Wrongful Termination Cases

Marc Flagg vs. AliMed, Inc. Norfolk. January 8, 2013. July 19, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Anti-Discrimination Law, Employee, Employment, Handicap, Association, Termination of employment. Employment, Discrimination, Termination. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. Statute, Construction. Libel and Slander. Actionable Tort. This court concluded that, in the circumstances of a civil action alleging employment discrimination on the basis of handicap, the Superior Court judge erred in dismissing, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the plaintiff’s claim of associational discrimination, i.e., that the plaintiff’s employment had been terminated, despite the plaintiff being an otherwise qualified, adequately performing employee, because the defendant employer did not want to bear the burden of increased health care costs (under a family medical insurance benefit that the employer provided to the plaintiff) when the plaintiff’s wife developed a disabling medical condition, where the language and purpose of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), as well as decisions of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, favored an interpretation of the statute prohibiting employment discrimination based on the disability of a family member, and where Federal antidiscrimination statutes have been interpreted to allow claims of associational discrimination. [27-37] Gants, J., concurring, with whom Cordy, J., joined. In a civil action arising from the termination of the plaintiff from his employment, the Superior Court judge properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claim of defamation, where the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant employer had published to anyone a statement that the plaintiff fraudulently had obtained money from the employer. [37-38] Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 8, 2010. A motion to dismiss was heard by Patrick F. Brady, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Marc S. Alpert for the plaintiff. James J. Rooney for the defendant. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal Foundation & another. J. Lynn Milinazzo-Gaudet for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Rebecca G. Pontikes, Jonathan J. Margolis, & Beth R. Myers for National Employment Lawyers Association, Massachusetts Chapter, & others. Matthew Segal, Sarah Wunsch, Anne Josephson, & Richard S. Loftus for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others. Janet Steckel Lundberg for Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts. Martha Coakley, Attorney General, & Joshua D. Jacobson & Gabrielle Viator, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Commonwealth. Botsford, J. The Commonwealth’s antidiscrimination statute, G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), bars employment discrimination on the basis of handicap. This case presents the question whether the statute bars an employer from discriminating against its employee based on the handicap of a person with whom the employee associates. We answer that, in the circumstances of this case, it does. Background. The plaintiff, Marc Flagg, appeals from the dismissal of his second amended complaint (complaint) against his former employer, the defendant, AliMed, Inc. (AliMed). The complaint contained claims of defamation and of employment discrimination in violation of G. L. c. 151B (c. 151B). We recite the pertinent facts alleged in the complaint. By February, 2008, the plaintiff had worked for AliMed for approximately eighteen years, and had received good job performance reviews. As an employee, the plaintiff received a salary and benefits, including family medical insurance, and an implied term of his employment was that AliMed would not terminate him because a family member developed a serious medical condition that involved considerable medical expense. On December 7, 2007, the plaintiff’s wife underwent surgery for removal of a brain tumor, and thereafter was receiving rehabilitative care. As a result, the plaintiff became responsible for caring for the couple’s children, including the obligation to pick up his daughter from school — a task that required him to be absent from work from about 2:55 p.m. until about 3:20 p.m. on certain days. The plaintiff’s manager at AliMed told him to take the time necessary to do what he had to do to care for his family. When the plaintiff left work to pick up his daughter on various days between December 27, 2007, and January 15, 2008,* ** he did not “punch out” — either when he went to pick up his daughter or after he had returned to work and was leaving at the end of the day. His manager knew the plaintiff was not punching out, and did not say anything to him about this practice. On February 4, 2008, however, AliMed terminated the plaintiff’s employment, proffering as its reason the fact that the plaintiff had failed to punch out on certain days when he left to pick up his daughter and therefore was being paid for hours that he had not actually worked. AliMed’s proffered reason for the termination was false: the real reason the plaintiff was terminated was that his wife had a very serious and expensive medical condition that rendered her totally disabled, and for which Ali-Med, through its health plan, was financially responsible. The February 4 employment termination took place at a time when the plaintiff’s wife was again a hospital inpatient because of a recurrence of the brain tumor, and