Workers’ Compensation Cases

Robert Letteney’s (dependent’s) Case. Suffolk. March 5, 1999. April 5, 1999. Present: Wilkins, C.J., Abrams, Lynch, Greaney, Fried, Marshall, & Ireland, II. Workers’ Compensation Act, Amount of compensation, Average weekly wages. Statute, Construction. This court concluded that the insurance scheme embodied in G. L. c. 152 contemplates no-fault compensation to workers for job-related injuries measured by earnings within, and not outside of, the Massachusetts workers’ compensation system, and that an employee’s self-employment or out-of-State employment cannot be used to determine the average weekly wage, for purposes of G. L. c. 152, § 35C, of an employee who becomes eligible for workers’ compensation benefits as a result of an industrial injury that occurred five or more years prior to the date of eligibility. [280-286] A reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents correctly concluded that an employee’s out-of-State self-employed average weekly wage that he was earning in 1991, at the time he became disabled from having been exposed to asbestos in the workplace in the 1950’s, could not be used to calculate his average weekly wage in determining the level of workers’ compensation benefits, and that the employee’s compensation was properly measured by the average weekly wage last earned in Massachusetts in 1986 before he moved out of State. [280-286] Appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. David J. McMorris for the employee. Paul R. Ingraham, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund. Alan S. Pierce for the employer. Fried, J. Only employment referred to in G. L. c. 152, § 1 (4), may be used in determining the average weekly wage, for purposes of G. L. c. 152, § 35C, of an employee who becomes eligible for workers’ compensation benefits as a result of an industrial injury that occurred five or more years prior to the date of eligibility. i The claimant’s husband, Robert Letteney (employee), had been employed at Hercules Powder Co. (Hercules), where he was exposed to asbestos. The last exposure was in 1955. The employee left the employ of Hercules in March of 1959. At that time he apparently took a job with another insured employer, where he continued to work until May of 1986, at which time he moved to Florida and went into business for himself. Mesothelioma forced him to retire from his business in 1991 and led to his death in June of 1992. The mesothelioma was the result of his exposure to asbestos during his work at Hercules. The claimant sought and was granted compensation under our workers’ compensation act, G. L. c. 152 (as in effect at the time the claimant became eligible for benefits — at the employee’s death in 1992). The only dispute relates to the level of that compensation. An administrative judge of the Department of Industrial Accidents (department), construing G. L. c. 152, § 35C, awarded compensation on the basis of the last average weekly wage the claimant’s decedent earned while self-employed in Florida. Hercules and the Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund (trust fund) appealed to the department’s reviewing board (board), which reversed in a divided decision. The board based its decision on G. L. c. 152, § 1 (4), which defined an employee covered by the act as a “person in the service of another,” and excluded, among others, masters of and seamen on vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, professional athletes, and drivers of leased taxi cabs. The dissenting member of the board agreed with the administrative judge from whom the appeal had been taken that this definition was relevant only to the issue of coverage, which was conceded, and not to the determination of the level of compensation for a covered injury. The administrative judge had also pointed out that the same argument, that self-employment wages would not count in determining the . level of compensation under § 35C, would compel the conclusion that wages earned in out-of-State employment could also not be used to calculate the last average weekly wage in determining compensation. The claimant appealed. We transferred the case here on our own motion and affirm the decision of the reviewing board. n Since its first enactment in 1911, St. 1911, c. 751, Part V, our workers’ compensation law was conceived as a system of insurance to replace in part the wages lost by workers or their dependents as a result of injuries suffered in connection with their work. See generally L. Locke, Workmen’s Compensation 1-25 (Nason & Wall Supp. 1995). There would be the time when an injury occurred, followed more or less directly by the death or disability resulting from that injury, which is what created eligibility under the scheme. See Zerofski’s Case, 385 Mass. 590, 594-595 (1982). As part of a comprehensive revision of our workers’ compensation law, see L. Locke, Workmen’s Compensation, supra, the Legislature addressed the problem of workers suffering injuries, the disabling effects of which are felt only many years later and during which time the worker may have continued to be gainfully employed. The typical example of such an injury is asbestos exposure, the ill effects of which may become apparent only decades later. This is such a case. General Laws c. 152, § 35C, provides the rule for such cases: Where five or more years elapse between the date of injury and the disabling effect of that injury, the wage replacement which the act provides is to be calculated not on the basis of the wages being earned at the time of the injury, but at the later time when the worker becomes eligible, that is the later time when he dies or becomes partially or totally disabled. This provision reversed the effect of our holding in Squillante’s Case, 389 Mass. 396, 397 (1983): “Where an employee’s injury results from a gradual exposure to harmful foreign matter the date of the injury is the date of last exposure to the foreign matter. . . . Often the date of last exposure coincides with the day when the employee is no longer able to continue his work because of the cumulative effect of such exposure. . . . Here, the last date of exposure to asbestos- occurred in 1945. The day that the employee was no longer able to work occurred in 1974, long after he had ceased his employment with [the employer]. In such a case, the date of injury is the date of last exposure, not the date of incapacity.” (Citations omitted.) And applying the law as it then stood, we were led to the conclusion that the compensation of the claimant’s award must be made on the basis of his wages at the time of his injury. Section 35C was obviously meant to mitigate the rigors of that rule, and to calculate his lost earning capacity in terms of what he was earning at the time of his disability — in the language of the statute, at the time of his eligibility, which with the passage of time, the accrual of seniority, and the effect of inflation is likely to be considerably higher. For a long