Wrongful Termination Cases

CAIN v WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC Docket Nos. 116389, 116945, 116953. Argued November 7, 2001 (Calendar No. 7). Decided January 23, 2002. Scott M. Cain brought a claim for worker’s compensation benefits against his employer, Waste Management, Inc., and its insurer, claiming total and permanent disability as a result of the amputation of his right leg and the loss of the use of his left leg following injuries suffered in the course of his employment. A magistrate granted total and permanent disability benefits, finding that the plaintiff had lost the industrial use of both legs. The Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission reversed, holding that the magistrate erred in failing to use a “corrected” standard in assessing the usefulness of the left leg. The Court of Appeals, Fitzgerald, P.J., and Saad and Whitbeck, JJ., affirmed in part and reversed in part in an unpublished opinion per curiam, holding that the wcac had exceeded its authority in applying the corrected test (Docket No. 214445). The parties seek leave to appeal. In an opinion by Justice Taylor, joined by Chief Justice Corrigan, and Justices Cavanagh, Weaver, Young, and Markman, the Supreme Court held'. Total and permanent disability is not demonstrated where the proofs indicate that a braced limb is functional and can support industrial use. In evaluating a claim under MCL 418.361(3)(g), the corrected standard should be applied. 1. Specific loss and total and permanent disability entitlements in the worker’s compensation statute are separately identified in specific subsections. They are unique categories with substantial differences. The focus of specific loss is on anatomical loss, irrespective of wage earning ability. In contrast, the focus of total and permanent disability is on the loss of wage earning capacity. While the test for specific loss is an uncorrected test, i.e., without regard to whether the loss could be corrected or restored, the test for total and permanent disability is a corrected test. Thus, in determining specific loss benefits, prostheses are not to be considered; in determining total and permanent loss, prosthetic devices and implants must be taken into consideration. 2. The “corrected” standard accords with the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of MCL 418.361(3)(g) and is properly applied in this case. Justice Kelly concurred in the result only. Reversed in part and remanded. Pinsky, Smith, Fayette & Hulswit (by Edward M. Smith and Pamela K. Bratt), for the plaintiff. Straub, Seaman & Allen, PC. (by Daniel W. Grow and James M. Straub), for defendants Waste Management, Inc., and Transportation Insurance Company. Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Ray W. Cardew, Jr., and Mitchell J. Wood, Assistant Attorneys General, for defendant Second Injury Fund. Amici Curiae: Libner, VanLeuven, Evans & Portenga, PC. (by John A. Braden), for the Worker’s Compensation Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan, supporting the employee. Gerald M. Marcinkoski, for the Worker’s Compensation Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan, supporting the employer and insurers. Taylor, J. The issue in this case concerns the proper standard for determining whether an injured employee is entitled to collect worker’s compensation benefits for total and permanent disability pursuant to MCL 418.361(3)(g). Specifically, the question is whether such a person’s injured limb or member should be evaluated in its “corrected” or “uncorrected” state. The Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission (wcac) held that a “corrected standard” should be applied, whereas the Court of Appeals held that an “uncorrected standard” was applicable. In keeping with prior decisions of this Court, and for the reasons set forth below, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that § 361(3)(g) envisions that a “corrected” standard be applied. i We begin by noting that this case involves a fairly uncommon kind of claim for worker’s compensation benefits. The worker’s compensation act provides, if certain conditions are met, for payments to workers who are injured or become disabled on the job. MCL 418.101 et seq. The most common situation is controlled by the general disability provision. MCL 418.301(1) provides that an employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment for an employer who is subject to this act at the time of the injury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act. If such a showing is made, one must then determine if the disability is total or partial. Payment formulas are set by statute. In addition to these more common claims for disability benefits, the act provides compensation for the loss of certain body parts. These are known as “scheduled” disabilities. MCL 418.361(2). For exam-pie, if a worker loses his foot at work he is given payments for 162 weeks. Loss of an arm results in payments for 269 weeks. These are known as “specific loss” benefits. If a worker