the termination resulted in the immediate cancellation of the plaintiff’s health insurance and an initial denial of unemployment benefits. As a consequence, the plaintiff had to deplete his retirement plan funds and all his savings and suffered mental anguish. In addition, AliMed’s false reasons, and allegation that the plaintiff fraudulently was claiming that he had worked certain hours when he had not and thereby obtained money to which he was not entitled, “became known amongst fellow workers and the community at large,” likely leading people who learned of this allegation and who did not know him to conclude that the plaintiff “had engaged in serious deliberate misconduct” when in fact he had not done so. AliMed moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), as amended, 365 Mass. 754 (1974), and to strike portions of the complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (f), as amended, 365 Mass. 754 (1974). After a hearing, a judge in the Superior Court allowed the motion to dismiss, ruling that (1) the claim of defamation was not pleaded adequately; and (2) the plaintiff’s claim of employment discrimination did not state a claim on which relief could be granted: “the theory that [AliMed] fired plaintiff because his wife was handicapped is not recognized in the Commonwealth.” A judgment of dismissal entered on December 28, 2010, and the plaintiff timely filed an appeal in the Appeals Court. We transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion. Discussion. 1. Standard of review. In reviewing the correctness of the judge’s decision allowing AliMed’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, see Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), we “take as true ‘the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.’ ” Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45 (2004), citing Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995). To survive a motion to dismiss, the facts contained in the complaint, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must “ ‘plausibly suggest[]’ ... an entitlement to relief” (citation omitted). Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). We consider first the plaintiff’s claim under G. L. c. 151B, and thereafter his defamation claim. 2. Violation of c. 151B. As the motion judge implicitly recognized, the plaintiff’s claim is one of associational discrimination. The term “associational discrimination” refers to a claim that a plaintiff, although not a member of a protected class himself or herself, is the victim of discriminatory animus directed toward a third person who is a member of the protected class and with whom the plaintiff associates. See, e.g., Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 512 (6th Cir. 2009), citing Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir. 1999). In substance, the c. 151B count of the complaint alleges that AliMed, the plaintiff’s employer, terminated his employment premised on discriminatory animus directed toward his handicapped wife, that is, its desire to be free from its obligation to pay for the wife’s costly medical treatment. The plaintiff’s argument is that this form of discrimination fits within the scope of c. 151B, § 4 (16) (§ 4 [16]), because it causes a direct and specific injury to the employee and represents “a formidable barrier to the full participation of an individual in the workplace,” College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 162 (1987), which c. 151B, § 4, is intended to prevent. We agree. As we next discuss, interpreting § 4 (16) to encompass a claim of associational discrimination finds support in the language and purpose of that section and c. 151B more generally in the longstanding and consistent interpretation given to the statute by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (commission), and in the analogous provisions of Federal antidiscrimination statutes. Section 4 (16) provides in pertinent part that it shall be an unlawful practice, “[f]or any employer, personally or through an agent, to dismiss from employment or refuse to hire, rehire or advance in employment or otherwise discriminate against, because of his handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation required to be made to the physical or mental limitations of the person would impose an undue hardship to the employer’s business” (emphasis added). AliMed argues that the language of this section precludes the plaintiff from raising a claim of associational handicap discrimination because the handicapped person at issue is not the plaintiff — its employee —■ but the plaintiff’s wife. AliMed reads the section too narrowly. “The general and familiar rule is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished.” Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). See, e.g., Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 707 (2012) (interpreting c. 151B, § 4 [4A]). Accordingly, although a statute’s words are of prime importance in a court’s effort to discern legislative intent, see, e.g., Lowery v. Klemm, 446 Mass. 572, 577 (2006), the words must be evaluated in the context of the overarching purpose of the statute itself. We begin, therefore, with the objectives and purposes of c. 151B. Chapter 151B was enacted in 1946 to provide remedies for employment discrimination, a practice viewed as harmful to “our democratic institutions” and a “hideous evil” that needs to be “extirpated.” The Legislature recognized that employment discrimination is often subtle and indirect, and that it may manifest itself “by so many devious and various means that no single corrective rule can be applied to prevent the injustices committed.” And the Legislature determined that workplace discrimination harmed not only the targeted individuals but the entire social fabric. See Gasior v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 446 Mass. 645, 653-654 (2006), quoting Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549, 563, cert. denied sub nom. Wilfert Bros. Realty Co. