Whistleblower Cases

DRIVER v HANLEY Docket No. 149151. Submitted February 16, 1994, at Grand Rapids. Decided September 19, 1994, at 9:30 a.m. Maria E. Driver brought an action in the Benzie Circuit Court against William and Julia Hanley, alleging violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, retaliatory discharge, and breach of an employment contract relating to the termination of her employment after she filed a complaint with the Department of Labor that the defendants were paying her an hourly wage that was lower than the legal minimum. The court, James M. Batzer, J., removed the action to the 85th District Court after a mediation evaluation of $8,000 in the plaintiff’s favor. The district court, Brent V. Danielson, J., entered a judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiff on all counts. The circuit court affirmed the judgment with respect to the claim under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, but reversed with respect to the claims of retaliatory discharge and breach of an employment contract, ruling those claims to be preempted by the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. The defendants appealed by leave granted, and the plaintiff cross appealed. The Court of Appeals held: 1. The circuit court erred in removing the case to the district court. An action under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court. 2. The circuit court did not err in reversing the judgment with respect to the claims of retaliatory discharge and breach of an employment contract. The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act is the exclusive remedy for an employee whose employment is terminated in retaliation for reporting an employer’s violation of law. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 1. Courts — Circuit Court — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. The circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over actions commenced pursuant to the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (MCL 15.363[2]; MSA 17.428[3][2]). References Am Jur 2d, Wrongful Discharge §§ 55, 216, 220. Liability for discharging at-will employee for refusing to participate in, or for disclosing, unlawful or unethical acts of employer or coemployees. 9 ALR4th 329. 2. Master and Servant — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act — Exclusive Remedy. The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act provides the exclusive remedy for a discharged employee who claims that the discharge is in breach of the employment contract and in retaliation for the employee’s report of a suspected violation of law by the employer (MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428[1] et seq.). Robert E. Hamel, for the plaintiff. Michael E. Hall, for the defendants. Before: Taylor, P.J., and Mackenzie and M. J. Matuzak, JJ. Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment. Taylor, P.J. Defendants appeal by leave granted the circuit court’s order affirming in part and reversing in part the district court jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff cross appeals that portion of the circuit court order reversing the jury verdict in her favor. We affirm in part and reverse in part. In 1985, defendants moved from a private apartment within their foster care facility to a nearby house. In anticipation of their move, they hired plaintiff to work during the night shift. At the employment interview, Mrs. Hanley provided plaintiff with a job description and informed plaintiff of various workplace rules. According to plaintiff, Mrs. Hanley stated that she would be discharged only if she could not carry out her responsibilities or follow defendants’ work rules. Plaintiff’s shift began at 9:00 p.m. and ended at 6:30 a.m. Defendants paid plaintiff $20 a night ($2.11 an hour) and $3.35 an hour when plaintiff worked the day shift. Although defendants could initially afford to pay plaintiff only $20 a night, plaintiff testified that defendants promised her a raise once they moved into their new home. While Mrs. Hanley admitted she had an unwritten policy against discharging her employees without just cause, she testified that she did not guarantee plaintiffs employment at the foster home. Mrs. Hanley’s need for employees depended on the number of residents in her foster care home. Also, Mrs. Hanley did not recall promising plaintiff a raise. Shortly after her employment began, plaintiff became concerned about the procedure for dispensing medication to the residents of the foster care home. She reported her concern to Mrs. Hanley, but defendants made no change in their procedure. Thereafter, plaintiff reported her concern to the Mental Health Licensing Bureau. A representative from the bureau visited defendant’s facility and required defendants to change their procedure. When defendants moved out of the foster care home without giving plaintiff the raise she allegedly was promised, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, reporting that she was being paid $2.11 an hour, less than the minimum wage. After receiving the Department of Labor complaint, Mrs. Hanley telephoned plaintiff and told her that defendants no longer needed her services. When plaintiff asked Mrs. Hanley if she was being fired, Mrs. Hanley responded affirmatively and stated that she could not tolerate employees going to the authorities without first coming to her. Several hours later, Mrs. Hanley again telephoned plaintiff and offered her the opportunity to finish the work week, but plaintiff declined because Mrs. Hanley would not assure plaintiff a wage increase. Plaintiff filed her complaint in circuit court alleging violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2), violation of the public policy against retaliatory discharge, and breach of her employment contract. After the parties received a mediation evaluation of $8,000, the circuit court removed the case to the district court because plaintiffs damages were likely to be below the $10,000 jurisdictional limit. The district court jury found in favor of plaintiff on each count and awarded $24,800 in damages. Defendants appealed to the circuit court, which reversed on the claims of retaliatory discharge and breach of an employment contract, finding that the wpa preempted them. The circuit court affirmed the district court’s judgment regarding the wpa claim, rejecting defendants’ argument that the judgment should be set aside for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendants argue on appeal that the circuit court erred in removing the case to the district court because the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over wpa actions. We agree. In removing plaintiffs claim to the district court, the circuit court relied on MCL 600.8301(1); MSA 27A.830K1) and MCR 4.003. According to MCL 600.8301(1); MSA 27A.8301(1): The district court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000.00. Pursuant to MCR 4.003(A)(1), the circuit court may order an action removed to the district court if it appears that the damages may be less than $10,000, and if removal will expedite disposition of the matter. However, the wpa specifically provides for circuit court jurisdiction: An action commenced pursuant to subsection (1) may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county where the complainant resides, or the county where the person against whom the civil compliant is filed resides or has his or her principal place of business. [MCL 15.363(2); MSA 17.428(3X2).] Because § 3 of the wpa and §8301(1) of the Revised Judicature Act each appear to provide jurisdiction to a different court, we must resolve the apparent jurisdictional conflict. Where a statutory jurisdictional conflict exists, the following rule applies: "Where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act, as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a conflict.” [Baxter v Gates Rubber Co, 171 Mich App 588, 590; 431 NW2d 81 (1988), quoting Wayne Co Prosecutor v Wayne Circuit Judge, 154 Mich App 216, 221; 397 NW2d 274 (1986).] We have previously determined that MCL 600.8301(1); MSA 27A.8301 is general in its application. Baxter, supra at 591. In contrast, § 3 of the wpa provides for circuit court jurisdiction over actions of a specific subject matter, namely, private actions for wrongful discharge or discrimination against an employee who has reported or is about to report a suspected violation of a law or regulation. MCL 15.363(2); MSA 17.428(3X2) and MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2). Accordingly, we hold that the specific jurisdictional grant of § 3 of the wpa takes precedence over the more general jurisdictional grant contained in § 8301 of the Revised Judicature Act. In other words, the wpa provides for exclusive circuit court jurisdiction, regardless of the amount in controversy. In her cross appeal, plaintiff claims the circuit court erred in reversing the jury verdict in her favor on the claim of breach of a just-cause employment contract. Although she acknowledges that the wpa provides the exclusive remedy for claims of retaliatory discharge, she asserts that a cause of action for breach of an employment contract is not precluded by the wpa. On the facts of this case, we disagree. It is well established that the wpa provides the exclusive remedy for an employee who has been discharged wrongfully from employment for reporting an employer’s violation of the law. Dudewicz v Norris Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68; 503 NW2d 645 (1993); Shuttleworth v Riverside Hosp, 191 Mich App 25; 477 NW2d 453 (1991); Branch v Azalea/Epps Home, Ltd, 189 Mich App 211; 472 NW2d 73 (1991). As a general rule, "when a statute creates a new right or imposes a new duty having no counterpart in the common law, the remedies provided in the statute for its violation are exclusive and not cumulative.” Shuttleworth, supra at 27. Because the wpa has no common-law counterpart, "the act is the exclusive remedy for an employee whose employment is terminated in retaliation for reporting an employer’s violation of the law.” Id. In the instant case, plaintiffs breach of an employment contract was based solely on the fact that she reported defendants’ violations of the law. Accordingly, we conclude that the wpa provided plaintiff with an exclusive remedy and preempted her cause of action for breach of an employment contract. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

FAULKNER v FLOWERS Docket No. 169088. Submitted May 11, 1994, at Marquette. Decided September 6, 1994, at 9:10 a.m. Deborah Faulkner and Debra Holbrook brought an action in the Luce Circuit Court against Gerald and Helen Flowers, alleging that the defendants violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq., when they discharged the plaintiffs from employment after the plaintiffs indicated that they were going to report certain business practices of the defendants to the Internal Revenue Service. The court, Charles Stark, J., granted summary disposition for the defendants, finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had filed a complaint with the Department of Labor, pursuant to the wage and fringe benefits act, MCL 408.471 et seq.; MSA 17.277(1) et seq., shortly after being fired, and the administrative proceeding was still being pursued. The plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals held: A plaintiff may initiate a cause of action in the circuit court under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act while at the same time pursuing administrative rights under the wage and fringe benefits act. The two acts provide differing remedies and encompass differing, but not conflicting, goals. The plaintiffs’ complaint satisfies the requirements of both acts. The Legislature provided overlapping remedies for an employee whose employment is terminated for reporting wage and fringe benefits violations. Reversed and remanded. Actions — Employment — Retaliatory Discharge — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act — Wage and Fringe Benefits Act. The Legislature has provided overlapping remedies for an employee whose employment is terminated for reporting wage and fringe benefits violations by an employer; the employee may initiate a cause of action in the circuit court alleging a violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act while at the same time pursuing administrative rights under the wage and fringe benefits act (MCL 15.361 et seq., 408.471 et seq.; MSA 17.428[1] et seq., 17.277[1] et seq.). References Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations, § 4451; Wrongful Discharge, §§ 55-57, 216, 241. Liability for discharging at-will employee for refusing to participate in, or for disclosing, unlawful or unethical acts of employer or coemployees. 9 ALR4th 329. Employee’s protection under § 15 (a) (3) of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USCS § 215 (a) (3)). 101 ALR Fed 220. John H. Underhill, P.C. (by John H. Underhill'), for the plaintiffs. Moher & Cannello, P.C. (by Timothy S. Moher), for the defendants. Before: Mackenzie, P.J., and Neff and R. L. Olzark, JJ. Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment. Neff, J. Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order of the circuit court granting summary disposition to defendants. The circuit court determined it was without subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ case, which was based on the Whistle-blowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq., because plaintiffs had already initiated an administrative action with the Department of Labor pursuant to the wage and fringe benefits act, MCL 408.471 et seq.; MSA 17.277(1) et seq. We reverse the order granting summary disposition to defendants and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. i Plaintiffs worked at defendants’ establishment as waitresses, cooks, and bartenders. Plaintiffs were allegedly required to put all of the tips they received into a jar, so that defendants could take half of the tips for themselves. When plaintiffs allegedly challenged this practice by claiming they would report defendants to the Internal Revenue Service, they were discharged by defendants. Shortly after being fired, plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Department of Labor pursuant to the wage and fringe benefits act. Shortly thereafter, and while the administrative proceeding was continuing, plaintiffs filed the instant suit in the circuit court. ii A When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), this Court must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact. MCR 2.116(G)(2) and 2.116(I)(1); Sargent v Browning-Ferris Industries, 167 Mich App 29, 33; 421 NW2d 563 (1988). B The relevant portion of the wpa, MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2), provides: An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action. The wage and fringe benefits act provides for the time and manner in which employees receive compensation. The provision relevant to this case, MCL 408.483(2); MSA 17.277(13X2), provides: An employee who believes that he or she is discharged or otherwise discriminated against by an employer in violation of this section may file a complaint with the department alleging the discrimination within 30 days after the violation occurs. Upon receipt of the complaint, the department shall cause an investigation to be made. If, upon the investigation, the department determines that this section was violated, the department shall order the rehiring or reinstatement of an employee to his or her former position with back pay. Defendants argued below that the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ claim because, once plaintiffs initiated the administrative proceeding with the Department of Labor, exclusive jurisdiction vested with that administrative agency. c The court below relied primarily on this Court’s opinions in Cockels v Int’l Business Expositions, Inc, 159 Mich App 30; 406 NW2d 465 (1987), and Murphy v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 190 Mich App 384; 476 NW2d 639 (1991), in support of its determination. In Cockels, this Court dealt with whether the provision of the wage and fringe benefits act regarding retaliatory dismissals provided an exclusive or cumulative remedy with respect to the common law. See Murphy, supra at 387. It did not deal with whether that remedy provision is exclusive when a separate statutory provision is involved. In Murphy, the question before this Court was whether a plaintiff must proceed with administrative remedies pursuant to the wage and fringe benefits act where that plaintiff also had an independent common-law remedy. This Court determined that the plaintiff may follow either course, but then, in dicta, went on to state that once an employee chooses to pursue the administrative remedy, that remedy must be utilized exclusively, including an appeal to the circuit court. [Id. at 388.] Plaintiffs here, rather than basing their civil complaint on a common-law remedy, seek their remedy pursuant to the wpa, a separate statutory scheme, which itself creates new rights and imposes new duties. See Tyrna v Adamo, Inc, 159 Mich App 592, 599-600; 407 NW2d 47 (1987). Accordingly, both Cockels, supra, and Murphy, supra, are distinguishable from this case. See, e.g., Tyrna, supra at 598-599. D On appeal, both parties rely on Shuttleworth v Riverside Osteopathic Hosp, 191 Mich App 25, 27; 477 NW2d 453 (1991), wherein this Court determined that no common-law cause of action predated the wpa, and that the statute’s remedy provision was exclusive. Accordingly, this Court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint that purported to be based on a common-law whistleblowers’ theory. Id. After this dispositive ruling was made, this Court, in dicta, also addressed whether a separate remedy was available to the plaintiff under the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act (miosha), MCL 408.1001 et seq.; MSA 17.50(1) et seq. Shuttleworth, supra at 28. This Court determined that the plaintiff had a separate remedy under the miosha, and then stated that "before resorting to a civil action, [the plaintiff] first must have pursued the administrative remedies contained in the miosha.” Id. Because this language is dicta, we decline to follow it. E We find this Court’s opinion in Tyrna, supra, to be most applicable here. In Tyrna, this Court determined that a plaintiff could initiate a cause of action in a civil court under the wpa, while at the same time pursuing administrative rights under the miosha. Id. at 600-601. The plaintiff in Tyrna was fired after reporting a safety violation to various local officials. Id. at 596. The plaintiff filed her miosha complaint after she was fired. Id. at 596-597. This Court began its analysis by examining the purposes behind the two statutes, noting that they overlapped, and determining that the plaintiffs reporting of the violation satisfied the requirements of both statutes. Id. at 599. This Court then held that the Legislature has provided overlapping remedies for an employee whose employment is terminated in retaliation for such reporting. The Legislature has not provided that the employee must pursue only one statutory remedy. [Id.] This Court also determined that the scope of the remedies provided by the wpa differed somewhat from those offered by the miosha. Id. at 600. Accordingly, this Court stated that "we see no reason, without further legislative direction, that plaintiff should not be able to pursue a cause of action under both statutes.” Id. at 600-601. Similarly, here, the wage and fringe benefits act and the wpa provide differing remedies and encompass differing, but not conflicting, goals. The preamble to the wage and fringe benefits act provides: An act to regulate the time and manner of payment of wages and fringe benefits to employees; to prescribe rights and responsibilities of employers and employees, and the powers and duties of the department of labor ... to provide for settlement of disputes regarding wages and fringe benefits; to prohibit certain practices by employers; to prescribe penalties and remedies. Thus, the goals of that act relate to wage and fringe benefits issues between an employee and an employer. These goals are narrower than those of the wpa. The goals of the wpa, according to this Court’s opinion in Hopkins v Midland, 158 Mich App 361, 374; 404 NW2d 744 (1987), are "to protect the integrity of the law by removing barriers to employee efforts to report violations of the law,” and "to protect the public by protecting employees who report violations of laws and regulations.” This applies broadly to "reporting to any public body a violation of any law or regulation of this state, a political subdivision, or the United States. MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2).” Tyrna, supra at 599. Plaintiffs’ complaint in this case, like that in Tyrna, supra, satisfies the requirements of both statutes. in We hold that the Legislature has provided overlapping remedies for an employee whose employment is terminated for reporting wage and fringe benefits violations. We find it within the legislative intent for a plaintiff to pursue a wpa cause of action even though that plaintiff has already initiated a wage and fringe benefits act administrative proceeding. The wpa provides remedies not available in the wage and fringe benefits act, cf. MCL 408.483(2); MSA 17.277(13X2) with MCL 15.364; MSA 17.428(4); see also Tyrna, supra at 600. There are no conflicts between the remedies provided, and the goals of the two statutes are complementary. In addition, if plaintiffs were to be relegated to their wage and fringe benefits act remedy, they could lose their wpa remedies if the resolution of the wage and fringe benefits act claims took longer than ninety days from the occurrence of the alleged violations. See MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3) (1). Thus, our holding here serves the beneficial purpose of allowing an harmonious reading of both statutes. See House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 568-569; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). Accordingly, we reverse the lower court’s determination that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ case and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

KATHERINE C. KENNEDY, Plaintiff v. GUILFORD TECHNICAL COMMUNITY COLLEGE, Defendant No. 9318SC444 (Filed 19 July 1994) Public Officers and Employees § 58 (NCI4th)— “whistleblower” action — job transfer — prima facie case — legitimate reason shown by defendant — no discrediting evidence by plaintiff — summary judgment for defendant Assuming that plaintiff’s transfer to a secretarial position she considered less attractive than her former secretarial position following her protected activity of reporting employee misuse or misappropriation of state property established a prima facie showing of discrimination in her employment in violation of the “whistleblower” statutes, N.C.G.S. §§ 126-84 and 126-85, the trial court properly entered summary judgment for defendant technical college where defendant presented evidence that plaintiff’s transfer had no effect on her hours, wages, seniority, or benefits, the job descriptions for the two positions were almost identical, plaintiff’s transfer was an integral part of a larger reorganization plan, and plaintiffs former position was permanently eliminated, and plaintiff presented no specific facts tending to discredit defendant’s reorganization claim or to show that the legitimate reason offered by defendant was not its true reason but was a pretext for discrimination. Am Jur 2d, Wrongful Discharge §§ 55 et seq. Liability for discharging at-will employee for refusing to participate in, or for disclosing, unlawful or unethical acts of employer or coemployees. 9 ALR4th 329. Appeal by plaintiff from summary judgment entered 12 March. 1993 by Judge Thomas W. Ross in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 February 1994. Smith, Follín & James, by Norman B. Smith and Margaret Rowlett, for plaintiff-appellant. Hendrick, Zotian, Bennett & Blancato, by William A. Blancato, for defendant-appellee. JOHN, Judge. Plaintiff-employee filed an amended complaint in this action on 16 April 1992, claiming retaliation in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-85 by defendant-employer following her reports of fellow-employee misuse and misappropriation of audio-visual (AV) equipment. In sum, plaintiff’s complaint stated that after she informed supervisory and investigatory personnel at defendant Guilford Technical Community College (GTCC) of employee personal use of State equipment and of State property missing from inventory, she was transferred from her position as “Audio-Visual Secretary” (AV secretary) to the position of “Library Public and Technical Services Secretary.” Plaintiff initiated her suit after unsuccessfully seeking reinstatement as AV secretary by means of an internal grievance procedure pursued with GTCC in the fall of 1991. From entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant on 12 March 1993, plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court. This action was brought under North Carolina’s “whistleblower” statutes, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-84 (1993), and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-85 (1993), which provide in pertinent part as follows: § 126-84. Statement of policy. It is the policy of this State that State employees shall be encouraged to report verbally or in writing to their supervisor, department head, or other appropriate authority, evidence of activity by a State agency or State employee constituting: (1) A violation of State or federal law, rule or regulation; (2) Fraud; (3) Misappropriation of State resources; or (4) Substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. § 126-85. Protection from retaliation. (a) No head of any State department, agency or institution or other State employee exercising supervisory authority shall discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate against a State employee regarding the State employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the State employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, any