Discrimination Cases

The plaintiff, a certified nursing assistant, sought to recover damages from the defendant for an alleged violation of the Connecticut Fair Employ- ment Practices Act (CFEPA) (§ 46a-60), for failing to hire the plaintiff, who is hard of hearing, on the basis of her disability. During the hiring interview with S, the owner and administrator of the defendant, the plaintiff asked S to speak up, as she had trouble hearing her. S subse- quently asked how the plaintiff would be able to hear her clients and the plaintiff responded that she had no problem communicating with her nonverbal autistic son. The interview continued with no further questions regarding the plaintiff's disability but, instead, focused on the plaintiff's sporadic work history. After the interview, S received a fax containing employment discrimination information from the plaintiff's mother, which S interpreted as a potential threat of litigation. Thereafter, the defendant did not hire the plaintiff. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed her discrimination action with the trial court, which determined that the plaintiff had not proven that the reason she was not hired by the defendant was because of her hearing disability, and that the reasons given by the defendant for not hiring the plaintiff, the gaps in her employ- ment history, her reliability, and the fax sent by her mother, were not due to intentional discrimination. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard for determining the defendant's liability under CFEPA. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred in applying the but-for causation standard in reviewing her disability claim pursuant to CFEPA, as the trial court properly applied the motivating factor test as the causation standard, which required the plaintiff to prove only that the illegal discrimination was a cause of the adverse employment action: although the trial court's decis

The intervening plaintiff C filed a complaint with the plaintiff Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities alleging discrimination in housing against the defendant. The commission filed a complaint in the trial court, claiming that the defendant had engaged in a prohibited discrimi- natory housing practice pursuant to statute (§ 46a-64c (a) (1) and (3)) by denying C an opportunity to rent or view a rental property and making discriminatory statements about C's ability to rent the property on the basis of a lawful source of income, a voucher pursuant to section 8 of the National Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 1437f). The defendant, who had told C that the property was not ''section 8 ready,'' also claimed that C's credit score, which C had reported as ''fair,'' did not meet her requirements. The court rendered judgment in favor of the commission and C, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that the defendant violated subdivisions (1) and (3) of § 46a-64c (a): a. There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the defendant had engaged in a prohibited discriminatory housing practice pursuant to § 46a-64c (a) (1): testimony by a previous tenant that he did not provide the defendant with his credit score prior to viewing the property supported the court's finding that the defendant did not have a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to show C the rental property; moreover, this court declined to review the defen- dant's unpreserved challenge to documentary evidence from individuals who had posed as prospective tenants to determine whether her actions toward C were legally actionable and testimony related to those prospec- tive tenants, as she did not make any objections to that evidence or testimony during the trial, and this court declined to assess the weight of the documentary evidence

The defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities appealed from the judgment of the trial court vacating the damages award granted by its human rights referee to the defendant employee, P, for garden- variety emotional distress in a sexual harassment complaint against the plaintiff employer. During a public hearing before the referee, P testified that the harassing and discriminatory conduct of M, who was her direct supervisor while she was employed by the plaintiff, made her feel uncom- fortable, stressed, and nervous and caused her to become depressed. On direct examination, she was not asked about, and did not testify regarding, any medical treatment that she received relating to her depres- sion. On cross-examination, however, the plaintiff's counsel questioned P regarding the professional treatment that she sought as a result of the emotional distress M had caused and asked why she had not pro- duced any medical records relating to such treatment. The plaintiff's counsel continued this line of questioning even after the referee ruled that P was not required to produce any medical records because she was claiming only garden-variety emotional distress. With the exception of her testimony in response to the questions of the plaintiff's counsel, P did not offer any evidence regarding her medical treatment. The referee found in favor of P and awarded her back pay and damages for garden- variety emotional distress. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, which vacated the referee's damages award, and the commission appealed to this court. Held that the trial court erred when it vacated the referee's damages award because it incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff was prejudiced by P's failure to disclose her medical records: the referee did not abuse her discretion when she awarded P damages for garden- variety emotional distress because our Supreme Court in Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert (343 Conn. 90) made clear that, where a claimant limits h