Breach of Contract Cases

RICHARD A. FRANCO, JR., Plaintiff v. LIPOSCIENCE, INC., Defendant No. COA08-785 (Filed 19 May 2009) 1. Employer and Employee— at-will — retaliation letter — absence of consideration The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant company on plaintiffs breach of contract claim even though plaintiff contends the promises in a retaliation letter formed a contract precluding defendant’s right to terminate his employment in retaliation for the actions of plaintiff’s father because: (1) there was no consideration to form a contract when the two promises in the retaliation letter constituted additional obligations on the part of defendant; the letter did not increase or diminish plaintiff’s pay, duties, rights, or anything else that could be deemed consideration flowing from plaintiff to defendant; and mere continued employment by the employee is insufficient consideration; (2) there was no evidence showing that plaintiff’s father negotiated the retaliation letter for his son’s benefit, the promises in the retaliation letter were not incorporated and made binding in the father’s severance agreement, and thus plaintiff cannot enforce the promises in the letter as a third-party beneficiary; and (3) the principles from debtor cases such as forbearance were inapplicable to defeat the application of the at-will employment doctrine, and the holding does not affect the rights of plaintiff’s father as he is not a party to this action, nor does it appear he has sought to enforce his rights in another action. 2. Judges— motions for new trial and recusal — failure to show trial judge disqualified The trial court did not err by denying plaintiff’s combined motions for a new trial and to recuse the trial judge on the ground that the judge’s father and defendant’s CEO were once commonly affiliated with the University of North Carolina because, given the remote and arm’s length affiliation defendant’s CEO had with the trial judge’s father, plaintiff did not carry his burden to demonstrate objectively that grounds for the trial judge’s recusal existed. Judge ERVIN dissenting. Appeal by plaintiff from order and judgment entered 9 August 2007 by Judge Allen Baddour in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 February 2009. James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by Richard B. Fennell & Preston 0. Odom, III, for plaintiff. Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., by Gregory P. McGuire & Phillip J. Strach, for defendant. WYNN, Judge. North Carolina embraces a strong presumption of at-will employment unless the employment relationship fits within one of three recognized exceptions — the pertinent exception here being an alleged contractual relationship. In this appeal, Plaintiff Richard A. Franco, Jr. argues that the evidence established that he had a contract with Defendant Liposcience, Inc. that barred his termination as an at-will employee. Because the record shows there was insufficient consideration to form a binding contract, we affirm the trial court’s grant of directed verdict in favor of Liposcience on Franco, Jr.’s breach of contract claim. In September 2002, Liposcience, a manufacturer and marketer of medical technology products, hired Franco, Jr. to serve as Vice President of Marketing. At that time, Franco, Jr.’s father — Richard A. Franco, Sr. — served as Chairman of Liposcience’s Board of Directors. However, Liposcience’s Board of Directors voted to remove Franco, Sr. as Chairman of the Board of Directors in October 2002. Thereafter, severance negotiations resulted in the drafting of three documents, each dated 13 December 2002. First, a document titled “Severance and Release Agreement” was signed by Franco, Sr. and Dr. Charles A. Sanders, Liposcience’s incoming Chairman of the Board of Directors. Under the Severance and Release Agreement, the parties agreed that Franco, Sr. would resign as Chairman of the Board of Directors, but would remain a voting member of the Board of Directors and a shareholder. Second, Dr. Sanders signed a letter as “Chairman of the Board of Directors of Liposcience, Inc.” that was addressed to Franco, Jr. and copied to Franco, Sr. (“Retaliation Letter”). The Retaliation Letter stated, in relevant part: First of all, this letter will signify my commitment to you that there will be no retaliation against you by the Company in connection with your father’s resignation. For the purposes of this letter, the term “retaliation” shall mean to take adverse employment action against you based upon your relationship with Richard Franco, Sr., and not for any legitimate business reason. In addition, from and after the date of this letter and for a period of two years thereafter, no employment action will be taken by Liposcience that will have any material adverse effect on the terms and conditions of your employment without my prior express written approval, of which you will receive a copy. Such employment actions include any material reduction in your compensation and benefits; any material diminution of your title, role and responsibilities with the Company; and any material disciplinary action, up to and including the termination of your employment. Nothing in this letter agreement shall diminish any other rights that you may have relative to your employment with the Company. Third, a letter addressed to Franco, Jr. (signed by Executive Vice President Lucy Martindale and Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary Timothy J. Williams), stated that any Chairman of the