suffers from certain enumerated injuries, such as loss of both hands or both feet, he may be entitled to benefits for total and permanent disability, as defined by MCL 418.361(3). As explained more fully hereinafter, such total and permanent disability benefits are a type of scheduled benefit, but they are distinct from the scheduled specific loss benefits. Total and permanent disability benefits are intended for those who sustain the more catastrophic loss of more than one member. “Loss of industrial use” is a special category of total and permanent disability benefits found in MCL 418.361(3)(g). This category allows recovery for total and permanent disability where there is no anatomical loss, but where there is a loss of industrial use. Hence, for example, even if an employee does not suffer actual amputation of one or both legs so as to qualify for specific loss benefits, he may nevertheless be entitled to scheduled benefits for injury to both legs if he has lost the “industrial use” of his legs. In this way the “loss of industrial use” category of total and permanent benefits differs from other total and permanent categories. The case at bar involves this distinctive “loss of industrial use” kind of total and permanent disability claim. n Plaintiff Scott M. Cain worked as a truck driver and trash collector for defendant, Waste Management, Inc. In October 1988, as he was standing behind his vehicle emptying a rubbish container, he was struck by an automobile that crashed into the back of the truck. Mr. Cain’s legs were crushed. Physicians amputated Mr. Cain’s right leg above the knee. His left leg was saved with extensive surgery and bracing. In February 1990, Mr. Cain was fitted with a right leg prosthesis, and he was able to begin walking. He returned to his employment at Waste Management and started performing clerical duties. Mr. Cain’s left leg continued to deteriorate. In October 1990, he suffered a distal tibia fracture. Doctors diagnosed it as a stress fracture caused by preexisting weakness from the injury sustained in the accident. After extensive physical therapy and further surgery on his left knee, Mr. Cain was able to return to Waste Management in August 1991, first working as a dispatcher and then in the sales department. Waste Management voluntarily paid Mr. Cain 215 weeks of worker’s compensation benefits for the specific loss of his right leg. MCL 418.361(2)(k). However, there was disagreement concerning whether he was entitled to additional benefits. m In August 1992, Cain filed a petition with the Bureau of Worker’s Compensation, seeking total and permanent disability benefits, which stated: My legs were crushed in a motor vehicle accident resulting in an amputation above the knee of my right leg. The severity of my injuries to my left leg result [sic] in the industrial loss of use of both legs. I am, therefore, entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. At the end of the second day of the hearing, Mr. Cain moved to amend his petition to include a claim for the specific loss of his left leg. The magistrate denied the motion. Less than a week later, Mr. Cain filed a petition requesting benefits for the specific loss of the left leg: In addition to my initial application, I am claiming specific loss of my left lower extremity for dates of injury of 10/25/88 and 10/21/90. On 10/21/90, while walking down a ramp at home, I refractured my left tibia causing it to become necessary for me to wear a permanent brace on my left leg. In December 1993, the magistrate awarded specific loss benefits (to be paid consecutively) for the loss of both legs. Although he had denied the motion to add a claim for the specific loss of the left leg, the magistrate nonetheless awarded the benefits, reasoning that Mr. Cain’s assertion of the loss of the industrial use of both legs implicitly included a claim for the specific loss of the left leg. The magistrate found that the left leg had been effectively lost in October 1990, when the stress fracture occurred and “any hope of restoring the member was abandoned.” The condition of the Plaintiff’s left leg subsequent to 10/21/90 appears to be tantamount to amputation. He cannot support himself without the brace which was fashioned for him. The Plaintiff is in effect wearing a prosthetic device on the left leg. Thus, he ruled that the Second Injury Fund would be obligated to pay benefits for total and permanent disability because Mr. Cain had lost the industrial use of both legs. Waste Management and its insurer appealed to the wcac, which reversed the judgment of the magistrate in April 1997. The wcac ruled that, in light of the phrasing of Mr. Cain’s initial petition to the bureau, the magistrate had erred in awarding benefits for the specific loss of the left leg. The wcac also held that the magistrate had committed legal error in his analysis of the total and permanent disability claim, since he had failed to use a “corrected” standard to examine the remaining usefulness of Mr. Cain’s braced leg. Applying such a standard, the wcac concluded that Mr. Cain is not totally and permanently disabled. In May 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the wcac’s denial of specific loss benefits, agreeing that Mr. Cain’s petition did not state a claim for such benefits. However, the Court of Appeals reversed and vacated with regard to the finding of total and permanent disability, stating: We reverse that portion of the wcac’s decision which holds that a claim for [total and permanent] disability benefits must be analyzed under the corrected test. While use of the corrected test is mandated in vision cases, [Hakala v Burroughs Corp (After Remand), 417 Mich 359; 338 NW2d 165 (1983)], and has been expanded to cases involving implants, [O’Connor v Binney Auto Parts, 203 Mich App 522; 513 NW2d 818 (1994)], its use has not been extended to cases involving prosthetics or braces. In the instant case, plaintiff wears a prosthetic right leg and a brace on his left leg. The brace is not permanently attached to plaintiff’s leg. In holding that use of the corrected test was required in this case, the wcac read Hakala, supra, and O’Connor, supra, too broadly. The issue whether a claimant has suffered loss of industrial use is one of fact. Pipe v Leese Tool & Die Co, 410 Mich 510, 527; 302 NW2d 526 (1981). We hold that the wcac exceeded its authority by applying the corrected test to make initial findings of fact regarding whether plaintiff had suffered the loss of industrial use of his legs. Such initial findings are within the exclusive province of the magistrate. [Layman v Newkirk Electric Associates, Inc, 458 Mich 494; 581 NW2d 244 (1998)].[ ] We vacate that portion of the wcac’s decision denying plaintiff’s claim for [total and permanent] disability benefits and remand with instructions that the wcac apply the uncorrected test to plaintiff’s claim. If necessary, the wcac may further remand the case to the magistrate for additional findings of - fact. Id.; MCL 418.861a(12); MSA 17.237(861a)(12). Applications for leave to appeal were filed by Waste Management, Inc., and the Second Injury Fund. Mr. Cain responded with an application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant. We granted all three applications and invited amicus curiae participation. IV We address only one issue: whether the “corrected” standard of Hakala, applied to a vision claim pursuant to MCL 418.361, should be applied to a permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs claim pursuant to MCL 418.361(3)(g). In Hakala, a worker with a preexisting vision disability suffered the loss of a hand. This second loss gave rise to the issue whether he was totally and permanently disabled under the predecessor of MCL 418.521(1). The parties turned to the predecessor of MCL 418.361(2)(1) for the rule that eighty percent loss of vision in an eye constitutes total loss of that eye. As it happened, Mr. Hakala’s uncorrected vision loss was greater than eighty percent, but his corrected vision did not constitute an eighty-percent loss. The question whether to gauge Mr. Hakala’s vision in its corrected or uncorrected state had led to a division in the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board panel that decided the case. In our Hakala opinion, we resolved the matter in this fashion: In Nulf [v Browne-Morse Co, 402 Mich 309; 262 NW2d 664 (1978)], we refused to extend the “uncorrected” vision test to total and permanent claims, although we had adopted such a test for specific loss claims in Lindsay v Glennie Industries, Inc, 379 Mich 573; 153 NW2d 642 (1967). We observed: “In Hakala v Burroughs Corp (On Rehearing) [399 Mich 162; 249 NW2d 20 (1976)], this Court recognized that the question of Second Injury Fund benefits in situations involving the loss of an eye could not be adequately resolved by the universal adoption of either the ‘uncorrected vision’ test or the ‘corrected vision’ test. The Court held that the question of entitlement to Second Iqjury Fund benefits must be determined by reference to the statutory language creating those benefits found in MCL 418.521; MSA 17.237(521), which requires a determination of whether the employee has suffered a ‘permanent disability in the form of the loss of a[n]... eye.’ The determination of whether a loss is a permanent disability within the meaning of that section must be evaluated in terms of the underlying legislative purpose of aiding the handicapped in obtaining and maintaining employment.” [Nulf] 402 Mich 312-313. We are persuaded that the Legislature intended compensation for a specific loss without regard to whether the vision could be “corrected” or restored after the ir\jury. Lindsay, supra. We are now persuaded that the Legislature intended that a different standard be used in determining total and permanent disability inasmuch as it provided that only “total and permanent loss of sight” would constitute the qualifying eye loss for such benefits. We are satisfied that to carry out the legislative intent a “corrected” vision standard should hereafter be used in assaying claims for total and permanent disability involving the loss of sight. We conclude that in this connection that is the sense in which the term “permanently disabled” is used for the purposes of the Second Injury Fund. [417 Mich 363-364.] We have not had occasion subsequently to elaborate upon or clarify the rule of Hakala. As noted in its opinion in the present case, the Court of Appeals has extended the principle only so far as cases involving “implants,” such as the knee replacement surgery discussed in O’Connor. 203 Mich App 522. v The question whether MCL 418.361(3)(g) requires application of a “corrected” or “uncorrected” standard in the present case is a legal question, which we review de novo. Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 697, n 3; 614 NW2d 607 (2000). Ultimately, entitlement to worker’s compensation benefits must be determined by reference to the statutoiy language creating those benefits. Nulf at 312. As previously indicated, total and permanent disability, compensation for which is provided in MCL 418.351, means: (g) Permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1 leg and 1 arm .... [MCL 418.361(3).] We conclude that the words “permanent” and “total” indicate the Legislature intended a “corrected” test. We agree with the O'Connor Court, supra at 533, that [t]he concept of permanence is necessarily one of status, involving an assessment of medical deterioration, stabilization, or improvement, and consideration of medical treatment options. Moreover, as indicated in Hakala and Nulf, the ordinary meaning of the word “permanent” suggests a condition or injury that cannot be improved or made functional. The word “total” similarly suggests a situation that cannot be corrected. Further, the use of the phrase “industrial use” in this section itself implies the kind of functional analysis that is implicit in the “corrected” standard of MCL 418.351. This phrase modifies “permanent and total loss” and effectively limits the coverage of this provision to only certain kinds of permanent and total losses, to wit, those that have adverse implications for the ability of an employee to cany out his industrial responsibilities. Different forms of serious injury may carry altogether different consequences in terms of the ability of an employee to perform his “industrial” responsibilities. The express language of MCL 418.351, in particular the phrase “industrial use,” makes these different consequences relevant. There certainly exist conditions that can be overcome, and we have previously held that the Legislature intended that poor vision, correctable with glasses, be evaluated in its corrected state. No sound distinction would lead to a different result in the case of a limb that, like vision corrected by glasses, can function with the aid of an external device. Where the legal inquiry is the effect of the work injury on a worker’s use of members in industry, that effect can only be reasonably measured by use of the members as aided and corrected, whether by the devices listed in MCL 418.315(l) or otherwisé. The Court of Appeals opined that the wcac had read Hakala and O’Connor too broadly. However, in actuality, and as indicated above, it is the Court of Appeals that read Hakala too narrowly. In considering the present issue, we have remained cognizant of the distinction between specific loss benefits and total and permanent disability benefits. As mentioned at the beginning of the opinion, they are unique categories with substantial differences. In its April 1997 decision, the wcac included this analysis, which we adopt as our own: We believe that the historical distinction repeatedly recognized by the appellate courts throughout the long interpretational history of the two statutory provisions continues to provide an important divider between the specific loss entitlements and the total and permanent disability entitlements established under the statute. An even more significant contrast between the two entitlements concerns the question of whether loss is measured with the help of prosthetics or without. The test for specific loss is clearly an uncorrected test. In Lindsay v Glennie Industries, Inc, 379 Mich [573] (1967), the plaintiff suffered an ii\jury that compelled surgical removal of his cataract, but even though he had virtually no sight in that eye, the subsequent use of contact lenses enabled him to er\joy virtually full vision. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s finding that no specific loss could be found because plaintiff’s vision had been restored, and stated that the proper analysis should take place without the corrective procedure. The Lindsay Court stated: “We recognize that substitut

Employment relations — Ohio public policy favoring workplace safety is an independent basis upon which a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be prosecuted — Common-law cause of action against employer who discharges employee in violation of public policy favoring workplace safety is subject to four-year limitations period in R.C. 2305.09(D).

