Whistleblower Cases

WEST v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION Docket No. 121003. Decided July 22, 2003. On application by a defendant, General Motors Corporation, for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the circuit court order of summary disposition in favor of the defendant. Rehearing denied post, 1224. Calvin West, and his wife, derivatively, brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against General Motors Corporation and several of its employees, alleging numerous counts relating to his dismissal from employment. The circuit court, Susan Bieke Neilson, J., granted summary disposition for the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals, Griffin, P.J., and Meter and K F. Kelly, JJ., in an unpublished opinion per curiam, affirmed in part and reversed in part, ordering a remand for trial on the count under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seq., because the Court could not determine as a matter of law that there was absolutely no causal connection between Calvin West’s police report of a workplace assault against him and his dismissal from employment (Docket No. 224408). General Motors Corporation sought leave to appeal. In an opinion per curiam, signed by Chief Justice Corrigan, and Justices Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman, the Supreme Court held-. The plaintiff failed to present evidence that would allow reasonable jurors to find a causal connection between the police report he made and the subsequent employment decisions affecting him. There is no factual issue for a jury to decide. 1. To establish a prima facie case under the wpa, a plaintiff must show that he was engaged in a protected activity under the act, that the plaintiff was discharged or discriminated against, and that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. The plaintiff failed to present evidence demonstrating a prima facie case. 2. In this case, the plaintiff reported an alleged assault to the police, a protected activity under the wpa, and then told his supervisors of the report. Because the supervisors were not involved in the decision to discharge the plaintiff, there is no demonstration that the report or the advising of his supervisors of the report was a cause of the adverse employment action. 3. The temporal relationship of the plaintiff’s discharge after the report to the police, standing alone, does not demonstrate a causal connection between the protected activity and any adverse employment action. The plaintiff presented no evidence connecting his discharge to his report to the police. Affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court order reinstated. Justice Kelly, joined by Justice Cavanagh, dissenting, stated that the plaintiff did present evidence to support his claim under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act sufficient to prevent summary disposition for the defendant. If the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the nonmoving party, the plaintiff presented several allegations that, if proven, could allow the jury to infer causation. The lack of action by General Motors relating to time sheet problems of the plaintiff in the year before he filed a police report and his discharge for claimed time sheet problems after the police report support an inference that the report brought about the adverse employment actions. The plaintiff was fired for seeking wages for overtime that gm claims he did not work, but the plaintiff claims he did work. A trier of fact could find that the plaintiff did work the hours in question, leading to the inference that he was wrongfully discharged. A wrongful discharge would show that there was not a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s firing. If the facts are construed as they must be, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it becomes apparent that a question of fact exists in this case. The Court of Appeals judgment should be affirmed and the case should be remanded to the trial court. Labor Relations — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act — Protected Activity — Adverse Employment Action. A causal connection between activity protected by the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act and an adverse employment action, which connection is necessary for a prima facie case under the act, is not established merely because the adverse employment action followed the protected activity; the plaintiff must present evidence that would allow reasonable jurors to find a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action (MCL 15.362). O’Neal O. Wright & Associates, P.C. (by O’Neal 0. Wright and Lynette M. Bledsaw), for the plaintiffappellee. Hardy, Lewis & Page, P.C. (by Terence V. Page and Kay Rivest Butler), for General Motors Corporation. Per Curiam. The circuit court granted defendant General Motors’ motion for summary disposition and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged a count under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., and counts of assault and battery, wrongful discharge, race discrimination, retaliation for reporting acts of discrimination, and loss of consortium. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s whistleblower count and affirmed the remainder of the circuit court’s ruling. Defendant seeks to appeal the part of the Court of Appeals decision reinstating plaintiff’s whistleblower count, while plaintiff seeks to cross-appeal the part of the Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the dismissal of the balance of his complaint. Because plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence supporting the causation element of his whistleblower claim, we reverse that aspect of the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate the circuit court’s order of summary disposition in favor of defendant. We have also considered plaintiff’s application for leave to cross-appeal, and that application is denied because we find no merit in the issues raised by plaintiff. I Plaintiff Calvin West worked as a maintenance supervisor for defendant General Motors. He was a salaried employee and was responsible for completing his own time sheet. Plaintiff was warned several times in 1996 and in February 1997 about misrepresenting the time he actually worked. Nevertheless, plaintiff reported four extra hours of overtime on his time sheet for May 22, 1997. His supervisors learned of this overstatement and, after an investigation, plaintiff was disciplined on June 4, 1997. Plaintiff was prohibited from working any overtime, and he was required to use the salaried-employee entrance and to “swipe” his identification badge at the entrance each time he entered or left the plant. In addition, plaintiff was advised, orally and in writing, that reporting time that was not actually worked constituted fraudulent conduct and could result in termination of his employment. Effective August 11, 1997, plaintiff was transferred from the morning shift to the afternoon shift. Plaintiff accordingly worked for different supervisors. In September 1997, plaintiff was again allowed to work overtime. On October 16, 1997, plaintiff reported two hours of overtime that he did not work. An investigation of this incident led to the termination of plaintiffs employment on January 8, 1998, because of plaintiffs repeated violations of the employer’s policies for reporting time worked. While plaintiff was still working on the morning shift, an incident occurred on May 4, 1997, involving a union committee person named Jim Reeves. Plaintiff entered a room where Reeves and others were in conference. When plaintiff did not leave the room as Reeves ordered, there was physical contact between plaintiff and Reeves. Plaintiff claims that he was shoved by Reeves; Reeves claims that when he stood up from his desk his stomach brushed plaintiff. Plaintiff reported to plant security that Reeves had assaulted him. In addition, plaintiff claims he telephoned the Romulus police and reported the assault. Plaintiff also asserts that he advised his immediate supervisor, Randall Koyal, and his area supervisor, John Tate, that he had reported the assault to the police. Plaintiff characterized Royal’s response to being told about the report to the police as “nonchalant.” Plaintiff said that he could not discern Tate’s response upon learning that plaintiff had contacted the police, but Tate seemed to be upset that the incident between plaintiff and Reeves had occurred. In his complaint, plaintiff claimed that his rights under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act were violated because he was retaliated against and discriminated against for reporting the Reeves assault to the police. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that after the report, both Tate and Koyal treated him differently and retaliated by, among other things, unfairly accusing him of time-sheet violations, transferring him to a different shift, and terminating his employment. The circuit court granted defendant summary disposition regarding this count, reasoning that plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case because he failed to present evidence of a causal connection between his report to the Romulus police and any adverse employment action. The circuit court also concluded that, even if plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the employer had shown a legitimate reason for its actions. The Court of Appeals found that a factual issue existed regarding whether there was a causal connection between plaintiffs telephone call to the Romulus police and the subsequent adverse employment actions. The Court accordingly reversed the summary-disposition order and remanded the case for further proceedings on plaintiffs whistleblower count. The Court of Appeals did not address the circuit court’s finding that there were legitimate reasons for the employment actions. II Defendants’ summary-disposition motion regarding the whistleblower claim was brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). Appellate review of the grant or denial of a summary-disposition motion is de novo, and the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. Shallal v Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 609; 566 NW2d 571 (1997); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 369; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). III Plaintiff’s whistleblower claim is brought under MCL 15.362, which states: An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action. To establish a prima facie case under this statute, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the plaintiff was discharged or discriminated against, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the discharge or adverse employment action. Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger, Inc, 456 Mich 395, 399; 572 NW2d 210 (1998); Shallal, supra at 610. Plaintiff claims that, because of his report to the police, he was disciplined when he was barred from overtime, required to swipe his identification badge, transferred to the afternoon shift, and discharged. However, our review of the record reveals no evidentiary support from which a reasonable jury could find a causal connection between plaintiffs report to the police and these employment actions. Plaintiff’s case rests on the factual point that he advised supervisors Koyal and Tate that he had reported the assault to the police. That assertion, by itself, is not enough to raise a reasonable inference that plaintiff was retaliated against or discriminated against on the basis of the report. It does nothing to establish a causal nexus between plaintiff’s contacts with his supervisors and any subsequent employment action. Summary disposition for the defendant is appropriate when a plaintiff cannot factually demonstrate a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. For example, in Shallal, the plaintiff failed to establish the necessary causal connection because she knew her discharge was imminent before the protected activity on which she based her whistleblower claim, and in Roberson v Occupational Health Centers of America, Inc, 220 Mich App 322; 559 NW2d 86 (1996), the plaintiff failed to show a causal connection because the evidence did not show that the employer knew about the plaintiff’s filing of a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration until after she was discharged. The most that plaintiff demonstrates here is that he was disciplined, and eventually discharged, after he reported to the police that Reeves had assaulted him. To prevail, plaintiff had to show that his employer took adverse employment action because of plaintiff’s protected activity, but plaintiff has merely shown that his employer disciplined him after the protected activity occurred. Plaintiff had to demonstrate that the adverse employment action was in some manner influenced by the protected activity, but has failed to make such a demonstration. The evidence does not show that either of the supervisors, whom plaintiff allegedly informed about the call to the police, viewed the call as a matter of any consequence. Nor was either supervisor involved in the decision to discharge plaintiff. There is no evidence that Koyal or Tate gave even a second thought to plaintiff’s report to the police. Plaintiff did not recall Tate saying anything when he learned about the police report, although he did seem upset that the incident with Reeves occurred, and plaintiff testified that Royal’s reaction was “nonchalant.” Although the employment actions about which plaintiff complains occurred after his report to the police, such a temporal relationship, standing alone, does not demonstrate a causal connection between the protected activity and any adverse employment action. Something more than a temporal connection between protected conduct and an adverse employment action is required to show causation where discrimination-based retaliation is claimed. Nguyen v City of Cleveland, 229 F3d 559 (CA 6, 2000) (retaliation for claim of discrimination based on national origin); Scroggins v Univ of Minnesota, 221 F3d 1042 (CA 8, 2000) (retaliation for race-discrimination claim); Cooper v North Olmsted, 795 F2d 1265 (CA 6, 1986) (retaliation for race-and sex-discrimination claims); Taylor v Modem Engineering, Inc, 252 Mich App 655, 662; 653 NW2d 625 (2002) (retaliation for alleged whistleblower activity). Plaintiff must show something more than merely a coincidence in time between protected activity and adverse employment action. A case in which a close temporal relationship supported the plaintiff’s claim is Henry v Detroit, 234 Mich App 405; 594 NW2d 107 (1999). But unlike plaintiff, the plaintiff in Henry also presented evidence that his superior expressed clear displeasure with the protected activity engaged in by the plaintiff. In contrast to Henry, plaintiff has not shown any reaction or conduct on the part of his supervisors that reasonably suggests that they were upset by the fact that plaintiff reported an assault to the police. Moreover, contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that plaintiffs record was “impeccable” or “unblemished” before the Reeves incident or that the discipline imposed was seemingly undeserved as it was in Henry. The fact that a plaintiff engages in a “protected activity” under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act does not immunize him from an otherwise legitimate, or unrelated, adverse job action. The only evidence plaintiff has shown other than the temporal sequence of events is that one of the two supervisors he notified was nonchalant. This does not amount to evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that any adverse employment action directed at plaintiff was related to the police report lodged by plaintiff. With regard to the employment-discharge decision in particular, plaintiff has presented no evidence connecting his discharge to his report to the police. There is no evidence that the persons conducting the investigation that led to plaintiff’s discharge or the persons who made the discharge decision were even aware that plaintiff called the police. The supervisors (Koyal and Tate), whom plaintiff claims he told about the police report, were not involved in the discharge decision. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that contested facts and permissible inferences present a factual issue for a jury in this case. There is nothing more than pure conjecture and speculation to link plaintiffs call to the police to any subsequent adverse employment action. IV Plaintiff did not present evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to find a causal connection between the police report made by plaintiff and the subsequent employment decisions affecting plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore failed to establish a prima facie case under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. We reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court order granting defendant summary disposition on plaintiff’s whistleblower claim. In all other respects the Court of Appeals decision is affirmed. MCR 7.302(G)(1). Corrigan, C.J., and Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred. Plaintiff Margo Ann West’s derivative claim is for loss of consortium. For ease of reference, in this opinion we refer to plaintiff in the singular. Defendant General Motors is the only defendant involved in this appeal. According to defendant, plaintiff was transferred to the afternoon shift because the morning shift required a maintenance supervisor who could work overtime. Plaintiff initially acknowledged that he had not worked the overtime on October 16, but said he had worked it the next day. Later, he asserted that he actually worked the overtime hours that he reported on October 16 on that date. However, his supervisor stated that plaintiff left after completing an eight hour shift and did not return. In addition, no one else saw plaintiff during the two hours at issue. According to plaintiff, the police told him to file a written complaint. Plaintiff never filed such a complaint, nor did he otherwise follow up with the police. Koyal testified at his deposition that he did not learn that plaintiff called the police until he received notice of this lawsuit. At his deposition, Tate recalled plaintiff being upset about the incident with Reeves, but Tate was not asked about whether plaintiff said anything about making a report to the police. The adverse employment actions specifically discussed by the circuit court were (1) the “overtime restriction” imposed in June 1997, (2) the transfer to the afternoon shift, and (3) the decision to terminate employment. For the purpose of this opinion, we assume without deciding that plaintiff called the Romulus po