activity described in G.S. 126-84, unless the State employee knows or has reason to believe that the report is inaccurate. (Emphasis added). A court ruling upon a motion for summary judgment must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (here, plaintiff), see, e.g., Durham v. Vine, 40 N.C. App. 564, 566, 253 S.E.2d 316, 318-19 (1979), overruled in part on other grounds, Roumillat v. Simplistic Enterprises, Inc., 331 N.C. 57, 63, 414 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1992), accepting all her asserted facts as true, Railway Co. v. Werner Industries, 286 N.C. 89, 98, 209 S.E.2d 734, 739 (1974) (citation omitted), and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. Whitley v. Gubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 207, 210 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1974) (citations omitted). However, once the moving party presents an adequately supported motion, the opposing party must come forward with specific facts (not mere allegations or speculation) that controvert the facts set forth in the movant’s evidentiary forecast. Roumillat, 331 N.C. at 63-64, 414 S.E.2d at 342; Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, 36 N.C. App. 350, 353, 244 S.E.2d 208, 210 (1978), aff’d, 296 N.C. 467, 251 S.E.2d 419 (1979); see also N.C.R. Civ. R 56(e) (1990), which provides in part: When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. (Emphasis added). Both parties correctly point out that our courts have issued no published decisions interpreting or applying G.S. §§ 126-84 and 126-85. Thus the question of whether the general principles just enunciated are applicable to actions commenced under these statutes has not been definitively answered. However, the parties direct our attention to related cases involving discrimination and retaliation claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e el seq. (Title VII) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983) and suggest our analysis of the case sub judice should follow that utilized by courts in considering Title VII and Section 1983 claims. Noting that the procedures adopted by courts in these cases closely parallel the customary summary judgment analysis set out above, we elect for purposes of this appeal to adopt the parties’ recommended reasoning. Plaintiff relies upon a decision from the federal court for the principle that a prima facie case of retaliation (based upon a violation of first amendment rights) in “whistle-blowing” circumstances is properly considered composed of the following elements: “(1) [plaintiff] engaged in protected activity, (2) followed by an adverse employment action, and (3) the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action.” McCauley v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 714 F. Supp. 146, 151 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (citations omitted) (plaintiff claimed she was retaliated against, in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983, for filing race and sex discrimination charges with the E.E.O.C.). The McCauley court then observed that although “[t]he analysis for retaliatory acts which violate . . . Title VII is similar, . . . the Plaintiff must prove ‘but for’ instead of ‘motivating factor’ causation in her prima facie case.” Id. (citation omitted). The case cited by plaintiff continues by stating that upon presentation of a prima facie case of retaliation based upon first amendment rights, “the burden shifts to the defendant to show that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Id. at 153. Stated otherwise, “the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse [employment] action.” Melchi v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs. Inc., 597 F. Supp. 575, 582 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (construing Michigan’s “Whistleblowers’ Protection Act”); see also Heerdink v. Amoco Oil Co., 919 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217, 115 L.Ed.2d 996 (1991). An articulated reason is not “legitimate,” and so does not overcome the presumption of discrimination arising from plaintiff’s prima facie showing, unless it has “a rational connection with the business goal of securing a competent and trustworthy work force.” Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1285 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds by Blue v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th. Cir. 1990). Finally, if the defendant-employer meets its burden, the plaintiff must then come forward with evidence to show “that the legitimate reason was a mere pretext for the retaliatory action.” Melchi, 597 F. Supp. at 582 (relying on language from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 679 (1973)); thus, “a plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving that the [adverse employment action] would not have occurred had there been no protected activity” engaged in by the plaintiff. Id. at 583. Courts have referred to this as requiring a showing by plaintiff of “but-for” causation, id., creating an affirmative obligation on plaintiff’s part to produce evidence countering that produced by the employer on its motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, if at that point “plaintiff has no evidence whatsoever of pretext, the continued litigation of plaintiff’s case can be frivolous despite the existence of a prima facie case.” Blue v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 536 (4th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). We begin our analysis of the case sub judice by assuming arguen-do (but explicitly not deciding) that when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence before the trial court established a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to conditions of plaintiff’s employment in retaliation for having engaged in the protected activity of reporting employee misuse or misappropriation of State property. In this context, however, we note parenthetically defendant’s strong arguments against consideration of plaintiff’s transfer to a secretarial position in the Learning Resources Center’s library as “discrimination” with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment. See G.S. § 126-85. GTCC emphasizes uncontested evidence demonstrating that plaintiff’s transfer had no effect on her hours, her wages, her seniority, or her privileges and benefits, and only minimal impact on her location (requiring a move from third to first floor), and that the written job description for her new secretarial position was virtually identical to the description for her former one. Defendant further counters plaintiffs suggestion that the transfer interrupted a “reclassification” of her former job which had been in progress for some time by pointing out she was unable to offer any evidence supporting that assertion. For instance, defendant continues, she presented no factual information establishing that her desired reclassification had been approved by the appropriate personnel, that funding for it was or would ever be available, or that being transferred would necessarily have an adverse effect upon any decision made about the reclassification. Furthermore, plaintiff stated she was primarily dissatisfied with her new job because she perceived it manifested less responsibility and she felt “isolated” and “bored.” However, GTCC observes that she had worked fewer than three weeks when she requested a transfer to another department, and during that time she was in the process of being trained. Moreover, she began her work in the library during the “slow” period when school was not in session. Finally, defendant argues it is uncontroverted that secretarial help was greatly needed in the library, and that within time and after training plaintiff would have been given a broader range of responsibilities there. On the other hand, the duties she had performed as the part-time AV secretary had been divided among student workers and another employee, and the job itself eliminated following her departure therefrom. Nonetheless, assuming arguendo plaintiffs transfer to a position she considered less attractive following reports to college authorities of employee misconduct constituted a prima facie showing of “discrimination,” we proceed to an examination of defendant’s evidence presented to the trial court. Defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 on 12 February 1993, and supported its motion with numerous affidavits as well as various attached memoranda. Included was the affidavit of Beverley Gass (Gass), current Dean and former Director of the Learning Resources Center (the LRC), which houses the AV department as well as the library and the Office of the Director of Education and Faculty/Staff Development. Other affidavits presented were those of Scott Burnette (Burnette), lead technician of the AV department, and Dr. Delores Parker (Dr. Parker), Vice-President for Academic Affairs and Student Development at GTCC, as well as Randy Candelaria (Candelaria) and Martha Davis (Davis), GTCC librarians. Defendant’s materials established that plaintiffs transfer to the library was part of a campus-wide reorganization, which directly affected the LRC in numerous respects. Considered cumulatively, defendant’s affidavits show the following: In the beginning of 1991, Lundee Amos (Amos) was the Director of Education and Faculty/Staff Development; in the summer of 1991, she was appointed to the position of Dean of GTCC’s Greensboro campus. On 1 August 1991, Robin Brewington (Brewington) became the Director of Educational Development (part of the LRC staff); in that role, Brewington assumed many of Amos’ earlier duties. Marlene Matthews (Matthews) had been Amos’ secretary before the latter became Dean, and since Amos’ former responsibilities had been given to a person working within the LRC, Matthews was also transferred to the LRC. Matthews is a full-time secretary with a ten-month contract of employment. With the transfer of Matthews, the LRC had three secretaries on staff — Betty Jones (Jones, Gass’ personal secretary), plaintiff, and Matthews. Plaintiff and Jones both worked on the third floor, where Brewington’s office was also located. Because Matthews was familiar with much of the work that had been assigned to Brewington upon Amos’ promotion, Brewington strongly desired that Matthews function as her secretary. Accommodating that wish meant that Matthews would also be situated on the third floor of the LRC. At that time, Gass began discussing the most efficient allocation of secretarial resources with various department heads of the LRC— in particular, Brewington and the LRC’s two librarians, Candelaria and Davis. Candelaria and Davis had been in need of secretarial assistance for several months, and occasionally asked Jones for help. However, as even plaintiff conceded in her deposition, because Gass herself had recently been promoted to Dean of the LRC, Jones was “swamped” with work, making reliance on her impractical. Gass first suggested the creation of a “secretarial pool” for the entire LRC building, but as Brewington wanted closer personal assistance from Matthews, this idea was not acceptable. Ultimately, Gass decided that Matthews would be situated on the third floor and assigned to Brewington; in addition, she would be available to perform secretarial tasks for the AV department should the need arise. Jones was to continue as Gass’ personal secretary, also remaining on the third floor. Plaintiff was transferred to the first-floor library to provide secretarial services for the librarians. The job of AV secretary was thereafter eliminated and not re-established, plaintiffs former duties having been parcelled out and assigned to others. However, the job description for the newly created secretarial position (Library Public and Technical Services Secretary) was virtually identical to that of the AV secretary. Included with Dr. Parker’s affidavit was a copy of GTCC’s policy regarding reorganization, which provides: The President reserves the right to make changes in job status through reorganization or reassignment of personnel (includes promotion and transfers ... as defined in procedures). All other promotions or transfers of employees will be considered upon request initiated by the employee or appropriate supervisory personnel. Dr. Parker elaborated by noting that each department’s dean has the right to “reassign or reorganize” clerical personnel (such as secretaries) within his or her department. Thus, it was Gass’ discretionary duty to decide where to place each secretary within the LRC. Dr. Parker approved plaintiff’s transfer after “full investigation],” because “in [her] opinion it was the most efficient allocation of resources within the LRC.” Furthermore, Dr. Parker found there to be “no need to reestablish the position [of AV secretary] and it would be inefficient to do so.” Candelaria and Davis both indicated that because no classes were held in August, it was a “slow” month in the library. Nonetheless, secretarial help was greatly needed, and they were in the process of training plaintiff for further duties when