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 543 U.S. 979 (2004) (recognizing that in context of c. 151B, punitive damages intended “as not merely vindicating personal rights, but comprising part of a scheme to vindicate a ‘broader public interest in eradicating systemic discrimination’ ”). The remedial aims of the statute are “only broadly set out.” Dahill v. Police Dep’t of Boston, 434 Mass. 233, 239-240 (2001) (Dahill), quoting Rock v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 204 (1981). The Legislature gave the commission comprehensive agency powers to effectuate the statute’s aims, and expressly directed that c. 151B “be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes.” G. L. c. 151B, § 9. The statutory provisions that proscribe employment discrimination based on handicap — § 4 (16) and derivatively c. 151B, § 1 (16), (17), and (19) — were added primarily in 1983. See St. 1983, c. 533, §§ 2, 6. They were enacted three years after the Legislature ratified an amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution prohibiting all discrimination based on handicap. See art. 114 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. Read against the backdrop of this constitutional amendment as well as the command of c. 151B, § 9, to interpret the statute liberally in order to effectuate its remedial purposes, these provisions can only be understood as establishing an expansive, categorical prohibition against discrimination based on handicap in the workplace generally. When an employer subjects an otherwise satisfactory employee to adverse employment decisions premised on hostility toward the handicapped condition of the employee’s spouse, it is treating the employee as if he were handicapped himself — that is, predicated on discriminatory animus, the employer treats the spouse’s handicap as a characteristic bearing on the employee’s fitness for his job. The employee is thereby subjected to the type of “prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear” relating to handicapped individuals that c. 151B, § 4 (16), seeks to protect against. See Cox v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 414 Mass. 375, 383-384 (1993), quoting School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987). Cf. Dahill, 434 Mass. at 240-241. Reading the statutory language broadly in light of its remedial purpose, and in order best to effectuate the Legislature’s intent, we think that the concept of associational discrimination also furthers the more general purposes of c. 151B as a wide-ranging law, “seeking] . . . removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to full participation in the workplace” that are based on discrimination. College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 162 (1987). See Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 391-392, cert. denied sub nom. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc. v. Ayash, 546 U.S. 927 (2005) (c. 151B is “comprehensive statute” and was enacted “to provide judicial and administrative remedies for destructive acts of discrimination in the workplace”). See also Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. at 707. Significantly, c. 151B expressly gives standing to seek relief to “[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved” by practices made unlawful by the statute (emphasis added). G. L. c. 151B, § 5. This section, using the same language as a cognate provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (Title VII), offers strong support for the conclusion that c. 151B’s protections against workplace discrimination were intended to cover all those adversely affected, whether or not they are the direct target of the proscribed discriminatory animus. Cf. Thompson v. North Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 869-870 (2011) (interpreting phrase “person claiming to be aggrieved” in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5[b] [2006]). We return to the language of § 4 (16). The section declares it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against, “because of his handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person.” The key term in § 4 (16) is “handicap.” It is defined in relevant part to mean “(a) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major Ufe activities of a person; (b) a record of having such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such impairment’ (emphasis added). G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (17). The third prong of the definition “protects those persons who, whether actually impaired or not, may be the victims of stereotypic assumptions, myths, and fears regarding such limitations.” Dahill, 434 Mass. at 241. We read this broad definition, and especially its third prong, as a signal that the Legislature intended § 4 (16) to prevent an employer’s animus against disabihty from adversely affecting not just those employees with actual handicaps but essentially all members of its workforce, because every employee theoretically has the potential for “being regarded” by the employer as having an impairment. When an employer takes adverse action against its employee because of his spouse’s impairment, it is targeting the employee as the direct victim of its animus, inflicting punishment for exactly the same reason and in exactly the same way as if the employee were handicapped himself. In other words, an employee treated in such a manner by his employer suffers precisely the same type of discrimination as an employee whom the employer directly but incorrectly “regard[s] as” being handicapped. In light of the Legislature’s expansive definition of “handicap,” and keeping in mind its command concerning liberal construction of the statute, see c. 151B, § 9, we conclude that the language of § 4 (16) is properly read to accommodate the concept of handicap discrimination based on association. Importantly, our interpretation of § 4 (16)’s language is one that the commission itself has adopted and consistently followed. “The primary responsibility to determine the scope of [c. 151B] has been entrusted to the [commission], not to the courts,” Rock v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 206 (1981), and we generally afford the commission’s interpretation of c. 151B’s provisions substantial deference. See, e.g., Dahill, supra at 239. See also, e.g., Zoning Bd. Of Appeals of Amesbury v. Housing Appeals Comm., 457 Mass. 748, 759-760 (2010). For over thirty years, the commission, through its decisions, has interpreted c. 151B, § 4, to protect against employment discrimination based on association, including associational discrimination based on handicap. See, e.g., Dittbenner v. Hopeo Auto Parts, Inc., 11 Mass. Discrimination L. Rep. 1139 (1989) (person aggrieved due to association with disabled individual has standing to bring claim under c. 151B before commission). This longstanding interpretation of § 4 (16) by the commission offers “illuminating” guidance to us, see Dahill, 434 Mass. at 239, and we accord it the deference to which it is due. It is also significant that analogous Federal antidiscrimination statutes, Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (Rehabilitation Act), have been interpreted to reach and cover claims of associational discrimination despite a lack of a specific reference in the statutory language. See Wheatley v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 418 Mass. 394, 397 (1994) (“It is our practice to apply Federal case law construing the Federal anti-discrimination statutes in interpreting G. L. c. 151B”). Title VII focuses on discrimination in employment, and “share[s] substantial common ground” with c. 151B. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 450 Mass. 327, 337-338 (2008). While Title VII do

AMY M. HORNE, Plaintiff, v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY HOSPITAL SYSTEM, INC., d/b/a CAPE FEAR VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, a/k/a CAPE FEAR VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant No. COA12-1276 Filed 2 July 2013 Employer and Employee — termination from employment — failure to state claim — claims properly dismissed The trial court did not err in an action based on plaintiff’s termination from her employment by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff’s failure to include in her complaint a specific no-discharge-except-for-cause allegation was fatal to her breach of contract claim; plaintiff’s complaint failed to sufficiently allege that her termination violated the public policy of this State and failed to sufficiently allege facts establishing the first and third elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress; and plaintiff’s claim for defamation was barred by the statute of limitations. As the trial court properly dismissed all of plaintiffs substantive claims, she was precluded from recovering punitive damages and her claim for punitive damages was properly dismissed. Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 1 August 2012 by Judge Douglas B. Sasser in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 March 2013. Law Offices of Kathleen G. Sumner, by Kathleen G. Sumner, for plaintiff-appellant. K&L Gates LLP, by Amie Flowers Carmack and, Brian C. Fork, for defendant-appellee. DAVIS, Judge. Amy M. Home (“plaintiff’) appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing her complaint against Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc. (“CCHS”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. After careful review, we affirm. Factual Background We have summarized the pertinent facts below using plaintiff’s own statements from her complaint, which we treat as true in reviewing the trial court’s order dismissing her complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Stein v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 360 N.C. 321, 325, 626 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2006) (“When reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), we treat a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true.”). Plaintiff began working part time for CCHS in April 2001 as a registered radiologic technologist. In May 2001, she switched to full-time employment in the same position. On 30 December 2010, plaintiff was hired as a CT technologist. In early February 2011, plaintiff attended an employee orientation, where she acknowledged in writing that she had received a copy of CCHS’s employee handbook, which provided certain grievance procedures for employees. On 16 March 2011, an incident occurred during a procedure