Discrimination Cases

Pursuant to the Public Accommodation Act (§ 46a-64 (a)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation . . . because of . . . sex . . . [or] to discriminate, segregate or separate on account of . . . sex . . . .'' Pursuant further to that act (§ 46a-64 (b) (1)), the provisions of § 46a-64 prohibiting sex discrimination ''shall not apply to . . . separate bath- rooms or locker rooms based on sex.'' The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the commission's human rights referee, who found that the defendants, E Co. and C Co., had not engaged in discriminatory public accommodations practices by providing sepa- rate women's only workout areas in their otherwise public fitness facili- ties. The complainants, two members of the defendants' respective gyms who both identified as male, filed complaints with the commission after they experienced delays in completing their workouts because they had to wait for other members to finish using the equipment in the coed portions of the facilities. The human rights referee concluded that the defendants did not violate § 46a-64 by maintaining women's only work- out areas and dismissed their complaints. On appeal to the trial court, that court recognized that a women's only workout area is neither a bathroom nor a locker room but nonetheless concluded that the defen- dants' provision of such areas did not violate the sex discrimination provisions of the Public Accommodation Act because there was an implied customer gender privacy exception encompassed within § 46a- 64 (b) (1). In so concluding, the court considered the privacy interests underlying the bathroom and locker room exceptions, as well as the burden that the elimination of women's only areas would place on women of certain religious practices. The trial court observed that, wit

Age discrimination disability discrimination. Plaintiff filed an action alleging age discrimination and disability discrimination. Defendant formerly employed plaintiff as a tenured professor. Plaintiff is a 68-year-old-man. During the spring of 2020, plaintiff went on medical leave to undergo cardiac surgery. In the summer of 2020, defendant notified plaintiff that he was one of 96 full-time faculty members whose employment was terminated as part of a reduction in force (RIF). Defendant motioned for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish prima facie that the RIF was discriminatory. In the context of an RIF, plaintiffs must proffer direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence that establishes age was a factor in their termination. Plaintiff alleged that his supervisors' inquiries into whether he might soon retire and the fact that only 15% of terminated employees were under the age of 40 constituted evidence of defendant's discriminatory intent. The court found that defendant's university-wide RIF was conducted out of economic necessity, which constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory purpose for plaintiff's termination. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted and judgment was entered in defendant's favor.