Board of Directors succeeding Dr. Sanders would be bound to the conditions in the Retaliation Letter. During 2003, Liposcience made a series of internal restructuring moves to make the company more efficient and to reduce payroll expenses. By February 2003, Liposcience had hired Richard Brajer as Chief Executive Officer, and shortly thereafter, hired Richard Pinnola as Chief Operating Officer. By December 2003, Mr. Brajer and Mr. Pinnola discussed eliminating the Vice President of Marketing and other lower-level positions to create a Vice President of Sales position, as Liposcience shifted its focus from marketing to product sales. That decision was finalized and executed on 24 February 2004, resulting in Franco, Jr.’s termination. However, under Franco, Jr.’s version of the events leading to his termination, a “quid-pro-quo” pattern of retaliatory adverse employment actions corresponded to each conflict Franco, Sr. had with Liposcience executives. Specifically, Franco, Jr. alleged that before he was terminated, the following series of events occurred: 1.) in March and April 2003, Franco, Sr. made several accountability requests of CEO Brajer; in response, Franco, Jr. received a critical voice message from CEO Brajer, and had his responsibilities and approved personal days reduced; 2) in June 2003, Franco, Sr. requested a full performance review of CEO Brajer; in response, Franco, Jr. received a critical performance review outside the normal review cycle; 3) in August 2003, Franco, Sr. criticized and requested a full performance review of CEO Brajer; in response, Franco, Jr.’s approved vacation time was reduced; 4) in September and October 2003, Franco, Sr. requested and was denied Liposcience sales information, was suspected of authoring an anonymous email criticizing shareholder communications, and ultimately resigned from the Board of Directors; in response, Franco, Jr.’s responsibilities were reduced further despite positive reviews. After his termination, Franco, Jr. brought this action asserting claims for breach of contract, wrongful discharge in violation of North Carolina public policy, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and punitive damages. In response, Liposcience answered denying liability and moved for summary judgment which Superior Court Judge Howard E. Manning granted on the wrongful discharge claim but denied on the breach of contract claim. Following Franco, Jr.’s voluntary • dismissal of his unfair and deceptive trade practices and punitive damages claims, a jury trial commenced on the breach of contract claim before Superior Court Judge Allen Baddour. However, at the close of all the evidence during the trial, Judge Baddour directed a verdict for Liposcience concluding that “[p]laintiff did not present any evidence at trial of consideration supplied by him to support the alleged contract at issue.” Thereafter, Franco, Jr. learned that Judge Baddour’s father and Dr. Sanders were once commonly affiliated with the University of North Carolina, and therefore filed motions for new trial and recusal. Judge Baddour denied those motions. On appeal, Franco, Jr. argues the trial court erred by (I) granting a directed verdict for Liposcience on his breach of contract claim; and (II) denying his motion to recuse Judge Baddour. I. Franco, Jr. acknowledges that Liposcience originally hired him as an at-will employee. In this appeal, however, he contends that the promises in the Retaliation Letter formed a contract precluding Liposcience’s right to terminate his employment in retaliation for Franco, Sr.’s actions. Because there was no consideration to form a contract, we diságree. North Carolina embraces a strong presumption of at-will employment unless the employment relationship fits within an exception, one being a contract specifying a definite period of employment. See Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 331-32, 493 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1997). Moreover, we have held that an “employment-at-will contract may be supplemented by additional agreements which are enforceable.” Martin v. Vance, 133 N.C. App. 116, 121, 514 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1999) (citing Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77 N.C. App. 253, 261, 335 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1985)). Like any other contract, however, such additional agreements must be supported by consideration. See id.; Watson Electrical Constr. Co. v. Summit Cos., LLC, 160 N.C. App. 647, 655, 587 S.E.2d 87, 94 (2003) (“Consideration is the glue that binds parties together, and a mere promise, without more, is unenforceable.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Retaliation Letter’s two distinct promises — that Liposcience would not retaliate against Franco, Jr. for Franco, Sr.’s actions and that the Chairman of the Board of Directors would provide express written approval of any material adverse employment action — constitute additional obligations on the part of Liposcience. Indeed, when Franco, Jr. received the Retaliation Letter, he was already employed. The Retaliation Letter did not increase or diminish his pay, duties, rights, or anything else that could be deemed consideration flowing from Franco, Jr. to Liposcience. As the trial court noted, mere continued employment by the employee is insufficient. See Howard v. Oakwood Homes Corp., 134 N.C. App. 116, 121-22, 516 S.E.2d 879, 882-83 (“the prospect of continued employment is insufficient to support a covenant not