she sought a transfer to the Guided Studies department. During the few weeks plaintiff was in the library, she occupied the same office space Jones had when serving as Gass’ secretary before they both relocated to the third floor in 1988. This area was connected to Candelaria’s (plaintiff’s new supervisor’s) office. We hold defendant met its burden of countering any prima facie showing of plaintiff by establishing a “legitimate explanation for the challenged action,” Carrv. F.W. Woolworth Co., No. 91-541-CIV-5-BO, slip op. at 9 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 1992) — specifically, that plaintiff’s transfer to the LRC library was an integral part of a larger reorganization plan, well within the realm of Gass’ discretionary power to make assignments for the secretarial personnel working at the LRC. In response to defendant’s well-supported motion, plaintiff offered nothing more than speculation regarding her supervisors’ motives. She presented no specific facts tending to discredit defendant’s reorganization claim or to show “that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Melchi, 597 F. Supp. at 582 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 215 (1981)). Indeed, in her deposition testimony, she acknowledged the verity of all the factual information presented in the affidavits submitted by defendant regarding the appointments, relocations, and resultant work loads of various staff and faculty members. Plaintiff produced no factual information tending to refute defendant’s contention that her transfer was simply a sensible managerial decision, or to show that it was instead the result of retaliation for her “whistleblowing” activities in the AV department. The only evidence offered by plaintiff arguably supporting her assertion of retaliation was deposition testimony of Brewington to the effect that Gass and Burnette had said they wanted plaintiff out of the AV department. Upon further inquiry therein, however, Brewington’s responses indicated those comments were reflective of personality conflicts between plaintiff and her co-workers; Brewington did not believe the statements were connected in any way with a desire to retaliate against plaintiff for reporting misuse or misappropriation of AV equipment. Accordingly, we hold that defendant’s motion for summary judgment was amply supported by evidence establishing a legitimate reason for plaintiff’s transfer to a substantially similar job in the LRC. Plaintiff then failed to meet her burden of coming forward with a showing that defendant’s stated reasons were simply a p

DUDEWICZ v NORRIS SCHMID, INC Docket No. 93029. Argued March 31, 1993 (Calendar No. 3 April). Decided July 27, 1993. Michael L. Dudewicz brought an action in the Saginaw Circuit Court against Norris Schmid, Inc., alleging that the termination of his employment because he refused to. drop criminal assault and battery charges against a fellow employee that arose out of a dispute over the handling of Norris Schmid’s business violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act as well as public policy. The court, Robert S. Gilbert, J., granted summary disposition for the defendant with respect to the public policy claim and entered a directed verdict for the defendant with respect to the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act claim. The Court of Appeals, Cavanagh, P.J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr., and Cynar, JJ., reversed, finding that retaliatory discharge violates the public policy of encouraging victims of crime to file criminal complaints, and that the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act applies to violations by fellow employees, as well as employers (Docket No. 126212). The defendant appeals. In an opinion by Justice Brickley, joined by Chief Justice Cavanagh, and Justices Levin, Riley, Griffin, and Mallett, the Supreme Court held: The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act applies to an employee who reports a violation of a law arising out of a dispute over the handling of company business occurring during business hours, regardless of whether the criminal actor is the employer or a fellow employee. 1. The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act applies to the discharge of employees who report a violation or a suspected violation of the law either by their employers or fellow employees. Reporting a fellow employee for violating the Criminal Code because of a dispute over the handling of company business is not so different from traditional notions of whistleblowing closely connected with employment, such as Health Code and safety violations or illegal labor practices. Nothing in the wpa or its legislative analysis limits protection only to those employees who report violations of law by their employer; rather, the explicit language of the analysis and the broad scope of the statute strongly suggest that the wpa was intended to protect employees who report violations by an employer or fellow employees. Remedial statutes, such as the wpa, are to be liberally construed in favor of the persons intended to be benefited. The trial court erred in directing a verdict on this issue. References Am Jur 2d, Wrongful Discharge § 57. See ALR Index under Whistleblowers. 2. Remedies provided by statute for violation of a right having no common-law counterpart are exclusive, not cumulative. At common law there was no right to be free from being fired for reporting an employer’s violation of the law. Thus, the remedies provided by the wpa are exclusive, not cumulative. The specific prohibition against retaliatory discharge is determinative of the viability of a public policy claim. A public policy claim is sustainable only where there is no applicable statutory prohibition against discharge in retaliation for the conduct at issue. Because the wpa provides relief for reporting illegal activity by a fellow employee, the public policy claim is preempted. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Justice Boyle, dissenting, stated that the employer’s demand that the employee withdraw the criminal complaint against his co-worker or be fired, rather, was an alleged violation of a clearly established public policy of this state. The plaintiff did not engage in activity protected under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act when he filed a criminal complaint against a coworker. The wpa was enacted to protect employees who report corrupt or illegal business practices or violations of law by an employer or co-worker that result from the conduct of the employer’s business. 192 Mich App 247; 480 NW2d 612 (1991) affirmed in part and reversed in part. Labor Relations — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act — Violations by Fellow Employees. The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act applies to an employee who reports a violation of a law arising out of a dispute over the handling of company business occurring during business hours, regardless of whether the criminal actor is the employer or a fellow employee (MSA 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428[1] et seq.). Jensen, Smith & Gilbert, P.C. (by Peter C. Jensen), for the plaintiff. Smith, Bovill, Fisher, Meyer & Borchard, P.C. (by Robert A. Jarema), for the defendant. Amicus Curiae: Mark Brewer (Paul Denenfeld, of counsel), for ACLU Fund of Michigan. Brickley, J. The issue before us is whether the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee who files a criminal complaint against a fellow employee for an assault that arose out of a dispute over the handling of the employer’s business, during business hours, and at the site of employment. We are also asked to decide whether the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine applies to the facts of this case. In a case of first impression for this Court, we find that the wpa applies and prohibits discharge under these facts. We also find that the wpa preempts any public policy claim arising out of the same facts. While summary disposition for the defendant on the public policy claim was proper, the trial court improperly granted a directed verdict for the defendant on the wpa claim. Therefore, the judgment for the directed verdict is reversed, and the case is remanded for trial of the wpa claim. I Plaintiff, Michael L. Dudewicz, worked as a parts manager for an automobile dealership, Norris Schmid, Inc., defendant. On the morning of November 4, 1987, Dudewicz attempted to obtain warranty service for a customer who, as a wholesale buyer, did. a lot of business with Norris Schmid. To get better service for the customer, Dudewicz enlisted the aid of one of the dealership’s owners, Samuel Norris. Together, the two men sought the assistance of the service manager, Dick Boehm, who agreed to do the work for the customer under warranty. After Norris. left the service area, Dudewicz alleged that the service manager reached over the service counter and grabbed Dudewicz by the collar and tried to pull him across the. counter. Dudewicz alleged that Boehm told him never to bring the owner into the service area again. During the course of this fracas, Dudewicz alleged that the service manager tore buttons off his shirt, broke a gold chain from around his neck, and left fingerprints on his neck. That same day, Dudewicz told Norris Schmid’s new car sales manager about the incident and also filed criminal charges with the Midland County Prosecutor, alleging assault and battery. Dudewicz testified that upon entering work the morning of December 1, 1987, he was called to Norris’ office and told to drop the criminal charges against the service manager or be fired. He was also told to leave the dealership. Dudewicz left the premises because he believed he had been fired; he also believed he could regain his job if he agreed to drop the criminal charges. Dudewicz then contacted an attorney who counseled him to return to work. When Dudewicz did return to the dealership on December 3, 1987, Norris told him the dealership considered him to have quit and that he had to leave the premises. Dudewicz argued that he had not quit, but had, in fact, been fired. Further, Dudewicz refused to leave unless provided with a letter of termination. Norris refused to comply with this request and called the police to escort Dudewicz from the premises. Subsequently, Dudewicz filed a two-count complaint, alleging that his termination violated Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act as well as public policy. Following discovery, Norris Schmid sought and received summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), on the ground that the public policy argument failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Then, after hearing proofs on the remaining count, Norris Schmid sought and received a directed verdict, under MCR 2.515, on the ground that Dudewicz failed to show that it had violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. The trial court denied a motion to reconsider this verdict. Dudewicz appealed as of right in the Court of Appeals, which reversed. 192 Mich App 247; 480 NW2d 612 (1991). The Court first addressed the public policy claim and found that Dudewicz had alleged an implied cause of action for retaliatory discharge because " 'the reason for a discharge was the employee’s exercise of a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment.’ ” Id. at 251, quoting Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 696; 316 NW2d 710 (1982). On the basis of federal precedent, Pratt v Brown Machine Co, 855 F2d 1225 (CA 6, 1988), the Court was satisfied that the ability to file a criminal complaint as the victim of a crime was a right conferred by a "well-established legislative enactment.” Therefore, Norris Schmid’s discharge violated a public policy that encouraged victims of crime to file complaints. Otherwise, the Court believed, "[t]o allow the discharge of an at-will employee because of a choice to file a criminal complaint against a fellow employee would force a choice between justice and livelihood. It is the public policy of this state to protect its citizens from such an onerous choice.” 192 Mich App 253. The Court also noted that, as Norris Schmid argued, Dudewicz might have had to choose the wpa as his exclusive remedy over his public policy claim. Because, however, the trial court "expressly stated that it had not granted the motion for summary disposition on the basis that the [wpa] provides the exclusive remedy,” the Court ruled that "consideration of the applicability of the public policy exception to the facts of this case [was] still proper . . . .” 