Discrimination Cases

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for alleged discriminatory conduct. The plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities alleging that the defendant town of East Lyme discriminated against him on the basis of national origin by denying him equal services and by treating him differently than his neighbors. The commission issued a release of juris- diction, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to warrant further investigation. The Superior Court granted the plaintiff's application for a waiver of fees, and the plaintiff subsequently served the defendants with a summons and complaint. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdic- tion pursuant to statute (§ 46a-101), because the plaintiff commenced the action more than ninety days after he received the release of jurisdic- tion. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the time limitation in § 46a-101 was subject matter jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. The court determined that, although the plaintiff had filed an application for a waiver of fees, the plaintiff's complaint was commenced, by service of the summons and complaint, beyond the ninety day limitation period. The court also concluded that the plaintiff improperly failed to plead the continuing course of conduct doctrine in his complaint in order for it to consider its affect on the limitation period. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court erred in concluding that the ninety day limitation period for commencing an action pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 46a-100) was subject matter jurisdictional: neither the language of § 46a-101 nor its legislative history revealed any indication that the legislature intended the time limitation of that statute to be jurisdictional, the geneaology of our antidiscrimination laws suggested an ongoing leg

The plaintiff employer appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities sustaining a disability discrimination complaint filed by the defendant employee, L, and awarding L, inter alia, back pay and emotional distress damages. L, who is hearing impaired, was hired by the plaintiff in 2012 and assigned to a secretarial position in its education personnel department. She worked directly for the human resources assistant, M, and performed many of the same tasks as him and covered his duties when he was absent from the office. As a result of her hearing impairment, L tended to speak loudly, and, on occasion, coworkers had raised concerns to T, the department's interim director, about the volume of her voice. In addition, S, who worked in the civil service personnel department, had inquired whether there was something wrong with L and had told M that he thought that L was loud and unprofessional. In 2014, M informed L that he intended to retire the following year. M encouraged L to apply for his position, began teaching her any duties of the position that she was not already performing, and strongly supported her candidacy. In August, 2015, the position was posted online, and L submitted an application. L met the qualifications listed in the posting. Two weeks later, S had the job posting removed and revised because he felt that he had a vested interest in assuring that the position was filled correctly. S interviewed prospective candidates for the position. Six candidates were interviewed for the position and two, P and J, were hired. L was not granted an interview because S concluded that she did not satisfy the revised minimum requirement of four years of human resources experience set forth in the revised job posting. After M retired, L became the interim human resources assistant until P's employment com- menced. In her complaint, L claimed that the plaintiff had discriminated against her on the basis of her

Disability discrimination summary judgment substantially limited major life activity disabled as a matter of law epilepsy is a physical impairment genuine issue of material fact. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendant-employer and determining that the plaintiff-employee did not demonstrate that she is disabled under the law. Under C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(1)(vii), epilepsy is a disability in terms of a prima facie case of disability discrimination. There are genuine issues of material fact remaining, including whether defendant-employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff-employee was merely pretextual.