time following his injury, the employee had been employed by another insured employer in the Commonwealth. There is no question that, due to this continued employment in Massachusetts by an employer subject to the workers’ compensation laws (although an employer different from the one for whom he was working when the injury occurred), the claimant is entitled to compensation measured by the employee’s average weekly wage from this subsequent employer, a significantly higher amount than if compensation was set at the date of injury. The difficulty in this case arises from the circumstance that, for his last five years in the work force (well after the date of injury, the date of last exposure), the claimant’s decedent had been self-employed in another State. The claimant argues that the ameliorative purpose of § 35C requires that she be compensated at that higher rate, which reflects the employee’s earning capacity at the time he became disabled, and not at the lower rate calculated on earnings as of the date of injury several years earlier. Because it is the purpose of § 35C to compensate an employee in terms of his earning capacity, what he or his survivor have lost as result of the injury, then by the board’s rule the claimant here will receive a good deal less than that. The board, Hercules, and the trust fund argue that, because self-employment (like employment out of the State) are outside what they call the “closed system” of the workers’ compensation scheme, self-employment wages should not count for purposes of calculating compensation from within the scheme. Both sides invoke the rule of plain meaning. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. One 1987 Mercury Cougar Auto., 413 Mass. 534, 537 (1992) (“It is a well-established canon of construction that, where the statutory language is clear, the courts must impart to the language its plain and ordinary meaning”); State Bd. of Retirement v. Boston Retirement Bd., 391 Mass. 92, 94 (1984) (intent of Legislature is to be ascertained from words of statute “construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language”). The trouble is that there is no very plain meaning here. Weighing for the claimant is the ameliorative purpose of the statute, coupled with the absence of any explicit provision stating that for the purposes of calculating compensation under § 35C only covered Massachusetts employment will count. Weighing for the board are the definition of “employee” in § 1 (4), which does spell out such an exclusion, and the references in § 35C to other sections of the act, all of which use that defined term “employee.” And these textual arguments are coupled with the conception of workers’ compensation as an insurance scheme funded entirely by the contributions of Massachusetts employers. The text, it must be acknowledged, compels neither conclusion, and it may be surmised that this is because the Legislature did not advert to the precise issue before us. But such specific advertence is not necessary if the scheme as a whole suggests a particular resolution. The Legislature need not, and indeed cannot, anticipate every circumstance that may arise under a general principle it enacts. It is for us to deduce what that principle requires. The board’s conclusion is supported by a consideration of the kind of scheme that the Legislature has enacted. The Legislature has enacted an insurance scheme. Employees give up their right to sue their employers in tort in return for a right to compensation for job-related injuries, whether or not the employer was at fault. See generally L. Locke, Workmen’s Compensation, supra at § 1.0. The employer is required to insure unless it qualifies as a self-insurer. G. L. c. 152, § 25A. Compensation to the employee measured by earnings outside the Massachusetts workers’ compensation system constitutes a liability for which neither the employer nor any other Massachusetts employer has provided. It may be said that this happens whenever an employee receives a higher award than that measured by the last wage the employee earned from the employer for whom he worked at the time he sustained the injury. That would not be a valid objection. The later Massachusetts employer paying that higher wage would presumably have paid premiums based on that higher wage. Although that later employer would not be liable for the higher award, its participation in the general system may be supposed, at least roughly, to work out in the long run when it must pay higher compensation for subsequent earnings of its employees earned elsewhere in the system. Self-employment, out-of-State employment, and other excluded employment are not within the system and thus this long-run equilibration cannot take place. Where an employee is injured by an employer who is required to but illegally has not insured, the worker obtains his compensation from the trust fund, to which all Massachusetts employers are required to contribute. See G. L. c. 152, § 65 (2). See generally 452 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.04 (1997). The trust fund may then seek to recover the award from the delinquent employer. See G. L. c. 152, § 65 (8); 452 Code Mass. Regs. 3.04 (6). This is a further demonstration that all Massachusetts employers participate in a common system, and thus that it would be unfair to measure their, obligations by events occurring outside of that system. Finally and most pertinently, an employer paying excess compensation by virtue of § 35C (excess in the sense that it is measured by higher wages earned after the employee has left the employer’s service) is entitled to reimbursement from the trust fund. G. L. c. 152, § 65 (2) (b). Thus all Massachusetts employers contribute to the pool from which the excess award the claimant seeks here will be paid. This more than suggests a legislative conception that such excess § 35C awards are a responsibility of all covered Massachusetts employers in common, and that therefore only employment by covered employers should count in the calculation of such awards. The decision of the reviewing board is affirmed. So ordered. GeneraI Laws c. 152, § 35C, provides: “When there is a difference of five years or more between the date of injury and the initial date on which the worker or his survivor first became eligible for benefits under section thirty-one, thirty-four, thirty-four A, or section thirty-five, the applicable benefits shall be those in effect on the first date of eligibility for benefits. “For purposes of adjustment to compensation under sections thirty-four B and thirty-five F for employees subject to this section, the first date of eligibility for benefits rather than the date of injury shall be used for purposes of computing such supplemental benefits.” The compensation awarded on remand was based on the average weekly wage earned by the decedent at the last job he held for an employer who participated in the Massachusetts workers’ compensation insurance system. This surely