Workers’ Compensation Cases

Workers' Compensation N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 97-2(5) Fair and just results Method 3

Employer appeals jury verdict entitling worker to participate in workers' compensation fund. Trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in instructing jurors that they need not be certain of the date of the worker's injury, only that the worker proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was injured in the course of his employment.

Workers' Compensation—Occupational Disease—Apportionment—Previous Injury. Claimant Hutchison has worked as a trailer mechanic for Pine Country, Inc. (employer) since 1990. Claimant began experiencing knee pain in 2012. In October 2014, when his symptoms worsened, claimant reported his knee pain to his employer as a work-related occupational disease. The employer contested the claim on relatedness grounds, and supported its position with an independent medical examination, which concluded that claimant had osteoarthritis and was overweight and suggested that claimant's employment was not the cause of the arthritis. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that one-third of claimant's injury was work-related. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) affirmed the ALJ's decision.On appeal, claimant challenged the apportionment of his benefits award. Claimant contended that his knee condition arose from repetitive kneeling and crawling necessitated by his work as a trailer mechanic, rather than from a specific incident, and therefore, it should be covered as an occupational disease. Here, because claimant's knee condition was one ongoing disease with both work- and non-work- related causes, there was no separate "previous injury" as anticipated by CRS § 8-42-104(3) it was instead one injury with multiple causes. The Panel therefore properly concluded that the CRS § 8-42-104(3) prohibition against apportionment for a previous injury did not apply. Further, the order is consistent with case law. Claimant also contended that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's apportionment. The Court of Appeals concluded that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's apportionment findings and held that the Panel did not err when it declined to set aside the ALJ's order on that basis. The order was affirmed.

Workers' compensation-Permanent total disability-There is no hourly standard for determining one's capability to perform sustained remunerative employment on part-time basis-Commission decides whether a claimant is capable of sustained remunerative employment on case-by-case basis-Commission did not abuse its discretion in relying on expert's report to find that claimant was capable of up to four hours of sedentary work a day-Court of appeals' judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed.

Workers' compensation-Appeal-R.C. 4123.512-Decision that preexisting condition substantially aggravated by workplace injury has returned to preinjury level is a decision regarding the extent of a claimant's disability and is not appealable-Court of appeals' judgment reversed.

In this workers' compensation case, Charles Kilburn sustained several injuries from a motor vehicle accident. He underwent cervical spine surgery to resolve his neck injury complaints. His authorized physician also recommended lumbar spine surgery to combat his back pain, but that request was denied through the utilization review process. Mr. Kilburn took oxycodone to alleviate his back pain, and his treating physician referred him to a pain management clinic. Six months after the cervical spine surgery, Mr. Kilburn died due to an overdose of oxycodone combined with alcohol. After a bench trial, the chancery court found that the death was compensable. Mr. Kilburn's employer appealed. The appeal was initially referred to a Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, but we later transferred the case to the Supreme Court for review. After examining the record, the parties' arguments, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court.

It was within the fact-finding discretion of the Industrial Commission to reject relator-employer's affidavits and suggested inference, and to determine, on the facts of the case, that the perpetration of a fraud in receiving TTD compensation did not necessarily mean that the initial injury did not occur. Thus, the Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying relator's request to exercise continuing jurisdiction to hold a hearing to determine if the industrial claim was fraudulently obtained. Objection overruled. Writ of mandamus denied.

Workers' compensation coming-and-going rule totality of the circumstances. Trial court erred in awarding employer summary judgment by application of the coming-and-going rule where there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether accident arose out of and in the course of employee's employment.

Workers' Compensation —Personal Jurisdiction—Specific Jurisdiction. In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether Colorado has jurisdiction to award benefits for out-of-state work-related injuries and impose a statutory penalty on an employer under CRS § 8-41-204 when the employer is not a citizen of Colorado and has no offices or operations in Colorado but hired a Colorado citizen within the state. The Court concluded that under the facts of this case, Colorado lacks personal jurisdiction over the employer and therefore the employer cannot be subject to the Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado, CRS §§ 8-40-101 to 8-47-209. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The trial court did not err by entering summary judgment for Appellee on Appellant's claim for workers' compensation benefits. Generally, the coming-and-going rule bars compensation of a fixed-situs employee for injuries which occur off the work premises. Neither the zone-of-employment exception or the totality-of-the-circumstances exception applies. Judgment affirmed.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 workers' compensation R.C. 4123.01 arising out of employment causal connection idiopathic injury. In order to survive defendants-appellees' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff-appellant had the burden of producing evidence demonstrating that a condition, risk, or hazard of her employment caused or contributed to her injuries. The record reflects that appellant failed to meet her burden. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted appellees' motion for summary judgment.

The trial court did not commit plain error in its use of diagnostic criteria and in finding that Appellants' doctors failed to perform any differential diagnoses in connection with Appellant's claim to add Complex Regional Pain Syndrome as a covered condition under Workers' Compensation. Additionally, the trial court did not commit plain error by accepting as persuasive the testimony of an expert retained by the Bureau of Workers Compensation. Affirmed.

Workers' compensation R.C. 4123.512 de novo scope of review failure to object to absence of exhibits to notice of hearing and deposition transcripts constitutes waiver. A trial court's scope of review on appeal from a workers' compensation determination pursuant to R.C. 4123.512 is, unlike traditional administrative appeals, de novo, and is based solely on the evidence placed before the trial court by the parties. The claimant bears the burden of proving entitlement to workers' compensation fund participation. The failure to object at the trial court to the absence of deposition and administrative hearing exhibits upon receipt of a notice of filing thereof constitutes a waiver of the argument, and appellant did not proffer the exhibits.