Retaliation Cases

defamation, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, whistleblower, R.C. 4113.52, statutory immunity, R.C. 2744.03, motion for summary judgment, genuine issue of material fact

Motion to compel arbitration contract contractual capacity ratification R.C. 2711.02. The trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. The record reflects that a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement existed because it had been ratified by appellant's guardian.

Trial court did not err in providing jury instruction requested by appellees, nor did court err in ruling on appellant's request to pursue a claim for retaliation in age discrimination action.

We granted the Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application for interlocutory appeal in this case to consider whether a healthcare provider can use Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272, ("the peer review statute"), to claim privilege and exclude evidence that an employee was threatened with dismissal or retaliation if the employee refused to change their story or alter documents in order to cover up possible negligent conduct. We find and hold that the peer review privilege contained within Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272 never was intended to allow a healthcare provider to attempt without fear of adverse consequences to force an employee to commit perjury. We, therefore, reverse the July 31, 2017 order of the Circuit Court for Washington County ("the Trial Court") excluding the testimony of defendants' employee pursuant to the peer review privilege contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272 and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on appellant's breach of contract claim as related to the termination of her administrative positions. However, trial court erred in granting summary judgment on appellant's breach of contract claim related to the cancellation of appellant's endowed professorship where appellee failed to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Trial court did not err in determining that it lacked jurisdiction over constitutional due process claim. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on discrimination claim because appellant failed to meet her burden of demonstrating prima facie case and pretext. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on retaliation claim because appellant failed to demonstrate prima facie case.

A 62-year-old former employee of the Macon County School System sued the Board of Education on the grounds of age discrimination and retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. She alleged that her supervisor, the school principal, made age related discriminatory remarks and demoted her after she complained about a co worker's repeated, sexually explicit comments. In its answer, the Board of Education contended that the re-assignment was a lateral transfer and was justified by nondiscriminatory reasons. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination or retaliation, and that the Board produced undisputed evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for transferring Plaintiff. We respectfully disagree, having concluded that Plaintiff identified and produced evidence to establish a prima facie case for both claims and to create a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the Board's stated reasons are pretexts for discriminatory or retaliatory animus. For these reasons, the Board was not entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.