Richard Fowler vs. Labor Relations Commission; Boston Water and Sewer Commission, intervener. No. 00-P-451. Suffolk. February 19, 2002. - September 26, 2002. Present: Mason, Cohen, & Mills, JJ. Administrative Law, Judicial review, Substantial evidence. Labor Relations Commission. Labor, Judicial review, Unfair labor practice, Discharge for union activity. On appeal from a decision of the Labor Relations Commission (LRC) dismissing a complaint by a principal organizer of a campaign to unionize mid-level managers at a city’s water and sewer commission (BWSC) contending that the BWSC’s actions in demoting and subsequently firing him were taken in retaliation for his involvement in protected activity in violation of G. L. c. 150E, § 10(a)(1), (2) and (3), this court concluded that the LRC’s decision was based on an erroneous view of the law and remanded the case for consideration under the proper legal framework, where there was direct proof that BWSC’s management had been told by an informant that employees were engaged in union activity, and where the LRC could consider circumstantial proof on the issue of the BWSC’s knowledge of the fired employee’s activities, including evidence that the BWSC’s asserted reasons for its adverse actions were a pretext. [97-103] Appeal from a decision of the Labor Relations Commission. Harold L. Lichten for the plaintiff. John B. Cochran for the defendant. Robert E. Holland, John Foskett, & Catherine S. Reidy, for the intervener, submitted a brief. The Boston Water & Sewer Commission was the responding party before the Labor Relations Commission. It appears in these appellate proceedings as intervener and has filed a brief in support of the decision of the Labor Relations Commission. Cohen, J. Soon after becoming one of the principal organizers of a campaign to unionize mid-level managers at the Boston Water and Sewer Commission (BWSC), Richard Fowler, a BWSC employee for nearly twenty years, was demoted and subsequently fired. He filed a charge with the Labor Relations Commission (commission) contending that the BWSC’s actions were taken in retaliation for his involvement in protected activity, in violation of G. L. c. 150E, § 10(a)(1), (2) and (3). The commission investigated, issued a complaint of prohibited practice, and referred the matter to a hearing officer. After a five-day hearing, the hearing officer issued recommended findings of fact that were favorable to Fowler; however, even though the commission largely adopted the hearing officer’s findings, it ultimately determined that Fowler had failed to prove an essential element of his case: that BWSC senior staff knew that Fowler was engaged in union activity. The commission therefore dismissed the complaint. Fowler appeals from the commission’s decision, contending that the commission misapplied the law by requiring him to prove employer knowledge by “direct evidence” and by failing to consider circumstantial proof on this issue, including evidence that the BWSC’s asserted reasons for its adverse actions were a pretext. He also argues that the hearing officer’s recommended findings of fact included a finding of employer knowledge and that the commission failed to explain its rejection of that finding as required by the State administrative procedure act. See G. L. c. 30A, § 11(8). We agree that the commission’s decision was based on an erroneous view of the law and remand the case for consideration under the proper legal framework. Although appellate review of the commission’s findings is limited to an examination of the record to ascertain if the findings are supported by substantial evidence, we review the legal standards employed by the commission for error of law without deference to its decision. See, e.g., Boston Police Superior Officers Fedn. v. Labor Relations Commn., 410 Mass. 890, 892 (1991); School Comm. of Boston v. Labor Relations Commn., 40 Mass. App. Ct. 327, 328-329 (1996). We begin by reiterating the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination based on protected activities before addressing the specific issues presented here. In a protected activities case, the charging party must produce evidence to support the conclusion that (1) the employee engaged in concerted activity as defined by G. L. c. 150E, § 2; (2) the employer knew of this activity; (3) the employer took adverse action against the employee; and (4) the adverse action was motivated by the employer’s desire to penalize or discourage the protected activity. School Comm. of Boston v. Labor Relations Commn., supra at 329 & n.5. In this case, it was not disputed that Fowler’s union organizing activities, which began in January, 1996, constituted protected concerted activity; nor was it disputed that thereafter the BWSC took adverse action against Fowler by demoting him from deputy superintendent of sewer operations to safety manager in July, 1996, and terminating his employment in October, 1996. The only issues in contention were employer knowledge and motivation. With respect to employer knowledge, Fowler took the position that his organizing activities were conducted publicly and must have been known to the BWSC’s executive director, Vincent Mannering, if not from Mannering’s own observations or his discussions with other members of the senior staff, then through information received from Mannering’s longtime personal friend, Joseph Crossen. Crossen was a BWSC safety engineer who, in mid-1996, became a deputy superintendent of water and sewer with direct oversight over Fowler after his demotion to safety manager. As elaborated in the margin, the commission made findings to the effect that Crossen served as a conduit of information to Mannering, that Crossen and others close to Mannering, such as chief of staff Jay Porter, knew that union activities were afoot, that Crossen closely supervised Fowler, and that Fowler’s union activities were open and well-known in the workplace. The commission also concluded, as had the hearing officer, that Mannering and Crossen were not credible when they denied knowing of Fowler’s role in the campaign. Nevertheless, the commission declined to infer that Manner-ing and Crossen knew of Fowler’s union organizing, observing that there was no direct evidence that Crossen knew of Fowler’s involvement in the organizing drive, and that no inference of employer knowledge could arise merely from disbelief of Man-nering’s and Crossen’s testimony. The commission explained that “[i]f Crossen’s knowledge of Fowler’s activity was proven by direct evidence, we could infer that he shared his knowledge of Fowler’s role in the organizing drive by the fact that he told Porter that the employees were organizing a union.” However, absent such direct evidence, the commission assumed that it could not infer that Crossen possessed knowledge of Fowler’s role. This assumption led the commission to conclude that it would be “mere suspicion or speculation” to find employer knowledge on the record before it. It therefore dismissed the complaint on that basis, without considering the remaining element of Fowler’s prima facie case — employer motivation. Fowler does not disagree that, without more, disbelief of Mannering and Crossen did not establish the opposite of their testimony. See, e.g., Prescott v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 36, 38 & n.4 (1997); Hopping v. Whirlaway, Inc., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 121, 126 (1994); Atkinson v. Rosenthal, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 219, 224 (1992). His quarrel is with the commission’s assumption that he needed to introduce direct evidence that Crossen knew of his union activity as a legal predicate to a finding of employer knowledge. We agree with Fowler that the commission was mistaken on this point. In cases arising under G. L. c. 150E, we may look for guidance, as did the commission, to Federal decisions applying the parallel provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1994). See Service Employees Intl. Union, Local 509 v. Labor Relations Commn., 431 Mass. 710, 713-714 (2000); Burlington v. Labor Relations Commn., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 402, 405 (1984). Cases decided under the NLRA establish, as a general principle, that employer knowledge of employee union activities may be found from circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable inference of knowledge may be drawn. See, e.g., FPC Holdings, Inc. v. NLRB., 64 F.3d 935, 943 (4th Cir. 1995); Montgomery Ward & Co., 316 N.L.R.B. 1248, 1253 (1995), enforced, 97 F.3d 1448 (4th Cir. 1996); Regional Home Care, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 85, 85-86 (1999). An inference of knowledge may be “based on such circumstantial evidence as the timing of the alleged discriminatory actions; the [employer’s] general knowledge of its employees’ union activities; the [employer’s] animus against the Union; and the pretextual reasons given for the adverse personnel actions.” Regional Home Care, Inc., supra at 85-86. Each case is fact specific. Thus, for example, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has inferred that an employer knew of a discharged employee’s union activities from a totality of circumstances that included evidence of the employer’s general knowledge of union organizing and the employee’s overt participation in union- activities. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra at 1253. Notwithstanding this authority, the commission declined to infer employer knowledge in reliance upon The American League, 189 N.L.R.B. 541 (1971) — a case that the commission understood as requiring direct proof to establish an informant’s knowledge that the complaining employee had engaged in union activity. The American League case arose from the termination, toward the end of the 1968 baseball season, of two American League umpires who were attempting to organize their cohorts to join an association previously established by National League umpires. Before their termination, the fired umpires had discussed this idea with other American League umpires and had met with a lawyer and with the National League association. Although these discussions were not entirely clandestine, the two organizers had attempted to keep knowledge of their efforts from League officials, and there was no evidence that any of those contacted had told management that organizing activity was taking place, much less that the fired umpires were behind it. Indeed, none of the numerous American League umpires who appeared as witnesses in the case testified that they had mentioned the organizing activities to League officials. On these facts, the hearing officer and the NLRB declined to infer employer knowledge. Viewed in its factual context, The American League at most illustrates that employer knowledge need not be inferred when there is no direct evidence that anyone has reported union activity to the employer. Id. at 549. However, it does not stand for the extended proposition that direct proof must always be introduced to establish an informant’s knowledge that the complaining employee was engaged in union activity. In the case at hand, the facts as found by the commission were considerably stronger on the issue of employer knowledge than the facts in The American League. The commission adopted the hearing officer’s finding, based on Crossen’s own testimony, that Crossen received union organizing information in June, 1996, and immediately shared it with Porter, who, in turn, relayed it to Mannering. Thus, there was direct proof that management had been told by an informant that employees were engaging in union activity. As to whether Crossen knew of Fowler’s involvement with the organizing campaign and shared that information with senior staff, direct evidence was not required, and the commission was free to draw that inference from other findings, adopted from those of the hearing officer, establishing Crossen’s close supervision of Fowler, Fowler’s openness in conducting the organizing drive, and Crossen’s role as a conduit of information to Porter and Mannering. Drawing an inference from these facts would rest upon affirmative evidence and would not be predicated solely on disbelief of Mannering and Crossen. See NLRB v. Joseph Antell, Inc., 358 F.2d 880, 883 (1966). The commission also was entitled to consider whether the reasons advanced by the BWSC for demoting and terminating Fowler were a pretext and, if so, to take that into account as an additional factor in deciding whether to infer employer knowledge. Although, by itself, “the unconvincing character of the employer’s professed reasons for acting against an employee [does not] supply the otherwise missing proof of knowledge,” Tomateck, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip op. at 76-77 (May 8, 2001), it is well-established that pretext may be considered as part of the totality of circumstances from which employer knowledge may be inferred. See NLRB v. Joseph Antell, Inc., supra at 883; Montgomery Ward, supra at 1253; Regional Home Care, Inc., supra at 85-86. In view of our decision, we need not dwell on Fowler’s claim that the commission ran afoul of G. L. c. 30A, § 11(8), by failing to give an adequate explanation for rejecting the hearing officer’s statement that “Crossen knew of Fowler’s involvement” with the union. See Vinal v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 92 (1982); Noone v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 756, 764 & n.13 (1993). Although the statement was made in passing, we agree with Fowler that this was an implicit, if not explicit, finding that went beyond simply discrediting Mannering and Crossen, and that the commission rejected the finding. Nevertheless, we detect no c. 30A violation, because the commission adequately explained itself by opining that, on its view of the law, the evidence supporting such a finding was insufficient. The problem was not that the commission failed to give an explanation; it was that the explanation was based on an incorrect view of the law. On remand, it will be open to the commission to reassess its rejection of the hearing officer’s finding in light of the correct legal standard. The commission’s decision is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. There was direct evidence, and the commission found, that Fowler’s role in the organizing campaign came to the attention of BWSC general counsel Henry Luthin; but because there was no proof (and no finding by the hearing officer) that Luthin met with Mannering between the time that Luthin obtained this information and the time that Fowler was terminated, the commission declined to infer employer knowledge from this evidence. Mannering had asked his friend Crossen to relay his observations about the operations department so that Mannering would not be relying upon “sanitized information.” Crossen was among those who were sent a letter from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 25 (teamsters), in June, 1996, soliciting their involvement in the union. He immediately shared the letter with Porter, who relayed it to Mannering. Others close to senior staff, including Mannering’s own administrative assistant, also received this letter. Fowler reported directly to Crossen. Crossen kept close track of Fowler’s performance and regularly met with Fowler to go over his work. Between January and April, 1996, Fowler and the other principal organizer in the campaign, Deacon Perrotta, met with numerous mid-level managers to inform them of the organizing drive and ascertain their level of interest in becoming unionized. In April or May, 1996, when the teamsters indicated an interest in representing the potential bargaining unit, Fowler and Perrotta began campaigning specifically for the teamsters by first meeting with managers individually and later by holding small group meetings. Fowler met with over fifty managers individually and had fifteen to twenty small group meetings. These overtures took place on BWSC property, including the building where Mannering had his office. Fowler and Perrotta also held a large meeting at the South Bay Hotel in Boston, which was attended by seventeen managers and six or seven teamsters officials. At that meeting, Fowler sat in the front of the room and fielded questions from the managers and the teamsters officials. Later, Fowler and Perrotta distributed union authorization cards to employees at work. They also compiled the list used by the teamsters to send a letter and authorization cards to sixty-seven managers in the potential bargaining unit, including Crossen and Mannering’s administrative assistants, although Fowler’s name did not appear in this correspondence. An inference of employer knowledge may also be drawn pursuant to the so-called “small plant doctrine,” where the size of the plant, as well as other considerations, make it likely that the employer observed the employee’s union activity. See United L-N Glass, 297 N.L.R.B. 329 (1989). Here, the commission determined that the facts did not support the application of the small plant doctrine. As Fowler does not challenge that determination on appeal, we do not consider whether it was supported by substantial evidence. The same is true of Synergy Gas Corp., 290 N.L.R.B. 1098, 1101 (1988), also relied upon by the commission. In that case, the discharged employee claimed that employer knowledge could be inferred because two members of management had sons who worked with the employee, and the sons may have reported his activities to their parents. The claim was rejected because there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, to establish the likelihood that either of the sons would have made such a communication. Furthermore, the employee’s union activities were not “intensive” and were not likely to have been observed. The BWSC claimed that Fowler was demoted and discharged because of over-all poor performance and his responsibility for the failure of a pumping station during a severe rainstorm in September, 1996. However, the commission found that Fowler received positive evaluations for many years up until he began his union activities; that Fowler was not given any negative performance evaluations, warnings or other counseling about alleged deficiencies in his performance in 1996; and that the BWSC did not consider Fowler responsible for the pumping station mishap.

