Discrimination Cases

The plaintiff town appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of the defendant State Board of Labor Relations determining that the town had unilaterally changed an established past practice of including extra duty pay in the calculation of pensions for members of the defendant union, M Co., in violation of the Municipal Employees Relations Act (§ 7-467 et seq.). The town established a retirement committee to admin- ister its retirement plan, consisting of three members appointed by the town. In the midst of ongoing negotiations with M Co. for a successor collective bargaining agreement, the retirement committee notified M Co. that it had decided to exclude extra duty pay from pension calcula- tions. M Co. filed a complaint with the labor board, alleging that the town violated the act when the retirement committee unilaterally elimi- nated extra duty pay from pension calculations. The town claimed, inter alia, that the labor board lacked jurisdiction over the complaint because the retirement committee was not a municipal employer under the act as defined by statute (§ 7-467). The labor board issued a finding that the town violated the statute (§ 7-470 (a) (4)) requiring municipal employers to bargain in good faith when the retirement committee excluded extra duty pay from the calculation of pensions. The labor board found, inter alia, that there was a consistent past practice of including extra duty pay in pension calculations that had endured for almost thirty years. It rejected the town's contract defense, concluding that M Co. had not waived its right to bargain over changes to the calculation of future retirement benefits. The labor board applied its well established standard that a waiver must be clear and unmistakable. During the pendency of the town's administrative appeal, the National Labor Relations Board issued a decision in MV Transportation, Inc. (368 N.L.R.B. No. 66), in which it abandoned the clear and unmistakable waiver standard for determining

Pursuant to statute (§ 46a-58 (a)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . for any person to subject, or cause to be subjected, any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States, on account of . . . sex . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (b)), ''upon a finding of a discriminatory employment practice, the [human rights referee] may order the hiring or reinstatement of employees, with or without back pay . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (c)), ''upon a finding of a discriminatory practice prohibited by section 46a-58 . . . the [referee] shall determine the damage suffered by the complainant . . . as a result of such discriminatory practice and shall allow reasonable attorney's fees and costs.'' The named defendant, G, who is employed as a judicial marshal by the plaintiff, the Connecticut Judicial Branch, filed a complaint with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in connec- tion with her allegations that another judicial marshal, M, had subjected her to severe and pervasive sexual harassment while they were stationed together at a particular courthouse. Specifically, G alleged that the branch discriminated against her on the basis of her gender by subjecting her to a hostile work environment, failing to investigate her allegations and to take remedial steps to protect her, and retaliating against her for making her complaint by reassigning her to courthouses farther from her residence. G claimed that the branch's misconduct violated the employment discrimination statute (§ 46a-60), as well as the general antidiscrimination statute, § 46a-58 (a), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), as a predicate for G's claim under § 46a-58 (a), insofar as § 46a-58 (a) includes within its ambit

Pursuant to statute (§ 46a-64c (a) (1)), it is a discriminatory practice ''[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . lawful source of income . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 46a-64c (a) (3)), it is a discriminatory practice ''[t]o make, print or publish, or cause to be made, printed or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . lawful source of income . . . or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.'' The plaintiff sought to recover damages for alleged housing discrimination in connection with certain statements that the defendant H, a real estate salesperson, made regarding the plaintiff's participation in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. H served as an independent contrac- tor for the named defendant, R Co., a real estate broker. R Co., through H, entered into a listing contract with the defendant V for the exclusive right to lease an apartment owned by V and his wife. Thereafter, the plaintiff, through her real estate agent, B, submitted an application and offer to lease the apartment. After receiving the documents and speaking with V, who wanted the apartment rented by April 1, 2017, H notified B that they were ''all set'' for a lease commencing on that date. B then sent H blank section 8 paperwork to accompany the plaintiff's application. H and B then proceeded to exchange e-mails and text mes- sages, in which H repeatedly indicated that she was not aware that the plaintiff would be using a section 8 voucher, that she would have to speak to V, that the decision was up to V, and that she was not sure if V would want to wait for the section 8 approval process. H eventually texted B that V had received a competing offer for t