ARMSTRONG v YPSILANTI CHARTER TOWNSHIP Docket No. 222924. Submitted June 6, 2001, at Lansing. Decided December 7, 2001, at 9:05 am Duke L. Armstrong brought an action in the Washtenaw Circuit Court against Ypsilanti Charter Township and five individual members of the township board, asserting various claims for damages resulting from the individual defendants’ votes to pass a motion that eliminated the line-item funding for the plaintiff’s position as administrative assistant to the township supervisor. The elected township supervisor, who is the sixth member of the township board, voted against the motion. The court, Donald E. Shelton, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the trial judge, and the chief judge of the circuit court, Timothy P. Connors, affirmed that denial. The court entered a judgment and order granting summary disposition in favor of the defendants on several grounds. The plaintiff appealed, and the individual defendants cross appealed from the denial of their motion to quash the plaintiff’s first amended complaint. The Court of Appeals held: 1. The separation of powers doctrine contained in Const 1963, art 3, § 2 applies to state government only and does not apply to township government. 2. Section 9 of the Charter Township Act, MCL 42.9, allows a township board to abolish any position within township government as long as the position is not the offices of the township clerk or the township treasurer. The plaintiff’s position may be abolished by the township board. 3. MCL 42.9 does not requires the township supervisor’s recommendation before a position may be abolished by the township board. 4. The Charter Township Act gives the township board full and absolute control over the township budget and does not provide that the board can reduce appropriations only when there has been a reduction in income. 5. The court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s tort claims against the individual defendants on the basis that the defendants were protected from liability by governmental immunity provided by state and federal law. 6. The court’s ruling on the motions for summary disposition did not evidence deep-seated favoritism or antagonism toward the plaintiff that would support the plaintiff’s claim of actual bias. 7. The trial judge had no economic, pecuniary, or other financial ties to the individual defendants. There were no grounds to support the motion to disqualify the trial judge. Affirmed. 1. Townships — Constitutional Law — Separation of Powers. The separation of powers doctrine in Const 1963, art 3, § 2 applies to state government only, not to local municipal or township government. 2. Townships — Charter Township Boards. Section 9 of the Charter Township Act allows a township board to abolish any position within the township government other than the township clerk and the township treasurer; the township supervisor’s recommendation is not required before a position may be abolished by the township board (MCL 42.9). 3. Townships — Charter Township Boards. A charter township board has full and absolute control over the township’s budget and may reduce appropriations without a showing that there has been a reduction in income (MCL 42.27, 42.28, 42.29). 4. Judges — Disqualification. Judicial rulings, in and of themselves, generally do not constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging judicial bias unless the rulings display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcome the heavy presumption of judicial impartiality. Jeffrey A. McKeever, P.L.C. (by Jeffrey A. McKeever), for the plaintiff. Garan Lucow Miller, PC. (by Rosalind Rochkind and Thomas F. Myers'), for the defendants. Amicus Curiae: Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall, P.C. (by John H. Bauckham), for the Michigan Townships Association. Before: Hood, P.J., and Whitbeck and Meter, JJ. Per Curiam. Plaintiff Duke Armstrong appeals the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants Ypsilanti Charter Township, Ruth Jamnick, Brenda Stumbo, Darcus Sizemore, Karen LovejoyRoe, and William Gagnon. Armstrong also challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to disqualify the trial judge and the later order of the chief judge affirming that denial. Jamnick, Stumbo, Sizemore, Lovejoy-Roe, and Gagnon cross appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to quash Armstrong’s first amended complaint. We affirm. 1. basic facts and procedural history A. OVERVIEW Ypsilanti Township is a charter township, organized under the Charter Township Act. Jamnick, Stumbo, Sizemore, Lovejoy-Roe, and Gagnon are all members of the township board. A sixth member of the township board, although not a defendant here, Wesley Prater, was the elected township supervisor. Armstrong had served as Prater’s administrative assistant since 1991, but on May 30, 1996, the township board, with only Prater voting against the motion, eliminated the line-item funding for Armstrong’s administrative assistant position, thereby effectively eliminating his job. It is undisputed that the elimination of the line-item funding was not part of the normal budgetary cycle; rather it occurred during, instead of before or at the commencement of, the township’s fiscal year. B. ARMSTRONG’S COMPLAINT Armstrong’s first amended complaint contained thirteen counts. Count I asserted a claim based on defamation against the board members. Count n asserted a claim based on violation of the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act. Armstrong claimed that he had been diagnosed with “stress reaction,” which required a temporary medical leave. Count m asserted a violation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act. Armstrong claimed that his age was at least one factor in the decision to terminate his employment. Count iv asserted a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Armstrong claimed that his involvement in the attempted organization of his fellow employees in a labor union was at least one factor in the decision to terminate his employment. Count v was a claim of breach of an implied employment contract. Armstrong claimed that the township’s management made statements to him and other employees that it was the township’s policy not to discharge employees as long as the employees performed their jobs. Count VI asserted wrongful discharge contrary to public policy. Armstrong claimed that during his employment, the township established policies and procedures that created a legitimate expectation that his employment could be terminated only for just cause. Count