Breach of Contract Cases

Farouk Martins vs. University of Massachusetts Medical School & others. No. 08-P-1343. Suffolk. June 8, 2009. October 30, 2009. Present: Lenk, Brown, & Grainger, JJ. Limitations, Statute of. Anti-Discrimination Law, Age, Race, Termination of employment, Prima facie case, Burden of proof. Civil Rights, Termination of employment. Employment, Discrimination, Termination, Retaliation. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Administrative Law, Exhaustion of remedies. Libel and Slander. This court concluded that a civil action alleging discrimination in employment was not time barred, where the running of the applicable statute of limitations had been tolled by the plaintiff employee’s action of filing a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination within 300 days of the conclusion of grievance proceedings into which the employee had entered with the defendant employer within 300 days of the complained of conduct. [628-629] In a civil action alleging, inter alia, discrimination in employment on the basis of race and age, the Superior Court judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants (the plaintiff’s former employer and certain members of the employer’s staff), where the plaintiff employee, after demonstrating that he was performing his job at an acceptable level and that his termination occurred in circumstances that would raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination, presented evidence on which a jury could reasonably find that the defendants’ articulated reason for the plaintiff’s termination was a pretext and that the true reason was discriminatory animus [629-630]; moreover, the judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s claims of retaliation, where, because the defendants never adequately addressed these claims, the summary judgment burden never shifted to the plaintiff, but even if it had, the plaintiff placed the issues of motivation and causation into legitimate dispute [630]; further, the judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s claim of intentional interference with advantageous relations, which turned on whether the plaintiff met his burden with respect to his discrimination claim [634]. In a civil action in which the plaintiff employee alleged, inter alia, discrimination in employment on the basis of race and age in violation of G. L. c. 151B, the Superior Court judge properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on a claim under the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, where G. L. c. 151B provides the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination not based on preexisting tort law or constitutional protections. [630-633] This court declined to reach a claim that fell below acceptable standards of appellate argument. [633] In a civil action alleging, inter alia, two claims of defamation, the Superior Court judge properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, where, with respect to one claim, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate publication, and with respect to the other claim, the memorandum at issue was not defamatory on its face, and even if it were, the memorandum was subject to conditional privilege. [634] In a civil action alleging, inter alia, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment setting, the Superior Court judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer, where the plaintiff provided sufficient record support to permit a jury to find that the defendant’s employment policies applied to the plaintiff, and to decide whether the plaintiff suffered economic harm as a result of the loss of his right under these policies to an internal appeal. [634-635] Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 14, 2006. The case was heard by Nancy S. Holtz, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Farouk Martins, pro se. Jean Marie Kelley for the defendants. Charles Cook, Nancy Kealey, and Anthony Zanette. Brown, J. The point of law we are required to clarify in this case is whether a complainant seeking a judicial remedy for discrimination who has satisfied his administrative requirements may bring parallel claims under G. L. c. 93, §§ 102-103, the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (MERA), in addition to his G. L. c. 15 IB claims in court. Although the Supreme Judicial Court unequivocally answered this question in the negative in 1994, an element of uncertainty has crept into the case law. We now reiterate that where, as here, G. L. c. 15IB remedies are or were available to a complainant, those remedies are exclusive, preempting the joining of parallel MERA claims on removal to court. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment entered in favor of the employer on the plaintiff’s MERA claims here. As we conclude that the judge properly ordered summary judgment to enter on only two of the plaintiff’s remaining five claims, further proceedings in the Superior Court will be required. 