Wrongful Termination Cases

We granted this Rule 9 interlocutory appeal in this healthcare liabilty action to consider whether termination of representation by plaintiff's prior legal counsel a few weeks before the expiration of the statute of limitations in this healthcare liability action constitutes sufficient extraordinary cause to excuse (1) plaintiff's failure to wait at least sixty days to file the complaint after providing pre-suit notice as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 and, (2) plaintiff's failure to file a Certificate of Good Faith with the complaint as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding and holding that termination of representation by plaintiff's prior legal counsel a few weeks before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations does constitute the type of extraordinary cause sufficient to excuse plaintiff's failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and 29-26-122. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court's orders denying the motions to dismiss.

This interlocutory appeal involves a complaint for damages under the Public Employee Political Freedom Act. The chancery court transferred the case to circuit court after determining that only unliquidated damages were "available" under the statute. We conclude that the complaint failed to allege any liquidated damages. As such, the chancery court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this case. The trial court's decision to transfer this case to circuit court is therefore affirmed.

This is an appeal of the termination of a tenured teacher's employment pursuant to the Tenure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-5-501 to – 515. The Director of Schools of the Franklin Special School District filed Charges for Dismissal of the tenured teacher on the grounds of unprofessional conduct, incompetence, inefficiency, insubordination, and neglect of duty. The charging document alleged multiple incidents of unprofessional conduct based on a lack of adherence to required procedures, particularly in the area of special education laws and procedures. It further alleged that the teacher was placed on a Corrective Action Plan for the 2014-2015 school year, during which the teacher was found to be in violation of the plan on multiple occasions. Moreover, at the end of the 2014-2015 school year, the teacher was suspended for three days without pay as a result of an incident that occurred on May 11, 2015, during which the teacher improperly restrained a special education student, which violated the student's individualized education plan. The charging document also identified, inter alia, an incident that occurred on October 28, 2015, when the teacher got into a physical altercation with a special education student who refused to return the teacher's day planner and which resulted in the two falling to the floor. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Impartial Hearing Officer recommended dismissal on the grounds of unprofessional conduct. When the school board voted to sustain the Hearing Officer's decision, the teacher sought review in chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the teacher's dismissal based on the grounds of unprofessional conduct and incompetence. This appeal followed. Because the Hearing Officer did not find that the ground of incompetence had been proven, and that decision was not appealed, the ground of incompetence was not before the court. Therefore, it may not be considered as a ground for dismissal. However, we affirm the decision to dismiss the

Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction of age discrimination claim against school board where employee elected to file OCRC charge tortious violation of rights not recognized claim under Ohio law employee failed to submit proper evidence to support disability discrimination claim employee failed to make prima facie case of retaliation conduct supporting IIED claim not sufficiently extreme and outrageous no abuse of discretion in affirming termination under R.C. 3319.16.

Disability discrimination perceived prima facie transitory and minor. A plaintiff claiming disability discrimination cannot make out a prima facie case of being perceived as disabled if the plaintiff's injuries are transitory and minor — defined under federal law as an impairment with an actual or expected duration of six months or less. Although plaintiff-employee had been placed on disability leave after breaking bones in both hands, her injuries healed and she returned to work in six weeks. The court did not err by directing a verdict in favor the defendant-employer because the plaintiff's injuries were thus transitory and minor, excluding her from a "perceived as" disabled discrimination claim.

Because R.C. 119.12(N) expressly limits an agency's right to appeal an adverse ruling of the common pleas court to questions of law relating to the constitutionality, construction, or interpretation of statutes and rules of the agency, the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction of an appeal by Ohio Veterans Home from a decision of the common pleas court affirming SPBR's determination that appellee's position with OVH placed him in the classified civil service. The question presented to the common pleas court was the correctness of the judgment in light of the facts and not a question of law relating to the constitutionality, construction, or interpretation of statutes and rules of the agency. Appeal dismissed.

Appeal from decision confirming an arbitrator's award and denying a motion to vacate the award. Trial court did not err in finding the grievance was arbitrable and upholding arbitrator's decision to reduce discipline and reinstate the grievants.

The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion on R.C. 3319.16 appellate review when it affirmed the board of education's order terminating teacher's employment. Judgment of the common pleas court affirmed.

Cummings was a deputy sheriff in Arapahoe County. The Sheriff terminated Cummings' employment, asserting that he violated the Sheriff's employee manual (the Manual) and was dishonest during the investigation of the original charges against him. Cummings exhausted his remedies within the Sheriff's department and sued for (1) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and (2) breach of an implied contract of employment, based on the policies in the Manual. The Sheriff moved to dismiss the wrongful termination claim based on governmental immunity, and the district court dismissed the claim with prejudice. The district court denied the Sheriff's motion to dismiss the implied contract claim, and the Sheriff moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, holding that there was an implied contract of employment and disputed issues of material fact existed. The Sheriff brought an interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 42 challenging the denial of summary judgment. On appeal, the Sheriff contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment. He argued that the at-will employment concept in CRS § 30-10-506 requires the court to hold that all policies promulgated by a sheriff relating to termination of deputy sheriffs' employment are only precatory, and to conclude otherwise would mean that the sheriff lacks the power to terminate at-will employees. CRS § 30-10-506 requires a sheriff to promulgate written employment policies, and the sheriff must give deputies the rights of notice and opportunity to be heard. A sheriff's other employment policies may be, but are not required to be, binding. If the sheriff elects to confer binding employment rights on his deputies, those rights are enforceable according to their terms. The Sheriff next argued that even if CRS § 30-10-506 allows sheriffs to promulgate binding personnel policies, the disclaimers in the Manual and the yearly disclaimers that Cummings signed preclu

contested case hearing, Whistleblower Act

Dismissal of complaint motion for judgment on pleadings common-law tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy Greeley claim unlicensed practice of nursing R.C. 4723.03 reporting Ohio Board of Nursing retaliatory discharge R.C. 4723.341 R.C. 4113.52 jeopardy adequate statutory remedy. Trial court did not err in dismissing employee's complaint for failure to state a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where jeopardy element of claim was not satisfied. Adequate statutory remedy existed under R.C. 4723.33 and 4723.341 — incorporating the rights and duties granted "whistleblowing" employees under R.C. 4113.52 — that addresses society's interest in protecting employees who report violations of R.C. Chapter 4723. Employee's failure to comply with the requirements for statutory relief for wrongful discharge did not render statutory remedy inadequate.

Plaintiff filed a wrongful termination case on the basis of racial discrimination as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress and retaliation against The Ohio State University. Plaintiff failed to file within the two year statute of limitation and the longer federal time period in this case is not applicable. Judgment affirmed.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE – COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING AGREEMENT – UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE – WRONGFUL DISCHARGE – DISCRIMINATION – JURISDICTION: The State Employment Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over a wrongful-discharge claim brought against a public employer by an employee subject to a collective-bargaining agreement. Pursuant to R.C. 4117.11(B)(6), the State Employment Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over claim against a union for a breach of the duty to fairly represent a public employee. R.C. Chapter 4117 does not provide the exclusive remedy for a claim of disparate-treatment discrimination, which does not arise from or depend on a collective-bargaining agreement.