Wrongful Termination Cases

PSAILA v SHILOH INDUSTRIES, INC Docket No. 236975. Submitted August 19, 2003, at Detroit. Decided September 9, 2003, at 9:05 A.M. Leave to appeal sought. John Psaila brought an action in the Macomb Circuit Court against Shiloh Industries, Inc., and others, alleging that his employment, which was terminable at will, was wrongfully terminated after he complained about unpaid sales commissions owed to him by the defendants. Contending that the plaintiff could not rely on the sales representatives’ commissions act, MCL 600.2961, as the basis for a public policy exception to the general rule of at-will employment, the defendants moved for summary disposition and directed verdict in their favor. The court, Edward A. Servitto, Jr., J., denied the motions, and a jury returned a verdict and award of damages for the plaintiff. The defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals held-. While some grounds for terminating an employee may be so contrary to Michigan’s public policy that an exception may be made to the at-will employment doctrine, MCL 600.2961 does not provide a public policy exception to the at-will employment of a sales representative who is paid by commission. The statute imposes a duty on an employer to pay sales commissions owed to a terminated sales representative, but it does not prohibit an employer from terminating a sales representative. The statute only provides a cause of action for sale representatives who have already been terminated. Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for the defendants. Stark, Reagan & Finnerty, P.C. (by Joseph C. Bird and John J. Cooper), for John Psaila. Harvey Kruse P.C. (by Dennis M. Goebel, Barry B. Sutton, Emily S. Ross, and Julie Nichols) for Shiloh Industries, Inc., and others. Before: Zahra, P.J., and Talbot and Owens, JJ. Per Curiam. Defendants appeal as of right from a jury verdict of $375,385 on plaintiff John Psaila’s wrongful termination claim. We reverse because MCL 600.2961 does not create a public policy exception to the general rule of at-will employment. This case arises out of defendants’ termination of plaintiff’s employment. In 1995, C&H Design, a tool design company in the automotive industry, hired plaintiff as a sales representative. Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor was Kenneth Hudson. Kenneth Hudson’s supervisor was Mark Bartolomucci, who owned C&H Design. As a side business, Kenneth Hudson and Bartolomucci also owned and operated Hudson Group Enterprises, Inc., a manufacturing representative company. In addition to his employment with C&H Design, plaintiff occasionally represented defendant Hudson Group. In fact, plaintiff’s 1997 employment agreement with C&H Design noted that plaintiff would receive additional compensation for sales done for Hudson Group. Plaintiff negotiated a set of agreements related to the production of the Saturn automobile by General Motors Corporation. In particular, plaintiff assisted a company named Aetna in receiving a substantial amount of production work. In fact, Aetna received so much business that it was required to outsource some of that production work. Aetna allowed plaintiff to try to find a company to do that work. Plaintiff, Kenneth Hudson, and Bartolomucci apparently agreed to split any commissions earned by plaintiff if he found a company to do Aetna’s outsourced work. These commissions were to be run through Hudson Group, rather than C&H Design. Eventually, plaintiff happened upon Greenfield Die & Manufacturing. Aetna approved Greenfield, and Greenfield agreed to pay Hudson Group a three percent commission. Thus, under their agreement, plaintiff, Kenneth Hudson, and Bartolomucci were to split that commission equally. At about the same time, Bartolomucci was negotiating the sale of C&H Design to Shiloh, the parent company of Greenfield. An asset sale was completed in August 1997, and Shiloh acquired the C&H Design name. The “old” C&H Design terminated plaintiffs employment, and the “new” C&H Design rehired plaintiff as an at-will employee. At the time of the asset sale, plaintiff expressed concern about commissions that he had not received. Plaintiff continued to express this concern through the first several months of his employment. Plaintiffs complaints eventually led to his termination. Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, seeking to recover unpaid commissions from all parties under MCL 600.2961. Plaintiff also sought damages from defendants for wrongful termination, contending that he was terminated for exercising his statutory right, MCL 600.2961, to recover those unpaid commissions. Although plaintiff reached a settlement agreement regarding his unpaid commissions, his wrongful termination claim proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found that defendants wrongfully terminated plaintiffs employment, and awarded him $375,385 in damages, plus interest, attorney fees, and costs. On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions for summary disposition and directed verdict. Specifically, defendants contend that plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim should have been dismissed as a matter of law because plaintiff was an at-will employee. Defendants contend that, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, MCL 600.2961 does not create an exception to at-will employment. We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129; 631 NW2d 308 (2001). We also review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a directed verdict motion. Derbabian v S & C Snowplowing, Inc, 249 Mich App 695, 701; 644 NW2d 779 (2002). Here, there is no dispute that plaintiff was an at-will employee at the time of his termination. Generally, either party to an at-will employment agreement may terminate it at any time and for any, or even no, reason. See Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 694-695; 316 NW2d 710 (1982). Thus, defendants could terminate plaintiffs employment at any time and for any reason. Plaintiff contended, however, that he was wrongfully terminated because MCL 600.2961 created an exception to the general rule of at-will employment. Indeed, in Suchodolski, supra, our Supreme Court recognized that some grounds for terminating an employee may be so contrary to Michigan’s public policy that an exception may be made to the at-will employment doctrine. Plaintiff contended that MCL 600.2961 created such an exception. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated for exercising rights conferred under MCL 600.2961 and, therefore, his termination of employment violated Michigan’s public policy. In denying defendants’ motions, the trial court opined that the purpose of MCL 600.2961 is to ensure that sales representatives are paid their full commissions, especially when those commission fall due after termination of the employment relationship. Whether MCL 600.2961 does, in fact, provide a public policy exception to employment that is otherwise terminable at will is a question of first impression. In determining what constitutes the public policy of Michigan, we are guided by Terrian v Zwit, 467 Mich 56, 66-67; 648 NW2d 602 (2002), where our Supreme Court stated: In defining “public policy,” it is clear to us that this term must be more than a different nomenclature for describing the personal preferences of individual judges, for the proper exercise of the judicial power is to determine from objective legal sources what public policy is, and not simply assert what such policy ought to be on the basis of the subjective views of individual judges. This is grounded in Chief Justice Marshall’s famous injunction to the bench in Mar-burg v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177; 2 L Ed 60 (1803), that the duty of the judiciary is to assert what the law “is,” not what it “ought” to be. In identifying the boundaries of public policy, we believe that the focus of the judiciary must ultimately be upon the policies that, in fact, have been adopted by the public through our various legal processes, and are reflected in our state and federal constitutions, our statutes, and the common law. The public policy of Michigan is not merely the equivalent of the personal preferences of a majority of this Court; rather, such a policy must ultimately be clearly rooted in the law. There is no other proper means of ascertaining what constitutes our public policy. [Citation omitted; emphasis added.] Plaintiff’s public policy claim is rooted in MCL 600.2961. We therefore focus our analysis on this statute. MCL 600.2961(4) imposes a duty on an employer to pay sales commissions to a terminated sales representative within forty-five days of the date of termination or posttermination accrual. An employer that intentionally violates this subsection may be liable for the lesser of treble damages or actual damages plus $100,000. MCL 600.2961(5). But nothing in the statute prohibits an employer from terminating a sales representative. Quite the contrary, MCL 600.2961 only provides a cause of action for sales representatives that have been already been terminated. Absent from the statutory language is any indication that our Legislature was concerned with commissions earned, but not paid, during the sales representative’s employment. Our Legislature did not, for example, provide that all sales commissions due be paid with forty-five days of becoming due. Nor is there any indication that our Legislature was at all concerned with preserving the employment relationship between the sales representative and the employer. Again, the only relevant time frame for demanding commissions was in respect to the date that the employment terminated. And the statute did not provide for the recovery of lost wages. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that MCL 600.2961 confers upon a sales representative the right to complain about a current employer not promptly paying sales commissions. If we were to conclude that the Legislature’s act of providing a remedy for the failure to pay commissions after termination evidences a public policy to protect commissioned sales representative before termination, we would be usurping the power of the Legislature to create Michigan’s social policy through duly enacted legislation. This we cannot do. Marbury, supra. Had the Legislature intended to protect commissioned sales representatives before termination it would have expressly-provided such protection within the legislation. We conclude that MCL 600.2961 does not provide a public policy exception to plaintiffs employment at will. Id. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. Beaudrie, supra at 129; Derbabian, supra at 701. We reverse the judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and remand for entry of a judgment in favor of defendants. We do not retain jurisdiction. For purposes of this decision, “defendants” refers only to appellants Shiloh Industries, Inc., Shiloh Corporation, Greenfield Die & Manufacturing, C&H Design, C&H Die Technology, and Majenna Industries.

Barbara Holland vs. BLH Electronics, Inc. No. 01-P-1026. Norfolk. April 11, 2003. July 31, 2003. Present: Porada, Kass, & Greenberg, JJ. Anti-Discrimination Law, Race, Termination of employment, Prima facie case. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Discussion of the plaintiff’s burden of production, for summary judgment purposes, in an employment discrimination case based on disparate treatment. [681] In an employment discrimination action, the judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer on the basis that the plaintiff, an African-American, had failed to establish a prima facie case that the defendant had terminated her employment on the basis of race, where the plaintiff had produced evidence that she had performed her job at an acceptable level and, by producing evidence that the defendant imposed less strict hiring standards on a similarly situated white employee, had established a genuine issue of material fact whether the defendant’s purported reason for her termination was a pretext. [682-684] Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 22, 1999. The case was heard by John S. McCann, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Wendy H. Sibbison for the plaintiff. Jerome H. Somers (Anne M. Gaeta with him) for the defendant. Greenberg, J. The plaintiff, an African-American, brought an action against the defendant, BLH Electronics (BLH), alleging in count I of her complaint discrimination based on her race, in violation of G. L. c. 15IB, and in count II civil rights violations, as defined in G. L. c. 266, § 127B. After what appears to have been extensive discovery, a Superior Court judge, on May 11, 2001, allowed BLH’s motion for summary judgment. He ruled that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the plaintiff “failed to show that she has a reasonable expectation of making out a prima facie case of race discrimination.” The plaintiff appeals, and we reverse. Our standard of review is relatively straightforward. A judge presented with a motion for summary judgment must consider “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any” in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate. Mass.R. Civ.R 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). The burden on the moving party is to “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. Further, “[wjhen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported ... an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.” Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(e), 365 Mass. 825 (1974). See Community Natl. Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 554 (1976). With these principles in mind, we sketch the salient facts. Responding to the defendant’s advertisement for unskilled “sensor etchers,” the plaintiff and several other applicants were interviewed on June 20, 1997. After an initial meeting with BLH’s human resources administrator, Dale Mandoni, the plaintiff met with the head of the sensor department, Adelinde Blair, to take some basic math and manual dexterity tests. Blair was “shocked that [the plaintiff] knew basic math,” where other applicants did not. The plaintiff was one of two candidates hired by the defendant that day. The other was Dorothy Foster, who was Caucasian. Blair did not meet with Foster before she was hired and did not require Foster to take any math or dexterity tests. Neither the plaintiff nor Foster had any experience as a sensor etcher, and both participated together in the same six-day training program. Although a trainee usually takes three months to become proficient as a sensor etcher, both women progressed so well that they began production work immediately upon completing their training. Three days later, Blair came to the plaintiff’s and Foster’s work area to observe their work. The two employees sat about five to six feet diagonally across a table from each other, where, according to Foster’s affidavit, they were doing identical work, both doing it “the same way we had been instructed.” Blair watched Foster and made no comment. Next, she observed the plaintiff. Apparently dissatisfied with the plaintiff’s work, Blair began “violently yelling and screaming” at the plaintiff, and slamming her hand on the table. The plaintiff attempted to explain that she was performing the work in the manner she believed the training supervisor had prescribed but was unable to finish her explanation because of Blair’s yelling. The plaintiff started to cry, and Blair left the work area. Later that same day, the plaintiff spoke to the human resources administrator, Mandoni, and recounted to her the incident earlier that day with Blair. Mandoni is then said to have granted the plaintiff permission to leave for the day with full pay, given her obvious distress. In reply, the plaintiff indicated she was able to finish her shift and, in fact, did so. The plaintiff also worked without incident the following two days in the same department. The next Monday, July 21, in a private meeting with Man-doni, Blair expressed the view that the plaintiff had been “insubordinate” to her. Blair also took exception to the fact that the plaintiff, as she saw it, had acted out in the presence of other employees. This led to BLH’s decision to end the plaintiff’s employment effective July 23, 1997, as Blair had recommended. Mandoni informed the plaintiff of the same, citing insubordination in the plaintiff’s obstinate refusal to do the work as Blair had instructed. The next day, July 24, the plaintiff filed a complaint against BLH with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), alleging that BLH had discriminated against her based on her race. After investigation, MCAD determined that the plaintiff’s allegations were credible and found probable cause that an act of discrimination had occurred. The MCAD offered the possibility of a conciliation conference and, absent that, a public hearing and final disposition. The plaintiff filed a related complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. However, both administrative cases were dismissed without prejudice when the plaintiff elected to pursue her judicial remedies. Discussion. We start with the proposition that “[sjummary judgment is a disfavored remedy in the context of discrimination cases based on disparate treatment.” Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 439 (1995), and cases cited. Where there is conflicting evidence as to a defendant’s discriminatory motive, courts may not dispose of such cases on the basis of affidavits. Id. at 439-446. The burden of persuasion rests at all times with the plaintiff. Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 139 (1976). For summary judgment purposes, the shifting burden of production in a racial discrimination case follows the three stage order of proof formula of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973), cited and discussed in Wheelock College, supra. Thus, to make out a prima facie case in stage one, the plaintiff must establish that she was a member of a protected class; that she was performing her job in an acceptable way; that she was fired; and that the defendant sought to fill the plaintiff’s position by hiring someone else who was no more qualified than the plaintiff. See Blare, supra at 441. The defendant in stage two must then rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence of some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s termination. See Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 107, 116-117 (2000). Should the defendant satisfy that requirement, the burden then shifts back in stage three to the plaintiff, who must produce evidence that the reason articulated by the employer is a mere pretext. Id. at 117-118. If the fact finder determines that one or more of the defendant’s reasons for its employment decision is false, “it may (but need not) infer that the [defendant] is covering up a discriminatory intent, motive or state of mind.” Lipchitz v. Ray-theon Co., 434 Mass. 493, 501 (2001). Here, the judge concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a stage one prima facie case of racial discrimination because she failed