had a large effect on the level of compensation, as the employee worked for Hercules, the employer where the injury occurred, for only four years following the last exposure. His employment with the subsequent (insured) employer extended more than twenty-five years after he left the employ of Hercules, thus extending nearly thirty years from the time of injury. Revenue for the trust fund and for the certain operating expenses of the department is raised by an assessment on all employers subject to the workers’ compensation law. G. L. c. 152, § 65 (2). Under the statutory scheme, the department receives a report annually detailing a base amount for each employer. G. L. c. 152, § 65 (3). The base amounts are aggregated and used to determine the employer assessment rate, which is tied to the losses paid by all employers under the chapter for the preceding calendar year. Id. This figure is then converted to a factor corresponding to a percentage of the insured’s standard workers’ compensation premium. G. L. c. 152, § 65 (5). The assessment rates are determined according to the projected budgets necessary to pay the department’s annual operating expenses and for the estimated amount of payments during the following year for compensation from the trust fund. Section 65 (2), as appearing in St. 1991, c. 398, § 85, provides in part: “There is hereby established a trust fund in the state treasury, known as the Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay or reimburse for the following compensation: ...(e)... approved claims against [uninsured] employers . . . .” Section 65 (8), as appearing in St. 1991, c. 398, § 88, provides in part: “If the trust fund pays compensation to a claimant pursuant to clause (e) of subsection (2), it may seek recovery from the uninsured employer for an amount equal to the amount paid on behalf of the claimant . . . plus any necessary and reasonable attorney fees.”

HOLDEN v FORD MOTOR COMPANY WEISS v JEWISH HOME FOR THE AGED Docket Nos. 90345, 90144. Argued November 6, 1991 (Calendar Nos. 8-9). Decided April 21, 1992. Rehearing denied in Weiss, post, 1241. Emaline F. Holden sought workers’ compensation death benefits after her husband, Carl Holden, a Ford employee, died at work. Following a hearing, at which the plaintiff’s experts testified that Carl Holden died of a job-related myocardial infarction and the defendant testified that his death resulted from an arrhythmia unrelated to the job, the magistrate denied benefits on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish the requisite nexus between the claimed injury to the heart and work. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission, acknowledging the limited scope of administrative appellate review, concluded that because the magistrate had failed to find whether the deceased sustained cardiac damage it was incumbent on the wcac to do so, found the requisite relationship between the cardiac damage and the deceased’s work, and ruled the death compensable. The Court of Appeals, Reilly, P.J., and Gillis and Cynar, JJ., reversed in an opinion per curiam (Docket No. 118813). The claimant appeals. Vera Weiss sought workers’ disability compensation benefits for a work-related injury to her back arising out of her employment as a registered nurse for the Jewish Home for the Aged. Following a hearing, at which conflicting evidence was presented regarding her ability to return to work, the magistrate found that she had been temporarily disabled and entered a closed award of benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission, acknowledging the limited scope of administrative appellate review, concluded that the magistrate’s finding was unsupported by substantial evidence and modified the decision to provide an open award of benefits. The Court of Appeals, Danhof, C.J., and Murphy and T. M. Burns, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 115339). The defendant appeals. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Levin, the Supreme Court held: The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission, on appellate review, did not exceed its authority in reversing the decisions of the magistrates and in awarding benefits. 1. 1985 PA 103 eliminated review de novo by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in workers’ compensation cases, beginning October 1, 1986. Findings of fact by a workers’ compensation magistrate are now considered conclusive, on administrative appellate review by the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission, if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. The findings of fact made by the wcac, not the findings of the magistrate, are to be conclusive on judicial appellate review, in the absence of fraud, if there is any evidence to support them. The standard for judicial review was not changed by 1985 PA 103. 2. The substantial evidence standard, like the standard for judicial appellate review, is rooted in Const 1963, art 6, § 28, which provides that administrative agency decisions subject to judicial review following a hearing are to be minimally reviewed to determine whether they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Review of the evidence by the wcac must include both a qualitative and quantitative analysis to ensure a full, thorough, and fair review. The wcac may adopt, in whole or in part, the order and opinion of the magistrate as its order and opinion. 3. The question on judicial appellate review is whether the wcac acted in a manner consistent with the concept of administrative appellate review that is less than review de novo in finding that magistrate’s decision was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. To judge whether it acted properly, consideration is given to the issues of credibility regarding live witnesses determined by the magistrate, the evidence considered and ignored, the care taken, and the reasoning and analysis of the magistrate and the wcac, with due deference given to the administrative expertise of both the wcac and the magistrate. Recognition that the wcac brings the administrative expertise of more than one person, may be appropriate depending on the factual or legal issue. A carefully constructed opinion by the wcac enables appellate courts to determine whether it duly recognized and observed the limitations on its reviewing function contemplated by the substantial evidence standard. A reviewing court should ordinarily defer to the collective judgment of the wcac unless it is manifest that it exceeded its reviewing power. 4. In these cases, the wcac panels did not exceed the legislatively prescribed reviewing function. Both panels, after acknowledging that their review of the magistrates’ decisions were limited by the "substantial evidence on the whole record” standard, gave adequate reasons, grounded in the records, for reversing the fact finding of the magistrates. Holden, reversed. Weiss, affirmed. 185 Mich App 305; 460 NW2d 316 (1990) reversed. 