Wrongful Termination Cases

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant in connection with the alleged wrongful termination of her employment by the defen- dant, alleging claims for wrongful discharge in violation of an implied contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). After the trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike all three counts, the plaintiff filed a substitute complaint, recasting the first count as one sounding in racial discrimination in her discharge from employ- ment. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended substitute complaint, amending the allegations in the second and third counts. The defendant filed another motion to strike all three counts, and a motion to dismiss the first count. The trial court granted the motion to strike and rendered a judgment of dismissal as to the entire complaint, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court, which affirmed the dismissal of count one but reversed the judgment of dismissal as to counts two and three because the defendant did not seek a dismissal of those counts. On remand, the plaintiff filed another substitute complaint setting forth four counts, which alleged claims for wrongful discharge in breach of an implied employment contract, defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of CUTPA. After the trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike each count, the plaintiff filed another substitute complaint incorporating counts one, two, and four from her previously stricken complaint and repleading count three. The trial court, again, granted the defendant's motion to strike the complaint and also granted a motion for judgment filed by the defendant. From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly struck each count of her operative complaint. Held: 1. The trial court properly struck the first count of the

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL - R.C. 3319.16 lower court did not abuse its discretion termination of teaching contracts for violation of hazing policy during band camp "fairly serious matters" "good and just cause" for termination Daugherty factors preponderance of the evidence, not manifest weight, was appropriate standard for Board of Education's rejection of a referee's findings of fact.

Although an employee's failure to participate in vocational rehabilitation can constitute voluntary abandonment of the workforce, here the Industrial Commission had some evidence to support its conclusion that the claimant's work-related injuries had rendered him permanently and totally disabled and thus obviated the need for vocational analysis. The magistrate's findings of fact and ultimate recommendation are adopted, and the requested writ of mandamus is denied. Objection overruled writ denied.

summary judgment – R.C. 4112.02(I) – retaliation – but-for cause – ineffective assistance of counsel in civil case