Discrimination Cases

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, her former employer, for alleged discrimination and the creation of a hostile work environment on the basis of her gender in violation of the applicable provision (§ 46a-60) of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. The plaintiff, who had been a finance manager at the defendant's car dealership, claimed that she had been paid less than male employees who performed the same job and that she had been subjected to mistreat- ment by four male managers, which included sporadic incidents of yelling. She further alleged that male employees made remarks in the workplace that were crude and demeaning to women. The plaintiff initially brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, in which she alleged that the defendant had violated the federal Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq.). While the federal action was pending, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, in which she alleged violations of § 46a-60. The commission thereafter issued to the plaintiff a release of jurisdiction letter that authorized her to bring this action in the Superior Court. During the pendency of that action, the District Court rendered summary judgment for the defendant. The trial court then granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and that the evidence she presented was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to her hostile work environment claim. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court correctly determined that res judicata barred the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim: contrary to the plaintiff's assertion that the statute of limitations for Equal Pay Act claims required her to litigate that claim before her gender discrimination claim, there was no genuine issue of materi

The plaintiff, Jane Doe, appealed from a Superior Court judgment dismissing her complaint against the defendants, Brown University and two of its employees. In Superior Court, the plaintiff asserted claims under both the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in determining that her claims under RICRA were precluded by the prior dismissal of the plaintiff's federal Title IX claim. The plaintiff also argued that the hearing justice erred in holding that section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution does not grant the plaintiff a private right of action. The Supreme Court first held that the plaintiff's claims under RICRA were predicated upon the defendants' alleged violations of Title IX, which had already been litigated in federal court. Further, the Supreme Court stated that the resolution of that issue in federal court was essential to the judgment on the merits and, therefore, issue preclusion barred the plaintiff's claim in Superior Court. The Supreme Court also held that the plaintiff's claim that the defendants interfered with her contract with an educational institution was not actionable. Next, the Supreme Court examined the antidiscrimination clause contained in section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution and held that it was not self executing. Further, the Supreme Court held that principles of judicial restraint prevented the Court from creating a private right of action under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.