to compete where the employee receives no change in compensation, commission, duties, nature of employment or other consideration in exchange for signing the agreement”), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 832, 539 S.E.2d 288 (1999). Nonetheless, Franco, Jr. contends that consideration to support the Retaliation Letter was supplied by Franco, Sr. He argues that because Franco, Sr. negotiated for the Retaliation Letter in connection with the Severance Agreement, Franco, Jr. is entitled to enforce the Retaliation Letter as a third-party beneficiary. Neither party disputes the validity of the Severance Agreement, and there is evidence showing that Franco, Sr. negotiated for the Retaliation Letter for Franco, Jr.’s benefit. However, the Retaliation Letter is not referenced in the Severance Agreement, which contains a merger clause. Therefore, the promises in the Retaliation Letter were not incorporated and made binding in the Severance Agreement. Accordingly, Franco, Jr. cannot enforce the promises in the Retaliation Letter as a third-party beneficiary and we reject this assignment of error. We note that our dissenting colleague implores us to hold that forbearance by Franco, Sr. created sufficient consideration to transform the letter sent by Liposcience to Franco, Jr. into an employment contract. First, our research reveals no case in North Carolina has ever held such regarding employment contracts. Second, all of the cases relied upon by the dissent to support holding that the forbearance of a third party may be sufficient to create consideration for another party, are debtor-type cases. Inv. Props. of Asheville, Inc. v. Norburn, 281 N.C. 191, 188 S.E.2d 342 (1972) (“In a guaranty contract, a consideration moving directly to the guarantor is not essential. The promise is enforceable if a benefit to the principal debtor is shown or if detriment or inconvenience to the promisee is disclosed.”); Myers v. Allsbrook, 229 N.C. 786, 51 S.E.2d 629 (1949) (defendant’s oral promise to pay his brother’s debt to plaintiff not enforceable under Statute of Frauds); Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Kenyon Inv. Corp., 76 N.C. App. 1, 332 S.E.2d 186, appeal withdrawn, 316 N.C. 192, 341 S.E.2d 587 (1986) (the defendant, holder of a second deed of trust on a parcel of land, assumed principal debtor’s obligation relating to first deed of trust). Though in general, employment contracts are guided by the general principles of contract, we decline to extend the principles from the debtor cases cited by the dissent to defeat the application of the at-will employment doctrine here. The dissent further notes that “a failure to allow Plaintiff to enforce the Retaliation Letter would have the effect of substantially undermining a significant component of the bargain that Franco Sr. made with Defendant in the Severance Agreement.” Post at 18. Our holding does not affect the rights of Franco Sr. as he is not a party to this action nor does it appear he has sought to enforce his rights in another action. II. Franco, Jr. next argues that the trial court erred by denying his combined motions for a new trial and to recuse Judge Baddour. We disagree. First, we address the denial of Franco, Jr.’s motion for a new trial pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(8) (2007), on the ground that the court committed various errors of law. We review denial of a Rule 59(a)(8) motion de novo. Kinsey v. Spann, 139 N.C. App. 370, 373, 533 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2000). However, the argument in Franco, Jr.’s brief before this Court consists of the following: “[T]he trial court reversibly erred in directing a verdict for Defendant. The trial court therefore also erred in denying Franco, Jr.’s motion for a new trial....” Because we have already concluded that the trial court did not err by granting the directed verdict, and Franco, Jr. advances no further argument, we summarily reject this assignment of error. Second, we consider Franco, Jr.’s argument that his motion for new trial should have been granted because he objectively demonstrated grounds for Judge Baddour’s disqualification. A party requesting a judge’s recusal “must ‘demonstrate objectively that grounds for disqualification actually exist.’ ” In re LaRue, 113 N.C. App. 807, 809, 440 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1994) (quoting State v. Kennedy, 110 N.C. App. 302, 305, 429 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1993)). “The requesting party has the burden of showing through substantial evidence that the judge has such a personal bias, prejudice or interest that he would be unable to rule impartially.” See State v. Fie, 320 N.C. 626, 627, 359 S.E.2d 774, 775 (1987) (citations omitted). Franco, Jr. argues that Judge Baddour’s father’s affiliation with Liposcience CEO Dr. Sanders created grounds for Judge Baddour’s disqualification. Specifically, Franco, Jr. produced evidence that Dr. Sanders served on the University of North Carolina’s Board of Trustees when the Board approved the hiring of Judge Baddour’s father as the University’s Athletic Director. Dr. Sanders’ tenure on the Board of Trustees ended in 2001. At the time of trial, Dr. Sanders was a member of UNC’s School of Public Health Advisory Council, which allegedly worked closely with the Athletic Department to promote health and nutrition in local schools. However, Dr. Sanders offered an affidavit which established that he had very little personal communication with Judge Baddour’s father, and that even his professional connection to the judge’s father was limited to Board of Trustees’ meetings and related functions. Accordingly, given the remote and arm’s length affiliation Dr. Sanders had with Judge Baddour’s father, Franco, Jr. did not carry his burden to demonstrate objectively that grounds for Judge Baddour’s recusal existed. Affirmed. Judge Robert C. HUNTER concurs. Judge ERVIN dissents by separate opinion. . Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 331-32, 493 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1997). ERVIN, Judge dissenting. Although I fully concur in the Court’s conclusion that the trial court properly denied Plaintiff’s recusal motion, I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ determination that the trial court correctly granted a directed verdict in favor of Defendant at the close of all of the evidence. As a result, I believe that the trial court’s judgment should be reversed and that this matter should be remanded for a new trial. A trial court evaluating a dismissal motion under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 50(a), must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference arising from the evidence. Clark v. Moore, 65 N.C. App. 609, 610, 309 S.E.2d 579, 580 (1983). During this process, all conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Davis & Davis Realty Co., Inc. v. Rodgers, 96 N.C. App. 306, 308-09, 385 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1989), dis. rev. den., 326 N.C. 263, 389 S.E.2d 112 (1990). After a careful review of the briefs and the record, I am convinced that there is evidence in the record tending to show that Plaintiff had an enforceable employment agreement providing him with protection from retaliatory treatment, which Defendant breached, and that this evidence is sufficient to withstand Defendant’s directed verdict motion. When viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the evidence tends to show that, at the time that Plaintiff’s father, Richard Franco, Sr., was removed from his position as the Executive Chairman of Defendant’s Board of Directors, he negotiated a Severance Agreement with Charles Sanders, the new Board Chairman, under which Franco Sr. resigned as Executive Chairman while remaining a voting member of the Board until at least May 2004. The Severance Agreement included a mutual release of claims between the parties to that agreement and contained language providing that “[t]his Agreement, together with the Non-Competition Agreement, sets forth the entire and fully integrated understanding between the parties, and there are no representations, warranties, covenants or understandings, oral or otherwise, that are not expressly set out herein [(merger clause)].” During the negotiations leading up to the execution of the Severance Agreement, Franco Sr. insisted that Plaintiff be provided with protection from retaliatory conduct stemming from his relationship with Franco Sr. As a result, Defendant provided Plaintiff with the Retaliation Letter, which is the document upon which he bases his claims in this proceeding. Plaintiff had no involvement in the negotiation of the Retaliation Letter. The Retaliation Letter provided that (I) Plaintiff would not be subject to adverse employment action “based on [his] relationship with [Franco Sr.] and not for any legitimate business purpose” and that (2), “from and after the date of this letter and for a period of two years thereafter, no employment action will be taken by [Defendant] that will have any material adverse effect on the terms and conditions of

GREGORY SCOTT KRANZ, Plaintiff v. HENDRICK AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC.; and JERRY HOLLIFIELD, Defendants No. COA08-253 (Filed 7 April 2009) 1. Employer and Employee— wrongful discharge — failure to show public policy violations — summary judgment The trial court did not err in a wrongful discharge case by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants even though plaintiff contends he presented ample evidence to show that he was dismissed in violation of established public policy because plaintiff failed to show that: (1) defendant HAG actually violated state or federal law; (2) HAG’s policies violated state or federal law; (3) HAG requested that plaintiff violate any law; (4) plaintiff ever raised the possibility with HAG that it was violating state or federal law; or (5) that any other basis existed for suggesting a violation of public policy. 2. Employer and Employee— failure to pay bonus after termination — summary judgment Plaintiff former at-will employee was not entitled to receive a bonus under his compensation plan where he was terminated prior to the annual bonus payment date and his compensation plan stated that he “must be an employee on each payment date in order to received the bonuses.” Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 21 September 2007 by Judge Timothy Patti in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 September 2008. Robertson, Medlin & Blocker, PPLLC, by Jonathan Wall, for plaintiff Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak, & Stewart, PC, by David B. Hawley, for defendant. ELMORE, Judge. Gregory Scott Kranz (plaintiff) appeals from an order granting a motion for summary judgment by Hendrick Automotive Group, Inc. (HAG), and Jerry Hollifield (together, defendants). For the reasons below, we affirm. I. Plaintiff was employed by defendant HAG in its information technology department beginning in 2000. From 2000 to 2005, plaintiff worked under the company’s chief financial officer; in 2005, he was promoted to vice president of information technology. Some time in 2005, plaintiff recommended to defendants that the procedures for authorizing users and access to certain databases of customer information be updated. In March and April 2006, plaintiff brought concerns regarding the classification of certain fixed assets for depreciation purposes to an outside firm for an outside assessment of the issues. In April 2006, plaintiff again raised the issue of access to customer databases at a strategy meeting. On 18 May 2006, plaintiff was terminated by defendant HAG for failing to meet certain deadlines. Plaintiff brought suit for wrongful discharge on 21 June 2006. On 21 September 2007, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted. Plaintiff appeals that ruling. II. A. Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants as to his wrongful discharge claim because he presented ample evidence to show that he was dismissed in violation of established public policy. We disagree. Specifically, plaintiff argues that he was wrongfully discharged due to his insistence that defendants comply with certain laws, an action which he argues violated our state’s public policy. In North Carolina, the employer-employee relationship is governed by the at-will employment doctrine, which states that “in the absence of a contractual agreement between an employer and an employee establishing a definite term of employment, the relationship is presumed to be terminable at the will of either party without regard to the quality of performance of either party.” However, our Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy of North Carolina. “There is no specific list of what actions constitute a violation of public policy. . . . However, wrongful discharge claims have been recognized in North Carolina where the employee was discharged (1) for refusing to violate the law at the employer’s request, ... (2) for engaging in a legally protected activity, or (3) based on some activity by the employer contrary to law or public policy[.]” Whitings v. Wolfson Casing Corp., 173 N.C. App. 218, 221, 618 S.E.2d 750, 752-53 (2005) (citations omitted; alterations in original). Further, “[t]he public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine is confined to the express statements contained within our General Statutes or our Constitution.” Id. at 222, 618 S.E.2d at 753. Based on our review of the evidence submitted by plaintiff, we must conclude that he has failed to present a sufficient forecast of evidence to establish a wrongful discharge claim. “Under [the] public policy exception, the employee has the burden of pleading and proving that the employee’s dismissal occurred for a reason that violates public policy.” Salter v. E & J Healthcare, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 685, 693, 575 S.E.2d 46, 51 (2003). Plaintiff has asserted that he was fired for insisting that HAG comply with (1) state and federal laws requiring that HAG ensure the security of sensitive client information maintained in its computer database and (2) state and federal laws requiring proper classification and depreciation of fixed assets for tax and banking purposes. With respect to customer privacy, plaintiff presented an affidavit of F. Stan Wentz, a certified information system security professional. Mr. Wentz stated that “internal controls over the safeguarding of sensitive customer [information] at HAG [were] not functioning in accordance with stated policy and regular practices of other entities.” In addition, after noting that sensitive customer information was not encrypted, Mr. Wentz stated: “Most companies encrypt or securely isolate sensitive customer information to protect that data in case of a security breach.” Mr. Wentz never stated that HAG was violating any state or federal law regarding security of sensitive client information. At most, he indicated that HAG was violating its own policies and not acting in a manner consistent with what other companies or entities were doing. Plaintiffs affidavit likewise does not state that HAG was violating any law regarding sensitive customer information. In his deposition, when asked whether he had ever suggested to anyone at HAG that HAG was violating any data privacy law, he testified that he did not know that he “would have used that terminology” and the he was “not sure [he] ever framed it as a privacy issue but customer access, third-party access was discussed.” He repeatedly indicated that the only violations of data privacy laws that he remembered complaining about involved “do not call” laws — not the issue relied upon by plaintiff in his wrongful discharge action. Thus, although plaintiff points to various state and federal statutes regarding the privacy of customer information, he has not shown any violation of those laws or that he was even asked to violate those laws. It is not sufficient to simply point to public policy that may be implicated in issues that an employee has raised. The employee must show that “the public policy of North Carolina was contravened when defendant terminated plaintiff from his at-will employment.” McDonnell v. Tradewind Airlines, Inc., 194 N.C. App.