192 Mich App 253. Next the Court considered Dudewicz’ claim that his discharge was in violation of the wpa because he was fired for filing a criminal complaint, alleging that he had been assaulted and battered by a fellow employee. In ruling that the wpa prohibited such conduct, the Court expressly rejected an earlier Court of Appeals holding, Dickson v Oakland Univ, 171 Mich App 68; 429 NW2d 640 (1988), that required, as an element of the applicability of the wpa, that the person accused of breaking the law be the employer. The Court found that the language of the act itself and the accompanying legislative analysis contained no such limitation and, in fact, indicated that violations by fellow employees, as well as by employers, were to be considered within the scope of the wpa. The Court therefore concluded that the trial judge erred in granting both a directed verdict and summary disposition for Norris Schmid. II In deciding whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant, we must first decide whether the wpa was intended to protect employees who are fired for reporting violations of the law by fellow employees. Norris Schmid contends that the wpa protects only those employees who are fired for reporting their employers’ violations of law. There is, however, no such limitation in either the express language of the wpa or the analysis of the House Bill that spawned the wpa. Section 2 of the wpa provides in full: An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action. [MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2).[] A plain reading of this provision reveals that protection is not limited to employee reports of violations by employers. On its face, the provision only seems to apply to the discharge of an employee who "reports ... a violation or a suspected violation of a law . . . .” Id. Moreover, the legislative analysis of the wpa supports the conclusion that its provisions protect employees who report violations of law by either their employers or fellow employees. The analysis recognizes the problem the wpa was designed to alleviate as the inability to combat corruption or criminally irresponsible behavior in the conduct of government or large businesses. House Legislative Analysis, HB 5088, 5089 (February 5, 1981). The analysis goes on to say that "[t]he people best placed to observe and report violations are the employees of government and business, but employees are naturally reluctant to inform on an employer or a colleague.” Id. (emphasis added). It appears that, at the time the bill was considered, the Legislature intended the protection to apply to employee reports of any and all violations of law by either employers or fellow employees. In any event, we find that the activity at issue here, reporting a fellow employee’s violation of the state’s Criminal Code because of a dispute over the handling of company business, is not so different from traditional notions of whistleblowing. Typically, the activity involves the violation of laws more closely connected with the employment setting, such as Health Code and safety violations, Tyrna v Adamo, Inc, 159 Mich App 592; 407 NW2d 47 (1987), or illegal labor practices, Hopkins v Midland, 158 Mich App 361; 404 NW2d 744 (1987), but there is no limitation in the statute to these types of activities. Moreover, the illegal activity is typically engaged in by an "employee,” even if that employee also happens to own the company. See Tyrna, supra. On the basis of these observations, we are satisfied that the events and individuals involved in this case are consistent with those activities and individuals contemplated by the WPA. In deciding that the wpa did not apply to the facts of this case, the trial judge relied upon a relatively recent Court of Appeals decision, Dickson v Oakland Univ, supra. The trial judge believed himself to be bound by the Dickson Court’s ruling that the wpa applied only to employees fired for reporting violations of law by their employers. We agree with the Court of Appeals, that there is no such limitation on the applicability of the wpa. The plaintiff in Dickson worked as a police officer for the defendant’s department of public safety. 171 Mich App 69. Before his dismissal, the plaintiff alleged that he was repeatedly criticized for enforcing the law against university students. Id. After he was allegedly assaulted by one student, the plaintiff requested that the defendant seek an arrest warrant against that student. Id. The defendant refused, and the plaintiff was subsequently discharged. Id. at 69-70. The trial court and Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s wpa claim, however, because the plaintiff only reported the wrongdoing of students to the defendant. Id. at 71. Nothing in the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant-employer violated any law or that the plaintiff was fired for reporting the defendant’s violation of law to a higher authority. Id. In support for limiting the wpa to reports of violations of law by employers, the Dickson Court quoted, inter alia, the same portion of the legislative analysis as quoted above. See 171 Mich App 70-71. However, as stated above, nothing in either the wpa itself or its legislative analysis limits protection only to those employees who report violations of law by their employer. On the contrary, the explicit language of the analysis and the broad scope of the statute strongly suggest that the wpa was intended to protect employees who report violations by either employers or fellow employees. Indeed, such an interpretation is also supported by the rule of statutory construction that remedial statutes, such as the wpa, are to be liberally construed in favor of the persons intended to be benefited. See Bierbusse v Farmers Ins Group, 84 Mich App 34, 37; 269 NW2d 297 (1978); Holmes v Haughton Elevator Co, 75 Mich App 198, 200; 255 NW2d 6 (1977), aff’d 404 Mich 36; 272 NW2d 550 (1978). Simply stated, the Dickson Court erred in limiting the applicability of the wpa to employee reports of violations of law by employers. Admittedly, a strictly literal interpretation of the statute without an analysis of legislative intent arguably could lead to an interpretation that would bar discharge of an employee for reporting a crime by anyone under any circumstances. See Tyrna, 159 Mich App 599 (the Court ruled that the wpa "provides a remedy to an employee terminated for reporting to any public body a violation of any law or regulation of this state, a political subdivision, or the United States”) (emphasis added). However, this is not the case and these are not the facts to test the outer limits of this rather broad statute. In concluding that it was intended to bar a discharge of an employee for reporting a crime by a fellow employee under the circumstances of this case does not begin to test those limits. In saying that, we note that not only was this a crime alleged to have been committed by a fellow employee, but the alleged crime arose out of a work incident at the work site. It is, therefore, very much within the employer-employee setting. Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on this issue. III The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition on the public policy claim because the trial court did not dismiss the claim on the basis of the fact that the wpa provided an exclusive remedy. While acknowledging the fact that the wpa was probably exclusive, the Court found that, because the trial court did not discuss this issue, it could not do so either. The Court erred in its rationale, however. Because the parties preserved the issue of public policy preemption and because the trial court failed to deal with the issue, the Court of Appeals was not precluded from dealing with the question whether the public policy claim was preempted by the wpa claim. The Court of Appeals, should have considered this issue and should have found that any public policy claim was preempted by the application of the wpa. As a general rule, the remedies provided by statute for violation of a right having no common-law counterpart are exclusive, not cumulative. Pompey v General Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537, 552-553; 189 NW2d 243 (1971). At common law, there was no right to be free from being fired for reporting an employer’s violation of the law. Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 83; 366 NW2d 76 (1985). The remedies provided by the wpa, therefore, are exclusive and not cumulative. Shuttleworth v Riverside Hosp, 191 Mich App 25, 27; 477 NW2d 453 (1991). In Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, supra, this Court recognized that there was an exception to the general rule that either party to an employment at will contract could terminate the agreement at any time for any or no reason. The exception is based on the principle that "some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable.” Id. at 695. We also found that these restrictions on an employer’s ability to terminate an employment at will agreement are most often found in explicit legislation. Id. The wpa is such legislation. Id. The existence of the specific prohibition against retaliatory discharge in the wpa is determinative of the viability of a public policy claim. In those cases in which Michigan courts have sustained a public policy claim, the statutes involved did not specifically proscribe retaliatory discharge. Whe

KAUFMAN & PAYTON, PC v NIKKILA Docket No. 133012. Submitted December 3, 1992, at Detroit. Decided June 21, 1993, at 9:25 a.m. The law firm of Kaufman & Payton, P.C., brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court against Catherine Nikkila, its former billing supervisor, alleging conversion and misappropriation of its files and records. Nikkila filed a counterclaim, alleging retaliatory constructive discharge in violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq., intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The court, Alice L. Gilbert, J., summarily dismissed the claim brought under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, ruling that there existed no genuine issue with respect to the fact that Nikkila or anyone acting on her behalf had not threatened to report the law firm to the Attorney Grievance Commission for billing irregularities before she tendered the resignation she claimed was a constructive discharge in retaliation for her threatened action. Nikkila appealed. The Court of Appeals held: The trial court correctly concluded that an affidavit by Nikki-la’s attorney, in which the attorney contradicted his earlier deposition testimony that there had been no threat of a report of the law firm’s billing practices to the Attorney Grievance Commission before Nikkila’s resignation, was insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. A party or its attorney may not contrive factual issues merely by asserting the contrary in an affidavit after giving damaging testimony in a deposition. Affirmed. Connor, J., dissenting, stated that discharge in retaliation for a feared imminent report to authorities, as opposed to actual knowledge of an imminent report, is sufficient for application of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, that the affidavit of Nikkila’s attorney did not contradict his deposition testimony, and that, if the affidavit and deposition can be considered contradictory, the benefit of reasonable doubt concerning the factual question raised by the contradiction should be given to Nikkila and the question decided at trial. Hyman & Lippitt (by Norman L. Lippitt and H. Joel Newman), for the plaintiff. Temple & Cutler (by Donald M. Cutler), for the defendant. Before: Corrigan, P.J., and Weaver and Con-nor, JJ. Corrigan, P.J. Catherine Nikkila appeals as of right the trial court’s summary dismissal of her counterclaim against the law firm of Kaufman & Payton, P.C., under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq. We affirm. The circuit court properly granted partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10). Nikkila did not raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning her Whistleblowers’ Protection Act claim. The circuit court properly found, considering all the evidence before it, that Nikkila could not prove that either she or her attorney had threatened to report the law firm to the Attorney Grievance Commission before her resignation from the firm. Catherine Nikkila, the billing supervisor at Kaufman & Payton for IV2 years, was scheduled to testify at a deposition in the law firm’s suit for collection of legal fees against a client in February 1989. As she prepared for her testimony with the law firm’s counsel, she became worried about the legality of certain billing procedures that she had executed. She decided to consult outside counsel, Ronald Prebenda. Prebenda advised Nikkila only about the potential criminal aspects of her conduct. Prebenda thereafter sent two letters to Kaufman & Payton on Nikkila’s behalf. The first, dated March 15, 1989, questioned the law firm’s billing practices and sought certain assurances from the firm about Nikkila’s future duties. The second, dated March 29, 1989, complained of the lack of response to the March 15 letter and prescribed unilateral changes in Nikkila’s billing duties. Alan Kaufman, managing partner of the firm, never formally responded to either letter. The evidence on this record is disputed concerning whether Nikkila was reassigned to different duties; in any event, she continued to receive the same salary. On April 19, 1989, Nikkila tendered her letter of resignation to the law firm. Four days later, on April 23, 1989, she sent a request for