Wrongful Termination Cases

Richard Pontremoli vs. Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital. No. 99-P-394. Suffolk. November 14, 2000. - May 23, 2001. Present: Porada, Lenk, & Duffly, JJ. Practice, Civil, Complaint, Motion to dismiss. Employment, Discrimination, Termination, Retaliation. A complaint alleging that the plaintiff’s employer terminated him in retaliation for his refusal to falsely implicate a co-worker in a purported workplace theft stated a claim for which relief could be granted, where the facts alleged, if believed, demonstrated activity that was covered by G. L. c. 15 IB, and subjected the plaintiff to an adverse employment action supporting a claim for retaliatory termination under G. L. c. 151B, § 4(4) and (4A). [624-626] Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 1, 1998. The case was heard by John C. Cratsley, J., on a motion to dismiss. William F. Green for the plaintiff. John J, Reardon for the defendant. In the caption of the complaint, the defendant is further identified as “[a] [m]ajar [a]ffiliate of Partners Health Care Systems, Inc.” The body of the complaint alleges on information and belief that the latter corporation is the sole owner of Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital. Duffly, J. Richard Pontremoli was fired in October, 1996, by Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital (hospital), where he had worked as a cook since 1989. Pontremoli’s complaint alleges that the hospital terminated him in retaliation for his refusal to falsely implicate a co-worker in a purported workplace theft, and thus violated G. L. c. 151B, § 4. The hospital’s motion to dismiss the complaint, for failing to allege protected activity that was linked to, or that occurred prior to, his termination, was allowed by a judge of the Superior Court. Pontremoli appeals from the dismissal of his complaint and the denial of his motion for reconsideration. We reverse. Background. We first relate the details of Pontremoli’s complaint, which generally asserts that he was terminated in connection with co-worker George Motta’s claims of discrimination and retaliation by the hospital. The complaint states that on August 9, 1995, Motta filed a discrimination claim with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) alleging that he had been denied a promotion by the hospital because he is Hispanic. In subsequent claims before the MCAD, Motta averred retaliation by the hospital because of the filing of his discrimination complaint and complained of onerous conduct against him by Scott Dánico, the hospital’s food service director. Pontremoli’s complaint further alleged that Pontremoli was an “honest and dedicated employee” who, during his period of employment, had performed his duties in an exemplary manner (as evidenced by consistently positive performance reviews and by a promotion from line cook to first cook) and was aware of Motta’s actions against the hospital. It was “common knowledge” in the food service department that Motta had filed the claims against the hospital and that Dánico had been openly hostile toward Motta after doing so. On October 12, 1996, Pontremoli and Motta left work together to socialize at a local establishment after their shift. Pontremoli carried some cans of soda that he had purchased prior to work; Motta carried dirty laundry from work in an old cocoa box. On the way to Pontremoli’s car, he and Motta were approached by a hospital security guard who inquired whether they were allowed to take the items they were carrying. Pontremoli responded that the items were their own property, and the security guard told them that they were free to go. The guard did not inspect what they were carrying, ask them to return to the hospital or accuse them of theft. Later that day, Dánico called Pontremoli at home and informed him that he was being suspended from his job for the theft of soda from the hospital. Pontremoli denied having stolen anything. In a subsequent meeting, as part of the hospital’s “investigatory” process concerning the theft allegation, Pontremoli reiterated that he had purchased the soda prior to work. He also stated that Motta had been carrying dirty laundry in the cocoa box on the date in question. On October 21, 1996, Pontremoli was terminated for theft. He then filed a grievance, pursuant to the hospital’s internal procedures, seeking reversal of his termination, and thereafter appeared at several grievance hearings. During these proceedings Dánico, on one or two occasions, asked to speak to Pontremoli “off the record.” On one of these occasions, Dánico and Kathleen Smith, Vice President of Human Resources, were both present when Dánico asked to speak with Pontremoli alone, whereupon Smith left the room. He then asked Pontremoli if “there is anything you would like to say to make me change my mind.” Pontremoli told Dánico that he could only reiterate that he was not a thief and had not stolen soda from the hospital. Following the grievance proceeding, Pontremoli’s termination was affirmed. Failure to state a claim. When evaluating the legal sufficiency of a complaint under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), it is well settled that (1) the plaintiff’s factual allegations must be taken as true; and (2) all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom must be made in favor of the plaintiff. See Eyal v. Helen Bdcst. Corp., 411 Mass. 426, 429 (1991). “It is familiar doctrine that a complaint can be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted only