Wrongful Termination Cases

ARNOLD FLOYD JOHNSON, Plaintiff v. CROSSROADS FORD, INC., Defendant No. COA13-173 Filed 15 October 2013 1. Evidence — affidavit—summary judgment — erroneously excluded —abuse of discretion The trial court abused its discretion in a wrongful termination case by excluding an affidavit presented by plaintiff prior to a summary judgment hearing. The affidavit from the individual hired to replace plaintiff was timely served upon defendant, the substance of the affidavit did not contradict any previous sworn testimony of the affiant, and the contents of the affidavit were .not contradictory to plaintiff’s complaint. 2. Employer and Employee — wrongful termination — correct evidentiary standard — genuine issue of material fact — summary judgment erroneous The trial court erred in a wrongful termination case by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant employer. Although the trial court did not use the wrong evidentiary standard as set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, plaintiff’s evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s age was the reason for his termination. Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 21 August 2012 by Judge Howard E. Manning in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 August 2013. Glenn, Mills, Fisher & Mahoney, P.A., by Stewart W. Fisher, for plaintiff-appellant. CranJUl Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Paul H. Derrick and Sara B. Warf, by defendant-appellee. North Carolina Advocates for Justice, by Winslow Wetsch, PLLC, by Laura J. Wetsch, amicus curiae. McCullough, Judge. Plaintiff Arnold Floyd Johnson appeals from the trial court’s order, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Crossroads Ford, Inc. and dismissing plaintiff’s claim that he was wrongfully terminated based on his age in violation of the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act (section 143-422.1, et seq., of the North Carolina General Statutes) with prejudice. After careful review, we reverse and remand the trial court’s order. I. Background On 17 February 2011, plaintiff Arnold Floyd Johnson filed a complaint against defendant Crossroads Ford, Inc., a North Carolina Corporation operating numerous car dealerships within North Carolina and Virginia, alleging wrongful termination. Specifically, plaintiff alleged he was wrongfully terminated by defendant based on his age in violation of the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act, section 143-422.1, et seq., of the North Carolina General Statutes. The complaint alleged the following: Plaintiff was bom on 9 April 1950. In March 2000, plaintiff was hired by defendant as a salesperson. Defendant’s president and principal owner Glenn Boyd (“President Boyd”) stated “that he could promote [plaintiff], so [p]laintiff should let [President Boyd] know what he was interested in doing, but that this was ‘a young man’s business.’ ” During his employment, plaintiff was promoted to Finance and Insurance Manager, then Business and Development Center Manager, and then Sales Manager at Crossroads Ford of Cary (“Crossroads Ford”). In 2007, plaintiff was promoted to the position of General Manager at Crossroads Ford. Plaintiff alleged that after he became General Manager, defendant’s Vice-President Allen Boyd would repeatedly refer to plaintiff in “an age-related derogatory manner,” call plaintiff “old man” up to five or six times in a single day, and say plaintiff could not hear a ringing telephone because of plaintiffs age when he did not have a hearing problem. In 2009, defendant hired Noah Woods, a thirty-five (35) year old male to replace plaintiff as General Manager of Crossroads Ford. Plaintiff was demoted to the position of Director of Sales and Service. Plaintiff further alleged that on 26 April 2010, a salesman named Patrick Rowe approached plaintiff and informed him that a customer was interested in purchasing a used Mustang convertible. Rowe wanted to sell plaintiff’s wife’s car, a Mustang convertible that had been sitting in the back lot of Crossroads Ford since April 2010. Plaintiff agreed to sell his wife’s car “but told [Rowe] that they would have to work it out with Vice-President Boyd to determine Rowe’s commission and how to complete the sale.” The customer gave plaintiff a check for the vehicle but the vehicle was not tendered to the customer because plaintiff wanted to wait until he talked to Vice-President Boyd about the transaction. On or about 31 April 2010, Vice-President Boyd informed plaintiff by phone that he was terminated for stealing. Plaintiff alleged that defendant’s reason for terminating plaintiff was false and pre-textual. On 5 January 2012, defendant filed an amended answer, denying many of plaintiff’s allegations. The amended answer admitted that Rowe advised customers that plaintiff was selling his wife’s used vehicle that was.sitting in defendant’s employee parking lot based on Rowe’s “understanding of