that resulted in the wrong scan being performed on a patient. Although plaintiff did not perform the scan, a student intern involved with the procedure wrote plaintiff’s initials on the form memorializing the procedure. On 21 March 2011, plaintiff was “written up” by her supervisor as a result of this incident. The write-up cited the policy violation as being a “failure of the employee to perform his/her assigned tasks to include neglect, carelessness in duty, or failure to adequately document work activities.” On 22 March 2011, plaintiff received a second write-up. Plaintiff’s supervisor expressed concerns about “ ‘issues noticed during orientation/probation period’ relating to being a team player, and doing more paperwork than physical work, taking smoke breaks, poor organizational skills regarding workflow and prioritizing work____” Plaintiff was written up a third time on 29 March 2011 for allegedly “walk[ing] out of a procedure ....” A final write-up occurred on 29 March 2011 for “a statement that [plaintiff] allegedly said during the middle of a procedure____” Plaintiff’s employment with CCHS was terminated on 18 April 2011. The documentation evidencing her dismissal referenced “four incidents of scanning exams incorrectly, alleged delay in patient care, scanning the wrong anatomy, alleged complaint on a patient survey, peer reviews of which [plaintiff] knew nothing, and alleged complaints from co-workers.” Plaintiff’s supervisor told her that she was not allowed to contest any of the incidents contained in her personnel file due to the fact that she was in her probationary period at the time. After her termination, plaintiff applied for, and received, unemployment benefits. On 17 April 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint against CCHS, asserting four causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) defamation. In addition to compensatory damages, plaintiff sought punitive damages, costs, interest, and attorney’s fees. On 15 June 2012, CCHS filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. After conducting a hearing, the trial court entered an order on 1 August 2012 granting the motion and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court. Analysis Plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). “When a party files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the question for the court is whether the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theoiy, whether properly labeled or not.” Enoch v. Inman, 164 N.C. App. 415, 417, 596 S.E.2d 361, 363 (2004). “A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where (1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports a plaintiff’s claim, (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim, or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats a plaintiff’s claim.” Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C. App. 462, 468, 574 S.E.2d 76, 83 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 66, 579 S.E.2d 576 (2003). An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court’s dismissal of an action under Rule 12(b)(6). Leary v. N.C. Forest Prods., Inc., 157 N.C. App. 396, 400, 580 S.E.2d 1,4, aff'd per curiam, 357 N.C. 567, 597 S.E.2d 673 (2003). I. Breach of Contract Claim Initially, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her breach of contract claim. Under North Carolina law, unless the employer and employee have entered into a contract specifying a definite term of employment, the employment relationship “is presumed to be terminable at the will of either party without regard to the quality of performance of either party.” Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 331, 493 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1997). Plaintiff does not allege that a contract specifying a definite period of employment existed between her and CCHS. Instead, she asserts that certain contractual rights regarding termination and grievance procedures arose out of CCHS’s “Employee Handbook.” CCHS’s failure to follow those procedures in terminating her employment, she argues, constitutes a breach of contract. We disagree. Plaintiff relies entirely on Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617, disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 (1986), with regard to her breach of contract claim. In Trought, this Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim, which was premised on the plaintiff’s assertion that her employer’s policy manual had become part of her employment contract. Id. at 762, 338 S.E.2d at 620. The plaintiff in Trought alleged that (1) the defendant’s policy manual provided that employees could be discharged only for cause; (2) when the plaintiff was hired, she was required to sign a statement acknowledging that she had read the policy manual; and (3) she was discharged without cause. Id., 338 S.E.2d at 619-20. As this Court has recognized, Trought is “[t]he only North Carolina case that has upheld a breach of contract claim based on an employee manual....” Guarascio v. New Hanover Health Network, Inc., 163 N.C. App. 160, 164, 592 S.E.2d 612, 614, disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 375, 597 S.E.2d 130 (2004). In Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d 357 (1987), our Supreme Court “limited the rule in Trought to its narrow facts.” Guarascio, 163 N.C. App. at 164, 592 S.E.2d at 614. The plaintiff in Harris - in contrast to the plaintiff in Trought - failed to allege that his employer’s procedure manual expressly represented