to show evidence that she was performing her job acceptably. Adequate job performance, according to the judge, assumes the ability to get along with coworkers, including supervisors, and the incident with Blair demonstrated that the plaintiff fell short in that respect. In addition, the judge concluded that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the independent ground that the plaintiff failed in her third stage order of proof to offer evidence that the defendant’s purported legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (insubordination) for terminating her employment was a mere pretext. For her part, the plaintiff argues that the judge erred by failing to accept as true, and even omitted from his decision any reference to, factual statements contained in the affidavit of her coworker, Foster, which refuted allegations that the plaintiff had been insubordinate, disrespectful toward Blair, or disruptive in any way; and also by disregarding the fact that Foster, unlike the plaintiff, was hired without ever meeting Blair and without being asked to take the tests that were required of the plaintiff. We have examined the record in this case and conclude that Foster’s affidavit corroborates in all material respects the plaintiff’s version of the encounter with Blair, thus creating an issue of fact in stage one proof whether the plaintiff had performed her job acceptably. Moreover, the imposition at the hiring stage of stricter standards on the plaintiff than on Foster may also support an inference of discriminatory motive on BLH’s part at the employment termination stage. See Smith College v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 316 Mass. 221, 227-228 (1978); Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. 122, 129 (1997) (“The most probative means of establishing that the plaintiffs’ termination was a pretext for racial discrimination is to demonstrate that similarly situated white employees were treated differently”). Prior to terminating the plaintiff, BLH made no attempt to look into her report of Blair’s supposed racial animus and of Blair’s supposed disparate treatment of the plaintiff by interviewing Foster or any other employee who may have overheard the altercation between Blair and the plaintiff. The termination decision appears to have been based solely upon BLH’s acceptance of the accuracy of Blair’s account and its confidence in Blair’s long record of service, which apparently was unmarred by any past reports of discriminatory behavior by her toward other employees under her supervision. Ultimately, a trier of fact might conclude that the treatment experienced by the plaintiff was, as the motion judge concluded, based merely upon her “subjective feelings,” unrelated to any actual discriminatory animus on BLH’s part. However, the motion judge erred by disregarding Foster’s affidavit and also by failing to consider that the plaintiff (who is black) and Foster (who is white) were similarly situated “in terms of performance, qualifications, and conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish [them].” Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. at 130 (internal quotations omitted). In sum, it was the plaintiff’s burden, once BLH demonstrated the absence of disputed issues of material fact, to provide evidence supporting each of the stage one requirements for a prima facie case of discrimination, and in addition to that, to provide evidence in stage three tending to show that BLH’s stated reason (insubordination) for terminating the plaintiff was a pretext. The plaintiff met her burden in stage one with evidence that she had performed her job at an acceptable level. Based on the disparate treatment accorded the defendant as distinct from Foster, the plaintiff also established a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide whether the insubordination ground for termination was a pretext. See Smith College v. Massachusetts Comma. Against Discrimination, supra. Where, as here, there are conflicting explanations for an adverse employment decision, a jury must weigh them for credibility. Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., supra at 439-440. Judgment reversed. The plaintiff does not appeal from the dismissal of the civil rights claim alleged in the second count of her complaint; she appeals only from the judgment dismissing her discrimination claim. Foster had an unobstructed view of the plaintiffs workstation and could hear clearly what was said by Blair and the plaintiff. Foster and the plaintiff were performing the same task in the same manner that had been taught to them in their recent training. Blair made no comment or criticism to Foster about her work; but, upon observing the plaintiffs work, she “began violently yelling and screaming at [the plaintiff] stating, ‘No, No, No’ and violently and repeatedly banging her hand on the work table right in front of [the plaintiff, who] kept trying to say ‘But this is the way we were taught . . .’ but [the plaintiff] was unable to finish because of Ms. Blair’s yelling ....’’ Foster further observed that, during the encounter, the plaintiff was not disruptive or insubordinate and did not refuse to follow instructions. Nor, by Foster’s observation, did the plaintiff threaten Blair or show disrespect toward Blair. In her deposition, Blair offers a dramatically different account of her exchanges that day with the plaintiff. Unlike Matthews, supra, this is not a case where, on summary judgment, the court must accept as true that the plaintiff was offensive or insubordinate to Blair; it merely must accept that the affidavits create an issue of fact on that score. There is no dispute that the plaintiff, as an African-American, is a member of a protected class or that she was terminated. Nor is there a genuine dispute that BLH needed to fill the position and did so, after the plaintiff had been terminated, with a person of qualifications similar to the plaintiff’s. Possible further indication of pretext is found in evidence from Blair’s own deposition that Blair did not initially consider recommending termination by reason of insubordination but then did so upon learning several days later that the plaintiff had reported the encounter to the human resources administrator who, in turn, asked Blair for a report and recommendations on the incident. It was only at that point that Blair recommended termination.