1. Facts. On de novo review of summary judgment, see Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007), we rehearse the facts of record in their aspects most favorable to Martins. See Chervin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 Mass. 95, 96 (2006). In May, 2000, the Executive Office of Health and Human Services (EOHHS) hired Farouk Martins, a fifty-one year old black man, as a program manager to work in the benefit coordination and recovery unit (BCRU). Previously, Martins had worked as a manager at Boston City Hospital. At EOHHS, Martins managed the health insurance premium program. Martins was the only black manager in BCRU, the first black manager ever hired, and the oldest mid-level manager. Through the end of June, 2003, Martins received commendable and meritorious job evaluations. In August or September, 2003, Nancy Kealey, the director of revenue operations of BCRU, selected Anthony Zanette for the position of revenue operations manager. Martins, who previously , was above Zanette in the organizational chart, was required to report to Zanette. After initially rejecting the reporting relationship, Martins accepted Zanette’s supervision rather than face disciplinary action. During their individual meetings, Zanette repeatedly subjected Martins, over his objections, to coarse and vulgar language. Moreover, on several occasions, Charles Cook, the director of BCRU, threatened to put Martins “on the street where [he] belonged and replace [him] with a younger manager.” Cook also expressed his view to Martins that city of Boston managers were not equal (i.e., inferior) to State managers. Notwithstanding the favorable job evaluations from Martins’s immediate managers, Cook offered Martins a deal to leave BCRU, promising to give him any recommendation he wanted if he left voluntarily. Martins rejected the offer. When the Commonwealth medicine revenue operations program at the University of Massachusetts Medical School (UMMS) took over the functions of the BCRU, the bulk of the BCRU staff transferred to UMMS. All BCRU staff were classified by UMMS as new hires subject to a six-month probationary period. Cook and Kealey became official UMMS employees before Martins in either 2002 or 2003. On February 1, 2004, Martins became a UMMS employee, receiving the title of revenue operations assistant manager, which Martins viewed as a demotion. At UMMS, Martins reported first to Kealey and then later to Zanette. After learning about his new placement in late January, 2004, Martins complained about the discrimination to Susan Levine, his UMMS contact person. Levine subsequently assured him that she had looked into the matter and that the other similarly situated BCRU managers, all white, had received the same position and title at UMMS. When Martins received a contact list from a UMMS revenue operations program he attended in June, 2004, however, he learned that all his former colleagues had been made managers at UMMS. Before Martins became a UMMS employee, Pat Hart, a contractor, at Zanette’s request, documented inaccuracies in Martins’s spreadsheets and other shortcomings in Martins’s work. On several occasions at EOHHS and at UMMS, Martins complained to Zanette that he was unable to read the size nine font required on the spreadsheets. Zanette refused to allow Martins to use either a larger font size or capitals and abbreviations because the spreadsheets were expected to look a certain way and changes would cause the form not to run properly. In March, 2004, Martins formally complained to Catherine Parker, UMMS’s manager of employee and labor relations, and to Julie Forgione, the assistant director of UMMS, that he was being treated differently from other employees. Martins maintained that he was being ostracized, stripped of his managerial duties, and humiliated and insulted by Zanette in front of his coworkers. Martins also specifically complained to Parker, Kealey, and Forgione about Zanette’s continuing use of “obscene” language, asking that it be stopped. Although Martins applied for higher level managerial positions in March or April, 2004, he was passed over in favor of white applicants, including Zanette, who were more than ten years younger than Martins. In April, 2004, Zanette and Kealey met with Martins to discuss performance issues. At the end of May, Zanette reported to For-gione an improvement in Martins’s attitude, performance, and interaction with his customers. Forgione congratulated Zanette in turning around a difficult situation. On June 3, 2004, Zanette completed his evaluation of Martins, rating him as meeting standards (the highest of the three available ratings) both overall and on six of eight categories. Disappointed with the evaluation because Zanette had recently informed him that he “was doing a good job,” Martins refused to sign it. After the evaluation, Zanette told everyone that he and Martins were getting along well. In connection with its 2004 better government competition, the Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research selected Martins’s program for an award. On June 11, 2004, Kealey sent the members of the unit, including Martins, a memorandum congratulating them and commending them for their hard work. A week later, during a routine meeting, Zanette yelled at Martins that “he [was] paying [Martins] and [he had] to do whatever it is he wants.” When Zanette brought up the subject of mistakes on the spreadsheets again, Martins told Zanette that the font size needed to be increased. Zanette responded, “[Y]ou are too fucking old to see.” Zanette then turned to Martins’s appearance, exclaiming that he “look[ed] like fuck.” Zanette asked why Martins did not leave and find another job. As Martins got up and attempted to leave the room, Zanette told him “to sit the fuck down” as he was not finished with him. A coworker, Elsa Rodriguez, who was present during the altercation, corroborated Martins’s account concerning Zanette’s hostility and inappropriate conduct toward him. Later that same day, Martins sent an electronic mail message (e-mail) to Zanette, requesting that Zanette keep their meetings strictly at a professional level. On June 21, 2004, Martins reported Zanette to Kealey and to Forgione. On June 28, 