if a reading of the complaint establishes beyond doubt that the facts alleged ... do not add up to a cause of action which the law recognizes.” Municipal Light Co. of Ashburnham v. Commonwealth, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 166, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 866 (1993). See Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977). “Nor should a complaint be dismissed because it asserts a new theory of liability . . . .” New England Insulation Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 28, 30 (1988). Pontremoli’s complaint seeks relief under subsection 4A of c. 151B, § 4, which provides that it is unlawful “[f]or any person to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with another person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by this chapter,[ ] or to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with such other person for having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any such right granted or protected by this chapter.” G. L. c. 151B, § 4(4A), inserted by St. 1989, c. 722, § 14. A claim based on these provisions is commonly called a “retaliation claim,” even though the statute does not use this term. See Bain v. Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 765 (1997). “To succeed on claims of retaliatory discharge and retaliatory harassment, a plaintiff must establish the basic fact that he was subjected to an adverse employment action because of his protected activity” (emphasis original). Lewis v. Gillette, Co., 22 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1994). Compare MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 423 Mass. 652, 662 (1996). Based on facts alleged by Pontremoli, reasonable inferences may be drawn that termination proceedings were instituted against Motta and Pontremoli because the hospital was looking for a pretext to fire Motta. The opportunity arose when both were seen carrying, in full view, an old cocoa box and cans of soda, after Motta had filed discrimination and retaliation claims against the hospital. It may be inferred that the security guard, who questioned them but did not ask to look into the box, immediately reported these facts to Dánico or to someone who reported to Dánico. Dánico contacted Pontremoli by telephone that same afternoon and suspended him. Although Pontremoli told Dánico that the soda was his, Pontremoli, a good and honest worker with an unblemished record, was terminated. Dánico’s later invitation to say something that would “change [his] mind,” during at least one and perhaps two of the grievance proceedings, about an event that on its face did not require prolonged discussion once explained, and that served no legitimate purpose by being “off the record,” permits the reasonable inference, favorable to Pontremoli, that all along Dánico’s actions were calculated to intimidate and coerce Pontremoli into falsely implicating Motta. Pontremoli’s persistent support of Motta’s claims of innocence negated the hospital’s nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Motta. In this way, Pontremoli aided and encouraged Motta’s right to be free from retaliation by the hospital. If believed, the alleged facts demonstrate activity that was covered by G. L. c. 151B, and subjected Pontremoli to an adverse employment action supporting a claim for retaliatory termination under subsections 4 and 4A of G. L. c. 151B, § 4. Compare Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., 424 Mass. 285, 295 (1997). We reverse the judgment of dismissal. So ordered. This chapter makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of, among other classifications, “race, color . . . national origin ... or ancestry,” including “discriminat[ion] against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment . . . .” G. L. c. 151B, § 4(1), as amended through St. 1989, c. 516, § 4. The judge pointed out below, and the hospital echoes on appeal, that the termination preceded, rather than followed, Dánico’s alleged invitation to Pontremoli to implicate Motta in the theft. Thus, the theory goes, there was no retaliation because the termination did not result from Pontremoli’s response to the invitation (i.e., his refusal to turn on Motta). The theory does not persuade us because Pontremoli’s retention, it may be inferred, was contingent upon his cooperation with his employer. The required “adverse employment action [occurring] because of [Pontremoli’s] protected activity,” Lewis v. Gillette, Co., 22 F.3d at 24, was not the initial termination but the subsequent decision affirming it. The facts as alleged could also support a claim under subsection 4 of G. L. c. 151B, § 4, which prohibits retaliation against a “person because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this chapter.” See, for example, subsection 5 of G. L. c. 15IB, § 4, providing that is an unlawful practice “[f]or . . . an employer or an employee ... to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter or to attempt to do so.” “It is not fatal to the complaint that [the statute in question] was not specifically pleaded. ... ‘[A] complaint is not subject to dismissal if it would support relief on any theory of law’ (emphasis in original). Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 89 (1979). Nor does the failure of the parties to address the statute prohibit us from considering it,” Ourfalian v. Aro Mfg. Co., 31 Mass. App. Ct. 294, 298 n.5 (1991), although we need not do so, see Foley v. Lowell Sun Publishing Co., 404 Mass. 9, 11 (1989).