corporate policy and his belief that Plaintiff had obtained authorization to sell his vehicle through the dealership [.]” Rowe heard plaintiff quote a sales price of $17,500.00 to one of the customers and “[t]hinking that the customer was going to finance the vehicle through the dealership, [Rowe] presented the customer with a credit application.” Plaintiff interceded, told Rowe that the credit application was not necessary, and told the customers to write a check payable to plaintiff personally. Defendant admitted that Vice-President Boyd confirmed to plaintiff that “his employment had been terminated for taking a corporate opportunity; selling his personal vehicle at the dealership to [a] customer of the dealership on company time with no benefit to the company and without authorization.” On 11 June 2012, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On 18 July 2012, plaintiff gave notice of filing of several documents including numerous depositions, an affidavit of Noah Woods, and several exhibits. On 20 July 2012, defendant filed a motion to strike the affidavit of Noah Woods and also filed numerous affidavits in support of its summary judgment motion. Following a hearing held on 23 July 2012, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summaiy judgment and dismissed plaintiff’s case with prejudice. From this order, plaintiff appeals. II. Standard of Review “Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a triable issue of fact. If the movant meets its burden, the nonmovant is then required to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating that the [nonmoving party] will be able to make out at least a prima facie case at trial. Furthermore, the evidence presented by the parties must be viewed in the fight most favorable to the non-movant. Thompson v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 151 N.C. App. 704, 706, 567 S.E.2d 184, 187 (2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). III. Discussion Plaintiff presents the following issues on appeal: (A) whether the trial comb erred by disregarding the affidavit of Noah Woods and (B) whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. A. Affidavit of Noah Woods Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by disregarding the affidavit of Noah Woods and finding that it was “presented at the 11th hour,” “inherently incredible,” and “inconsistent” with plaintiffs complaint. We agree. On 18 July 2012, plaintiff filed and served upon defense counsel the affidavit of Noah Woods, the thirty-five (35) year old who was hired by defendant to serve as General Manager of Crossroads Ford in 2009. Woods’ affidavit provided he was hired to replace plaintiff. It also stated the following, in pertinent part: 8. During the time that [plaintiff] and I worked together ..., I observed that Allen Boyd appeared to give [plaintiff] a hard time and to needle him. On several occasions I heard Allen refer to [plaintiff] as “old man.” 9. Allen Boyd did not use “old man” as a term of endearment. 10. Based upon my observations of the interactions between [plaintiff] and Allen Boyd, I would say that Allen Boyd knew that [plaintiff] did not like to be referred to as “old man” and that Allen Boyd could see that it was humiliating to [plaintiff.] 13. I am aware of the circumstances surrounding [plaintiff’s] termination from the company. 17. As the General Manager, I was fully aware of the sale. [Plaintiff] did not tiy to deceive anyone or hide the fact that he was selling the car. I approved of him selling the car to the customers. 18. [Plaintiff] was willing to pay a commission from the sale to Crossroads Ford and I did not think that there was anything wrong with his selling the car to the customers. 19. [Plaintiff] was going to let Allen Boyd know about the sale and work out a cut for Crossroads Ford with Allen. 20. On Friday, April 30, 2010, Allen Boyd called me and told me he wanted me to fire [plaintiff] for selling his car. 21. Although I disagreed with Allen’s decision, it was clear that Allen had already made up his mind[.] 24. I think Allen Boyd used the sale of [plaintiffs] car as a pretext to fire him. One of the principal reasons that Allen Boyd removed [plaintiff] from the position of General Manager and terminated him from his job was because of [plaintiff’s] age. On 20 July 2012, defendant filed a motion to strike the affidavit of Noah Woods. Although the trial court stated that it was not going to strike Woods’ affidavit during the 23 July 2012 hearing, in the 21 August 2012 summary judgment order, the trial court stated that [t]he Court finds that Woods’ affidavit is inherently incredible, presented at the 11th hour and therefore, does not create a material issue of fact to bootstrap [plaintiff] over the motion for summary judgment. Had Woods in fact approved of the sale as he now contends, the complaint would have contained these alleged facts. [Plaintiff] is simply using Woods as a “straw man” to put forth a last