2004, Zanette informed Martins that his UMMS employment was terminated, advising him that UMMS’s grievance procedure entitled him to a hearing on the matter. Parker made arrangements to have a State police officer in plain clothes, in addition to the usual security, present during the termination. After giving Martins fifteen minutes to pack his belongings, three individuals escorted Martins from the building. Martins had no history of violence or of making threats. Kealey was unaware of armed security being used in connection with any previous employee terminations. That evening, an interagency memorandum regarding the “personnel action” was sent by e-mail to the other tenants of 600 Washington Street, the building in which Martins had worked, and forwarded to UMMS’s office staff. Employees were reminded not to let anyone, including “familiar faces,” enter the workspace without an access card. On some undisclosed date in July, 2004, Martins filed an internal discrimination complaint with UMMS’s equal opportunity office. On November 1, 2004, following an investigation, the grievance proceedings ended unfavorably for Martins. On December 23, 2004, Martins filed his administrative complaint at the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). 2. Discussion, a. Count 1 (G. L. c. 15IB, §§ 4[1], 4[1C], & 4[4]). (i) Statute of limitations. Most, if not all, of the discriminatory actions at issue in this litigation, including the demotions, failures to promote, retaliation, and termination, occurred between January, 2004, and June 28, 2004. Where, as here, the complainant entered into grievance proceedings with his employer concerning the alleged discriminatory acts within 300 days of the complained of conduct and filed his complaint at MCAD within 300 days of the conclusion of those proceedings, the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of those proceedings. See G. L. c. 151B, § 5, as amended by St. 2002, c. 223, § 1; 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.10(2) (2004); Silvestris v. Tantasqua Regional Sch. Dist., 446 Mass. 756, 770 (2006). Thus, factoring out that four-month period (July to November, 2004) here, Martins’s MCAD complaint (filed in December, 2004) was timely as to all these complained of actions, and the statute of limitations does not bar this action. To the extent that the defendants seek the affirmance of the summary judgment as to Cook individually, at least some of Cook’s alleged discriminatory acts occurred within the statutory period. On this record, the defendants have failed to show that Cook was entitled to summary judgment based on a limitations defense. See Silvestris v. Tantasqua Regional Sch. Dist., 446 Mass. at 766-767; O’Connor v. Redstone, 452 Mass. 537, 550-551 (2008). (ii) Race and age discrimination. The defendants argue that Martins was unable to show not only that he performed his job at an acceptable level, a necessary element of his prima facie cases of race and age discrimination, but also that his termination occurred in circumstances that would raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. We disagree. Martins never received an unfavorable performance evaluation. Given Martins’s “meet[ing] standards” performance evaluation, the positive feedback from Zanette, the Pioneer award, and the personal commendation from Kealey — all occurring in Martins’s last month of employment — as well as the discriminatory remarks by Zanette, a decision maker, made one week before the termination, Martins met his stage-one burden under either formulation. See Knight v. Avon Prod., Inc., 438 Mass. 413, 425-426 & n.9 (2003); Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 40-46 (2005); Trustees of Health & Hosps. of Boston, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 449 Mass. 675, 682-683 (2007); Somers v. Converged Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 598 (2009). Martins met his burden at the third stage with proof of disparate treatment that could be considered together with the strong prima facie evidence of adequate job performance. Here, upon transfer to UMMS, Martins was the only BCRU manager to receive the title and position of assistant manager. At UMMS, Martins repeatedly complained without success to senior management about Zanette’s unprofessional language. No other manager was subjected to this abusive treatment. Moreover, in deviation of regular practice, armed security was hired to escort Martins, a middle-aged program manager with no history of violence, out of the building upon his termination. Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably find that the articulated reason for Martins’s termination was a pretext and that the true reason was discriminatory animus. See Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 107, 118 (2000); Somers v. Converged Access, Inc., 454 Mass. at 599. (iii) Retaliation. Martins alleges that, as a result of his internal complaints of discrimination in late January, March, and June, 2004, he was effectively demoted and fired within a week of his last complaint. The defendants have not adequately addressed these claims in their brief. Because the defendants have failed to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on every relevant issue, the summary judgment burden never shifted to Martins here. See Fortenbacher v. Commonwealth, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 82, 85 (2008). In any event, even if the defendants did manage to shift the burden, Martins placed the issues of motivation and causation into legitimate dispute. See Mole v. University of Mass., 442 Mass. 582, 591-592 (2004); Ritchie v. Department of State Police, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 663-666 (2004). The claims should have been submitted to the jury. b. Count II (G. L. c. 93, § 103[a]). In 1994, the Supreme Judicial Court held that “where applicable, G. L. c. 15 IB provides the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination not based on preexisting tort law or constitutional protections.” Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 586 (1994) (finding plaintiff’s discrimination claims under MERA barred). In that case, the plaintiff proceeded solely on a MERA claim in court, attempting to bypass both c. 15 IB and MCAD completely. See id. at 581. In contrast, the plaintiff in Agin v. Federal White Cement, Inc., 417 Mass. 669 (1994), decided two weeks later, did attempt (without success) to exhaust his remedies at MCAD before filing parallel c. 15 IB and MERA claims in the Superior Court. See id. at 672. In an effort to provide guidance to trial court judges, the Supreme Judicial Court stated, “[Sjhould a judge decide that G. L. c. 151B is or was available to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would have no viable c. 93, § 103, claim under the teaching of Charland.” Read together, these cases established that the right to file a parallel MERA claim in court turns not on the proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, but on the availability of a remedy under c. 151B. Jancey v. School Comm. of Everett, 421 Mass. 482 (1995), appears to have blurred the bright-line rule. In that case, after timely complying with the procedural requirements of c. 15IB, the plaintiffs filed claims in court under c. 151B and parallel claims, inter alia, under G. L. c. 149, § 105A, the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act, and MERA. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ parallel c. 149 claims, while subject to MCAD’s administrative process, were not barred by the exclusivity provision of c. 151B, § 9. See id. at 495-497. The primary rationale for that conclusion was the clear evidence of legislative intent. See id. at 496. In the part of the decision most relevant for present purposes, the court concluded that the “core” holding of Charland did not apply because the plaintiffs in Jancey had timely exhausted their remedies at MCAD. See id. at 498 n.14. The court also directed readers to Agin, which was analogous only to the extent that the plaintiff there had attempted exhaustion. While recognizing the continuing import of Charland and Agin, some commentators read Jancey as holding out the possibility of parallel MERA and c. 151B claims proceeding in court as long as administrative remedies were properly exhausted. See Moriearty, Adkins, Rubin, & Jackson, Employment Law §§ 10.1 & 10.4 (2d ed. 2003). The issue has caused confusion in the Superior Court, resulting in inconsistent decisions. Any confusion should have been dispelled by our appellate courts, reaffirming the rule of preemption stated in Charland and Agin. See Mammone v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 446 Mass. 657, 681 n.l (2006) (Greaney, J., dissenting); Carleton v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 791, 812 (2006); Cargill v. Harvard Univ., 60 Mass. App. Ct. 585, 604 (2004).

Wendy Dixon vs. Perry & Slesnick, P.C., & others. No. 08-P-1421. Hampshire. April 17, 2009. September 28, 2009. Present: Rapoza, C.J., Vuono, & Meade, JJ. Contract, Employment, Arbitration. Labor, Wages, Failure to pay wages. Dentist. In a civil action brought by the plaintiff against her former employer, alleging breach of contract and violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act (Wage Act), G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 et seq., arising from the employer’s failure to pay the plaintiff all the compensation owed under the parties’ employment agreement, the trial court judge erred in denying the employer’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration under the mandatory arbitration provision in the parties’ employment agreement, where the language of the Wage Act did not necessarily bar the arbitration of such a claim, and where the plaintiff’s claim, as it was brought solely on her behalf and after notice to the Attorney General, was one that could be arbitrated [272-276]; and where the plaintiff, who had voluntarily executed the individually negotiated employment agreement and who had brought claims arising directly from a term of that agreement (i.e., her rate of compensation), did in fact waive her right to litigate her claim in court and agree to submit to arbitration, regardless of the fact that the language of the arbitration provision did not specifically waive claims under the Wage Act [277-279]. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 3, 2008. A motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration was considered by Bertha D. Josephson, J. George H. Boerger for the defendants. Patricia A. Szumowski for the plaintiff. Doing business as 1st Advantage Dental. David Perry and Michael Slesnick. Rapoza, C.J. The question presented in this appeal is whether a claim under the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 et seq. (Wage Act), is subject to a mandatory arbitration provision in the parties’ individually negotiated employment agreement. We conclude that it is and reverse the order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration. Background. Plaintiff Wendy Dixon, a dentist, was hired by the predecessor corporation to defendant Perry & Slesnick, P.C. In 2004, Dixon and her employer executed an “Employment and