TAYLOR v MODERN ENGINEERING, INC Docket No. 228152. Submitted March 11, 2002, at Detroit. Decided August 27, 2002, at 9:10 a.m. Earl Taylor brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court against Modem Engineering, Inc., and DaimlerChrysler, alleging that his employment was terminated by the defendants in violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seq., because he was about to report certain safety violations to a public body. The court, Alice L. Gilbert, J., granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, finding that the defendants established the existence of a legitimate reason for the discharge. The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held-. 1. The court correctly granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants because, even if the plaintiff did establish a prima facie case under the wpa, the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendants’ stated reasons for firing the plaintiff were not the trae reasons, but were only a pretext, for the discharge. 2. The number of employees involved in a reorganization does not, by itself, affect whether a reorganization actually took place. Here, the reorganization of the plaintiffs department consisted of the elimination of his position and the hiring of a person with different skills to do different work. 3. The plaintiff failed to present evidence, other than the fact that there was a short period between when he allegedly notified the defendants that he was reporting safety issues and when his employment was terminated, sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that the termination was retaliatory. Affirmed. Steven Fellows for the plaintiff. Pilchak & Cohen, P.C. (by William E. Pilchak'), for Modem Engineering, Inc. Driggers, Schultz & Herbst, P.C. (by William C. Schaefer), for DaimlerChrysler. Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Wilder and Zahra, JJ. Wilder, J. Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition in this claim under the Whistle-blowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seq. We affirm. 1. FACTS and proceedings Plaintiff was employed by defendant Modem Engineering, Inc. Under a contract between Modem Engineering and defendant DaimlerChrysler (then Chrysler), plaintiff worked at the Chrysler Jeep Truck Engineering Plant as a wood model maker. Although plaintiff was hired as a wood model maker, at the time he was fired only about five percent of his time was devoted to model making because computer aided design and computer aided manufacturing made hand-made wood models nearly obsolete. Accordingly, much of plaintiff’s work consisted of activities he was not originally hired to do, including make-work carpentry and furniture-making tasks that could fill his time. The record established that plaintiff sat idle for about fifty percent of his working hours. Plaintiff’s employment with Modem Engineering began in approximately 1988 and ended on February 26, 1999. On February 22, 1999, a representative of Modem Engineering came to plaintiff’s work site and told him that his employment was being terminated because he was no longer qualified to do the work his employer needed him to do. Plaintiff contends that for approximately two years before he was fired, he had expressed concern on numerous occasions regarding safety conditions in the workplace. Specifically, plaintiff claims he addressed problems with housekeeping, unguarded machines, machines that needed dust-collecting devices, and the presence of carbon monoxide fumes in his work area. Plaintiff alleges that he directed some of these concerns to his attorneys and that he also spoke to his manager at DaimlerChrysler. Plaintiff also asserts that the department safety representative was aware of and remedied some of plaintiffs concerns, and that he had also communicated his complaints to a representative of Modem Engineering, Kelly Davis. Plaintiff further alleges that he had intended to report these safety concerns to governmental authorities and that he had repeatedly told Davis that this was his intent. According to plaintiff, the last of his conversations with Davis regarding his intent to report his concerns was in early January 1999. Plaintiff never made an official report to any governmental agency, but says that he did contact the Department of Labor to learn the procedures for filing a complaint. Plaintiff did not know exactly when he contacted the Department of Labor, but believed that it was between June and December 1998. Plaintiff claims that the Department of Labor representative instructed him to take pictures of the conditions and gather documents regarding suspected violations, and that his inability to get all the documentation, specifically Material Safety Data Sheets, prevented him from filing his complaint. Sometime in late 1998, and then again in mid-February 1999, plaintiff told his supervisor that he had called the Department of Labor. Plaintiff filed suit under the wpa, claiming that defendants fired him because he was about to report safety violations to a public body, which is a protected activity under the wpa. Defendants jointly moved for summary disposition on the basis of MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiff could not prove a prima facie case under the wpa and that he had failed to demonstrate that their legitimate business reason for terminating his employment was a pretext. Defendants asserted that plaintiffs employment was terminated so that DaimlerChrysler’s need for a computerized numerical control (CNC) programmer, who knew how to use the computer-aided design program used by DaimlerChrysler, the catia program, could be met. The trial court granted defendants’ motion, and this appeal ensued. H. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Veenstra v Washte-naw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159; 645 NW2d 643 (2002). A motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the plaintiffs claim. Veenstra, supra at 163. In order to prevent summary disposition, the nonmoving party must show by use of substantively admissible evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. We view all the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 164. If no genuine issues of material fact exist, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. m. ANALYSIS Plaintiff argues first that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case under the wpa. Assuming, without deciding, that plaintiff is correct, nevertheless, plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that defendants’ stated reasons for firing him were pretextuai. Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted summary disposition in favor of defendants. When considering claims under the WPA, we apply the burden-shifting analysis used in retaliatory discharge claims under the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. Roulston v Tendercare (Michigan), Inc, 239 Mich App 270, 280-281; 608 NW2d 525 (2000). If the plaintiff has successfully proved a prima facie case under the wpa, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate business reason for the plaintiff’s discharge. Id. If the defendant produces evidence establishing the existence of a legitimate reason for the discharge, the plaintiff then has the opportunity to prove that the legitimate reason offered by the defendant was not the true reason, but was only a pretext for the discharge. Id. Here, defendants offered evidence that they discharged plaintiff because his wood model-making skills were no longer needed, and that they had reorganized the department that plaintiff worked in because they needed to hire someone with cnc skills and experience, not because plaintiff was about to report safety violations to a public body. This evidence satisfies defendants’ burden. Plaintiff argues that this was not the true reason for his discharge—that defendants’ departmental reorganization was merely a pretext. In order for plaintiff’s claim to survive the motion for summary disposition, plaintiff must “demonstrate that the evidence in the case ... is ‘sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that [plaintiff’s protected activity] was a motivating factor in the adverse action taken by the employer ....’” Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 465; 628 NW2d 515 (2001), quoting Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 176; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). In other words, a plaintiff must “ ‘raise a triable issue that the employer’s proffered reason . . . was a pretext for [retaliating against plaintiff’s protected activity].’ ” Hazle, supra at 465-466, quoting Lytle, supra at 176. “A plaintiff can prove pretext either directly by persuading the court that a retaliatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Roulston, supra at 281, citing Hopkins v Midland, 158 Mich App 361, 380; 404 NW2d 744 (1987). Plaintiff first argues that the evidence shows that the stated reason for the discharge was not legitimate because the reorganization involved only his position. We disagree. A work force reduction can legitimately consist of the elimination of only one employee. Lytle, supra at 177, n 27. Here, the reorganization of plaintiff’s department consisted of the elimination of his position and the hiring of a person with different skills to do different work. We conclude that, as with work force reductions, the number of employees involved in a reorganization does not, by itself, affect whether a reorganization actually took place. Plaintiff next argues that the proffered reason for the termination of his employment was pretextual because he was not permitted to complete the training necessary to meet his employers’ changing needs. However, plaintiff presents no evidence to establish that defendants prevented him from receiving the training he needed to meet his employers’ requirements. Instead, the evidence showed that while other employees worked at their own initiative to obtain the training needed to meet their employers’ evolving needs, plaintiff did not take sufficient steps to develop the necessary qualifications to operate the computer aided equipment in the required timeframe. Finally, plaintiff argues that his alleged pending report of safety concerns to the Department of Labor, and not defendants’ workplace reorganization, motivated defendants to terminate his employment. Plaintiff claims that the short time between the last time he notified defendants that he was reporting safety issues and the termination of his employment shows that defendants fired him because he was going to engage, or had engaged, in protected activity. Close timing between alleged protected activity and the termination of a plaintiff’s employment may establish the “causal connection” element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliation, and “[t]he proofs offered in support of the prima facie case may be sufficient to create a triable issue of fact that the employer’s stated reason is a pretext, as long as the evidence would enable a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer’s decision had a discriminatory [here, retaliatory] basis.” Town v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688, 697; 568 NW2d 64 (1997). In the proceedings below, the trial court, relying on Swanson v General Services Administration, 110 F3d 1180 (CA 5, 1997), found that any temporal relationship between plaintiffs alleged protected activity and the termination of his employment could not establish that the stated reason was a mere pretext. We agree that the short time between plaintiff’s participation in protected activity and the termination of plaintiff’s employment, without more, is insufficient to establish that the stated reason was a mere pretext. In Roulston, supra at 281-282, this Court found that the short period between when the plaintiff’s employer was notified of her whistleblowing activity and when her employment was terminated, coupled with other evidence that the plaintiff presented, created a genuine issue of material fact that the termination was pretextual. Here, as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, plaintiff has presented no evidence other than the timing of the events from which a jury could infer that defendants retaliated against him. The lack of evidence other than the timing of plaintiff’s termination in relation to his participation in protected activity fails to create a genuine issue of material fact that the termination was retaliatory. Rather, plaintiff’s reliance solely on the timing of his termination merely serves to encourage speculation. Sanchez v Henderson, 188 F3d 740, 747 (CA 7, 1999). See also Skrjanc v Great Lakes Power Service Co, 272 F3d 309, 317 (CA 6, 2001), citing Conner v Schnuck Mkts, Inc, 121 F3d 1390, 1397-1398 (CA 10, 1997); Sprenger v Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 253 F3d 1106, 1114 (CA 8, 2001); Pugh v Attica, Indiana, 259 F3d 619, 628-629 (CA 7, 2001); Walton v Mental Health Ass’n of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 168 F3d 661, 669-670 (CA 3, 1999). Affirmed. We reiterate that in this case we have assumed, without deciding, that plaintiff has established a prima facie case against defendants under the WPA.