ditch yam that is inconsistent with the complaint and his sworn deposition testimony. It is crystal clear that , a party opposing a summary judgment motion cannot create an issue of fact by filing an affidavit that is in conflict with his prior sworn testimony. Woods’ affidavit is merely a surrogate for [plaintiff’s] inconsistent and newly created story that he had authority to sell the car from Woods. . . . Cousart v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, 704 S.E.2d 540, 543-44 (2011); Carter v. West Am. Ins. Co., 190 N.C. App. 532, and Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984). Reduced to essentials, Woods’ last minute affidavit is incredible, contradictory to [plaintiffs] complaint and his sworn deposition testimony and cannot be used to create an issue of fact to forestall summary judgment. (emphasis added). In determining whether the trial court properly disregarded Woods’ affidavit, “[w]e review an order striking an affidavit for abuse of discretion.” Waterway Drive Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Town of Cedar Point, _ N.C. App. _, _, 737 S.E.2d 126, 135-36 (2012) (citation omitted). First, we note that Woods’ affidavit was filed and served on defense counsel on 18 July 2012, five days prior to the 23 July 2012 hearing. This was in compliance with rule 6(d) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure which states that “opposing affidavits shall be served at least two days before the hearing.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 6(d) (2011). At the 23 July 2012 hearing, defense counsel stated that Woods’ affidavit “was timely filed and served on me. I don’t dispute that.” Therefore, the trial court erred by finding that because Woods’ affidavit was presented at the “11th hour,” it was inherently incredible. Further, all three of the cases cited by the trial court in its summary judgment order stand for the well-established proposition that “a party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by filing an affidavit contradicting his prior sworn testimony.” Cousart v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 209 N.C. App. 299, 304, 704 S.E.2d 540, 543 (2011) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); See Carter v. West Am. Ins. Co., 190 N.C. App. 532, 539, 661 S.E.2d 264, 270 (2008) and Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984). These cases specifically state that a party cannot survive a motion for summary judgment by merely filing an affidavit that contradicts their own personal, prior sworn testimony. In the case before us, however, the substance of Noah Woods’ affidavit did not contradict any previous sworn testimony of Noah Woods. Therefore, we hold that Cousart, Carter, and Barwick are not applicable to the facts in this case and that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Woods’ affidavit inherently incredible. Next, we address whether it was improper for the trial court to find that Woods’ affidavit was inherently incredible because it was “inconsistent with [plaintiff’s] complaint” and “contradictory to [plaintiff’s complaint.]” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Woods’ affidavit indicated that as General Manager of Crossroads Ford, Woods was aware of and approved the sale of plaintiff’s wife’s vehicle. The affidavit also showed that Woods believed that Vice-President Boyd used the sale of plaintiff’s wife’s vehicle as a pretext to terminate plaintiff. Woods believed that “[o]ne of the principal reasons [Vice President Boyd] removed [plaintiff] from the position of General Manager and terminated him from the job was because of [plaintiff’s] age.” The content of Woods’ affidavit was not contradictory to plaintiff’s complaint as the trial court’s summary judgment order states. Rather, it supported plaintiff’s claim that he was wrongfully terminated by defendant based on his age in violation of the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding Woods’ affidavit based on the belief that it was inconsistent with plaintiff’s complaint. B. Summary Judgment Order Plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously relied on the holding in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greens 411 U.S. 792, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and applied an incorrect burden of proof - placing the burden upon plaintiff to disprove defendant’s affirmative defense - in considering defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiffs evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiffs age was the reason for his termination. We address each of these arguments in turn. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that defendant terminated him because of his age, in violation of North Carolina public policy as set forth in the Equal Employment Practices Act (“EEPA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.1, et seq. The EEPA provides that [i]t is the public policy of this State to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination or abridgement on account of race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex or handicap by employers which regularly employ 15 or more employees. N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2 (2011). “Our Supreme Court has directed that we look to federal decisions for guidance in establishing evidentiary standards and principles of law to be applied in discrimination cases.” Youse v. Duke Energy Corp., 171 N.C. App. 187, 193, 614 S.E.2d 396, 401 (2005) (quotations omitted) (citing Dept. of Correction v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131, 136, 301 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1983)). la McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), Green, a black citizen of St. Louis, who had previously worked for McDonnell Douglas Corporation, an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer, as a mechanic and laboratory technician from 1956 until 28 August 1964 was “laid off in the course of a general reduction in [McDonnell Douglas Corp.’s] work force.” Id. at 794, 36 L.Ed.2d at 673. Green was a long-time civil rights activist and during the time he was laid off, “protested vigorously that his discharge and the general hiring practices of [McDonnell Douglas Corp.] were racially motivated.” Id. Three weeks following these activities, McDonnell Douglas Corp. publicly advertised for qualified mechanics and Green promptly applied for re-employment. Id. at 796, 36 L.Ed.2d at 674. McDonnell Douglas Corp. denied Green employment basing its rejection on Green’s protest activities. Id. Thereafter, Green filed an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that McDonnell Douglas Corp. had “refused to rehire him because of his race and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement[.]” Id. The Supreme Court of the United States in McDonnell Douglas established evidentiary standards to be applied “governing the disposition of an action challenging employment discrimination[.]” Id. at 798, 36 L.Ed.2d at 675. First, the claimant carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802, 36 L.Ed.2d at 677. “The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Id. at 802, 36 L.Ed.2d at 678. If a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason has been articulated, the claimant has the opportunity to show that the employer’s stated reason for the claimant’s rejection was in fact pretext. Id. at 804, 36 L.Ed.2d 679. “[T]he North Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly adopted the Title VII evidentiary standards in evaluating a state claim under § 143-422.2 insofar as they do not conflict with North Carolina statutes and case law.” Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1383 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). N.C. Dep’t of Correction v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78 (1983), was an employment discrimination case based on race and our Supreme Court applied the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary standards in evaluating a claim brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2. In N.C. Dep’t of Grime Control & Pub. Safety v. Greene, 172 N.C. App. 530, 616 S.E.2d 594 (2005), our Court applied the McDonnell Douglas “scheme by which employees may prove [age] discrimination in employment.” Id. at 537, 616 S.E.2d at 600. Our Court noted that “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the [employer] intentionally discriminated against the [employee] remains at ail times with the [employee].” Id. at 538, 616 S.E.2d at 600 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not err by utilizing the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary standards. Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiff’s evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s age was the reason for his termination. We agree. In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2, plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] was qualified for [his] job and [his] job performance was satisfactory; (3) [he] was fired; and (4) other employees who are not members of the protected class were retained under apparently similar circumstances. Hughes, 48 F.3d at 1383 (citation omitted). To support his claim, plaintiffs forecast of evidence established that he was bom on 9 April 1950, making him 60 years old at the time of his termination. Plaintiff began working for defendant in 2000 as a Salesman and quickly became one of th