that an employee could be discharged only for cause. Harris, 319 N.C. at 631, 356 S.E.2d at 360. In the absence of such an allegation, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff in Harris could not rely on Trought in order to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a valid claim for breach of contract. Id. at 633, 356 S.E.2d at 360. As we are bound by our Supreme Court’s decision in Harris, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim for breach of contract. Nowhere in plaintiff’s complaint does she allege that CCHS’s employee handbook provided that an employee could be terminated only for cause. Instead, she merely alleges that, “[a]s part of [CCHS’s] employee orientation, [plaintiff] was required to acknowledge in writing the receipt of the Employee Handbook that set forth the grievance procedures that were available to employees of [CCHS]” and that she was likewise “required to acknowledge in writing the receipt of Standards of Performance for Employees.” Thus, as in Harris, plaintiff’s failure to include in her complaint a “specific no-discharge-except-for-cause allegation” is fatal to her claim. Id. at 631, 356 S.E.2d at 360. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. II. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy Claim The trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy was also correct. Under the employment-at-will doctrine, employees may be discharged for any reason, for no reason at all, or for an irrational or arbitrary reason. Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 175, 381 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1989). However, an exception to this doctrine is that employers are prohibited from discharging employees for reasons that violate the public policy of our State. Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors Inc., 350 N.C. 567, 571, 515 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1999). Claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy have been recognized in circumstances where the employee was terminated: “(1) for refusing to violate the law at the employer[’]s request, (2) for engaging in a legally protected activity, or (3) based on some activity by the employer contrary to law or public policy.” Ridenhour v. Inter’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 132 N.C. App. 563, 568-69, 512 S.E.2d 774, 778 (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 595, 537 S.E.2d 481 (1999). With respect to claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, this Court has explained that “notice pleading is not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss; instead a claim must be pled with specificity.” Gillis v. Montgomery County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 191 N.C. App. 377, 379, 663 S.E.2d 447, 449, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 508, 668 S.E.2d 26 (2008). In order to maintain such a claim, therefore, the plaintiff must allege “specific conduct by a defendant that violated a specific expression of North Carolina public policy . . ..” Considine v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 145 N.C. App. 314, 321-22, 551 S.E.2d 179, 184 (emphasis added), aff’d per curiam, 354 N.C. 568, 557 S.E.2d 528 (2001). Plaintiff contends that her complaint sufficiently alleges that her termination violated the public policy of this State in four ways: (1) CCHS violated her constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process; (2) CCHS failed to comply with its own internal grievance procedures; (3) CCHS breached the covenant of good faith in the employer-employee relationship; and (4) CCHS violated numerous statutory expressions of public policy. We discuss each of these arguments in turn. i. Due Process It is well established that in order for an employee to be entitled to procedural due process protection, the employee must possess a property interest or right in continued employment with a public employer. Soles v. City of Raleigh Civil Serv. Comm’n, 345 N.C. 443, 446, 480 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1997). Because CCHS is a private employer, plaintiff did not have any constitutional protections. See Teleflex Info. Sys., Inc. v. Arnold, 132 N.C. App. 689, 693-94, 513 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1999) (rejecting plaintiffs arguments that his discharge violated his constitutional rights because such rights were not “implicated in a dispute between an employee and a private employer”). Moreover, this Court has expressly held that an at-will employee, such as plaintiff, even if a government employee, “does not have a constitutionally protected right to continued employment and does not have the benefit of the protections of procedural due process.” Wuchte v. McNeil, 130 N.C. App. 738, 740, 505 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1998). As such, plaintiff cannot rely on procedural due process principles to support her wrongful discharge claim. With regard to her substantive due process claim, plaintiff, in her brief, fails to cite any legal authority in support of her contention on this issue. We, therefore, deem this argument abandoned on appeal pursuant to Rule 28(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. ii. Failure to Follow Internal Grievance Policies Plaintiff’s second ground for her wrongful discharge claim is that CCHS violated its own internal policies by preventing plaintiff from using CCHS’s grievance procedures to (1) challenge her termination; or (2) pursue her complaints