TREPANIER v NATIONAL AMUSEMENTS, INC Docket No. 224262. Submitted November 13, 2001, at Detroit. Decided April 5, 2002, at 9:00 AM. Leave to appeal sought. Gary Trepanier brought an action in the Genesee Circuit Court against National Amusements, Inc., his former employer, alleging that the defendant’s discharging him from his employment constituted a violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seg., was in violation of public policy, was a breach of his contract with the defendant, and was unlawful because it was gender based. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had slandered him. After an intimate relationship between the plaintiff and a coworker had ended, the co-worker began to make threatening telephone calls to the plaintiff and his girlfriend at the plaintiff’s home. The plaintiff contacted the police, who advised him to request a personal protection order (ppo). The plaintiff then requested a ppo for the purpose of trying to stop the co-worker from making threatening telephone calls to the plaintiff’s home. After the plaintiff’s girlfriend contacted the defendant’s corporate headquarters and indicated that the plaintiff was being subjected to a hostile work environment, a corporate representative contacted the plaintiff and advised him to go home from work and to have no contact with the workplace until the representative could investigate. Although the plaintiff did stay away from the workplace, he admitted going to the co-worker’s home to ask her why she was harassing him. The corporate representative, upon learning that the plaintiff had contacted the co-worker at her home, terminated the plaintiffs employment, apparently believing that the plaintiff’s contact with the co-worker at her home violated the instructions that the representative had given to the plaintiff. The plaintiff stipulated the dismissal of the slander claim. The court, Archie L. Hayman, J., granted summary disposition for the defendant with respect to the plaintiff’s claims based on breach of contract and sex discrimination, but denied summary disposition for the defendant with respect the claims based on the wpa and discharge in violation of public policy. The plaintiff agreed to dismiss the claim based on violation of public policy. The defendant appealed by leave granted the trial court’s denial of summary disposition with respect to the wpa claim. The Court of Appeals held: 1. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the provisions of the wpa by discharging him, in part, because he had sought a ppo against the co-worker. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had not been engaged in a protected activity under the wpa because the necessity of the ppo arose out of a personal affair and the plaintiff could neither show any direct connection between the ppo and the defendant’s business nor claim that the ppo was based on a desire to inform the public on a matter of public concern. 2. In order to establish a claim of an unlawful discharge under the WPA, the plaintiff was required to show that he was engaged in a protected activity as delineated in the wpa, that the defendant discharged him, and that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the discharge. A protected activity under the wpa occurs where a person reports a violation or suspected violation of a law or regulation to a public body, is about to report such a violation to a public body, or is asked by a public body to participate in an investigation. 3. There is no question that the plaintiff’s request for a ppo on the basis of the co-worker’s threatening telephone calls constituted a protected activity under the provisions of the wpa. Although the evidentiary connection between the plaintiff’s protected activity in requesting the ppo and the defendant’s discharge of the plaintiff is a tenuous one, a sufficient evidentiary connection between the protected activity and the discharge was shown to allow a jury to find that the defendant’s discharge of the plaintiff resulted from the plaintiff’s undertaking of an activity protected under the provisions of the wpa. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for summary disposition with respect to the wpa claim. Affirmed. Labor Relations — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act — Protected Activity — Personal Protection Orders. A claim of an unlawful discharge under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act is established by showing that an employee was engaged in a protected activity as set forth in the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, that the employer discharged the employee, and that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the discharge; a protected activity under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act occurs where a person reports a violation or suspected violation of a law or regulation to a public body, is about to report such a violation to a public body, or is asked by a public body to participate in an investigation; the seeking of a personal protection order by an employee against a co-worker in an effort to halt the co-worker’s harassment of the employee, even if the harassment takes place away from the workplace, may constitute a protected activity for the purpose of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (MCL 15.362). Law Offices of Glen Lenhoff (by Glen N. Lenhoff and Julie A. Gafkay), for the plaintiff. Collins, Einhom, Farrell & Ulanoff P.C. (by Janice G. Hildenbrand and J. Mark Cooney), for the defendant. Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Doctoroff and Jansen, JJ. Per Curiam. Defendant appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s order denying its motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seq. We affirm. Defendant employed plaintiff from 1983 until plaintiff was discharged on September 21, 1998. From 1995 until his termination, plaintiff was the managing director of defendant’s Showcase West Theater in Flint. In October or November 1996, plaintiff began a sexual relationship with Coleen Heathcoat, who was also employed by defendant. After the relationship ended in January 1997, Heathcoat began to make threatening telephone calls to plaintiff at his home, prompting plaintiff to change his telephone number. Heathcoat also complained to plaintiff’s supervisor, Brad Wick, who told plaintiff that he would have to work with Heathcoat in a businesslike manner and advised plaintiff not to let the personal relationship affect his work. In the fall of 1997, plaintiff and Heathcoat resumed their sexual relationship, which lasted until July 1998. In August 1998, Heathcoat again made threatening telephone calls to plaintiffs home. At the time, plaintiff had a live-in girlfriend, Linda Ptacek, who was unaware of plaintiff’s sexual relationship with Heathcoat. On August 27, 1998, plaintiff contacted the police, who recommended that plaintiff request a personal protection order (ppo). Plaintiff then requested a ppo to try to stop Heathcoat from calling his home and threatening his girlfriend. Plaintiff admitted that the ppo pertained to Heathcoat’s harassment at his home and did not have anything to do with her conduct at work. On August 31, 1998, Wick met with plaintiff again and offered to arrange a transfer for plaintiff. During this period, Ptacek contacted a senior vice president at defendant’s corporate office and reported that plaintiff was being subjected to a hostile work environment because of Heathcoat’s conduct and that plaintiff had applied for a ppo. At that point, Cindy Montgomery, an employee from defendant’s headquarters, told plaintiff to go home until she was able to arrive in Michigan to investigate. Plaintiff was assured that he would be paid, but was asked not to have any contact with the theater. On September 4, 1998, plaintiff went to Heathcoat’s home to ask her why she was harassing him. During a meeting with Montgomery, plaintiff admitted that he had gone to Heathcoat’s home. Although plaintiff did stay away from the theater as requested, Montgomery apparently believed that plaintiff’s contact with Heathcoat violated her instruction. At a meeting on September 21, 1998, Montgomery informed plaintiff that he was terminated. Montgomery admitted that among the factors she considered in recommending plaintiff’s termination were the second incident of threatening telephone calls by Heathcoat and plaintiff’s relationship with Heathcoat. In October 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging several claims, including that defendant violated the wpa by discharging him in part because he sought a ppo against Heathcoat. Defendant moved for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims. Regarding the wpa claim, defendant argued that plaintiff was not engaged in a protected activity under the wpa because the necessity for a ppo arose out of a personal affair between plaintiff and the co-worker and that plaintiff neither could show any direct connection between the ppo and defendant’s business nor could claim that his need for a ppo was based on any desire to inform the public on a matter of public concern. The court granted summary disposition for the defendant with respect to plaintiff’s claims of breach of contract and sexual discrimination; however, the court denied summary disposition with respect to plaintiff’s claims under the wpa and of discharge in violation of public policy. Plaintiff subsequently agreed to dismiss the latter claim. Defendant sought and was granted leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary disposition regarding plaintiff’s wpa claim. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition. Baker v Arbor Drugs, Inc, 215 Mich App 198, 202; 544 NW2d 727 (1996). Because the trial court looked beyond the pleadings in deciding defendant’s motion, we review the motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. The court considers the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996); MCR 2.116(G)(5). Summary disposition may be granted if, except with regard to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Babula v Robertson, 212 Mich App 45, 48; 536 NW2d 834 (1995). In order to establish a claim of an unlawful discharge under the WPA, plaintiff was required to show that (1) he was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the defendant discharged him, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the discharge. Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 399; 572 NW2d 210 (1998). A person is engaged in “protected activity” under the WPA where the person (1) reports a violation or suspected violation of a law or regulation to a public body, (2) is about to report such a violation to a public body, or (3) is asked by a public body to participate in an investigation. Id.) MCL 15.362. The principal issue in this case is whether plaintiff was involved in a protected activity, as that concept is delineated in the WPA, that was causally connected with his discharge from his employment. There is no question that plaintiff reported a violation or suspected violation of the law to a public body when he sought the ppo against his co-worker. Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that the wpa protects reports made against a co-worker, not just an employer. Dudewicz v Norris Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 74-75; 503 NW2d 645 (1993). However, defendant maintains that the finding that plaintiff engaged in protected activity by requesting a PPO regarding a matter that was not related to defendant’s business is not consistent with the intent behind the WPA. The wpa was enacted to encourage employees to assist in law enforcement and to protect employees who participate in whistleblowing activities. Dolan v Continental Airlines/Continental Express, 454 Mich 373, 378; 563 NW2d 23 (1997). The underlying purpose of the act was to protect the public and to promote public health and safety by removing barriers that may interfere with employee efforts to report violations or suspected violations of the law. Id. at 378-379. A plain reading of the wpa reveals that employees who report violations or suspected violations of the law to a public body are entitled to protection under the act. As interpreted, the act provides protection to employees who report violations of law by either their employers or fellow employees. . . . Frequently, a close connection exists between the reported violation and the employment setting, although no such limitation is found in the statute. [Id. at 381 (citations omitted).] In Dolan, the plaintiff alleged that she was fired for reporting to the Drug Enforcement Agency the names of two airline passengers who fit a suspect profile after the defendant adopted a policy against employees directly contacting the dea without prior management approval. The Supreme Court found that the reported violation was sufficiently related to the plaintiffs employment setting to be protected under the wpa, commenting: “This is not to say that only those violations that are connected to the employment setting are contemplated under the WPA, only that the reported violation in the present case was sufficiently connected to the employment setting to be contemplated under the majority opinion in Dudewicz.” Dolan, supra at 382. In Dudewicz, supra at 70-71, the plaintiff was assaulted by a co-worker while on the job as the result of the plaintiffs having involved one of the owners of the business in a customer service dispute. The plaintiff filed criminal charges against the coworker and was told to drop the charges or he would be fired. The Supreme Court concluded that the activity at issue, reporting a co-worker’s violation of the Criminal Code resulting from a dispute over the handling of company business, fell within the WPA. Id. at 75-76. The Court stated: Admittedly, a strictly liberal interpretation of the statute without an analysis of legislative intent arguably could lead to an interpretation that would bar discharge of an employee for reporting a crime by anyone under any circumstances. ... However, this is not the case and these are not the facts to test the outer limits of this rather broad statute. In concluding that it was intended to bar a discharge of an employee for reporting a crime by a fellow employee under the circumstances of this case does not begin to test those limits. In saying that, we note that not only was this a crime alleged to have been committed by a fellow employee, but the alleged crime arose out of a work incident at the work site. It is, therefore, very much within the employer-employee setting. [Dudewicz, supra at 77-78.] While the appellate courts of this state have opined that there are “outer limits” to a claim under the wpa, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has defined those outer limits, leaving the issue to be decided case by case. See Terzano v Wayne Co, 216 Mich App 522, 528-529, 532; 549 NW2d 606 (1996). Although this case presents a close question, we conclude that summary disposition was properly denied. It is apparent that the plain language of the WPA does not limit protected activity to that which has a close connection to the work environment or to the employer’s business practices. MCL 15.362; Dolan, supra at 381. Moreover, remedial statutes, such as the WPA, should be “liberally construed in favor of the persons intended to be benefited.” Dudewicz, supra at 77. Therefore, we decline to interpret the wpa so as to create a limitation that is not apparent in the unambiguous language of the statute. Further, the submitted evidence established some connection, albeit a tenuous one, between plaintiff’s request for a ppo and defendant’s employment setting. Plaintiff showed that once he obtained the PPO, it became more difficult for him to work with Heathcoat. Further, there was evidence that, in firing plaintiff, defendant took into account the ongoing problems between plaintiff and his co-worker and how it was affecting defendant’s operations. Even if we were to conclude that the wpa only protects activity that is related to the conduct of the employer’s business, we would find that the evidence in this case meets that test. Defendant argues that plaintiff obtained the PPO for purely personal reasons, not out of concern for the public and, therefore, was not engaged in a protected activity, citing Shallal v Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 621; 566 NW2d 571 (1997). However, the facts of Shallal are clearly distinguishable from the present case. In Shallal, the plaintiff told her agency’s president that she would report his alleged wrongdoing “if [he didn’t] straighten up.” Id. at 614. Our Supreme Court found that the threat was sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was “about to report” a violation or suspected violation of the law. Id. at 621. However, the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between her actions and her firing because she used the threat of a report to prevent her termination. Id. at 622. [I]t is clear that plaintiff used her own situation to extort defendant not to fire her. . . . Furthermore, it is clear that the decision to fire plaintiff was made before her threat to [the agency president] and that plaintiff knew of this decision .... Plaintiff cannot use the whistleblowers’ act as a shield against being fired where she knew she was going to be fired before threatening to report her supervisor. To hold otherwise “would encourage other employees to hold off blowing the whistle until it becomes most advantageous for them to do so. Plaintiff has offered no evidence which suggests that the Michigan Legislature intended the Whistleblowers Act to be used as an offensive weapon by disgruntled employees.” [Id. at 622 (citations omitted).] Although plaintiff’s decision in this case to obtain a PPO may have been motivated by personal reasons, plaintiff did not use his protected activity to extort his employer, as did the plaintiff in Shallal. Further, although plaintiff’s primary purpose may have been to protect himself and his girlfriend from harassment, reasonable jurors could conclude that plaintiff was acting in the public’s interest, in addition to his own. Assuming the truth of plaintiffs assertions, Heath-coat’s threatening telephone calls could constitute aggravated stalking, a felony and a serious public safety issue. See MCL 750.41 li. Moreover, in this case there is evidence of a causal connection between plaintiff’s protected activity and his termination, namely, Montgomery’s admission that plaintiff was discharged because of circumstances surrounding Heathcoat’s harassment. Accordingly, we believe that the evidence, viewed most favorably to plaintiff, was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether plaintiff engaged in a protected activity for purposes of the wpa. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Affirmed. Plaintiff also alleged that (1) defendant terminated him in violation of public policy, (2) his discharge was in breach of a contract with defendant under which he could not be terminated without good cause, (3) defendant discharged him because of his gender in violation of MCL 37.2202, and (4) defendant slandered him. Plaintiff later stipulated the dismissal of his slander claim.