Non-Competition Agreement” (agreement). The agreement included a section entitled “Remedies,” which states in relevant part: “[A] 11 disagreements and controversies arising with respect to this Agreement, or with respect to its application to circumstances not clearly set forth in this Agreement, shall be settled by binding arbitration .... “All rights and remedies of each Party under this Agreement are cumulative and in addition to all other rights and remedies which may be available to that Party from time to time, whether under any other agreement, at law, or in equity.” Dixon resigned her employment and terminated the agreement in August, 2007. On April 3, 2008, she sued the defendants in Superior Court for breach of contract and violation of the Wage Act, alleging that they did not pay her all the compensation owed to her under the agreement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration. Dixon conceded that her breach of contract claim is subject to arbitration, but argued that her statutory claim is not. A Superior Court judge summarily denied the defendants’ motion in its entirety, and the defendants filed this appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 251, § 18(a)(1). Discussion. The “ ‘gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause’ [is] an issue for judicial resolution.” Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192, 198-199 (2009), quoting from In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litigation, 554 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. May 29, 2009) (No. 08-1473). On appeal, we review the decision on the motion to compel arbitration de novo. Feeney v. Dell, Inc., supra. The Wage Act requires employers to pay wages promptly to employees. The Wage Act further provides: “No person shall by a special contract with an employee or by any other means exempt himself from this section or from section one hundred and fifty.” G. L. c. 149, § 148, as amended through St. 1956, c. 259. General Laws c. 149, § 150, provides, inter alia, that an employee may sue, after certain conditions are met, for a violation of § 148, including an award of treble damages, and shall be awarded attorney’s fees if successful. Dixon argues that the Wage Act prohibits arbitration provisions that encompass claims under §§ 148 and 150, citing the text of § 148 set out above, and language from § 150, as amended through St. 2005, c. 99, § 32, which provides: “An employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation . . . may . . . institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for others similarly situated, a civil action . . . .” Dixon maintains that the word “action” means only a suit brought in court and does not include a claim subject to arbitration. She asserts that “[sjince an agreement to arbitrate is a waiver of an ‘action,’ i.e., a complaint in a court, an arbitration provision which includes Massachusetts Wage Act claims is a prohibited ‘special contract with an employee’ within the meaning of Section 148 of the Wage Act. Arbitration exempts the employer from Section 150 by avoiding both a direct action and a representative action by the employee on behalf of ‘others similarly situated.’ ” Dixon also argues that even if judicial resolution of her claim under the Wage Act can be waived, she did not do so. As to Dixon’s first argument, we disagree and conclude that claims under the Wage Act are arbitrable. We discern nothing in the language of § 148 or § 150 that would lead us to conclude otherwise. While it does not appear that a reported Massachusetts case has ever considered whether an aggrieved party can be compelled to arbitrate a Wage Act claim, other statutory claims have been held to be subject to arbitration. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court recently confirmed that discrimination claims under G. L. c. 151B are arbitrable. Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Center, Inc., 454 Mass. 390, 395 (2009). The United States Supreme Court has considered a similar question with respect to claims under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and addressed many of the arguments Dixon raises here. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (Gilmer). In Gilmer, the Supreme Court noted that a plaintiff bringing a claim under the ADEA must first file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which can use informal methods to ensure compliance or can institute a formal action against the employer. Id. at 27. The plaintiff in Gilmer argued that arbitration would be inconsistent with the ADEA’s design to further certain social policies, in addition to resolving individual claims, and would weaken the role of the EEOC in enforcing the ADEA. Id. at 26-27. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments. Id. at 27-28. “We do not perceive any inherent inconsistency between those [social] policies, however, and enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. It is true that arbitration focuses on specific disputes between the parties involved. The same can be said, however, of judicial resolution of claims. Both of these dispute resolution mechanisms nevertheless also can further broader social purposes. . . . ‘So long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.’ ” Ibid., quoting from Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). In Gilmer, the Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that arbitration would “undermine” the ability of the EEOC to enforce the ADEA, noting that “[a]n individual ADEA claimant subject to an arbitration agreement will still be free to file a charge with the EEOC, even though the claimant is not able to institute a private judicial action,” and that “the mere involvement of an administrative agency in the enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitration.” Id. at 28-29. The Court similarly rejected the plaintiff’s argument that arbitration procedures are inadequate to further the purposes of the ADEA, in light of the broad remedial powers of arbitrators. Id. at 32. See Drywall Sys., Inc. v. ZVI Constr. Co., 435 Mass. 664, 667 (2002); Superadlo Ltd. Partnership v. Winstar Radio Prod., LLC, 446 Mass. 330, 337-339 (2006) (upholding arbitration panel’s imposition of monetary sanctions for a discovery violation). Although we conclude that the language of G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, does not operate as a per se bar to the arbitration of a Wage Act claim for many of the reasons set forth in Gilmer, whether a particular claim can be arbitrated is subject to a case-by-case analysis. Considering the record before us, we conclude that Dixon’s specific claim under the Wage Act can be arbitrated. As an initial matter, our determination that the Wage Act does not bar arbitration of Dixon’s claim does not “exempt” her employer from the operation of either G. L. c. 149, § 148 or § 150, as she contends. Dixon may continue to pursue her claim in arbitration and, if successful on the merits, be eligible for all the remedies that she seeks under the Act, including multiple damages and attorney’s fees. See Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Center, Inc., 454 Mass. at 398 n.13 (in claims pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, “[a]n employee who agrees to arbitrate such a claim of course does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute”). See also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, quoting from Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. at 628 (“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum”). We start by observing that G. L. c. 149, § 150, requires an employee who seeks relief under the Wage Act to submit a complaint to the Attorney General notifying her of the alleged violation. After the expiration of ninety days, or sooner if the Attorney General assents in writing, the employee may then pursue a civil action against the employer either on her own behalf or for herself and for others who are similarly situated. In any such civil action the employee may seek both injunctive relief and any damages incurred, including treble damages for loss of wages and other benefits. Where successful, the employee is also entitled to an award of costs of the litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees. In the present case, Dixon complied with the provision requiring notice to the Attorney General before filing suit in Superior Court. Consequently, submitting her claim now to arbitration would not frustrate the statutory requirement of notice to the Attorney General, as that has already occurred. Moreover, as noted in Gilmer, supra at 28, Dixon, or any other aggrieved employee subject to an arbitration provision, would be able to file a complaint with the Attorney General even though she or he would not be able to seek further redress in a judicial forum. Here, Dixon brought a claim solely on her own behalf and not, as the Wage Act permits, on behalf of any other persons similarly situated. As a result, the submission of Dixon’s claim to arbitration does not affect the rights of third parties who are not subject to the arbitration provisions of her employment agreement. Similarly, while the Supreme Judicial Court has acknowledged the broad remedial powers arbitrators may possess, see, e.g., Superadio Ltd. Partnership v. Winstar Radio Prod., LLC, 446 Mass. at 337, we need not tarry on the point, as Dixon seeks only money damages, which are clearly available in arbitration. In sum, Dixon’s claim under the Wage Act can be arbitrated. Having established both that the language of G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, does not necessarily bar the arbitration of a Wage Act claim and that Dixon’s claim, as brought, is one that can be arbitrated, we turn to the final part of our analysis: whether Dixon did in fact waive her right to litigate her claim in court and agree to submit to arbitration. “We apply general principles of State contract law to determine whether a particular agreement requires arbitration of a claim.” Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Center, Inc., 454 Mass. at 396. For the following reasons, we conclude that Dixon waived her right to judicial resolution and is compelled to arbitrate her Wage Act claim. First, the agreement here is an individually negotiated employment contract and not a collective bargaining agreement. Despite her attempts to portray herself as being in an unequal bargaining position with the defendants, Dixon is an educated professional. In addition, she could have retained a lawyer to review the contract before she signed it. While Dixon hints at being pressured to sign the agreement quickly, the record does not support the conclusion that her execution of the agreement was anything but voluntary. Second, in contrast to the facts in Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Center, Inc., supra, Dixon’s claims arise directly from a term of the agreement, namely, Dixon’s rate of compensation. In holding that the arbitration provision at issue in War-field did not encompass discrimination claims under G. L. c. 151B, the Supreme Judicial Court stated, “Read as a whole, the contract language chosen by the parties suggests