against her supervisor. Plaintiff, however, failed to identify in her complaint any express public policy violated by a private employer’s failure to comply with its own internal procedures. The failure to include such an allegation warrants dismissal of plaintiff’s claim. See Considine, 145 N.C. App. at 319, 551 S.E.2d at 183 (affirming dismissal of claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where “[p]laintiff’s complaint d[id] not assert that defendant’s . . . conduct violated any public policy that has been established by our state’s statutes or constitution”). Moreover, plaintiff’s assertion that CCHS failed to follow the grievance procedures set out in its policy handbook is not the same as an allegation that she was terminated for a reason that violates the public policy of our State - the essence of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See Garner, 350 N.C. at 572, 515 S.E.2d at 441 (“In order to support a claim for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee [in violation of public policy], the termination itself must be motivated by an unlawful reason or purpose that is against public policy.”). iii. Bad Faith Plaintiffs third basis for her wrongful discharge claim is that CCHS terminated her employment in bad faith. However, our Supreme Court has made clear that North Carolina “d[oes] not recognize a separate claim for wrongful discharge in bad faith.” Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348, 360, 416 S.E.2d 166, 173 (1992). Accordingly, this claim was properly dismissed. iv. Statutory Violations Finally, plaintiff makes the blanket assertion that her discharge contravenes “important” public policy statements expressed in North Carolina’s: (1) “unemployment compensation laws”; (2) “labor relations laws”; (3) “ ‘[b]lacklisting’ and ‘[j]ob [references’ laws”; and (4) “the compliance and good business practices laws embodied within the corporate laws ....” However, in making these allegations, plaintiff merely refers generally to various topics addressed in the North Carolina General Statutes without citing any specific statutory provisions. Such oblique references are insufficient to put CCHS “on notice of what public policy [its] termination of plaintiff violated.” Gillis, 191 N.C. App. at 381, 663 S.E.2d at 450; accord Considine, 145 N.C. App. at 321-22, 551 S.E.2d at 184 (affirming dismissal of wrongful discharge claim based on caselaw requiring allegations of “specific conduct by a defendant that violated a specific expression of North Carolina public policy”) (emphasis added). Given the absence of such allegations, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). III. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). In order to state a claim for NIED, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct; (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress; and (3) the conduct did, in fact, cause the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (1990). Plaintiffs complaint fails to sufficiently allege facts establishing the first and third elements. The first element of an NIED claim requires allegations that the “defendant failed to exercise due care in the performance of some legal duty owed to [the] plaintiff under the circumstances[.]” Guthrie v. Conroy, 152 N.C. App. 15, 25, 567 S.E.2d 403, 410-11 (2002). Nowhere, however, in her complaint does plaintiff reference any duty owed to her by CCHS. The failure to allege such a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff is fatal to an NIED claim on a motion to dismiss. See id., 567 S.E.2d at 411 (“[Plaintiff alleges no duty that [defendant] owed plaintiff .... Absent a breach of duty of care, plaintiff’s suit against [defendant] for NIED cannot be maintained.”). Moreover, plaintiff’s NIED claim is premised on allegations of intentional - rather than negligent - conduct. Beyond the conclusory assertion that “[CCHS] negligently engaged in the aforementioned conduct against [plaintiff],” plaintiffs complaint recounts only intentional conduct on the part of CCHS. Indeed, plaintiff alleges: “[CCHS’s] action[] toward [plaintiff] constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct which was intended to - and did in fact - cause her severe emotional distress.” (Emphasis added.) The complaint elsewhere alleges that plaintiff became a “target” of her supervisor’s “deliberate, vicious, malicious, and outrageous campaign and conspiracy of harassment....” Allegations of intentional conduct, such as these, even when construed liberally on a motion to dismiss, cannot satisfy the negligence element of an NIED claim. See Sheaffer v. County of Chatham, 337 F.Supp.2d 709, 734 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (“Even taking all these allegations as true, they demonstrate intentional acts for which Plaintiff has made other claims; they do not show negligent acts required for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.”). Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to properly plead an element essential to her NIED claim. In addition, in order to plead a valid NIED claim, a plaintiff must allege severe emotional distress, which has been defined as “any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.” Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. Here, the complaint merely asserts that CCHS’s actions were the “direct and proximate cause of [plaintiff’s severe emotional distress” - without any factual allegations regarding the type, manner, or degree of severe emotional distress she clai