Cyrus D. Lipsitt vs. Joseph J. Plaud & another. Worcester. April 2, 2013. August 12, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Massachusetts Wage Act. Common Law. Contract, Employment, Performance and breach. Damages, Quantum meruit. Practice, Civil, Statute of limitations, Motion to dismiss, Motion to amend. Limitations, Statute of. Attorney General. Corporation, Corporate disregard. This court concluded that G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, were not intended by the Legislature to be the exlusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid wages under Massachusetts law and, therefore, did not preempt common-law breach of contract and quasi-contract claims. [244-252] In a civil action in which the plaintiff asserted common-law breach of contract and quasi-contract claims for unpaid wages against a defendant corporation and its president, the Superior Court judge erred in dismissing the claims against the individual defendant on the ground that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil and hold the individual defendant personally liable for the corporation’s liabilities, where the factual allegations in the complaint were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss [252-254]; further, the judge erred in denying the motion to amend the complaint to plead such facts with more specificity [254-255]. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 20, 2010. A motion to dismiss was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J., and a motion to amend the complaint was considered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Mark I. Zarrow for the plaintiff. Brandon H. Moss for the defendants. Franklin D. Roosevelt American Heritage Center, Inc. (Heritage Center). Cordy, J. In this case, we are asked to decide whether G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150 (Wage Act), are intended to be the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid wages under Massachusetts law, preempting common-law breach of contract and related quasi-contract claims. We conclude that they are not. Cyrus D. Lipsitt filed suit against the defendants, the Franklin D. Roosevelt American Heritage Center, Inc. (Heritage Center), and its president, Joseph J. Plaud, for failing to pay approximately $117,500 in compensation he claimed was owed to him under an employment contract. The complaint asserted claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and violations of the Wage Act, among others. A judge in the Superior Court dismissed all but Lipsitt’s claim under the Wage Act, reasoning that the Wage Act is the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid wages, thereby preempting his common-law claims. Further, because Wage Act claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, G. L. c. 149, § 150, the judge ruled that Lipsitt’s potential recovery would be limited to wages earned but unpaid during the three-year period preceding the filing of the suit. After voluntarily dismissing the remaining portion of his Wage Act claim with prejudice, Lipsitt appealed from the earlier dismissal, and we transferred his appeal to this court on our own motion. We reverse. 1. Background. We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all factual allegations in the complaint and favorable inferences drawn therefrom. Curtis v. Herb Chambers 1-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011), and cases cited. We may also consider exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record. Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 165-166 (2012), citing Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477 (2000). Plaud founded the Heritage Center in 2004 for the purpose of establishing a museum to showcase his collection of memorabilia focused on President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Just prior to the Heritage Center’s opening, Plaud offered Lipsitt the position of museum director, and the parties agreed that Lipsitt would be paid $2,000 per month for June and July, 2004, after which his salary would increase to $4,167 per month. Payments were to be made on the 15th and 30th of each month. The parties memorialized their agreement in October, 2004. The Heritage Center experienced financial difficulties from its inception. Lipsitt never received the full salary due to him under the contract, but continued to work for the Heritage Center based on Plaud’s continuing representations to Lipsitt that the arrearages would be paid in full once debts owed to Plaud by third parties were paid. Most of the salary Lipsitt did in fact receive was paid from Plaud’s personal checking account. Based on his desire to see the Heritage Center succeed and his belief that Plaud would honor his repeated promises to pay the back salary in full, Lipsitt continued to work for the Heritage Center through the summer of 2007. In July, 2007, the city of Worcester, which owned the building where the Heritage Center was located, decided not to renew its lease with the Center and the Center closed its doors. Initially, Plaud intended to reopen the Center at a new location in Chicopee in late 2007, and Lipsitt continued to work for the Center performing tasks relative to the intended relocation. Ultimately, Plaud abandoned the relocation plan, and the Center never reopened. On September 17, 2008, Lipsitt filed a complaint with the Attorney General for nonpayment of wages pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150. On April 22, 2010, after an investigation, the Attorney General settled various Wage Act complaints with the Heritage Center and, on the same day, issued Lipsitt a right-to-sue letter. Lipsitt filed this action in Superior Court on September 20, 2010, seeking damages of approximately $117,500, a figure that apparently represents the roughly $127,000 he claims he is owed, minus the $9,000 in restitution he received from the Heritage Center pursuant to the terms of its settlement with the Attorney General. The complaint asserted claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, fraud and deceit, violations of the Wage Act, and violations of G. L. c. 93A, § 11. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety pursuant to Mass R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), arguing that the Wage Act creates a comprehensive statutory remedy for the recovery of unpaid wages, thereby precluding Lipsitt’s common-law claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and fraud and deceit. As to the Wage Act claim, the defendants argued it was time barred because more than three years had elapsed since the termination of Lipsitt’s employment with the Heritage Center, which they contend occurred on July 31, 2007. Further, the defendants argued that G. L. c. 93A does not apply to employment relationships. Finally, Plaud argued that Lipsitt had failed to allege sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil, which is a prerequisite to imposing individual liability on Plaud for the common-law claims. A judge in the Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss as to the common-law claims and the G. L. c. 93A claim, but not as to any portion of the Wage Act claim that alleged nonpayment of wages within the three-year period preceding the filing of the complaint. Following the dismissal of the majority of his claims, Lipsitt moved to amend his complaint to plead sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil and hold Plaud individually liable. The judge denied the motion principally on the basis that the amendment was futile where Lipsitt’s common-law claims had aheady been dismissed as preempted. Subsequent depositions in the case cast doubt on the viability of Lipsitt’s claim that he was employed by the Heritage Center (and thus owed salary) as of September 17, 2007 (three years prior to the commencement of the action), and Lipsitt moved to voluntarily dismiss the remaining Wage Act claim with prejudice so that he could appeal the dismissal of his common-law claims. Given the much longer six-year statute of limitations for contract claims, G. L. c. 260, § 2, and the fact that the majority of Lipsitt’s damages in the form of unpaid salary accrued between six and three years prior to the commencement of the Superior Court action, the survival of the contract claim was vital to any meaningful recovery. Lipsitt appeals from the dismissal of his contract and quantum meruit claims, and from the dismissal of Plaud as a defendant in his individual capacity. 2. Discussion, a. Dismissal of common-law claims. The Wage Act requires “[ejvery person having employees in his service” to pay “each such employee the wages earned” within a fixed period after the end of each pay period. G. L. c. 149, § 148. While acknowledging that there is “scant precedent” regarding whether the Wage Act preempts common-law claims for the recovery of unpaid wages, the motion judge nonetheless con-eluded that “[i]n enacting the Wage Act, the legislature created a comprehensive vehicle for recovering unpaid wages” and, accordingly, intended to preempt Lipsitt’s common-law claims. We disagree. “It is well established that ‘an existing common law remedy is not to be taken away by statute unless by direct enactment or necessary implication.’ ” Eyssi v. Lawrence, 416 Mass. 194, 199-200 (1993), quoting Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 521 (1980). Where the statute does not contain any express language concerning the availability of common-law remedies, we consider the possibility of implied preemption. Elyssi v. Lawrence, supra. This court has “long held that a statutory repeal of the common law will not be lightly inferred; the Legislature’s ‘intent must be manifest.’ ” Passatempo v. McMenimen, 461 Mass. 279, 290 (2012), quoting Comey v. Hill, 387 Mass. 11, 20 (1982). “The purpose of the Wage Act is ‘to prevent the unreasonable detention of wages.’ ” Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 170 (2012), quoting Boston Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 720 (2002). See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 340 Mass. 144, 147 (1959). The Wage Act “was intended and designed to protect wage earners from the long-term detention of wages by unscrupulous employers as well as protect society from irresponsible employees who receive and spend lump sum wages.” Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., supra, quoting Cumpata v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 164, 167 (D. Mass. 2000). When the Wage Act was first enacted in 1886, its application “was initially limited to employees of a ‘manufacturing, mining or quarrying, mercantile, railroad, street railway, telegraph, telephone and municipal corporation and every incorporated express company and water company.’ ” Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., supra at 171 & n.6, quoting St. 1886 c. 87, § 1. Since that time, the “Legislature has broadened the scope of employees covered, the type of eligible compensation, and the remedies available to employees whose rights have been violated” (footnotes omitted). Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., supra at 171. The private right of action that is at issue here, however, did not exist until the Legislature amended the Wage Act in 1993. Statute 1993, c. 110, § 182, codified at G. L. c. 149, § 150, “dramatically increased” the remedies available to employees, by authorizing a private right of action, including provisions for treble damages and attorney’s fees and costs. Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., supra at 171 n.8. The Legislature later made treble damages mandatory by St. 2008, c. 80, § 5, superseding our decision in Wiedmann v. The Bradford Group, Inc., 444 Mass. 698, 709 (2005). Thus, despite the arguably “comprehensive” nature of the Wage Act in its current form, the earliest the Legislature collectively could have formed or manifested an intent to preempt common-law remedies was on the creation of the private right of action by the 1993 amendments. Unfortunately, the legislative record of the 1993 amendments sheds little light on the question. Instead, it demonstrates that the driving force behind the 1993 amendments was a desire to transfer enforcement of the Wage Act from the Department of Labor and Industries (department) to the Attorney General, amid criticism that the department was not aggressively enforcing the Wage Act for political reasons. See St. 1993, c. 110, § 269 (transferring enforcement of Wage Act to office of Attorney General). It is inferable that the Legislature contemporaneously created the private right of action as a means further to ensure rigorous enforcement of the Wage Act, but this underlying purpose does not by itself suggest an intent to abrogate the common law. Essentially, where there is no indication of legislative intent to preempt the common law, the question is one of practicality. We must decide whether the common-law remedy is preempted by “necessary implication.” Eyssi v. Lawrence, 416 Mass. 194, 199-200 (1993), quoting Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 521 (1980). Virtually all the cases on which the defendants (and the judge below) rely are distinguishable because they find an implied preclusion of common-law actions where “the legislature creates a new right or duty that ‘is wholly the creature of statute [and] does not exist at common law.’ ” Mansfield vs. Pitney Bowes, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 12-1031-DJC, slip op. at 6 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 2013) (Mansfield), quoting School Comm. of Boston v. Reilly, 362 Mass. 334, 338 (1972). In contrast, the right of an employee to sue for breach of contract or on a quasi-contract theory arising from the nonpayment of wages is so long standing and fundamental that it requires no citation. Lipsitt’s claims for breach of contract, or, in the alternative, quantum meruit, do not depend on proving a violation of some statutorily created right. His claims for unpaid wages due him under an employment agreement were cognizable well prior to the creation of the Wage Act’s private right of action in the 1993 amendments. Indeed, for much of the Wage Act’s existence before then, an employee’s principal recourse for the nonpayment of wages would have been to file a contract or quasi-contract action. As previously stated, “statutory repeal of the common law will not be lightly inferred; the Legislature’s ‘intent must be manifest. ’ ” Passatempo v. McMenimen, 461 Mass. 279, 290 (2012). Had the Legislature intended the Wage Act — which was designed to enhance the rights of employees with respect to the payment of wages, see Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 171 & n.8 (2012) — to abrogate these long-standing common-law causes of action, “we think it would have done so explicitly.” Eyssi v. Lawrence, 416 Mass. 194, 200 (1993). In Passatempo v. McMenimen, supra, we considered whether a provision of G. L. c. 175, § 181, which grants to buyers of insurance the right of rescission against insurance companies whose officers or agents induced the sale of insurance by fraud, was intended to exclude other “long-standing” common-law remedies against insurance companies and their agents for fraud or misrepresentation. As to the right to bring suit against an agent