185 Mich App 687; 462 NW2d 821 (1990) affirmed. Thomas J. Bertino (.Daryl Royal, of counsel) for the plaintiff in Holden. Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O’Hare, Helveston & Waldman, P.C. (by A. Donald Kadushin and Granner S. Ries), for the plaintiff in Weiss. John M. Thomas for the defendant in Holden. Murray R. Feldman (Conklin, Benham, Ducey, Listman & Chuhran, P.C., by Martin L. Critchell, of counsel) for the defendant in Weiss. Amici Curiae: Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Gay Secor Hardy, Solicitor General, and Caleb B. Martin, Jr., and Ray W. Cardew, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, for the Attorney General. Mark Granzotto, Monica Farris Linkner, and Charles P. Burbach for the Michigan Trial Lawyers Association. Levin, J. The question presented concerns the scope of administrative appellate review by the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission of a decision of a magistrate, and the scope of judicial appellate review on leave granted by the Court of Appeals or this Court. We conclude that the wcac did not, on administrative appellate review, exceed its authority in reversing the decisions of the magistrates and in awarding benefits, and that the Court of Appeals panel in Holden erred in reversing, and the panel in Weiss did not err in affirming, the wcac. I Before the reforms enacted in 1985, hearings in workers’ compensation cases were conducted by a referee, also referred to as an administrative law judge, with de novo review by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. Judicial review was obtainable on application, not as of right, in the Court of Appeals and this Court. In an effort to address the large number of backlogged appeals, the Department of Labor considered proposals for changes in the administrative appellate review process. In 1980, the Lesinski Report, summarizing the results of the department’s Workers’ Compensation Adjudication Project, proposed that decisions of a magistrate be made conclusive "unless fraudulently obtain[ed] or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.” No procedural reform legislation was, however, enacted. In 1984, Theodore J. St. Antoine, the Governor’s Special Counsel on Workers’ Compensation, recommended significant changes in the decision-making process. Like the Lesinski Report, St. Antoine recommended that de novo review of the hearing officer’s decision be eliminated. He proposed that the question, on administrative appellate review, should be whether the decision of the hearing officer is supported by "substantial . . . evidence on the whole record.” He said that this standard was "deliberately designed to allow the Appeal Board a bit more latitude” than it would have had under the "great weight of the evidence” standard proposed in the Lesinski Report. St. Antoine said this would enable the reviewing panel to "remedy any serious misstep by [a hearing officer] in assessing the evidence and making factual findings.” St. Antoine’s proposals were in general adopted by the Legislature when it enacted 1985 PA 103. Magistrates replaced referees, and the wcac replaced the wcab. A Under Act 103, beginning October 1, 1986, de novo review was eliminated. Henceforth, findings of fact by a workers’ compensation magistrate were to be considered conclusive, on administrative appellate review by the wcac, if supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record.” MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3). This substantial evidence standard provides for administrative appellate review more deferential to the hearing officer’s decision than de novo review, but for more searching review by the wcac than judicial review under the "any evidence standard.” The constitution provides for such limited judicial review: Findings of fact in workmen’s compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law. [Const 1963, art 6, § 28.] Act 103 did not change the standard for judicial review of final decisions in workers’ compensation proceedings. The Legislature had provided, under former law, that it was the findings of fact made by the wcab that were to be conclusive on judicial appellate review, in the absence of fraud. Act 103 provides that the findings of fact made by the wcac, not the findings of the magistrate, are to be conclusive, on judicial appellate review, in the absence of fraud. The Legislature, by employing the language of the constitution in stating that the fact finding of the wcac is final subject to limited judicial review, made clear that judicial review by the Court of Appeals or this Court of a wcac decision is to be of the findings of fact made by the wcac and not the findings of fact made by the magistrate. And the findings of fact made by the wcac are conclusive if there is any competent evidence to support them. As under prior law, judicial review is obtainable on application, not as of right, to the Court of Appeals and this Court. B The substantial evidence standard, like the standard for judicial appellate review, is rooted in Const 1963, art 6, § 28, which provides that administrative agency decisions subject to judicial review following a hearing shall be minimally reviewed to determine whether the decision is "supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record.” (Emphasis added.) As originally introduced in the Senate, the 1985 legislation would not have defined what constitutes "substantial evidence on the whole record.” The House Substitute, which became Act 103, retained the "substantial evidence on the whole record” standard, but added definitions of "substantial evidence” and "whole record” taken from MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc, 393 Mich 116; 223 NW2d 283 (1974), where this Court considered the meaning of "substantial evidence” in the context of judicial review of findings of fact by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission pursuant to the labor mediation act. The House Substitute also added language, again taken from Detroit Symphony, providing that the wcac’s review of a magistrate’s decision should include both a "qualitative and a quantitative” analysis of the evidence to ensure a full, thorough, and fair review. As enacted, the "substantial evidence on the whole record” standard largely parallels the description of substantial evidence in MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra. The statute provides that findings of fact made by a magistrate shall be considered "conclusive by the commission if supported by competent, material, and substantive evidence on the whole record”: —" '[Substantial evidence’ means such evidence, considering the whole record, as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to justify the conclusion.” (Emphasis added.) —" '[W]hole record’ means the entire record of the hearing including all of the evidence in favor and all the evidence against a certain determination.” (Emphasis added.) —Wcac review of the evidence "shall