CORLEY v DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION Docket No. 218528. Submitted January 9, 2001, at Detroit. Decided May 15, 2001, at 9:05 A.M. Leave to appeal sought. Patricia M. Corley brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against the Detroit Board of Education, Joseph Smith, and Barbara Finch, alleging discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., breach of contract, and intentional infliction of • emotional distress. The court, Wendy M. Baxter, J., granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, finding, in part, that the alleged adverse employment action against the plaintiff that was based on the plaintiff’s former intimate relationship with Smith, her supervisor, did not present a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under the act. The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held: 1. Adverse employment action against an employee based on the employee’s former intimate relationship with the employee’s supervisor presents a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under the act. The court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of the defendants with regard to the plaintiffs sexual harassment claim. That part of the court’s order must be reversed and the matter must be remanded for further proceedings. 2. The plaintiff established sufficient facts for her claims of sexual harassment and hostile work environment to survive a motion for summary disposition. 3. The plaintiff failed to present sufficient facts to support her theories of intentional sex discrimination or disparate treatment. Summary disposition of those claims of sex discrimination was proper and must be affirmed. 4. Reasonable minds could not find that the defendants’ conduct was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The court did not err in dismissing the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 5. The court properly dismissed the breach of contract claim, which alleged an implied contract, on the basis that the claim concerned subject matter expressly covered by the plaintiff’s union contract. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Civil Rights — Sex Discrimination — Adverse Employment Actions. Alleged adverse employment action against an employee that is based on the employee’s former intimate relationship with the employee’s supervisor presents a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under the Civil Rights Act (MCL 37.2101 et seg.). Ernest L. Jarrett, for the plaintiff. Plunkett & Cooney, PC. (by Christine D. Oldani, Kenneth L. Lewis, and Venessa Peterson Williams'), for the defendants. Before: Neff, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Jansen, JJ. Neff, P.J. Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants on her claims of sex discrimination, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, following the termination of her adult education job with defendant Detroit Board of Education. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. i This appeal presents an issue of first impression regarding whether alleged adverse employment action against an employee based on the employee’s former intimate relationship with the employee’s supervisor presents a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under the Civil Rights Act (cra), MCL 37.2101 et seq. We conclude that it does, and, therefore, summary disposition of plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim in favor of defendants was improper. However, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of the defendants regarding plaintiff’s other claims of sex discrimination and her claims of breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. n Plaintiff was employed by defendant Detroit Board of Education as a full-time counselor at Cass Technical High School and, following a divorce in 1991, she took an additional part-time position in the adult education program at the Golightly Vocational Center operated by the board. An intimate, romantic relationship developed between plaintiff and her supervisor at Golightly, defendant Joseph Smith, that lasted nearly four years, but ended in 1995, when Smith became involved with defendant Barbara Finch, another Golightly administrator, whom he married in the spring of 1996. Because of plaintiffs past intimate relationship with Smith, problems arose at Golightly between plaintiff, Smith, and Finch. Following the 1995-96 school year, Smith informed plaintiff that her counseling job at Golightly would not be continued. Following the termination of her adult education position, plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination in violation of the CRA, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In her claims, plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, sexual harassment, disparate treatment, and the unlawful termination of her employment because of her gender and her prior relationship with defendant Smith. The trial court initially granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants with regard to all claims except the breach of contract claim against the board and Smith. The court subsequently granted summary disposition in favor of the board and Smith regarding plaintiffs breach of contract claim, concluding that it was barred by the applicable collective bargaining agreement. m This Court reviews a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary disposition de novo as a question of law. Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215 (1999). The trial court granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(C)(10). motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying a claim. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). We consider all relevant documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.; Ardt, supra. Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is proper only when there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is proper when “the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no- factual development could establish the claim and justify recovery.” Smith v Stolberg, 231 Mich App 256, 258; 586 NW2d 103 (1998). In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8), this Court does not act as a factfinder, but, instead, accepts all well-pleaded facts as true. Radtke, supra at 373. Statutory construction is also a question of law, requiring review de novo. Haworth, Inc v Wickes Mfg Co, 210 Mich App 222, 227; 532 NW2d 903 (1995). A Under Michigan law, freedom from discrimination in employment because of a person’s sex is a civil right. MCL 37.2102; Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 309; 614 NW2d 910 (2000). Subsection 202(1)(a) of the cra provides that an employer may not “discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of . . . sex . . . .” MCL 37.2202(1)(a). Discrimination because of a person’s sex includes sexual harassment of the person. MCL 37.2103(i); Chambers, supra at 309. The CRA defines sexual harassment to include unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the following conditions: :|: * * (ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual’s employment.... (hi) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment, ... or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment . . . environment. [MCL 37.2103(i)(i), (ii), (iii).] To establish a claim of harassment under subsection 103(i)(n), generally termed “quid pro quo” harassment, an employee must show “(1) that she was subject to any of the types of unwelcome sexual conduct or communication described in the statute, and (2) that her employer or the employer’s agent used her submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct as a factor in a decision affecting her employment.” [Chambers, supra at 310-311, quoting Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702, 708-709; 545 NW2d 596 (1996).] To establish an harassment claim under subsection 103(i)(m), referred to as “hostile work environment” harassment, an employee must prove (1) the employee belonged to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of sex; (3) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or communication; (4) the unwelcome sexual conduct or communication was intended to or in fact did substantially interfere with the employee’s employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) respondeat superior. [Chambers, supra at 311, quoting Radtke, supra at 382-383.] In her complaint, plaintiff set forth claims of both “sexual harassment” (presumably quid pro quo sexual harassment) and “hostile work environment.” On the evidence presented, we conclude that plaintiff established sufficient facts for her claim to survive a motion for summary disposition under either theory. B The threshold issue for a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment is that submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct was “a factor in decisions affecting [the plaintiffs] employment . . . .” MCL 37.2103(i)(n); Chambers, supra at 317. Because it is undisputed that plaintiffs employment at Golightly was terminated, and because plaintiff averred various actions by Smith and Finch affecting plaintiffs job at Golightly, plaintiff has established a genuine issue concerning whether the alleged adverse actions were factors in decisions affecting her employment. Thus, we first consider whether plaintiff established a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment under subsection 103(i)(w). Plaintiff argues that defendants’ adverse actions against her constituted sexual harassment because they were rooted in the reactions of Smith and Finch to a past consensual intimate relationship between plaintiff and Smith, who was plaintiff’s supervisor and a department head at Golightly. In her complaint, plaintiff averred that after their breakup, Smith confronted her at work with thinly veiled threats either expressly or implicitly warning her that she would lose her job unless she promised to do nothing to adversely affect his subsequent relationship with Finch. Further, Smith repeatedly raised the issue in the form of threats throughout the school year, despite plaintiff’s reassurances that she had no intention of interfering with Smith’s relationship with Finch. Plaintiff, an evening-school counselor, further averred that defendant Finch, a day-school administrator at Golightly, was aware of the former relationship between Smith and plaintiff, and that Finch, through conduct and indirect communications, exhibited hostility toward plaintiff and made her displeasure with plaintiff’s regular presence at the school known to plaintiff. Plaintiff testified during her deposition that Finch, through Smith, interceded in the directing of plaintiff’s employment to impose work conditions specific to plaintiff, such as assigning her a particular desk in the counseling center within Finch’s area of responsibility, thus preventing plaintiff from working away from Finch. No one else was given an assigned seat. In Barrett v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 322; 628 NW2d 63 (2001), this Court recently held that the cra does not “prohibit conduct based on romantic jealousy,” and therefore no claim of sex discrimination could be made where the male plaintiff alleged that his male supervisor subjected him to adverse employment actions because they were both pursuing a romance with the same female employee. However, Barrett can be distinguished from this case in that the defendants’ conduct in Barrett did not emanate from a prior sexual/romantic relationship between the plaintiff and his supervisor and there was no claim or evidence that the plaintiff was required to submit to sexual harassment as a condition of employment. Id. at 319, 323. Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants targeted her for persistent and hostile communications and other adverse actions because they disliked her continued presence in the workplace as Smith’s former paramour may reasonably be considered allegations of conduct or communication “of a sexual nature,” MCL 37.2103(i)(i), in that they emanated from the romantic/sexual relationship between plaintiff and Smith. Similarly, plaintiff’s allegation that she suffered adverse employment actions and was discharged for reasons stemming from her status as Smith’s former girlfriend may reasonably be considered an allegation that plaintiff’s employment was terminated because of her “submission” to Smith’s prior romantic/sexual advances. The Civil Rights Act is a “remedial statute” of “manifest breadth and comprehensive nature . . . .” Eide v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 431 Mich 26, 36; 427 NW2d 488 (1988). “[R]emediai statutes are to be liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy.” Id. at 34. The provisions of the cra covering sexual harassment in the workplace should be read to broadly protect an employee against adverse employment action taken by an employer acting in furtherance of personal animosity toward the employee as the result of the employer’s sexual advances. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that plaintiff has presented a genuine issue of fact concerning whether she was subjected to quid pro quo sexual harassment. c With regard to plaintiff’s claim of a hostile work environment, we conclude on the same facts that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for that claim to survive a motion for summary disposition. Our reasoning with regard to quid pro quo harassment applies similarly to establish that plaintiff belonged to a protected group, was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of her sex, and that the conduct or communication was unwelcome. See Radtke, supra at 383-385 (analyzing the first three elements of a claim of hostile work environment). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, as a female, former girlfriend of her supervisor, plaintiff was the object of unwelcome sexual conduct or communication, in the form of remarks and offensive actions by Smith and Finch. She informed Smith that she considered his actions to be harassment and told him to cease threatening her; plaintiff also expressed her resentment to Finch for complaining about plaintiff. With respect to the fourth element of a claim of hostile work environment, plaintiff presented evidence to create a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the conduct or communication substantially interfered with her employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. “[W]hether a hostile work environment existed shall be determined by whether a reasonable person, in the totality of circumstances, would have perceived the conduct at issue as substantially interfering with the plaintiff’s employment or having the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment.” Id. at 394. Plaintiff was subjected to threats, numerous offensive remarks, adverse working conditions, and ultimately replaced as a counselor because of her past relationship with her supervisor. Finally, plaintiff presented evidence to establish the element of respondeat superior. Plaintiff testified during her deposition that Smith telephoned plaintiff at Cass Technical on the day she was to return to work at Golightly and told her that she was being replaced by another counselor, although her counterpart, a Ms. Watts, was not being replaced. Plaintiff received no other notice that her position at Golightly, which she had had for the past five years, was terminated. On that same day, plaintiff contacted Dr. Lucille Peoples, the Golightly adult education director, concerning the termination of her employment and whether there was any problem with her work, but plaintiff was not thereafter assigned to a counseling position. Mindful of the standards by which a court must view the evidence in deciding a motion for summary disposition, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, MCR 2.116(C)(8), and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, MCR 2.116(C)(10), we conclude that summary disposition of plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims was improper. We find no error in the summary dismissal of plaintiff’s other claims of sex discrimination. We conclude that plaintiff failed to present sufficient facts to support her theories of intentional sex discrimination or disparate treatment. See Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 181, n 31; 579 NW2d 906 (1998) (disparate treatment requires evidence that a female plaintiff was treated differently than a similarly situated male employee); Schultes v Naylor, 195 Mich App 640, 646; 491 NW2d 240 (1992) (intentional discrimination requires a showing that the defendant was predisposed to discriminate against persons in the affected class). IV We also find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of contract. We conclude that reasonable minds could not differ that the complained-of conduct was not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Haverbush v Powelson, 217 Mich App 228, 234; 551 NW2d 206 (1996). We also conclude that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs implied contract claim on the ground that it concerned subject matter expressly covered by her union contract. Wallace v Recorder’s Court of Detroit, 207 Mich App 443, 446-447; 525 NW2d 481 (1994). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff also characterizes these actions as discrimination based on marital status, contending that her status as a single mother was a factor in her harassment because Smith knew that she could not afford to lose her job. However, plaintiff presents only cursory argument on this claim, and we find plaintiffs argument too tenuous to form a basis for relief.

1. <bold>Statutes — construction — factors considered. —</bold> In considering the meaning of a statute, the appellate court considers it just as it reads, giving words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language; if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation; where the meaning is not clear, the court looks to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject; the appellate court will also look to the object to be accomplished and the purpose to be served by the statute. 2. <bold>Statutes — construction — standard on appeal. —</bold> Although the appellate court is not bound by the decision of the trial court, in absence of a showing that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the law, the appellate court will accept that interpretation as correct on appeal. 3. <bold>Statutes — construction — absurd conclusion will not be</bold> <bold>reached. —</bold> The appellate court will not interpret a statute in a manner so as to reach an absurd conclusion that is contrary to legislative intent. 4. <bold>Schools school districts — statute expressly directed that</bold> <bold>school districts incorporate its rights into their written personnel</bold> <bold>policies — general savings clause insufficient to comply with</bold> <bold>statute's express directive. —</bold> Where appellee contended that Ark. Code Ann. § <cross_reference>6-17-1209</cross_reference> did not provide a private right of action and simply required school districts to incorporate its terms into their written personnel policies, but presented no support for its argument that the general savings clause in the Professional Negotiations Agreement (PNA) was sufficient to comply with the express directive in Ark. Code Ann. § <cross_reference>6-17-1209</cro