investigation to the Attorney Grievance Commission (agc) and followed up on May 4, 1989, with a formal complaint. Prebenda assisted her in drafting the formal complaint to the agc. On May 22, 1989, Kaufman & Payton sued Nikkila for conversion and misappropriation of the firm’s files and records. Nikkila answered and also filed a countercomplaint against the law firm, alleging constructive termination, retaliatory discharge, discharge in violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, intentional infliction of mental distress, and defamation. She also filed a separate complaint against Alan Kaufman, alleging essentially the same claims. The Kaufman proceedings were consolidated with this case in the circuit court. However, Nikkila did not file a claim of appeal in the case against Kaufman. This case, accordingly, relates solely to the circuit court’s grant of partial summary disposition of Nikkila’s countercomplaint against Kaufman & Payton concerning the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act claim. The theory alleged in Nikkila’s countercomplaint was that Kaufman & Payton constructively discharged her because she had reported or was about to report an alleged violation of law, rule, or regulation. The central issue is whether Nikkila or anyone acting on her behalf, threatened, mentioned, or otherwise indicated that Nikkila might report Kaufman & Pay-ton or any of its attorneys to any agency before her April 19 resignation. In deciding that Nikkila had not made out a genuine issue of material fact with regard to this question, the circuit court analyzed the evidence as follows: First, Nikkila testified that she could not remember speaking to her employer about threatened action. (Nikkila deposition, pp 109-111). Second, Nikkila’s husband and attorney Prebenda both testified that they did not know about the grievance request until after Nikkila filed it after she left her employment. (Jeffrey Nikkila deposition, pp 41-42; Prebenda deposition, p 92). Next, the deposition testimony of Defendant Alan Kaufman referred to threats made by Prebenda, not Nikkila. (Kaufman deposition, p 93). Finally, the court notes that the affidavit of Prebenda in support of Nikkila’s claim, which states that Prebenda advised Irwin Alterman of Nikkila’s doings prior to her resignation, wholly contradicts Prebenda’s deposition testimony that he did not notify or threaten anyone on Nikkila’s behalf prior to her resignation. The circuit court did not err in disregarding Prebenda’s affidavit. It is undisputed in the record below that an affidavit dated December 1989 was not filed in this cause until after defendant moved for summary disposition. Prebenda’s later-filed affidavit contradicted his deposition testimony in relevant details. During his deposition, Prebenda testified: Q. Did you assist Ms. Nikkila in filing a grievance against Alan Kaufman? A. Yes, I did. Q. When did you determine that you would file such a grievance? A. She told me — first of all, she filed a grievance without my knowledge. She had filed some preliminary documents of some kind that to this day I have never seen. Q. Did you discuss doing so with her prior to that time? A. I have no present — prior to what time? Q. Prior to filing this document to the grievance board to which you were unaware. A. My understanding was that she had filed something with the grievance commission that I had no knowledge of and there was no discussion of to the best of my knowledge and then at that time she came to me and asked me if I would assist her in filing a complaint, and I read in the rules, and the rules that you must assist a person that request that you file a grievance and I complied with the rule. Q. Do you recall approximately when you assisted her filing this more formal complaint against Mr. Kaufman? A. No, I don’t recall. I assisted her as to form only. Earlier in that deposition, Mr. Prebenda had stated: Q. Do you recall ever telling anyone that you on behalf of Ms. Nikkila intended to file a State Bar grievance against Mr. Kaufman or his law firm? A. No. I have no recollection of telling him that. No. Q. Tell Mr. Kaufman that or anyone else? A. I never talked to Alan Kaufman after I wrote that letter, he chose never to face me. [Emphasis supplied.] The lower court also considered Alan Kaufman’s affidavit, in which he amplified his deposition testimony. In it, he referred to threats by Prebenda after Nikkila resigned that he would file a State Bar Grievance on his own behalf and not as a representative of Catherine Nikkila. Further, Kaufman averred that at no time before Nikkila left her position did Prebenda, Nikkila, or anyone else state that Nikkila was contemplating filing a grievance with the State Bar regarding Kaufman or his firm. Similarly, the law firm administrator’s affidavit averred that she had no conversation regarding this subject with Prebenda before Nikki-la’s departure from the firm. These assertions are all fully consistent with Prebenda’s deposition testimony on these points and further demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Although Prebenda’s deposition testimony in some respects displayed a failure of his memory, on the precise points at issue, his deposition testimony was intelligent, clear, and unequivocal. By contrast, Prebenda’s affidavit averred that he had informed Irwin Alterman, then a partner in the firm, before Nikkila’s resignation that Nikkila had been advised to go to the Attorney Grievance Commission and intended to do so. The circuit court appropriately disregarded Prebenda’s contradictory, later-filed affidavit in deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact existed. In Downer v Detroit Receiving Hosp, 191 Mich App 232; 477 NW2d 146 (1991), this Court observed that the plaintiffs affidavit contradicted testimony she had previously given in a deposition. Downer recognized the principle that parties may not contrive factual issues merely by asserting the contrary in an affidavit after having given damaging testimony in a deposition, and held that a trial court that disregards such testimony does not err. The principle, as discussed in Griffith v Brant, 177 Mich App 583; 442 NW2d 652 (1989), and Peterfish v Frantz, 168 Mich App 43; 424 NW2d 25 (1988), is not limited to parties who make contradictory assertions. The principle that contradictory affidavits should be disregarded stands irrespective of the identity of the maker of the conflicting statements. Even if the Griffith-Peterñsh-Downer principle is somehow limited, a party is bound by representative admissions of counsel. Neither a party nor that party’s legal representative may contrive factual issues by relying on an affidavit when unfavorable deposition testimony shows that the assertion in the affidavit is unfounded. Even if Prebenda’s contradictory assertions would somehow create a genuine issue of material fact as to Kaufman & Payton, they are totally insufficient to make a case against Alan Kaufman personally. At best, Prebenda told Irwin Alterman, a partner in Kaufman & Payton, of Ms. Nikkila’s threat before her resignation. Prebenda concededly never spoke directly to Kaufman. We see no proof in this record that Alterman ever relayed the substance of his discussions with Prebenda to Kaufman. Further, Kaufman acknowledges that he spoke to Prebenda only after Nikkila had already resigned. Finally, we disagree with the dissent’s advocacy of a reduction in the burden of proof in claims under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. An employer’s subjective fear of retaliation will not substitute for some form of notice of threatened action. Instead, an employer is entitled to objective notice of a report or a threat to report by the whistleblower. Neither Kaufman’s nor the firm’s knowledge that Nikkila had retained counsel, together with other unspecified evidence, yields an inference that the firm believed before she resigned that she would report her complaints to responsible agencies. Plaintiff did not present adequate evidence that a record might be developed upon which reasonable minds could differ with regard to the whistleblower claim. Affirmed. Weaver, J., concurred. The trial court’s summary disposition left Nikkila with two remaining counterclaims. However, after a hearing, the trial court made an express determination that there was no reason for delay, and made the partial summary judgment a final order pursuant to MCR 2.604(A). We question the circuit court’s certification of this order because the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act claim was but one of several theories upon which Catherine Nikkila sought recovery below. Where only one of several theories has been resolved, certification of a final judgment pursuant to MCR 2.604(A) is improper. Derbeck v Ward, 178 Mich App 38, 41; 443 NW2d 812 (1989), quoting 3 Martin, Dean & Webster, Michigan Court Rules Practice, Rule 2.604, p 417, observed: [I]f a claimant presents merely alternative legal theories, such that he will be permitted to recover on at most one of them, his possible recoveries are mutually exclusive, and he has presented only a single claim for relief. A preliminary disposition of one of his alternative theories cannot be made the subject of a final judgment and resulting appeal under MCR 2.604(A). The plaintiffs only liability claim against the defendant was for personal injuries. Although several theories of negligence were alleged, partial summary disposition of one, but not all, of the theories was not sufficient to qualify this order as a final judgment under MCR 2.604(A). To warrant certification, the undecided claims should be sufficiently independent of the decided claims to justify splitting the case. The theory disposed of here was not sufficiently independent of the remaining theories. The retaliatory discharge, constructive termination, and wrongful discharge claims seem to be interdependent. Moreover, the parties have apparently stipulated to stay further proceedings until the outcome of this appeal. The only reason justifying this stay is that the remaining theories depend on our ruling. More fundamentally, we question the continuing viability of any trial court certifications under MCR 2.604(A). The court below, applying MCR 2.604(A), found "no just reason for delay.” Such pro forma invocation of magic words in reality condemns litigants in this state to years of delay. We urge circuit judges to deny certifications under MCR 2.604(A) as long as the enormous docket backlog of this Court continues to persist. Such certifications are luxuries that the bench and bar of this state can no longer afford. In the early days of this Court, when the backlog was nonexistent, the judges of this Court could usually render a decision well before the trial court could finally render judgment. MCR 2.604(A) certifications served an important and helpful purpose in providing quick and definitive appellate resolutions. Now the situation is reversed. The circuit courts are relatively current, but this Court is buried in cases. The parties here have waited since mid-1990 to learn of this Court’s disposition of but one small aspect in ongoing litigation. The Supreme Court should either act to abolish jurisdiction under MCR 2.604(A), or authorize this Court to decline certification whenever this Court’s backlog precludes speedy disposition of piecemeal claims — a situation that we believe will persist well into the future. Connor, J. (dissenting). I dissent. I believe the trial court erred in granting Kaufman & Payton, P.C., and Alan J. Kaufman summary disposition. I would reverse and remand for further proceedings. A motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10) tests whether there is factual support for a claim. Giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opponent, the court must determine whether a record might be developed that would leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. Amorello v Monsanto Corp, 186 Mich App 324, 329-330; 463 NW2d 487 (1990). In this case, the motion tested whether Nikkila could establish retaliation. Kaufman & Payton and Alan J. Kaufman argued below that what they did could not have been retaliation because they did not know Nikkila was going to file a grievance with the Attorney Grievance Commission. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that showing actual knowledge of an imminent report is required to establish retaliation. The Whistle-blowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq., makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because the employee is about to report a suspected violation of law. MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2). Employers do not always wait to discriminate until they have proof that an employee is going to blow the whistle. They may discriminate against an employee they fear may blow the whistle either to nip the problem in the bud, or to give the employee a taste of things to come should the employee actually blow the whistle. If an employer actually discriminates against an employee, it should not matter whether that discrimination is motivated by knowledge or fear. Employers should not be allowed to peremptorily retaliate against employees with impunity. See McLemore v Detroit Receiving Hosp, 196 Mich App 391, 396; 493 NW2d 441 (1992). Both Kaufman & Payton and Alan J. Kaufman, Nikkila’s supervisor, knew that Nikkila thought Alan J. Kaufman’s billing practices were illegal, and both knew that she was very unhappy about being asked to participate in those practices. Giving Nikkila the benefit of reasonable doubt, I believe a reasonable factfinder could decide that Kaufman & Payton and Alan J. Kaufman suspected Nikkila was going to report those billing practices and made Nikkila’s work environment intolerable as a result. Moreover, even if a showing of actual knowledge is required, I would find that Nikkila made such a showing through the affidavit of her former attorney, Ronald Prebenda. Prebenda swore that, before Nikkila left Kaufman & Payton’s employ, he had told a member of Kaufman & Payton that Nikkila intended to file a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission. This conclusively demonstrates that Kaufman & Payton knew that she was going to report the billing practices. Considering that Alan J. Kaufman was an officer of Kaufman & Payton, the object of the complaint, and Nikkila’s supervisor, I think a reasonable factfinder could infer that this information would have been passed on to Alan J. Kaufman. I also disagree with the majority that Prebenda’s affidavit is contradicted by his deposition testimony. Prebenda was deposed by Kaufman & Pay-ton and Alan J. Kaufman over his own strong objections based on attorney-client privilege. He answered many questions by saying he had "no present recollection,” and gave responses so unsatisfactory that the trial court later ordered him to be redeposed. Regardless, a careful reading of his testimony shows no direct contradiction with his affidavit. Finally, even if Prebenda’s December 18, 1989, affidavit and his March 15, 1990, deposition testimony were contradictory, I disagree with the majority that the result should be to reject the evidence most favorable to Nikkila and accept the evidence most favorable to Kaufman & Payton and Alan J. Kaufman. When reviewing the supporting materials to determine whether a question of material fact exists, courts are supposed to give the benefit of reasonable doubt to the party opposing a motion for summary disposition, not to the party making the motion. See Rizzo v Kretschmer, 389 Mich 363, 372; 207 NW2d 316 (1973). There is a longstanding rule, followed in Griffith v Brant, 177 Mich App

DUDEWICZ v NORRIS SCHMID, INC Docket No. 126212. Submitted June 5, 1991, at Lansing. Decided December 16, 1991, at 9:35 a.m. Leave to appeal sought. Michael L. Dudewicz brought an action in the Saginaw Circuit Court against his former employer Norris Schmid, Inc., for wrongful discharge, alleging that he had been discharged because he had refused to drop criminal assault charges against a fellow employee and that his discharge for that reason was contrary to public policy and violative of the provisions of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. The trial court, Robert S. Gilbert, J., granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition with respect to the public policy count, finding that the public policy exception to the right to fire an employee at will was not applicable to the facts of the case. Following the close of the plaintiff’s proofs, the court granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, holding that the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act was not applicable. The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held: 1. The right to bring a criminal complaint against a fellow employee is the type of protected right necessary to invoke the public policy exception to the right of an employer to discharge an employee at will. The trial court erred in granting summary disposition for the defendant with respect to the public policy count. 2. The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act is applicable in situations where an employee reports to a law enforcement agency the criminal act of a fellow employee; it is not limited merely to situations where an employee reports a violation of a law or regulation by the employer. The trial court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict with respect to the count based on the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. Reversed. 1. Master and Servant — Wrongful Discharge — Public Policy. The discharge of an employee at will because of the employee’s filing of a criminal complaint against a fellow employee or refusal to withdraw such a charge is an act that is contrary to public policy and is sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of wrongful discharge. References Am Jur 2d, Master and Servant § 48.5. Modern status of rule that employer may discharge at-will employee for any reason. 12 ALR4th 544. 2. Master and Servant — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. The discharge of an employee at will because of the employee’s filing of a criminal complaint against a fellow employee constitutes a violation of the prohibition of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act of termination for reporting to any public body a violation of any law or regulation; the provisions of the act are not limited to situations in which an employee reports ,a violation of a law or regulation by the employer (MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428[1] et seq.). Jensen, Smith & Clark, P.C. (by Peter C. Jensen), for the plaintiff. Smith & Brooker, P.C. (by Robert A. Jarema), for the defendant. Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Cynar, JJ. Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment. Holbrook, Jr., J. In this wrongful-discharge case, plaintiff sought to be reinstated to his former position and to receive full back wages, including monthly bonuses, and attorney fees. On December 18, 1989, defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition was granted with respect to the count that claimed plaintiff’s discharge violated public policy. The parties then went to trial on plaintiff’s claim that his discharge violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq. Following the close of plaintiff’s proofs, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The order granting this motion was entered January 5, 1990. Plaintiff now appeals as of right. We reverse._ Plaintiff was employed as a parts manager for defendant, an automobile dealership. Plaintiff testified that on November 4, 1987, he was manhandled when another employee, the service manager, reached over the counter and grabbed plaintiff by his shirt collar, breaking a gold chain and several buttons on plaintiff’s shirt. That day, plaintiff informed defendant’s new car sales manager about the incident. Plaintiff also filed criminal charges against the service manager with the Midland County Prosecutor, alleging assault and battery. Plaintiff testified that on December 1, 1987, he was called to the office of Sam Norris, owner of defendant, and was told by Mr. Norris to drop the charges or be fired. Plaintiff was also told to leave the premises. Plaintiff left the premises believing that he had been fired but could regain his job if he decided to drop the charges against the service manager. Plaintiff then contacted an attorney, who told him to return to work. Plaintiff did so on December 3, 1987, but was told by Mr. Norris that he had quit and had to leave the premises or the police would be called. Plaintiff told Mr. Norris he had not quit and would leave only if given a statement of termination. The police were then called, and plaintiff was escorted from the premises. Plaintiff first argues that it is a violation of public policy for an employer to fire an employee who files a criminal charge against a supervisor for an assault that occurred during the course of employment. We agree. A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) should be reviewed to determine whether the claim is so clearly unenforceable that as a matter of law no factual development could possibly justify a right of recovery. Scameheorn v Bucks, 167 Mich App 302, 306; 421 NW2d 918 (1988). The day before trial, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition. A colloquy between the court and plaintiffs counsel indicates that plaintiffs attorney believed that the trial court was dismissing the "public policy” count on the basis that the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act provided the exclusive remedy. Plaintiffs counsel moved for reconsideration on the basis that the public policy exception to an employer’s right to discharge at will an employee not covered by contract provided a ground for relief separate from that provided by the act. The court declined to rule on the motion for reconsideration until after receiving proofs. Following plaintiffs proofs, the court denied plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the basis that the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act was not applicable to the case. The court stated that it had earlier dismissed the public policy count because it considered the public policy exception to discharge to be inapplicable to the instant case, not because it believed the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act was the exclusive remedy. The public policy exception to discharge in an employment at will situation was introduced in Sventko v Kroger Co, 69 Mich App 644; 245 NW2d 151 (1976), where the discharge of an employee in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim was found to be against public policy. In Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 412 Mich 692; 316 NW2d 710 (1982), the Supreme Court elaborated on this exception. The Suchodolski Court first recognized prohibitions against discharging employees who act in accordance with some explicitly granted statutory right or duties. The Court referred to four such statutes that granted explicit rights: the Civil Rights Act, the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. Id., p 695. The Court also recognized a "sufficient legislative expression of policy to imply a cause of action for wrongful termination, even in the absence of explicit prohibition on retaliatory discharges.” Id. An implied cause of action for discharge exists in two situations: first, when a discharge occurs because an employee refuses to violate a law in the course of employment, and second, when "the reason for a discharge was the employee’s exercise of a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment.” Id., p 696. Defendant argues that plaintiffs statutory right to bring a criminal complaint against a fellow employee does not come within the Court’s meaning of a "well-established legislative enactment.” We strongly disagree. Defendant argues that there must be a nexus between the statute violated and the employment relationship and points to the four statutes enumerated in Suchodolski as examples of this type of statute. Defendant argues that the Sventko opinion required a nexus between the statute violated and the employment relationship. Our reading of that case, however, reveals no such requirement. The discussion by the Supreme Court in Suchodolski did note four statutes that gave explicit rights to employees. But the discussion went on to focus on implied causes of action, showing that the four statutes mentioned by the Court were not meant to be an exhaustive description of the public policy exception. In Suchodolski, the plaintiff sought to establish a public policy exception based on the regulation of the accounting system of public utilities. The Supreme Court rejected this claim on the basis that the statute regulating the accounting systems of utilities was not aimed at conferring rights on an employee. Suchodolski, supra, p 696. Thus, the central requirement of the public policy exception is that there be an expressed legislative enactment that gives an employee an individual right, not that there be a direct nexus between the purpose of the statute and the employment relationship. This view finds support in the case of Pratt v Brown Machine Co, 855 F2d 1225, 1237 (CA 6, 1988). In Pratt, the plaintiff was discharged for refusing to discontinue an investigation into harassing phone calls that he was receiving. The district court found a violation of public policy because the employer’s action conflicted with Michigan’s compounding and aiding and abetting statutes. In Pratt, supra, p 1236, the district court stated: The public policy is the same, whether the underlying criminal offense is the maker [sic] of obscene phone calls or bank robbery or arson or any other crime. It matters not whether one of its employees or some other person is suspected of having committed the crime. In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that, for the public policy exception to exist, "[i]t is sufficient that the company requested the plaintiff to drop his investigation into criminal wrongdoing, and terminated him for his refusal to do so.” Id., p 1237. This view is not contradictory to the language of existing case law and serves the purpose of the public policy exception. It serves " 'what is naturally and inherently just and right between man and man.’ ” Skutt v Grand Rapids, 275 Mich 258, 264; 266 NW 344 (1936), quoting Pittsburgh, C, C & St L R Co v Kinney, 95 Ohio St 64; 115 NE 505, 507 (1916). To allow the discharge of an at-will employee because of a choice to file a criminal complaint against a fellow employee would force a choice between justice and livelihood. It is the public policy of this state to protect its citizens from such an onerous choice. The trial court’s decision that the public policy exception did not apply to the instant case was erroneous, and the partial summary disposition for defendant is reversed. Defendant correctly points out that plaintiff may have to choose the remedy of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, rather than the remedy of the public policy exception to an employer’s right to terminate an at-will employee, as the exclusive remedy available in this case. Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 83; 366 NW2d 76 (1985). However, the trial court expressly stated that it had not granted the motion for summary disposition on the basis that the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act provides the exclusive remedy; therefore, the consideration of the applicability of the public policy exception to the facts of this case is still proper, and reversal of the partial summary disposition is required. Plaintiff next argues that defendant violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act by discharging an employee who filed a formal complaint with a county prosecutor for assault and battery and obtained a warrant for the arrest of an employee. Once this report was filed, plaintiff argues the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act became applicable and he should have been protected by it. We agree. In deciding whether the trial court erred in granting or denying a motion for a directed verdict, this Court reviews all the evidence to determine whether a question of fact existed. In doing so, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and grant every reasonable inference and resolve any conflicts in the evidence in that party’s favor. Stoken v JET Electronics & Technology, Inc, 174 Mich App 457, 463; 436 NW2d 389 (1988). However, in the case at bar, the trial court found, on the basis of an interpretation of a statute by an earlier panel of this Court, that plaintiff had failed to present a prima facie case. The determination of what satisfies a prima facie case of a statutory cause of action is a question of law that this Court may determine without deference to the lower court. Beason v Beason, 435 Mich 791, 805; 460 NW2d 207 (1990). The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq., "provides a remedy to an employee terminated for reporting to any public body a violation of any law or regulation of this state, a political subdivision, or the United States.” Tyrna v Adamo, Inc, 159 Mich App 592, 599; 407 NW2d 47 (1987). The statute defines "public body” as including "[a] law enforcement agency or any member or employee of a law enforcement agency.” MCL 15.361(d)(v); MSA 17.428(1)(d)(v). The clear language of the statute would seem to include the facts of the case at bar where plaintiff reported a violation of the law to the local prosecutor’s office. However, the case of Dickson v Oakland University, 171 Mich App 68; 429 NW2d 640 (1988), relied upon by the trial court below, employed the language of a house legislative analysis to conclude that the act was applicable only when an employer was in violation of the law and an employee sought to report the violation. Id., p 71. The trial court indicated that, but for the Dickson ruling, it would not have granted the directed verdict in this case. We now believe the Dickson Court erred in concluding that the purpose of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act was only to protect employees who reported violations of the law by their employers. While appellate courts have a duty to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature, a house bill analysis prepared before passage of a proposed bill is not persuasive authority of legislative intent embodied in an enacted statute. It is only an analysis and a description of the content of a proposed bill. The language of the bill analysis cited by the Dickson Court does not explicitly describe the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act as being limited to violations of employers. Rather, the section of the legislative analysis quoted by the Dickson Court stated that one reason for the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act would be that "employees are naturally reluctant to inform on an employer or a colleague.” Dickson, supra, p 71. This portion of the analysis could reasonably be read to indicate that violations by fellow employees were also to be considered within the scope of the act. The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act itself does not limit its application only to violations of employers but, rather, states that an employee shall not be terminated for reporting "a violation or suspected violation of the law ... of this state.” MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2). When resolving disputed interpretations of statutory language to effectuate the legislative intent, it is presumed that when the language of the statute is clear the Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed. Ripley v Drivers Services, Inc, 151 Mich App 91, 94; 390 NW2d 690 (1986). In the case at bar, the language of the statute is inclusive of all violations, not just those of employers. We therefore find that the act is not limited to violations of employers and hold that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict against plaintiff. Reversed. The author of this opinion was a member of the panel in Dickson and now believes that case to have been wrongly decided.

SHUTTLEWORTH v RIVERSIDE OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL Docket No. 121019. Submitted March 11, 1991, at Detroit. Decided August 20, 1991, at 9:40 a.m. Leave to appeal sought. Arlene Shuttleworth and her husband, Kim Shuttleworth, brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against the Riverside Osteopathic Hospital, claiming that it terminated her employment because she filed a complaint under the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act. The court, Kathleen I. MacDonald, J., granted summary disposition for the defendant, finding that Arlene Shuttleworth had failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the act and had failed to file timely a claim under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. The plaintiffs appealed, asserting that a common-law cause of action exists for retaliatory discharge. The Court of Appeals held: 1. No common-law cause of action exists for the discharge of an employee in retaliation for reporting an employer’s violation of law. That right was created by the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, which requires the timely filing of a claim under that act. 2. An employee must exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act before commencing a civil action alleging retaliatory termination of employment for the filing of a complaint under that act. Affirmed. 1. Actions — Common-Law Actions — Employment — Retaliatory Discharge. No common-law cause of action exists for retaliatory discharge from employment for reporting an employer’s violation of law. References Am Jur 2d, Master and Servant §§ 43, 48.3, 48.7, 49; Plant and Job Safety-OSHA and State Laws §§ 131,137. Liability for retaliation against at-will employee for public complaints or efforts relating to health and safety. 75 ALR4th 13. Liability for discharge of at-will employee for in-plant complaints or efforts relating to working conditions affecting health or safety. 35 ALR4th 1031. Modern status of rule that employer may discharge at-will employee for any reason. 12 ALR4th 544. 2. Actions — Employment — Retaliatory Discharge — Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. An employee whose employment allegedly is terminated in retaliation for filing a complaint against the employer for violations of the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act may seek redress under that act or under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (MCL 408.1001 et seq., 15.362; MSA 17.50[1] et seq., 17.428[2]). Roy, Shecter & Vocht, P.C. (by Lynn H. Shecter), for the plaintiff. Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman (by Henry W. Saad and Gary S. Casey), and H. Elliot Parnés, for the defendant. Before: Brennan, P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and D. F. Walsh, JJ. Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment. Michael J. Kelly, J. Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit after plaintiff Arlene Shuttleworth was terminated from her employment by defendant in alleged retaliation for filing a complaint under the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act, MCL 408.1001 et seq.; MSA 17.50(1) et seq. The circuit court granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) in favor of defendant after finding that plaintiff Arlene Shuttleworth had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the miosha and had failed to file a timely claim under § 2 of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2). Plaintiffs appeal as of right, and we affirm. A motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim solely on the basis of the pleadings. All factual allegations made in support of the claim are accepted as true, as well as any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. The motion is properly granted when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could justify a right of recovery. Parkhurst Homes, Inc v McLaughlin, 187 Mich App 357, 360; 466 NW2d 404 (1991). Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in finding that the wpa is the exclusive remedy for an employee who has been wrongfully discharged from employment for reporting an employer’s violation of the law. Plaintiffs assert that a common-law cause of action for retaliatory discharge predated the wpa and that, therefore, the remedies are cumulative. We disagree. The wpa provides a remedy to an employee terminated for reporting to any public body a violation of any law or regulation of this state, a political subdivision, or the United States. MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2). It is the general rule in this state that when a statute creates a new right or imposes a new duty having no counterpart in the common law, the remedies provided in the statute for its violation are exclusive and not cumulative. Pompey v General Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537, 552; 189 NW2d 243 (1971). This Court in Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76; 366 NW2d 76 (1985), held that no common-law counterpart existed before passage of the wpa and that, therefore, the act is the exclusive remedy for an employee whose employment is terminated in retaliation for reporting an employer’s violation of the law. Plaintiffs have not cited, nor do we find, any common-law counterpart to the wpa. Although plaintiffs maintain that retaliatory discharge actions predated passage of the wpa, they failed to direct this Court to any decision recognizing a common-law right for the type of retaliatory discharge that is now protected by the wpa. The only case that we can locate that held that a cause of action for discharge of an employee in retaliation for reporting an employer’s violation of law existed before enactment of the wpa is Watassek v Dep’t of Mental Health, 143 Mich App 556, 564; 372 NW2d 617 (1985). However, the panel in that case recognized the cause of action only after considering the public policy espoused in the wpa itself. The events at issue in Watassek occurred before the act took effect in 1981, and the panel therefore looked to the statute as evidence that a recognized public policy existed before the statute was enacted. We find that the conclusion in Watassek that there was a preexisting common-law counterpart to the wpa was nothing more than an attempt to give preenactment effect to a statutory right by fabricating a supposed preexisting common-law right wholly from the provisions of the subsequently enacted statute. We therefore decline to hold that a common-law counterpart preexisted the wpa. Lastly, we note that a separate remedy under the miosha was available to plaintiff Arlene Shuttleworth for being terminated in retaliation for filing a complaint or instituting a proceeding under that act. Tyrna v Adamo, Inc, 159 Mich App 592; 407 NW2d 47 (1987). However, before resorting to a civil action, she first must have pursued the administrative remedies contained in the miosha. Schwartz v Michigan Sugar Co, 106 Mich App 471, 480; 308 NW2d 459 (1981). The trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim. Affirmed.