individually, we reasoned: “Given the Legislature’s expansion of the types of misrepresentation for which agents and employees could be criminally sanctioned, the heightened criminal sanctions it imposed on them, and its approval of expanded civil liability against the companies for which they sold insurance, it seems most unlikely that the Legislature intended to change course by insulating agents from this long-established right of action.” Passatempo v. McMenimen, supra at 289. As to the ability of an insured to seek remedies other than rescission against the companies themselves, we stated: “[T]he Legislature’s desire to enhance deterrence makes it doubtful that the Legislature would have intended to preempt civil remedies other than rescission against insurance companies.” Id. Analogous in purpose to G. L. c. 175, § 181, the Wage Act is clearly intended to deter the nonpayment of wages through the imposition of enhanced penalties and remedies not available at common law. See Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., supra. Where, as is the case with the Wage Act, a statute is designed to enhance certain rights, we will not read it to abrogate common-law actions aimed at perfecting those same rights unless the statute requires such a reading by express language or necessary implication. Eyssi v. Lawrence, supra. The minimal practical impact that the continued existence of a common-law right to recover unpaid wages will have on the enforcement scheme established by the Wage Act further supports our conclusion that the Wage Act does not preempt the common law by necessary implication. On this point, the defendants argue that the continued existence of a common-law cause of action for unpaid wages will frustrate the purposes of the Wage Act’s requirement that an employee report a Wage Act claim to the Attorney General’s office before proceeding in court. We disagree. First, we note that the reporting requirement in G. L. c. 149, § 150, “is intended simply to ensure that the Attorney General receives notice of the alleged violations, so that she may investigate and prosecute such violations at her discretion.” Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., 465 Mass. 607, 612 (2013), citing Nahigian v. Leonard, 233 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164 (D. Mass. 2002). “[Ujnlike the filing requirement in [the Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute, G. L. c. 151B], the filing requirement in § 150 triggers no mandatory agency investigation or administrative adjudicatory action” and therefore does not operate “as the necessary first step in a comprehensive remedial scheme. ...” Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., supra at 613-614. See G. L. c. 151B, § 5 (filing of complaint with Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination [MCAD] triggers mandatory “prompt investigation” by that agency, after which, if allegations prove credible, MCAD shall “immediately endeavor to eliminate the unlawful practice complained of . . .by conference, conciliation and persuasion”). Although we will not speculate on every single reason an employee might chose to pursue a common-law contract or quasi-contract claim in lieu of a Wage Act claim, we suspect this will largely occur only in cases such as this one, where an employee’s Wage Act claims are time barred. This is true for the simple reason that it would be foolhardy for an employee to forgo the mandatory award of treble damages and attorney’s fees provided by the Wage Act in the event the employee prevails on such a claim. Some plaintiffs may choose to plead common-law claims in addition to or in the alternative to Wage Act claims, if, for instance, there is some dispute over the applicability of the Wage Act that cannot be resolved at the pleadings stage. See Mansfield, supra at 8 n.5. Moreover, for cases where an employee’s Wage Act claims are time barred, the employee would have little reason to report the claim to the Attorney General’s office in the first place, as he or she would be unable to bring the claim in court. We therefore doubt that our holding today will have any appreciable effect on the reporting of Wage Act claims or the enforcement scheme generally. The fact that, in cases like the present one, an employer whose Wage Act liability for treble damages and attorney’s fees has been extinguished will nonetheless be exposed to simple contract liability for an additional three-year period is consistent with both the public policy objectives underlying the Wage Act and the status of an employment agreement as a contract like any other. In Crocker v. Townsend Oil Co., 464 Mass. 1, 6-7 (2012), we held that an employee whose claim for unpaid overtime pursuant to G. L. c. 151, § 1A, was time barred under that statute’s two-year statute of limitations could nonetheless assert a claim for unpaid wages under the Wage Act, with his recovery limited to uncompensated time worked at the reg