WEST v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION Docket No. 121003. Decided July 22, 2003. On application by a defendant, General Motors Corporation, for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the circuit court order of summary disposition in favor of the defendant. Rehearing denied post, 1224. Calvin West, and his wife, derivatively, brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against General Motors Corporation and several of its employees, alleging numerous counts relating to his dismissal from employment. The circuit court, Susan Bieke Neilson, J., granted summary disposition for the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals, Griffin, P.J., and Meter and K F. Kelly, JJ., in an unpublished opinion per curiam, affirmed in part and reversed in part, ordering a remand for trial on the count under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seq., because the Court could not determine as a matter of law that there was absolutely no causal connection between Calvin West’s police report of a workplace assault against him and his dismissal from employment (Docket No. 224408). General Motors Corporation sought leave to appeal. In an opinion per curiam, signed by Chief Justice Corrigan, and Justices Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman, the Supreme Court held-. The plaintiff failed to present evidence that would allow reasonable jurors to find a causal connection between the police report he made and the subsequent employment decisions affecting him. There is no factual issue for a jury to decide. 1. To establish a prima facie case under the wpa, a plaintiff must show that he was engaged in a protected activity under the act, that the plaintiff was discharged or discriminated against, and that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. The plaintiff failed to present evidence demonstrating a prima facie case. 2. In this case, the plaintiff reported an alleged assault to the police, a protected activity under the wpa, and then told his supervisors of the report. Because the supervisors were not involved in the decision to discharge the plaintiff, there is no demonstration that the report or the advising of his supervisors of the report was a cause of the adverse employment action. 3. The temporal relationship of the plaintiff’s discharge after the report to the police, standing alone, does not demonstrate a causal connection between the protected activity and any adverse employment action. The plaintiff presented no evidence connecting his discharge to his report to the police. Affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court order reinstated. Justice Kelly, joined by Justice Cavanagh, dissenting, stated that the plaintiff did present evidence to support his claim under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act sufficient to prevent summary disposition for the defendant. If the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the nonmoving party, the plaintiff presented several allegations that, if proven, could allow the jury to infer causation. The lack of action by General Motors relating to time sheet problems of the plaintiff in the year before he filed a police report and his discharge for claimed time sheet problems after the police report support an inference that the report brought about the adverse employment actions. The plaintiff was fired for seeking wages for overtime that gm claims he did not work, but the plaintiff claims he did work. A trier of fact could find that the plaintiff did work the hours in question, leading to the inference that he was wrongfully discharged. A wrongful discharge would show that there was not a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s firing. If the facts are construed as they must be, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it becomes apparent that a question of fact exists in this case. The Court of Appeals judgment should be affirmed and the case should be remanded to the trial court. Labor Relations — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act — Protected Activity — Adverse Employment Action. A causal connection between activity protected by the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act and an adverse employment action, which connection is necessary for a prima facie case under the act, is not established merely because the adverse employment action followed the protected activity; the plaintiff must present evidence that would allow reasonable jurors to find a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action (MCL 15.362). O’Neal O. Wright & Associates, P.C. (by O’Neal 0. Wright and Lynette M. Bledsaw), for the plaintiffappellee. Hardy, Lewis & Page, P.C. (by Terence V. Page and Kay Rivest Butler), for General Motors Corporation. Per Curiam. The circuit court granted defendant General Motors’ motion for summary disposition and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged a count under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., and counts of assault and battery, wrongful discharge, race discrimination, retaliation for reporting acts of discrimination, and loss of consortium. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s whistleblower count and affirmed the remainder of the circuit court’s ruling. Defendant seeks to appeal the part of the Court of Appeals decision reinstating plaintiff’s whistleblower count, while plaintiff seeks to cross-appeal the part of the Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the dismissal of the balance of his complaint. Because plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence supporting the causation element of his whistleblower claim, we reverse that aspect of the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate the circuit court’s order of summary disposition in favor of defendant. We have also considered plaintiff’s application for leave to cross-appeal, and that application is denied because we find no merit in the issues raised by plaintiff. I Plaintiff Calvin West worked as a maintenance supervisor for defendant General Motors. He was a salaried employee and was responsible for completing his own time sheet. Plaintiff was warned several times in 1996 and in February 1997 about misrepresenting the time he actually worked. Nevertheless, plaintiff reported four extra hours of overtime on his time sheet for May 22, 1997. His supervisors learned of this overstatement and, after an investigation, plaintiff was disciplined on June 4, 1997. Plaintiff was prohibited from working any overtime, and he was required to use the salaried-employee entrance and to “swipe” his identification badge at the entrance each time he entered or left the plant. In addition, plaintiff was advised, orally and in writing, that reporting time that was not actually worked constituted fraudulent conduct and could result in termination of his employment. Effective August 11, 1997, plaintiff was transferred from the morning shift to the afternoon shift. Plaintiff accordingly worked for different supervisors. In September 1997, plaintiff was again allowed to work overtime. On October 16, 1997, plaintiff reported two hours of overtime that he did not work. An investigation of this incident led to the termination of plaintiffs employment on January 8, 1998, because of plaintiffs repeated violations of the employer’s policies for reporting time worked. While plaintiff was still working on the morning shift, an incident occurred on May 4, 1997, involving a union committee person named Jim Reeves. Plaintiff entered a room where Reeves and others were in conference. When plaintiff did not leave the room as Reeves ordered, there was physical contact between plaintiff and Reeves. Plaintiff claims that he was shoved by Reeves; Reeves claims that when he stood up from his desk his stomach brushed plaintiff. Plaintiff reported to plant security that Reeves had assaulted him. In addition, plaintiff claims he telephoned the Romulus police and reported the assault. Plaintiff also asserts that he advised his immediate supervisor, Randall Koyal, and his area supervisor, John Tate, that he had reported the assault to the police. Plaintiff characterized Royal’s response to being told about the report to the police as “nonchalant.” Plaintiff said that he could not discern Tate’s response upon learning that plaintiff had contacted the police, but Tate seemed to be upset that the incident between plaintiff and Reeves had occurred. In his complaint, plaintiff claimed that his rights under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act were violated because he was retaliated against and discriminated against for reporting the Reeves assault to the police. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that after the report, both Tate and Koyal treated him differently and retaliated by, among other things, unfairly accusing him of time-sheet violations, transferring him to a different shift, and terminating his employment. The circuit court granted defendant summary disposition regarding this count, reasoning that plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case because he failed to present evidence of a causal connection between his report to the Romulus police and any adverse employment action. The circuit court also concluded that, even if plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the employer had shown a legitimate reason for its actions. The Court of Appeals found that a factual issue existed regarding whether there was a causal connection between plaintiffs telephone call to the Romulus police and the subsequent adverse employment actions. The Court accordingly reversed the summary-disposition order and remanded the case for further proceedings on plaintiffs whistleblower count. The Court of Appeals did not address the circuit court’s finding that there were legitimate reasons for the employment actions. II Defendants’ summary-disposition motion regarding the whistleblower claim was brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). Appellate review of the grant or denial of a summary-disposition motion is de novo, and the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. Shallal v Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 609; 566 NW2d 571 (1997); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 369; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). III Plaintiff’s whistleblower claim is brought under MCL 15.362, which states: An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action. To establish a prima facie case under this statute, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the plaintiff was discharged or discriminated against, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the discharge or adverse employment action. Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger, Inc, 456 Mich 395, 399; 572 NW2d 210 (1998); Shallal, supra at 610. Plaintiff claims that, because of his report to the police, he was disciplined when he was barred from overtime, required to swipe his identification badge, transferred to the afternoon shift, and discharged. However, our review of the record reveals no evidentiary support from which a reasonable jury could find a causal connection between plaintiffs report to the police and these employment actions. Plaintiff’s case rests on the factual point that he advised supervisors Koyal and Tate that he had reported the assault to the police. That assertion, by itself, is not enough to raise a reasonable inference that plaintiff was retaliated against or discriminated against on the basis of the report. It does nothing to establish a causal nexus between plaintiff’s contacts with his supervisors and any subsequent employment action. Summary disposition for the defendant is appropriate when a plaintiff cannot factually demonstrate a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. For example, in Shallal, the plaintiff failed to establish the necessary causal connection because she knew her discharge was imminent before the protected activity on which she based her whistleblower claim, and in Roberson v Occupational Health Centers of America, Inc, 220 Mich App 322; 559 NW2d 86 (1996), the plaintiff failed to show a causal connection because the evidence did not show that the employer knew about the plaintiff’s filing of a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration until after she was discharged. The most that plaintiff demonstrates here is that he was disciplined, and eventually discharged, after he reported to the police that Reeves had assaulted him. To prevail, plaintiff had to show that his employer took adverse employment action because of plaintiff’s protected activity, but plaintiff has merely shown that his employer disciplined him after the protected activity occurred. Plaintiff had to demonstrate that the adverse employment action was in some manner influenced by the protected activity, but has failed to make such a demonstration. The evidence does not show that either of the supervisors, whom plaintiff allegedly informed about the call to the police, viewed the call as a matter of any consequence. Nor was either supervisor involved in the decision to discharge plaintiff. There is no evidence that Koyal or Tate gave even a second thought to plaintiff’s report to the police. Plaintiff did not recall Tate saying anything when he learned about the police report, although he did seem upset that the incident with Reeves occurred, and plaintiff testified that Royal’s reaction was “nonchalant.” Although the employment actions about which plaintiff complains occurred after his report to the police, such a temporal relationship, standing alone, does not demonstrate a causal connection between the protected activity and any adverse employment action. Something more than a temporal connection between protected conduct and an adverse employment action is required to show causation where discrimination-based retaliation is claimed. Nguyen v City of Cleveland, 229 F3d 559 (CA 6, 2000) (retaliation for claim of discrimination based on national origin); Scroggins v Univ of Minnesota, 221 F3d 1042 (CA 8, 2000) (retaliation for race-discrimination claim); Cooper v North Olmsted, 795 F2d 1265 (CA 6, 1986) (retaliation for race-and sex-discrimination claims); Taylor v Modem Engineering, Inc, 252 Mich App 655, 662; 653 NW2d 625 (2002) (retaliation for alleged whistleblower activity). Plaintiff must show something more than merely a coincidence in time between protected activity and adverse employment action. A case in which a close temporal relationship supported the plaintiff’s claim is Henry v Detroit, 234 Mich App 405; 594 NW2d 107 (1999). But unlike plaintiff, the plaintiff in Henry also presented evidence that his superior expressed clear displeasure with the protected activity engaged in by the plaintiff. In contrast to Henry, plaintiff has not shown any reaction or conduct on the part of his supervisors that reasonably suggests that they were upset by the fact that plaintiff reported an assault to the police. Moreover, contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that plaintiffs record was “impeccable” or “unblemished” before the Reeves incident or that the discipline imposed was seemingly undeserved as it was in Henry. The fact that a plaintiff engages in a “protected activity” under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act does not immunize him from an otherwise legitimate, or unrelated, adverse job action. The only evidence plaintiff has shown other than the temporal sequence of events is that one of the two supervisors he notified was nonchalant. This does not amount to evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that any adverse employment action directed at plaintiff was related to the police report lodged by plaintiff. With regard to the employment-discharge decision in particular, plaintiff has presented no evidence connecting his discharge to his report to the police. There is no evidence that the persons conducting the investigation that led to plaintiff’s discharge or the persons who made the discharge decision were even aware that plaintiff called the police. The supervisors (Koyal and Tate), whom plaintiff claims he told about the police report, were not involved in the discharge decision. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that contested facts and permissible inferences present a factual issue for a jury in this case. There is nothing more than pure conjecture and speculation to link plaintiffs call to the police to any subsequent adverse employment action. IV Plaintiff did not present evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to find a causal connection between the police report made by plaintiff and the subsequent employment decisions affecting plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore failed to establish a prima facie case under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. We reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court order granting defendant summary disposition on plaintiff’s whistleblower claim. In all other respects the Court of Appeals decision is affirmed. MCR 7.302(G)(1). Corrigan, C.J., and Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred. Plaintiff Margo Ann West’s derivative claim is for loss of consortium. For ease of reference, in this opinion we refer to plaintiff in the singular. Defendant General Motors is the only defendant involved in this appeal. According to defendant, plaintiff was transferred to the afternoon shift because the morning shift required a maintenance supervisor who could work overtime. Plaintiff initially acknowledged that he had not worked the overtime on October 16, but said he had worked it the next day. Later, he asserted that he actually worked the overtime hours that he reported on October 16 on that date. However, his supervisor stated that plaintiff left after completing an eight hour shift and did not return. In addition, no one else saw plaintiff during the two hours at issue. According to plaintiff, the police told him to file a written complaint. Plaintiff never filed such a complaint, nor did he otherwise follow up with the police. Koyal testified at his deposition that he did not learn that plaintiff called the police until he received notice of this lawsuit. At his deposition, Tate recalled plaintiff being upset about the incident with Reeves, but Tate was not asked about whether plaintiff said anything about making a report to the police. The adverse employment actions specifically discussed by the circuit court were (1) the “overtime restriction” imposed in June 1997, (2) the transfer to the afternoon shift, and (3) the decision to terminate employment. For the purpose of this opinion, we assume without deciding that plaintiff called the Romulus po

COLLINS v COMERICA BANK Docket No. 121563. Decided July 2, 2003. On application by the plaintiff for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that Court for further proceedings. Rehearing denied 469 Mich 1223. Gwendolyn Collins brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Comerica Bank, her employer, and another employee of the bank, alleging, in part, that the termination of her employment was the product of race and gender discrimination. The circuit court, Amy Patricia Hathaway, J., denied the defendants’ motion for summary disposition based on the statute of limitations, ruling that the date of cessation of employment was the day the causes of action accrued. The Court of Appeals, Wiiitbeck, C.J., and Wilder and Zarra, JJ., in an unpublished opinion per curiam, reversed, relying on the decision in Parlcer v Cadillac Gage Textron, Inc, 214 Mich App 288 (1995), for the premise that the date of termination was the last day worked (Docket No. 227834). The plaintiff sought leave to appeal. In an opinion per curiam, signed by Chief Justice Corrigan, and Justices Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman, the Supreme Court held: The plaintiffs causes of action for discriminatory termination did not arise until the date her employment was terminated, so the trial court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary disposition on this ground. If a discharge from employment has yet to occur, the last day worked does not represent the date of discharge. A claim for discriminatory discharge cannot arise until a claimant has been discharged. When a claimant’s last day actually worked precedes the date of actual discharge, the last day worked cannot represent the date of discharge for the purpose of the period of limitation. Justices Cavanagh and Kelly concurred in the result only. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Civil Rights — Employment Discrimination — Termination — Period of Limitation. For the purpose of the period of limitation, in cases where the last day worked precedes the discharge, a cause of action for discharge arises on the date of termination. Jeanne VanderHeide, P.C. (by Jeanne M. VanderHeide), for the plaintiff-appellant. Vercruysse Metz & Murray (by Robert M. Vercruysse and William E. Altman) and Comerica Incorporated (by Terri L. Renshaw) for the defendantsappellees. Per Curiam. The issue presented in this case concerns when the period of limitation begins to run for a claim of discriminatory termination of employment under the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 el seq. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Gwendolyn Collins was employed by defendant Comerica Bank as a customer-service representative. In August 1996, defendant notified plaintiff that an investigation was being conducted to determine whether she had accepted cash gifts from customers or disclosed customer account balances to third parties. On September 5, 1996, defendant suspended plaintiff, apparently for failing to cooperate with the investigation. While suspended, plaintiff was required to be available during normal working hours. After the investigation was completed, defendant terminated plaintiffs employment on September 25, 1996. On September 24, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that the termination of her employment was the product of race and gender discrimination. Defendant moved for summary disposition on several grounds. One of the arguments advanced by defendant was that plaintiff failed to meet the applicable three-year period of limitation on filing discrimination claims, MCL 600.5805(10). The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that plaintiffs causes of action for discriminatory termination arose on the date of termination, September 25, 1996. Therefore, plaintiffs filing of the complaint on September 24, 1999, satisfied the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals granted defendant interlocutory leave to appeal. Relying primarily on Parker v Cadillac Gage Textron, Inc, 214 Mich App 288; 542 NW2d 365 (1995), the Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that plaintiffs causes of action for discriminatory termination accrued on the last day plaintiff actually worked, September 5, 1996. Because plaintiff’s complaint was filed on September 24, 1999, the Court of Appeals held that it was time-barred. Plaintiff sought leave to appeal with this Court. n. standard of review Whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations is a question of law, which we review de novo. Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). Similarly, we review de novo decisions on summary disposition motions. First Pub Corp v Parfet, 468 Mich 101, 104; 658 NW2d 477 (2003). m. DISCUSSION In Parker, the plaintiffs were advised on December 3, 1990, that they would be among the next group of employees to be laid off pursuant to a work force reduction plan. On December 21, 1990, the plaintiffs worked their last day. However, the defendant’s records indicated that the plaintiffs’ “effective date of separation” was January 7, 1991. The plaintiffs filed claims for discriminatory termination on January 7, 1994, and the defendant moved for summary disposition on the ground that the period of limitation had expired. The Court of Appeals in Parker rejected the proposition that the period of limitation on a discriminatory employment termination claim begins to run on the “effective date of separation,” writing: A claim of discriminatory discharge accrues on the date the plaintiff is discharged. The last day worked is the date of discharge. Subsequent severance or vacation pay does not affect the date of discharge. In this case, plaintiffs filed their case more than three years after the date they were discharged. Despite the fact that January 7, 1991, may have been plaintiffs’ “effective” date of separation, it is undisputed that the last day they actually worked was December 21, 1990. [Parker, supra at 290 (internal citations omitted).] Relying on Parker, the Court of Appeals in the present case held that plaintiffs causes of action for discriminatory termination accrued on the last day she actually performed work for defendant. Because plaintiff was a suspended employee on the date of her termination, the Court of Appeals held that the day of her suspension served as her last day worked and, according to Parker, the date of her discharge. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition, disagreeing with the trial court that the applicable period of limitation began to run on the date plaintiff was actually terminated from employment as a result of the investigation. The Court of Appeals concluded: Because plaintiff’s last day of work was September 5, 1996, claims of race and gender discrimination were required to be filed on or before September 5, 1999. Since plaintiff’s complaint was not filed until September 24, 1999, her discrimination claims were time-barred and the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition on these claims. [Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 30, 2002 (Docket No. 227834), p 3.] In sum, the Court of Appeals held that the limitation period for plaintiff’s discrimination claims began to run on the date of her suspension, September 5, 1996, even though plaintiff’s employment was not terminated until September 25, 1996. The Court did so because the last day plaintiff “actually worked” was the date of her suspension on September 5, 1996, and the Court read Parker as instructing that the last day worked is always the date of discharge. We disagree. Properly understood, Parker's “last day worked” holding is limited to situations where a discriminatory discharge claim has already surfaced. We agree with Parker's holding because the “effective date of separation” there was not the date of discharge. Rather, where a plaintiff has already been subjected to an alleged discriminatory termination, a cause of action naturally accrues on the last day an employee worked. However, if a discharge has yet to occur, it cannot be said that the last day worked represents the discharge date. Simply put, a claim for discriminatory discharge cannot arise until a claimant has been discharged. Accordingly, the “last day worked” cannot represent the date of discharge, as held in Parker, where a claimant’s last day actually worked precedes the discharge. In the present case, even though plaintiff was suspended on September 5, 1996, and in retrospect that date represents the last day she actually worked, it was not until September 25, 1996 that she was actually discharged, or terminated, from employment. Unlike the plaintiffs in Parker who knew on the last day they worked that their employment had been terminated and that they were being discharged as employees on that date, on September 5, 1996, plaintiff in this case only knew that she had been suspended indefinitely. On September 5, 1996, plaintiff had not been terminated and thus had no causes of action based on her discharge on that date. In fact, although it may have been a foregone conclusion that the investigation would lead to plaintiff’s termination, it is clear that plaintiff’s official status as an employee was nothing other than “suspended” until September 25, 1996, when her employment was terminated as a result of the investigation. “Suspended” does not equate with “terminated” or “discharged,” and, thus, being suspended does not create a cause of action for discharge or termination. Accordingly, plaintiffs causes of action for discriminatory termination had yet to arise on the date of her suspension, September 5, 1996, and the limitation period does not begin to run before a cause of action accrues. Plaintiff had no causes of action for discriminatory termination on September 5, 1996. Because we hold that plaintiffs causes of action for discriminatory termination did not arise until the date she was discharged as an employee, September 25, 1996, plaintiffs filing of her complaint on September 24, 1999 satisfied the three-year period of limitation. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition on this ground. IV. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to that Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied. Corrigan, C.J., and Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred. Cavanagh and Kelly, JJ., concurred in the result only. For ease of reference, defendants Comerica Bank and Cathy Masalskis will collectively be referred to as “defendant.” Plaintiff signed the following agreement: I, Gwen Collins, understand effective Thursday, Sept. 5, 1996, I am being suspended indefinitely with pay pending further investigation. I understand that I must be available to the bank during my normal scheduled working hours. We note that Sumner v The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505; 398 NW2d 368 (1986), does not compel a different result. Sumner concerned the “continuing violation theory,” which is not relevant to a cause of action for discriminatory termination of employment, because a termination occurs at a fixed time and is not susceptible to being a continuing violation. Plaintiff has filed suit for discriminatory termination, not discriminatory suspension. Because the Court of Appeals dismissed plaintiff’s discrimination claims on .the basis of a statute of limitations analysis, it did not address defendant Masalskis’s alternative issue concerning whether she was properly served. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should address this matter on remand. We do not disrupt the judgment of the Court of Appeals regarding the timeliness of plaintiffs claims for tortious interference of contract and business relations and invasion of privacy.