an intent to arbitrate disputes that might arise from or be connected to the specific terms of the agreement itself; there is no contractual term dealing with discrimination.” Id. at 402. Here, of course, there is a contractual term dealing with compensation, and Dixon’s Wage Act claim (and her common-law breach of contract claim) originates from that provision of the agreement. Third, Dixon was capable of waiving her right to judicial resolution of her Wage Act claim even though the arbitration clause in the agreement does not specifically reference claims under the Wage Act. While holding that arbitration provisions that intend to encompass discrimination claims under G. L. c. 151B must be “stated in clear and unmistakable terms,” id. at 398, the Supreme Judicial Court also stated, “Our conclusion in this case should not be understood to suggest that parties entering into an employment (or any other) contract must specifically list every possible statutory claim that might arise or else the claim will not be covered by an otherwise ‘broad’ arbitration clause.” Id. at 401 n.16. Dixon agreed to arbitrate “all disagreements and controversies arising with respect to” her employment contract, including her claim under the Wage Act for compensation allegedly owed to her. Fourth, we disagree with Dixon that the reservation of rights clause in the agreement renders the arbitration provision ambiguous and therefore unenforceable. That clause reads: “All rights and remedies of each Party under this Agreement are cumulative and in addition to all other rights and remedies which may be available to that Party from time to time, whether under any other agreement, at law, or in equity.” This provision acknowledges the causes of action available to the parties outside of the contract itself, but it does not exempt these claims from the arbitration clause. See Laughton v. CGI Technologies & Solutions, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 262, 265 (D. Mass. 2009), quoting from Morse vs. Sir Speedy, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 97-40013-NMG (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1997) (court refused to render the contract’s arbitration provision “meaningless” because the contract also contained a reservation of rights clause; “[t]he correct reading of the Arbitration and Cumulative Remedies provisions is that arbitration is mandatory, but ‘the arbitrator is not limited to awarding certain remedies but rather may award all remedies provided for at law’ ”). Finally, there is a strong public policy favoring arbitration in Massachusetts. Drywall Sys., Inc. v. ZVI Constr. Co., 435 Mass. at 669. “[Tjhere is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that ‘[ajn order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.’ ” Massachusetts Hy. Dept. v. Perini Corp., 444 Mass. 366, 374 (2005), quoting from Local No. 1710, Intl. Assn. of Fire Fighters v. Chicopee, 430 Mass. 417, 421 (1999). Order denying motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration reversed. Individual defendants David Perry and Michael Slesnick were the officers of the defendant professional corporation, which appears to be no longer in existence. In particular, we note the absence of any language in the statute or its legislative history prohibiting arbitration. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991), quoting from Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (in compelling arbitration of claim under Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Court stated that Congress “did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of claims. ... ‘If Congress intended the substantive protection afforded ... to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history’ ”). In this way, the instant case is distinguishable from other recent cases addressing claims under the Wage Act in which employers attempted to avoid the substantive provisions of the statute. See Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 454 Mass. 63, 70 (2009) (“the Wage Act would have little value if employers could exempt themselves simply by drafting contracts that placed compensation outside its bounds”). See also Stanton v. Lighthouse Financial Servs., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 5, 15-16 (D. Mass. 2009). The arbitration provision we consider here does not implicate any of Dixon’s substantive rights under the Wage Act. This requirement recognizes the Attorney General’s considerable enforcement powers under the Wage Act and the corresponding importance of her receiving notice of alleged infractions. In any event, it appears that class actions, which are permitted under the Wage Act, can be maintained in the arbitration forum. See, e.g., DaLuz v. Department of Correction, 434 Mass. 40, 42 n.9 (2001); Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. at 205 (“class arbitrations do in fact occur”). As Dixon has not sought to maintain such an action, however, this point is irrelevant to the resolution of the instant case. Dixon argues that she must have waived her right to seek judicial resolution of her Wage Act claim “explicitly and voluntarily,” citing Blanchette v. School Comm. of Westwood, 427 Mass. 176, 184 (1998). Blanchette, which concerned whether an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement applied to a discrimination claim under G. L. c. 151B, is inapposite here. Moreover, even if we were to agree that “explicit and voluntary” is the standard to be applied, a point we do not and need not resolve, Dixon’s waiver satisfied this standard for the reasons hereinafter explained.