include both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of that evidence and ensure a full, thorough, and fair review thereof.” (Emphasis added.) —The wcac "may adopt, in whole or in part, the order and opinion of the worker’s compensation magistrate as the order and opinion of the commission.” (Emphasis added.) In apparent recognition of the difference between judicial appellate review of an administrative agency’s decision, and administrative appellate review by the wcac of a magistrate’s decision, the Legislature did not enact, as part of the substantial evidence standard for workers’ compensation administrative appellate review purposes, the merc language that review by the wcac is to be "undertaken with considerable sensitivity” to provide "due deference to administrative expertise” and to avoid displacing a "choice between two reasonably differing views.” MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, supra, p 124. C The question on judicial appellate review is, in each case, whether the wcac acted in a manner consistent with the concept of administrative appellate review that is less than de novo review in finding that the magistrate’s decision was or was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. In judging, on judicial appellate review, whether the wcac acted .properly, this Court and the Court of Appeals begin with the words of the Legislature. This Court and the Court of Appeals consider whether there are issues of credibility of live witnesses to be determined by the magistrate, the evidence considered and ignored by the magistrate and the wcac, the care taken by the magistrate and the wcac, and the reasoning and analysis of the magistrate and the wcac. We agree with the Court of Appeals in Weiss that the stringent constitutional and statutory limitations on judicial appellate review suggest that some latitude must be given the wcac, should it find that the magistrate’s findings of fact are not supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record,” if there is to be any effective appellate review, administrative or judicial, at all. And that if the appellate courts were not to allow such latitude to the wcac, they would find that they were increasingly called upon to perform the appellate reviewing function so that there would be effective appellate review at some level. Due deference should be given to the administrative expertise of the wcac, as well as to the administrative expertise of the magistrate. Recognition that a wcac panel brings to the table the administrative expertise of more than one person may, depending on the factual or legal issue, be appropriate. A carefully constructed opinion by the wcac enables the Court of Appeals and this Court to determine whether the wcac duly recognized and observed the limitations on its reviewing function contemplated by the substantial evidence standard. If the opinion is carefully constructed, a reviewing court should ordinarily defer to the collective judgment of the wcac unless it is manifest that it exceeded its reviewing power. We do not now offer a judicial standard in exegesis of the legislatively stated standard. If it appears on judicial appellate review that the wcac carefully examined the record, was duly cognizant of the deference to be given to the decision of the magistrate, did not "misapprehend or grossly misapply” the substantial evidence standard, and gave an adequate reason grounded in the record for reversing the magistrate, the judicial tendency should be to deny leave to appeal or, if it is granted, to affirm, in recognition that the Legislature provided for administrative appellate review by the seven-member wcac of decisions of thirty magistrates, and bestowed on the wcac final fact-finding responsibility subject to constitutionally limited judicial review. II In Holden, the magistrate denied death benefits to the widow of a Ford employee who suffered a cardiac episode at work, and died shortly thereafter. The wcac reversed the magistrate, and was in turn reversed by the Court of Appeals which reinstated the magistrate’s decision. A Carl Holden managed food service operations in three dining rooms and four cafeterias for Ford Motor Company. He oversaw the cafeteria and dining rooms in Ford’s Renaissance Center facility and managed dining facilities in four other metropolitan Detroit locations. In addition to overseeing daily lunch preparation and service for over 1,000 Ford executives and employees, Holden was responsible for executive dinners and company-sponsored parties. Holden’s supervisor testified that Holden was very conscientious. On July 11, 1986, Holden arrived around 8:30 a.m. at his office in the Renaissance Center. First cook Daniel Micallef testified that he was in Holden’s office when he arrived. Holden took off his coat and "made like a sigh.” Holden did not look well and "[h]is color was like a gray, grayish color.” Holden said that "he had just took [sic] the stairs and he wasn’t feeling well. His hands were clammy and his chest hurt.” Micallef left Holden sitting in his chair. He returned shortly thereafter to speak to Holden. Holden was lying on his desk, gasping for air. Emergency medical personnel were called; Holden was taken to the hospital, where he died within an hour. Holden was assigned a parking space in Renaissance Center "m” lot. To reach the elevators, Holden had to climb three flights of approximately ten stairs each. While Holden could have parked in another lot, this too would have required him to climb three flights of stairs to reach an elevator. Dr. Werner Spitz, then the Wayne County Medical Examiner, board certified in pathology and forensic pathology, and plaintiff’s expert witness, testified that Holden suffered a myocardial infarction caused by job-related stress and precipitated by stair climbing. Dr. Donald L. Newman, board certified in family practice and Holden’s personal physician, testified on the basis of his review of records, including Spitz’ autopsy report, the death certificate, a job description and witness statements. Newman opined that Holden suffered a myocardial infarction precipitated by stair climbing. Dr. Robert A. Gerisch, board certified in internal medicine and specializing in cardiology, testified for Ford. He said that he had examined the tissue slides from the autopsy, hospital records, Spitz’ deposition testimony and Holden’s job description. He opined, on the basis of his examination of the tissue slides and the record of an ekg taken at the hospital shortly before Holden died, that Holden did not suffer a myocardial infarction. Gerisch said that the tissue slides did not evidence scarring that would indicate either a recent or an old myocardial infarction. He also testified, however, that the characteristic scarring that occurs after a myocardial infarction is not reflected in the heart muscle tissue for six to eight hours after the infarction occurs. He added that the ekg indicated "an acute infarction type of pattern or ischemia which, if it persists, could develop into an infarction.” Gerisch opined that, given the condition of Holden’s heart, there was a one hundred percent probability that he would eventually suffer a myocardial infarction, but that he actually died of ischemia that brought on arrhythmia. He said that the heart was depleted of all oxygen by the ischemia, caused by narrowed arteries, which brought about the arrhythmia which, corrected only temporarily at the hospital, resulted in Holden’s death. B The magistrate found that the claimant failed to establish the requisite nexus between the claimed injury to the heart and work. The magistrate found that there was almost no testimony concerning specific episodes of job stress that might be related to Holden’s death. He rejected testimony that Holden was a worrier as "grossly speculative and without foundation.” He reviewed Micallef’s testimony and concluded th

