Discrimination Cases

The defendant H filed a complaint with the plaintiff Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities alleging discrimination in housing because of race against the defendant C, her neighbor in a condominium complex. C was defaulted in the underlying administrative proceeding. At the hearing in damages, the plaintiff commission requested $75,000 in com- pensatory damages. The human rights referee of the defendant Commis- sion on Human Rights and Opportunities awarded H, inter alia, $15,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress. The plaintiff commission filed a request for the referee to reconsider her decision, which request was deemed denied after the referee failed to take further action. The plaintiff commission then appealed the referee's decision, claiming, pri- marily, that the damages awarded were insufficient. The trial court remanded the matter for further consideration of damages in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co. (304 Conn. 679). On remand, the referee issued a final decision that did not change the amount of the damages awarded. The administrative appeal was then argued before the trial court, which rendered judgment dismissing the appeal and affirming the referee's decision. On the plaintiff commis- sion's appeal to this court, held that the referee did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in her decision and the trial court did not abuse its discre- tion in dismissing the plaintiff commission's appeal and affirming the referee's decision: neither the referee nor the trial court misinterpreted or misapplied Patino in the determination of emotional distress dam- ages, as Patino did not establish a presumptive or mandatory range of damages for emotional distress claims but merely addressed a general range that such claims typically merit, references to that range in other cases did not establish any binding principle pertaining to damage awards in emotional distress actions, the fact that the emotional distress damag

The trial court erred by entering summary judgment under Civ.R. 56 on appellant's claim of sex discrimination because the evidence did not eliminate any genuine issue of material fact regarding the comparability of three male co-workers who were allegedly treated more favorably by appellee, or regarding the validity of appellee's purportedly nondiscriminatory reasons for its comparatively less favorable treatment of appellant. Regarding appellant's claim of disability discrimination, however, the trial court did not err by entering judgment under Civ.R. 56. Appellant, who alleges that appellee terminated her employment because she was disabled, failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to her alleged inability to perform the essential functions of her position at the time of her termination. In addition, the trial court did not err by entering summary judgment on appellant's claim for retaliation, because appellant failed to present evidence sufficient to create any genuine issue of material fact with respect to the alleged causal connection between her engaging in protected activity and appellee's termination of her employment. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.