-,-, 670 S.E.2d 302, 307 (2009). Plaintiff has failed to make that showing here and, therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. See Salter, 155 N.C. App. at 694, 575 S.E.2d at 52 (affirming grant of summary judgment when plaintiff failed to substantiate any statutory violations even though the statute at issue could be a source of public policy for purposes of wrongful discharge claim). In addition, in Garner v. Rentenback Constructors, Inc., 350 N.C. 567, 572, 515 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1999), our Supreme Court held that a violation of a statute, standing alone, is not sufficient for a wrongful discharge claim, but rather there must be “a degree of intent or wilfulness on the part of the employer.” In that case, because the plaintiff had not shown that the defendant employer “knew, or even suspected” that it had violated the statute at issue, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim. In this case, in plaintiffs deposition, when asked about the response of HAG when he raised “the third-party access issue” (the issue now couched as a violation of data privacy laws), he responded: “I don’t think they understood, had any idea what I was talking about.” On another occasion, when asked what reception he had received when expressing privacy concerns to the executive committee, he replied: “Marginal, marginal reception. I don’t think people actually understood the significance of the issue.” Thus, even if plaintiff had presented evidence of a violation of state or federal privacy laws, he has failed to demonstrate that HAG knew of the violations and, therefore, summary judgment was also proper under Gamer as to this public policy theory. With respect to plaintiff’s fixed assets contentions, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of John C. Compton, a certified public accountant. Mr. Compton reviewed HAG documents regarding its internal controls over the accounting for fixed assets. He concluded that “internal control over fixed assets at Hendrick Auto Group (HAG) was not functioning in accordance with stated policy and regular practices of other entities.” According to Mr. Compton, “[s]uch lack of control has the potential for causing errors in accurately reporting information to outside parties such as federal, state and local governments, thereby causing possible improper reporting of tax liabilities to those governments.” In addition to Mr. Compton’s affidavit, plaintiff asserted in his own affidavit that he was told by a person in HAG’s accounting department that “the Fixed Asset System had been ‘screwed up for years.’ ” In plaintiff’s deposition, he indicated only that he raised the issue of fixed assets because he found they were being miscategorized, thereby creating a potential for inaccurate information and depreciation. When asked if he ever told Mr. Hollifield that HAG was violating any law through its Fixed Asset System, he said: “I don’t know if I phrased it quite like that.” In an e-mail upon which plaintiff relies, he sought authorization to hire an accountant to assist him with the categorization of IT assets because correcting the problem could lead to cost savings. The e-mail did not reference any violation of law or any potential for misreporting of financial data to the government. Although plaintiff, on appeal, cites numerous state statutes regarding proper and accurate filing of tax returns and argues that he was attempting to ensure that “perceived tax reporting improprieties” did not go “unchecked,” his summary judgment showing included no evidence of any “tax reporting improprieties.” Indeed, he presented no evidence that any law, state or federal, was violated, or even that HAG was failing to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. His expert witness’s affidavit indicated only that HAG 'was violating its own policies and that its accounting was inconsistent with how other companies handled fixed assets. While the expert stated that the internal controls were such that improper tax reporting could possibly occur, he never concluded that improper tax reporting necessarily would occur or had occurred. Thus, as with the data privacy issue, plaintiff failed to make any showing that any state or federal law was violated as to the reporting of fixed assets or more generally as to tax reporting. In short, plaintiff failed to show (1) that HAG actually violated state or federal law, (2) that HAG’s policies violated state or federal law, (3) that HAG requested that plaintiff violate any law, (4) that plaintiff ever raised the possibility with HAG that it was violating state or federal law, or (5) that any other basis exists for suggesting a violation of public policy. Plaintiff’s general assertions of wrongdoing by defendants are insufficient to place his discharge in the narrow public policy exception carved out by our case law. As such, we overrule this assignment of error. B. Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. This argument is without merit. Plaintiff signed a compensation plan for 2005, then a new compensation plan for 2006. Plaintiff’s compensation plan for 2006 lists his salary and benefits, then, under “Bonus,” states: “Bonuses to be determined based on meeting defined objectives. You must be an employee on each payment date in order to receive the bonuses.” The bonus would have been paid at the end of the calendar year. Plaintiff’s employment .with defendant ended on 18 May 2006. As such, regardless of whether plaintiff had earned the annual bonus in the five and a half months of 2006 he worked, by the terms of his compensation plan, he was not entitled to the bonus. We overrule this assignment of error. Affirmed. Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and GEER concur.