Workers’ Compensation Cases

Bethany Shelton ("Employee") filed a petition for benefit determination against Hobbs Enterprises, LLC ("Employer") alleging an injury to her right shoulder suffered in a work- related accident on August 26, 2017. She sought temporary total, permanent partial, and continued medical benefits. Following the issuance of a dispute certification notice, Employer moved for summary judgment on the basis the only medical testimony, from the Employee's treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Sean Kaminsky, was insufficient as a matter of law to establish causation. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims (the "trial court") denied the motion and denied Employer's motion to reconsider. Employer sought an expedited appeal before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, but then sought and was granted a dismissal of that appeal. A trial was held, after which the trial court denied Employee's claim on the ground she had failed to meet her burden to establish her right shoulder injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment with Employer. Employee filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. She appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION – PREEXISTING CONDITION – SUBSTANTIAL AGGRAVATION: The trial court did not err in its application of the substantial-aggravation standard by requiring evidence of the claimant's "pre-injury reference point." The trial court's determination that claimant's expert testimony was insufficient to establish a preexisting condition was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Workers' compensation—Application of Bureau of Workers' Compensation formulary guidelines under Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.3 and application of Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.7 to a self-insuring employer's termination of payment for narcotic and muscle-relaxant prescriptions for allowed conditions pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.1(I)(4)—Court of appeals' judgment granting limited writ vacated—Writ granted in part.

For eighty-two years, this Court struggled to correctly apply the "statutory employee doctrine." Today, following our more recent decisions on the statutory employee doctrine, we apply the doctrine in light of the General Assembly's original purpose for enacting it. We find the circuit court and the court of appeals correctly determined the injured worker was not the statutory employee of the defendant.

Home health aide sought workers' compensation benefits after she fell in the wet grass in the side yard of her client's home and sustained an injury to her back. The employee had completed her shift, had stayed with the client (a long-time friend) for approximately 15 minutes after her shift, and was leaving the home when she went to check on an unknown noise around the side of the house. The trial court did not err in concluding that the employee's injury did not occur in the course of and arising out of her employment. Judgment affirmed.

Section 65-01-02(11)(a)(3), N.D.C.C., requires claimants to prove a compensable heart-related injury by showing with reasonable medical certainty their employment caused the injury and unusual stress was at least 50% of the cause of the injury. Objective medical evidence may not be established solely by deductive reasoning.

The defendant employer, R Co., and its owner, M, appealed to this court from the decisions of the Compensation Review Board affirming the finding of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner that the Workers' Compensation Commission had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits and that the plaintiff employee had sustained a compensable injury. The plaintiff sustained injuries when a car he was working on at R Co.'s junkyard fell on his shoulders and the back of his head. The plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim within one year of the date of his injury as required by statute (§ 31-294c), and R Co. and M argued that the commission lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. The commissioner bifurcated the issues, deciding the jurisdictional question first before holding a hearing on the issue of compensability. After the first hearing, the commissioner found that the medical care exception in § 31-294c (c) applied. The commissioner further found that an employer-employee relationship existed between R Co. and/or M. Thus, the commissioner found that the commission had jurisdiction over the matter. R Co. and M filed a petition for review with the board, which affirmed the commissioner's finding of jurisdiction in a decision issued in 2017. In 2019, a hearing was held before the commissioner to address the issue of compensability. No additional evidence or testimony was presented and the parties agreed that record from the prior hearing would be incorporated by reference and constitute the record for purposes of the new hearing. The commissioner concluded that the plaintiff's injury was compensable and that R Co. and M, as alter egos, were jointly and severally liable. The board affirmed the decision of the commissioner in part, and R Co. and M appealed both decisions of the board to this court. Held: 1. Although the board erred in affirming the 2019 decision of the commis- sioner on the basis of collateral estoppel, it properly

Kenneth L. Barr, Employee, appeals the decision of the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission denying his claim for medical and compensation benefits. Employee asserts injury as a result of exposure to volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the paints he used while working as a painter for the Darlington County School District. We affirm the decision of the Commission.

Claimants must prove by a preponderance of evidence that they have sustained a compensable injury and are entitled to workers' compensation benefits. A claimant must prove that the condition for which benefits are sought is "causally related" to a work injury. To establish a "causal connection," a claimant must demonstrate the claimant's employment was a substantial contributing factor to the injury and need not show employment was the sole cause of the injury. A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective medical findings, which may include a physician's medical opinion based on an examination, a patient's medical history, and the physician's education and experience.

Summary judgment employee independent contractor R.C. 4123.84(A)(3)(a). The trial court did not err in denying the defendant-appellant's motion for summary judgment and in granting the plaintiff-appellees' motion for summary judgment because the team physicians are considered in the employ of the employer instead of independent contractors as defined by R.C. 4123.84(A)(3)(a).

EVIDENCE — WORKERS' COMPENSATION: Where the defendant-employer asserted on appeal that the trial court had failed to consider all the exhibits before rendering judgment, the court did not err in granting plaintiff-employee the right to participate in the workers' compensation fund for the condition of accessory navicular displacement where it is apparent from the record that the trial court properly reviewed all the evidence prior to entering judgment.