Discrimination Cases

Summary judgment res judicata federal court R.C. 4112.02 statute of limitations retaliation breach of contract R.C. 4117.02 State Employee Relations Board. Trial court properly awarded transit authority and union summary judgment where plaintiff's discrimination claims were previously rejected in federal court, retaliation and breach of contract claims were barred by the statute of limitations, claims for breach of rights set forth in the collective bargaining agreement were never arbitrated, were not filed with the State Employment Relations Board, and were also outside the statute of limitations.

Motion for judgment on the pleadings Civ.R. 12(C) discrimination R.C. 4112.02(A) R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) R.C. 4112.02(J) individual liability aid and abet R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c) motion to amend complaint change name final appealable order. The trial court's order granting plaintiff-appellee's motion to amend her complaint where the plaintiff-appellee moved to change the name of the party defendant where plaintiff-appellee demonstrated she mistakenly omitted a portion of the party's name on the complaint is not a final appealable order. We therefore have no jurisdiction to review the second assignment of error. The trial court properly denied the supervisor's Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. R.C. 4112.02(J) expressly imposes liability on a political subdivision employee so as to trigger the immunity exception outlined in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c).

Trial court did not err when it dismissed appellant's appeal of a letter of determination on reconsideration issued by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant city for employ- ment discrimination pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Prac- tices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.) following his resignation from his employment after he was notified by the defendant that he was going to be discharged. The plaintiff, a Hispanic American citizen of Puerto Rican descent, who was employed as a probationary police officer by the defendant and was seeking a position as a police officer with the defendant's police department, filed a two count complaint, alleging that the defendant, in discharging him, had discriminated against him on the basis of national origin and race. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and submitted uncontroverted documentary proof to substantiate its proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for deciding to dis- charge the plaintiff, namely, the plaintiff's deficient performance throughout his field training and probationary period. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, from which the plaintiff appeal to this court. Held that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's nondiscriminatory justification for his discharge was a pretext for unlaw- ful discrimination on the basis of national origin and race: although the plaintiff asserted that the defendant did not discipline other officers who had performed deficiently in the same manner that he had been disciplined, he did not produce any evidence to substantiate that asser- tion, and the defendant presented contrary evidence that it had dis- charged a Caucasian officer during his probationary period due to that officer's failure to meet the police department's expectations and to properly document reports in accordance with department require- ments; more

A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, second degree kidnapping, and first degree sexual assault. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying his challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when the prosecutor removed R.P., a prospective Hispanic juror, from the venire. When a party raises a Batson challenge, the trial court must conduct a three-step analysis to assess the claim of racial discrimination. First, the opponent of the peremptory strike must allege a prima facie case showing that the striking party struck the prospective juror on the basis of race. Next, the burden shifts to the striking party to provide a race-neutral explanation for excusing the prospective juror. The opponent is then given the opportunity to rebut the striking party's explanation. Here, the prosecutor claimed concern with R.P.'s views that the criminal justice system disproportionately affects people of color and those with mental disabilities. In addressing the Batson challenge, the trial court did not explicitly evaluate the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking R.P. Instead, the court sua sponte offered two race-neutral reasons to justify striking R.P. The court also failed to recognize that the record refuted most of the prosecutor's proffered excuses. Thus, the trial court erred in denying the Batson challenge. The judgment of conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial.