Court of Appeals concluded that the regulation at issue is authorized by statute and was promulgated in a manner consistent with the statutory requirements. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals concluded that the private cause of action created by the regulation fits within public policy exceptions to Michigan’s at-will employment doctrine. We agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusions. In affirming, we adopt as our own the Court of Appeals’ opinion, McNeil v Charlevoix Co, 275 Mich App 686; 741 NW2d 27 (2007): In this action for declaratory relief, plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s order denying their motion for summary disposition. We affirm. I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant Northwest Michigan Community Health Agency (NMCHA) is a multicounty district health department organized by Antrim, Charlevoix, Emmet, and Otsego counties under Part 24 of the Public Health Code (PHC), MCL 333.2401 et seq. In purported furtherance of its duty to protect the public health and welfare in its district, the NMCHA promulgated what it entitled the Public Health Indoor Air Regulation of 2005 (the regulation). In addition to prohibiting smoking in all public places, the regulation requires employers who do not wholly prohibit smoking at an enclosed place of employment to designate an NMCHA-approved smoking room, which is required by the regulation to be “a separate enclosed area that is independently ventilated so that smoke does not enter other non-smoking areas of the worksite.” The regulation additionally prohibits an employer from discharging, refusing to hire, or otherwise retaliating against an employee for exercising his or her right to the smoke-free environment afforded by the regulation. After the regulation was approved by each of the four counties, plaintiffs, each of whom resides or operates a business within defendant Charlevoix County, brought this action to invalidate the regulation by judicial declaration that the NMCHA was without authority to promulgate such a regulation and that the regulation itself was preempted by Part 126 of the PHC, MCL 333.12601 et seq., which prohibits smoking in buildings used by the public except in designated areas. In seeking summary disposition on these grounds, plaintiffs argued that nothing in Part 126 of the PHC, which is also known as the Michigan Clean Indoor Air Act (MCIAA), authorizes a local health department to enforce or augment the smoking restrictions set by the MCIAA. Plaintiffs further argued that § 12605 of the MCIAA, MCL 333.12605, grants owners and operators of public places the discretion to choose whether to maintain a smoking section or remain smoke-free, and that this discretion to permit smoking in public places constitutes a statutorily conferred right that a local health department cannot annul by regulation. Moreover, plaintiffs argued, where the owner or operator of a public place chooses to have a designated smoking area, § 12605 requires only that existing physical barriers and ventilation be used to minimize the toxic effects of smoking. Thus, insofar as the NMCHA regulation requires that smoking be restricted to a separate, enclosed area with independent ventilation, it conflicts with the MCIAA and must be found to be invalid Citing this Court’s decision in Michigan Restaurant Ass’n v City of Marquette, 245 Mich App 63; 626 NW2d 418 (2001), plaintiffs further asserted that smoking is an issue better suited to regulation on a statewide basis, and that local regulation must therefore yield to the preemptive provisions of the MCIAA. Plaintiffs additionally argued that, to the extent the regulation impinges on the common-law right of an employer to discharge an employee at will, the regulation violates public policy and is void. The trial court, however, disagreed and denied plaintiffs’ motion. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary disposition. In doing so, plaintiffs again argue that the NMCHA lacked the authority to promulgate regulations restricting smoking and that local regulation was, in any event, preempted by the MCIAA. We disagree. A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Resolution of the questions presented on appeal requires the interpretation of statutes, which is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. See Michigan Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners v Ferndale, 256 Mich App 401, 405; 662 NW2d 864 (2003). When interpreting a statute, this Court’s goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature by applying the plain language of the statute. Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 597; 664 NW2d 705 (2003). B. OVERVIEW OF THE MICHIGAN CLEAN INDOOR AIR ACT The MCIAA, enacted in 1986 as Part 126 of the PHC, prohibits smoking “in a public place or at a meeting of a public body, except in a designated smoking area.” MCL 333.12603. Although seemingly broad in scope, “public place,” as defined by the MCIAA, renders the act inapplicable to most private-sector workplaces and public areas that are not themselves enclosed. See MCL 333.12601(m). Also exempt from the requirements of the act are food service establishments, MCL 333.12603(3), private educational facilities “after regularly scheduled school hours,” MCL 333.12603(4), and enclosed private rooms or offices occupied exclusively by a smoker, “even if the room or enclosed office may be visited by a nonsmoker,” MCL 333.12601(2). Further, the MCIAA expressly does not apply to “a room, hall, or building used for a private function if the seating arrangements are under the control of the sponsor of the function and not under the control of the state or local government agency or the person who owns or operates the room, hall, or building.” MCL 333.12603(2). In all other public places in which smoking is not “prohibited by law,” the MCIAA permits a “person who owns or operates a public place” to designate a smoking area. MCL 333.12605(1). In those public places in which an owner or operator elects to designate a smoking area, the act requires that “existing physical barriers and ventilation systems shall be used to minimize the toxic effect of smoke in both smoking and adjacent nonsmoking areas.” MCL 333.12605(1). The act further requires that seating within the public place be arranged “to provide, as nearly as practicable, a smoke-free area,” MCL 333.12607(b), and that the owner or operator develop, implement, and enforce “a written policy for the separation of smokers and nonsmokers which provides, at a minimum,” for a procedure to receive, investigate, and take action on complaints, and that ensures that nonsmokers will be located closest to the source of fresh air and that special consideration will be given to individuals with a hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke, MCL 333.12605(3); see also MCL 333.12607(c). C. AUTHORITY OF THE NMCHA TO PROMULGATE SMOKING REGULATIONS In challenging the validity of the regulation promulgated by the NMCHA, plaintiffs assert that nothing in Part 126 of the PHC authorizes a local health department to enforce or augment the smoking restrictions set by the MCIAA. Plaintiffs argue that, pursuant to MCL 333.12613, implementation and enforcement of the act and rules promulgated thereunder is a power within the exclusive province of the Michigan Department of Community Health. Plaintiffs’ argument in this regard, however, is not sustained by the plain language of § 12613(2) of Part 126, which expressly provides that “the department may authorize a local health department to enforce this part and the rules promulgated under this part.” MCL 333.12613(2). Moreover, even if the responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of the restrictions established by Part 126 had been exclusively granted to the Department of Community Health, that would not, by itself, deny a local health department the authority to promulgate, implement, and enforce similar regulations of its own making. As previously noted, Part 24 of the PHC authorizes the creation of local health departments such as the NMCHA. See MCL 333.2415 and 333.2421. Pursuant to § 2433 of Part 24, such departments are charged with the duty to “continually and diligently endeavor to prevent disease, prolong life, and promote the public health through organized programs, including prevention and control of environmental health hazards; prevention and control of diseases; prevention and control of health problems of particularly vulnerable population groups; development of health care facilities and health services delivery systems; and regulation of health care facilities and health services delivery systems to the extent provided by law. [MCL 333.2433(1).]” The regulation at issue is consistent with these duties and is authorized to be promulgated by the NMCHA under §§ 2435 and 2441 of Part 24, which provide that a local health department may “[a]dopt regulations to properly safeguard the public health,” MCL 333.2435(d), or regulations that “are necessary or appropriate to implement or carry out the duties or functions vested by law in the local health department,” MCL 333.2441(1). See also MCL 333.2433(2)(a) (which provides that a local health department “shall... [implement and enforce' laws for which responsibility is vested in the local health department”). As argued by defendants, the only limitation placed by the Legislature on the promulgation and adoption of such regulations is that they “be at least as stringent as the standard established by state law applicable to the same or similar subject matter.” MCL 333.2441(1). The regulation at issue here, being more restrictive than the standards set by the MCIAA, meets this requirement We recognize plaintiffs’ argument that, under a plain reading of § 2433(1), the fulfillment of the duties imposed by that section on local health departments is arguably limited to the institution of programs. The section must, however, be read in context and in light of the purpose of both Part 24 and the PHC in general. See Macomb Co Prosecuting Attorney v Murphy, 464 Mich 149, 159; 627 NW2d 247 (2001). As noted earlier, MCL 333.2435(d) expressly grants a local health department authority to “[ajdopt regulations to properly safeguard the public health.” Plaintiffs assert that the Legislature has also granted local health departments more specific powers. However, that does not lessen the general duty and authority of those agencies to protect the public health, MCL 333.2433(