ROMEIN v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION GONZALEZ v FORD MOTOR COMPANY Docket Nos. 83830, 83831. Argued October 5, 1989 (Calendar No. 7). Decided September 28, 1990. Rehearing denied 437 Mich 1202. Evert Romein was injured in the course of his employment with General Motors Corporation before 1981. On September 28, 1983, General Motors began coordinating benefits pursuant to the provision of 1981 PA 203, § 354, effective March 31, 1982, that permitted deduction of employer-financed pension and social security benefits from workers’ compensation benefits received by a disabled employee. A hearing referee held that § 354 could not be applied retroactively. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reversed, finding that Chambers v General Motors Corp, 422 Mich 636 (1985), requires retroactive application. The Court of Appeals, Shepherd, P.J., and Wahls and G. B. Ford, JJ., reversed (Docket No. 101298). The defendant appeals. Arthuro Gonzalez was disabled prior to March 31, 1982, in the course of his employment with the Ford Motor Company. Workers’ compensation benefits were awarded pursuant to a voluntary agreement. After March 31, 1982, Ford began to coordinate benefits. A hearing referee held that § 354 did not apply retrospectively because the injury occurred prior to the effective date of the act. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board affirmed on the basis of 1987 PA 28 which declared that Chambers was erroneously decided. The Court of Appeals, Shepherd, P.J., and Wahls and G. B. Ford, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 101510). The defendant appeals. In an opinion by Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justices Levin, Boyle, and Archer, the Supreme Court held: The amendment of the workers’ compensation act by 1987 PA 28, § 354(17)-(20), which prohibits the coordination of work_ers’ compensation benefits for employees who were injured before the effective date of 1981 PA 203, § 354, does not violate the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions, the Contract Clause of the federal constitution, or the Separation of Powers Clause of the Michigan Constitution. The amendment was a constitutional exercise of legislative power retroactively modifying benefit levels for a legitimate purpose furthered by rational means. The statute does not abrogate any vested rights of the employers and validly may be applied to all compensation liabilities within its terms except those reduced to a final judgment before its effective date. References Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 7, 8. See the Index to Annotations under Due Process; Impairment of Contract; Separation of Powers; Vested Rights; Workers’ Compensation. 1. A rational basis standard of review governs the scrutiny of the legitimacy of social and economic legislation. A retroactive workers’ compensation statute will not be deemed unconstitutional simply because it imposes a new duty or liability on the basis of past acts. All workers’ compensation benefits and liabilities are statutory in origin and may be revoked or modified at the will of the Legislature. Thus, 1987 PA 28 is constitutional even though it applies to benefits due and payable for a period prior to the date of the statute. Only judgments entered under former law are immune from legislative modification. 2. 1987 PA 28 serves a legitimate state interest and employs reasonable means sufficient to survive a Contract Clause challenge. The level of benefits existing at the time of an injury does not constitute a legitimate contractual expectation protected by the Contract Clause. While the Contract Clause prohibits any state law from impairing the obligations of a contract, the prohibition must be accommodated to the state’s inherent police power. The test for this accommodation involves determining whether the state law substantially impaired a contractual relationship, whether there is a legitimate public purpose for the law, and whether the means chosen to implement it are reasonable. In this case, the impairment is not substantial. The workers’ compensation act substitutes a remedial scheme of compensation for injuries otherwise subject to recovery in tort for negligent acts of employers in the workplace. Employers benefit from the limit placed on their liability; the impairment at issue does not alter this benefit. The act regulates a field of commerce that has been subject to wide-ranging government regulation; the employers knew their rights were subject to alteration. There is a significant state interest in protecting the rights of disabled employees to receive compensation in return for relinquishment of their tort claims. The means chosen by the Legislature are reasonable. 3. The amendment does not violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the Michigan Constitution. The operative provisions of the statute do not encroach upon the sphere of the judiciary. Rather, they merely repeal the act construed in Chambers v General Motors Corp. The enactment is a valid exercise of the Legislature’s authority to retroactively amend legislation perceived to have been misconstrued by the judiciary. Such retroactive amendments based on prior judicial decisions are constitutional if the statute comports with the requirements of the Contract and Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions, and as long as the retroactive provisions of the statute do not impair final judgments. Justice Brickley, concurring, expressed dissatisfaction with respect to the current state of constitutional law regarding retroactive civil legislation. Applicable precedent does not prohibit the Legislature from redefining rights and liabilities enjoyed and owing in the past, notwithstanding the delineation of those rights and liabilities by a prior Legislature. The appellants’ due process claims, therefore, are not viable under current law. Affirmed. Chief Justice Riley, dissenting, stated that in interpreting 1987 PA 28 the intent of the Legislature that enacted 1981 PA 203, the