vil asserted interference with a business relationship. Armstrong claimed that the board members interfered with his business relationship with the township, which relationship had a reasonable likelihood of future economic benefit to him. Count vni asserted the board members were grossly negligent concerning their conduct and treatment of Armstrong, including alleged false accusations and statements made by the board members concerning him. Count IX was a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress concerning defendants’ conduct and treatment of Armstrong during his employment. Count x asserted violation of Armstrong’s constitutional rights. Armstrong claimed that, before his employment was terminated, he engaged in constitutionally protected speech on a matter of public concern by speaking with administrative assistants of various departments regarding forming a union and that his exercise of his constitutional rights was one reason for the termination of his employment. Count XI asserted a separate violation of Armstrong’s constitutional rights. Armstrong claimed that, before depriving him of his constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment, defendants did not conduct a hearing or otherwise afford him either notice of the grounds for the termination of his employment or a meaningful opportunity to respond. Count xn asserted a violation of the Michigan Constitution with respect to due process and fair treatment in investigations. Armstrong claimed that defendants failed to adequately investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding alleged false accusations. Count xttt was a conspiracy claim. Armstrong contended that the tortious conduct asserted in the complaint was done in concert by the board members in order to violate his legal and constitutional rights. In mid-March 1999, the township moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). In early April, the trial court held a hearing on this motion but delayed ruling until a final decision was made on the judicial disqualification matter hereinafter outlined. In late April 1999, the board members filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). In early June 1999, the trial court held a hearing on this motion and took the matter under advisement. C. THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING The trial court addressed and granted both motions for summary disposition in an order and opinion entered on September 29, 1999, stating: Plaintiff... alleges that defendants wrongfully eliminated funding for the Administrative Assistant to the Ypsilanti Township Supervisor, a position which plaintiff held. The four individual defendants were Township board members who voted for the resolution. . . . * * * For his claim against the township, plaintiff argues that the Township Supervisor position is analogous to that of a chief executive position and that [the] board’s action to eliminate funding thereby violates the separation of powers doctrine. He urges the Court to find that the Supervisor is the chief executive with the exclusive authority to abolish plaintiff’s position. The Township of Ypsilanti has adopted the Charter Township Act (“the Act”). Pursuant to that Act, all legislative authority and powers of the township are vested in the township board. MCL 42.5(1). [At this point, the trial court quoted MCL 42.5 and MCL 42.9.] Plaintiff asserts that this section of the statute only allows the board to create a position and does not explicitly grant the board authority to abolish a position. Plaintiff further claims that even if this section is construed to confer authority to abolish a position on the board, that authority would only concomitantly arise at the township supervisor’s recommendation. Plaintiff argues that since in this case the supervisor voted against the elimination of the funding for plaintiff’s position, the board had no authority to do so. The construction of the statute urged by plaintiff is without merit. The legislature clearly provides . . . that the entire elected township board, which by definition includes the supervisor, has the authority to create employment positions at taxpayer expense. That authority is not conferred by the statute on the supervisor. Inherent in the board’s authority to create such a position is its authority to abolish it. The ensuing sentence in this section of the Act fortifies the inteipretation that the board has the power to abolish employment positions in the township. That sentence expressly states that the board may not “abolish” the offices of township clerk or treasurer. The express designation of the offices of township clerk and township treasurer as offices that may not be abolished by the township board is recognition that the legislature intended that the board has the power to abolish other positions not so designated. . . . Plaintiff also claims that the board’s role is to check the power of the supervisor by approving a budget that includes the appropriation of funds for the supervisor’s use. He claims that when [the] board eliminated funding for plaintiff’s position, the board encroached on the executive’s authority. On the contrary, it is the board that has the exclusive authority over budget, appropriation and expenditure for a township under the Act. MCL 42.27, 42.28. There was no usurpation of supervisor authority by the actions of the board in this case. As to plaintiffs tort claims against the individual board members, the defendants assert that they are immune from plaintiffs tort claims under Michigan law. The highest elective officials of all levels of government are immune from tort liability when acting within their authority. Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633 (1984). The same was codified in 1986 [at this point, the trial court quoted MCL 691.1407(5)]. These defendants are clearly the highest elective officials in the township and are immune if they were acting within their authority when they eliminated plaintiffs position. ... As indicated by the analysis of the board’s actions above, the legislature gave the board as a whole the authority to create, combine, and abolish administrative offices as set forth in MCL 42.9. The actions of the individual trustees were therefore within their legislative authority and they are immune from plaintiffs tort actions by virtue of MCL 691.1407(5). D. DISQUALIFICATION OF THE TRIAL COURT The trial court record does not contain a motion to disqualify the judge, but the record does reflect that a hearing was held on such a motion on April 7, 1999. At the hearing, the following discussion ensued: Mr. McKeever (plaintiff’s counsel]: Judge, as we just mentioned at the bench, I found out yesterday that I think four of the individually named defendants were involved with— as well as Mr. Winters was involved in setting up fundraisers for Your Honor, as well as selling tickets and what have you. And because of those facts— The Court: You mean when I ran for the Supreme Court [in 1996]? Mr. McKeever. That’s right, Judge. And I just — as I mentioned at the bench, due to those facts, at my client’s request, I bring this motion for Your Honor to disqualify himself. And as I mentioned previously, I certainly mean no disrespect, Judge. Armstrong submitted his own affidavit, which asserted that the board members “participated in raising election funds for the Honorable Donald E. Shelton.” The trial court denied Armstrong’s motion for disqualification from the bench and stated: Well, there were a number of people, obviously, who were kind enough to assist in the campaign when I ran for the Supreme Court. But, to my knowledge, the successful candidates do not disqualify themselves from hearing cases in which contributors to their campaigns were involved, nor do I think that I’m required to do so, nor do I think it would be appropriate to punish people for participating in the process in that way. More importantly — so I’m going to deny the motion on the basis of any economic interest. More importantly is the question of whether I have any bias in favor of the defendants. I would gather that, if the Township of Ypsilanti were to — or its officials were to take a vote on whether I was generally in favor of them or generally against them in terms of my rulings, it would be a close issue. It probably would be a divided vote, and as it should be. I have not — I don’t have — I don’t hesitate in my rulings to rule against the local governments or their elected officials when I think that justice of the cause requires that. And I would expect that the township officials in this township as well as other municipal bodies would, with chagrin, agree with that. So I’m going to deny the motion to disqualify. If you would like to appeal that before we take up other matters, you can take it to the chief judge. Shortly thereafter, the chief judge of the circuit court held a hearing to review the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for disqualification, ruling: You have to show actual bias or prejudice. Again, you know, this is — I think the only way you’re ever going to avoid this is if you go to something like the Missouri plan. And I’m not saying that’s necessarily the best way, either, because there’s arguments that, then, you don’t have accountability to the general public. So there’s countervailing public policy reasons to go the way that we are. But as long as we have this system, you’re going to have contributors and you’re going to have people who don’t contribute. And the logical extension of your argument is, literally, be — I mean, we might have just a few lawyers left practicing. And I don’t think you’ve been able to demonstrate, sir, based on that record, that there’s actual bias or prejudice; and, therefore, the appeal of Judge Shelton’s decision to me — the appeal is denied. His decision is affirmed. He’s in the best position to say whether his relationship is such that he would not be able to do that. H. SUMMARY DISPOSITION A. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews de novo rulings on motions for summaiy disposition. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. We also review constitutional issues de novo. Whether there has been a violation of the separation of powers doctrine is a question of law, which we also review de novo. B. GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (1) MCR 2.116(C)(7) MCR 2.116(C)(7) provides, in part, that summary disposition is appropriate when a claim is barred because of immunity granted by law. In reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court accepts a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. In determining whether a plaintiffs claim is barred by governmental immunity, this Court must consider all documentary evidence, including any pleadings, depositions, admissions, or any other documentary evidence submitted by the parties. In order to survive a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a plaintiff is required to allege facts in the complaint that justify application “ ‘of an exception to governmental immunity.’ ” (2) MCR 2.116(C)(8) MCR 2.116(C)(8) provides for summary disposition of a claim on the ground that the opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone and all factual allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted as trae as well as any reasonable inferences or conclusions that can be drawn from the facts. (3) MCR 2.116(C)(10) MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides for summary disposition where there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that a trial court “ ‘may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the affidavits or other documentary evidence show that there is no genuine issue in respect to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” In addition, all affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties is viewed “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” C. ARMSTRONG’S ISSUES ON APPEAL Armstrong’s appeal requires us to address three separate, but interrelated, issues. The first issue is whether defendants’ actions violated the separation of powers doctrine. The second issue is whether defendants’ actions violated the Charter Township Act. The third issue is whether defendants were protected by governmental immunity. We will address each of these issues. D. SEPARATION OF POWERS (1) THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE In Hopkins, this Court, discussing the separation of powers doctrine, stated: The Michigan Constitution provides for the separation of the three branches of government as follows: “The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.”[] This separation of powers intends to preserve the independence of the three branches of government. In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mi

Public employment—State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. clarified—Relators in mandamus action entitled to reinstatement to their positions as school bus drivers, back pay, and benefits—Board of education's actions concerning subcontracting school-busing services to a private company are declared void.