Legislature of 1987 invaded the constitutional authority granted to the judicial branch and usurped the judicial function of determining the proper construction of a statute. It is within the power of the Supreme Court, not the Legislature, to interpret the legislative intent of 1981 PA 203. Therefore, 1987 PA 28, § 354(17)-(20), violates Const 1963, art 3, § 2 and art 6, § 1 and should be applied prospectively from its effective date, May 14,1987. The declaration made by the 1987 Legislature in 1987 PA 28, § 354(17) that it was providing the legislative intent of the 1981 Legislature is contrary to prior Michigan case law. Additionally, it is not supported by the economic, political, and legislative history behind the enactment of each amendment at issue in these cases. The interpretation of § 354 imputed to the 1981 Legislature by the 1987 Legislature was erroneous. The 1981 Legislature was fully cognizant of the consequences of coordinating workers’ compensation benefits, yet it enacted 1981 PA 203 in an attempt to stimulate a poor state economy by lowering the cost of doing business in Michigan. Furthermore, the claim of the 1987 Legislature that it provided the original intent of the 1981 Legislature flies in the face of the fact that those members of the 1981 Legislature who opposed 1981 PA 203 failed in their attempt to limit its application. 1987 PA 28 is not a remedial or curative amendment. The function of curative legislation is to repair the consequences of legal accident or mistake. These cases involve just the opposite. 1981 PA 203 was enacted to eliminate receipt by injured workers of total benefits in excess of workers’ compensation and thus reduce the cost of workers’ compensation to businesses through coordination of benefits. In Chambers, the Supreme Court unanimously interpreted the statute to mean that employers have the right to coordinate benefit payments regardless of the date of injury. 1987 PA 28 was enacted to invalidate this decision, thus effecting a substantive change in the law. The word of the curing legislature should not be conclusive in determining what the prior representatives meant. The question of original intent is ultimately one for the reviewing court. Applying both Michigan law and the rules of statutory construction in these cases leads to the conclusion that the coordination of benefits provisions that were interpreted by the Supreme Court in Chambers were not repealed. Rather, because they were reenacted by adopting the identical language from the original act, the coordination of benefits provisions have continued in force from the time of original enactment, March 31,1982. Justice Griffin, dissenting, stated that 1987 PA 28 violates Michigan’s constitutional requirement of separation of powers and contravenes the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process. It is fundamental that the Supreme Court, not the 1987 Legislature, is entrusted by the constitution with the power to determine the meaning of 1981 PA 203. The Legislature, by enacting 1987 PA 28, not only declared what the law shall be, a legislative function, but purported to declare what the law is, i.e., what the intent of a prior Legislature was, a judicial function. This declaration by the 1987 Legislature concerning the intent of the 1981 Legislature is a nullity. Retroactive legislation has always been looked upon with disfavor. Even its constitutionality has been conditioned upon a rationality requirement beyond that applied to other legislation. The Supreme Court has never before recognized or sanctioned a legislative attempt to retroactively overrule one of its decisions, nor has the United States Supreme Court given consideration to the effect of retroactive legislation upon conduct occurring after judicial interpretation, but before the overruling legislation was enacted. While the Legislature possesses the authority to enact workers’ compensation laws that increase the burden on an employer for disability or expenses occurring or continuing after the date of enactment of the amendatory statute, even though the accident which gave rise to the disability or expenses occurred prior to that time, past cases have limited the retroactive effect of such legislation by applying a change in benefit levels to those payments due after the effective date of an enactment. The appellants’ reliance on the preexisting state of the law should be considered in determining whether retroactive legislation is constitutional. Because the Supreme Court never before recognized legislation purporting to retroactively overrule one of its decisions interpreting the enactment of a prior Legislature, it could hardly be said that the appellants were on notice that the law might be changed in such a manner. Where a person can prove detrimental reliance on the interim state of the law, it seems clear that there is entitlement to relief. In order to protect this Court’s status as the final arbiter of what the law is, and to secure the guarantee of due process, the Legislature should not be permitted to undo retroactively past transactions completed in reliance upon a decision of this Court. 168 Mich App 444; 425 NW2d 174 (1988) affirmed. Workers’ Compensation — Coordination of Benefits — Retroactive Application. The amendment of the workers’ compensation act by 1987 PA 28, § 354(17X20), which prohibits the coordination of workers’ compensation benefits for employees who were injured before the effective date of 1981 PA 203, § 354, does not violate the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions, the Contract Clause of the federal constitution, or the Separation of Powers Clause of the Michigan Constitution; the amendment was a constitutional exercise of legislative power retroactively modifying benefit levels for a legitimate purpose furthered by rational means; the statute does not abrogate any vested rights of the employers and validly may be applied to all compensation liabilities within its terms except those reduced to a final judgment before its effective date (1987 PA 28, MCL 418.354[17]-[20]; MSA 17.237[354][17]-[20]; US Const, art I, § 10, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, §§ 10,17, art 3, § 2, art 6, § 1). Levine, Benjamin, Tushman, Bratt, Jerris & Stein, P.C. (by Barrie R. Bratt and Charles P. Burbach), for appellee Romein. James M. O’Reilly, P.C. (by James M. O’Reilly), for appellee Gonzalez. Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O’Hare, Helveston & Waldman, P.C. (by Theodore Sachs, of counsel), for appellees Romein and Gonzalez. Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Sterling W. Schrock and George H. Weller, Assistant Attorneys General, for the intervenor-appellee. Bodman, Longley & Dahling (by Theodore Souris, Kim Michael Lavalle, and Martha B. Goodloe) for the appellants (John P. Raleigh and John G. Rahie, of counsel), for General Motors Corporation; (Douglas E. Cutler, Anthony P. Márchese, Jr., and Alan S. Gorosh, of counsel), for Ford Motor Company. Amicus Curiae: Clark, Klein & Beaumont (by Dwight H. Vincent, J. Walker Henry, M. Diane Vogt, and Rachelle G. Silherberg) for Michigan Manufacturers Association. Cavanagh, J. We granted leave in these consolidated cases to decide the constitutionality of 1987 PA 28, §354(17X20), MCL 418.354(17X20); MSA 17.237(354)(17)-(20). This statute prohibits the coordination of workers’ compensation benefits for employees who were injured before the eifective date of 1981 PA 203. It also requires the repayment plus interest of all benefits withheld as a result of coordinating benefits between 1982 and 1987 from disabled employees whose injury dates were before 1982. We hold that the amendments of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act contained in 1987 PA 28, § 354(17)-(20) are constitutional exercises of legislative power retroactively modifying benefit levels for a legitimate purpose furthered by rational means. We also hold that the statute does not abrogate any vested rights of the employers. The statute may validly be applied to all compensation liabilities within its terms except those which have been reduced to final judgment before its enactment. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The plaintiffs were injured before 1981. In 1981, the Legislature enacted 1981 PA 203 which included the coordination of benefits provision of § 354, MCL 418.354; MSA 17.237(354). This section allowed coordination of workers’ compensation benefits with employer-funded pension plan payments. This statute was part of a legislative reform package involving a series of related amendments of the workers’ compensation statute. The coordination provisions were an essential component of a compromise plan that restructured benefits payable to disabled workers. The resources saved as a result of this coordination were reallocated by the statute to increase benefit levels generally, from two-thirds of the average weekly wage to eighty percent of after-tax wages, effective for injuries occurring after January 1, 1982. The plaintiffs were subjected to these coordination provisions even though the statute was silent regarding its application to claims resulting from injuries occurring before its 1982 effective date. On September 28, 1983, General Motors Corporation informed plaintiff Romein that he had been overpaid $75.03 per week from January 1, 1982, because of the corporation’s failure to coordinate benefits under 1981 PA 203, § 354, as of its effective date. Thus, the corporation began to deduct the amount of this "overpayment” of $3,913.57 from compensation benefits as they became due and payable. The corporation also began coordinating future benefit payments by deducting pension and social security benefits from the workers’ compensation payments due, resulting in a thirty-five percent reduction of benefits actually paid. This resulted in a reduction of $132 a week. His total benefits were reduced from $19,377.80 to $12,513.80 per year. Plaintiff Gonzalez experienced an even more dramatic reduction in his workers’ compensation benefits. The Ford Motor Company informed Gonzalez that it would begin coordination of his benefits in accordance with § 354 resulting in the withholding of his entire $176 weekly payment beginning March 31, 1982. Between January 1, 1982, and October 7, 1985, the legality of coordination of benefits for injuries which occurred before the effective date of 1981 PA 203, § 354, was in doubt. The Legislature expressed its view that the initial, lower court decisions permitting application of § 354 coordination rights only to claims arising from injuries occurring after the effective date of § 354 were correct. The defendants’ efforts to coordinate plaintiffs’ benefits under § 354 received judicial acceptance in 1985 when this Court reversed the lower court in Chambers v General Motors Corp, 422 Mich 636; 375 NW2d 715 (1985). The Court applied principles of statutory interpretation to hold that § 354 permitted coordination of benefits regardless of the date of injury since the Legislature did not state an intent to apply the provision only to benefits paid to employees whose injuries occurred after its effective date. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted 1987 PA 28 which clearly indicated that the coordination of benefits provision of 1981 PA 203 was not intended to reduce benefits for injuries which occurred before the effective date of the 1981 statute. This statute retroactively amended § 354 and prevented any coordination of benefits for claims arising from injuries which occurred before March 31, 1982. The first provision of 1987 PA 28 states that it is the Legislature’s intent to prohibit the coordination of benefits for pre-March 31, 1982, injuries. Another provision of the act requires that any setoffs which have been made by employers between March 31, 1982, and May 14, 1987, be refunded to employees, with interest. Thus, any benefits that were reduced under the coordination provisions of § 354, are deemed by statute to have been "underpayments” of workers’ compensation benefits and must be refunded within sixty days with interest. In addition, if the employee had repaid money to the employer for benefits received that the employer alleged should have been coordinated, 1987 PA 28 requires the employer to reimburse the employee, with interest, within sixty days. The issue before the Court is whether the Legislature has violated the defendants’ constitutional rights under the Due Process or Contract Clauses of the state and federal constitutions by retroactively altering the level of benefits due and payable prior to the amendment. We must also decide whether this retroactive alteration of benefits violates the Separation of Powers and One Court of Justice Clauses of the Michigan Constitution. i The defendants contend that 1987 PA 28, § 354(17)-(20) violates the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions by retroactively imposing liability for additional workers’ compensation benefits for past compensable periods. They contend that they relied on the coordination provisions of § 354 during the period between its effective date of March 31, 1982, and the amendment date of May 14, 1987, and that this reliance gives them a vested right to have their liability for those periods determined by the law then in effect. The defendants argue that 1987 PA 28 is "purely retroactive” and unconstitutionally impairs rights under executed contracts of employment. The defendants urge that this statute is "purely retroactive” because it not only applies to injuries arising before the effective date of the act, but also modifies the employer’s liability for a preenactment compensable period. Thus, this statute is different from the one upheld in Chambers. We hold that the challenged statute satisfies the rational relationship test and does not abrogate any vested rights of the employers. The statute, therefore, does not violate the Due Process Clauses. A