Breach of Contract Cases

HILLENBRAND v CHRIST LUTHERAN CHURCH OF BIRCH RUN Docket No. 319127. Submitted March 11, 2015, at Lansing. Decided September 15, 2015, at 9:00 a.m. Richard P. Hillenbrand brought an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in the Saginaw Circuit Court, alleging that Christ Lutheran Church of Birch Run had wrongfully terminated his employment as a pastor in violation of the constitution and bylaws of the Lutheran Church' — -Missouri Synod (LCMS), of which defendant was a member. Plaintiff initially sought relief through the dispute resolution process set forth in the LCMS’s bylaws, but before a hearing could be held, defendant withdrew its membership from the LCMS and declined to participate. Nevertheless, an LCMS dispute resolution panel determined that it had the authority to act in the matter and ruled that defendant’s decision to terminate plaintiffs employment should be reviewed and revised, and further ruled that plaintiff was entitled to compensation from defendant. After plaintiff brought this court action seeking to be restored to his position, defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevented a court from determining whether a church had violated its own policies and procedures. The corut, Frederick L. Borchard, J., granted defendant’s motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), ruling that because the relationship between defendant and the LCMS was congregational rather than hierarchical in nature, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. The court denied plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held.'. 1. The trial court did not err by granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, if the facts indicate that a denomination is hierarchical, a civil court may not redetermine the correctness of an interpretation of canonical text or some decision relating to the government of the religious polity, but must defer to the resolution of those issues by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization. When a denomination is determined to be hierarchical, trial coruts have jurisdiction to enter a judgment, but the judgment must resolve the matter consistent with any determinations already made by the denomination. Determining whether a denomination is hierarchical is a factual question. A church organization is congregational if it is self-governing and hierarchical if it is part of and governed by a larger organization. A plain reading of LCMS’s constitution indicated that the LCMS was only an advisory body and not a governing body. Therefore, the court did not clearly err by determining that LCMS was congregational in nature. Further, LCMS’s constitution provided that it controlled and superseded bylaws and all other rules and regulations, including a 1983 resolution indicating that the LCMS had hierarchical dimensions, and that LCMS’s resolutions were not binding on individual congregations if the individual congregations deemed them inexpedient. This statement clearly left individual congregations open to adopt or disregard LCMS’s resolutions. Because the plain language of LCMS’s constitution expressly indicated that it was not a governing body, the court was not required to accept the interpretation provided by the denomination. 2. The trial court erred by finding that defendant could withdraw from the LCMS because LCMS’s bylaws prohibited its members from terminating their membership in a manner that would render a decision of the dispute resolution panel inapplicable. Defendant informed the LCMS that it was withdrawing its membership because of the politics involved with the Michigan District of the Missouri Synod and because it wanted a pastor who cared about them, and further informed the LCMS that it would not be attending and did not agree to be bound by any dispute resolution hearing conducted by the LCMS. Because defendant was not permitted to render the dispute resolution hearing inapplicable in that manner, its doing so was improper. However, the trial court did not err by concluding that any decision from the dispute resolution panel would have been advisory and not binding on the parties. Affirmed. Davis Burket Savage Listman Brennan (by Robert C. Davis and William N. Listman) for plaintiff. Johnston, Sztykiel & Hunt, PC (by J. Steven Johnston and Joseph N. Fraser), for defendant. Amicus Curiae: Thompson Coburn LLP (by Todd A. Rowden) for the Lutheran Church — Missouri Synod. Before: WILDER, P.J., and SERVITTO and STEPHENS, JJ. STEPHENS, J. Plaintiff appeals as of right the opinion and order of the trial court granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND Defendant is a Lutheran church. Plaintiff served as pastor at defendant church for seven years, from 2005 until his employment was terminated in 2012. In 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant that alleged defendant, as a member of the Lutheran Church — Missouri Synod (LCMS), wrongfully terminated plaintiffs employment in violation of LCMS’s constitution. Plaintiff requested that the trial court enjoin defendant’s termination of plaintiff as its pastor, order defendant to reinstate plaintiff as its pastor, order defendant to remove any reference to defendant’s termination of plaintiff as its pastor, and order the restoration of plaintiffs rights under his employment agreement with defendant. According to plaintiff, LCMS’s constitution required the employment dispute to be presented to an LCMS Dispute Resolution Panel. A hearing was held before such a panel on August 17, 2012, and August 18, 2012, but defendant had withdrawn its membership from LCMS on June 18, 2012, and stated that it would not participate in the hearing. The panel ruled that defendant’s decision to terminate plaintiffs employment as its pastor “should be reviewed and revised.” The panel further concluded that plaintiff was entitled to compensation from the date that defendant terminated plaintiffs employment as its pastor, March 11, 2012, “until said time when [plaintiff] receives and, if he so chooses, as led by the Holy Spirit, to accept a call to another congregation,” in the amount of $59,800 as an annual salary, as well as $12,500 for additional out-of-pocket expenses related to health insurance, retirement benefits, and costs related to the hearing. In lieu of filing an answer to plaintiffs complaint, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.108(B), MCR 2.116(C)(4), and MCR 2.116(C)(7). Defendant asserted that it was entitled to summary disposition because the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevented a court from determining whether a church had violated its own policies and procedures. Defendant also argued that it was entitled to summary disposition because, under the common law governing arbitration, its agreement to be bound by a hearing before an LCMS panel was unilaterally revocable. Plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s motion, arguing that because LCMS was hierarchical, as opposed to congregational, the hearing before the panel was binding and should therefore be enforced. After a hearing, the trial court issued a written opinion and order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition. The trial court found that LCMS was congregational and not hierarchical. The trial court found that the plain language of LCMS’s 1983 resolution created a hierarchical relationship only as to the “initial call to become a pastor and not for the decision to terminate a call.” The trial court further ruled that even if the 1983 resolution language applied to a pastor’s termination, the only remedy available would be to revoke defendant’s membership in LCMS. Lastly, the trial court ruled that LCMS did not have authority to bind defendant during the hearing because defendant was no longer an LCMS member and had withdrawn its consent before the hearing. Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was denied. This appeal followed. LCMS was granted leave to file a brief amicus curiae. II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION Plaintiff maintains that the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant was erroneous because LCMS is a hierarchical organization. We disagree. “[This Court] review[s] the trial court’s grant or denial of summary disposition de novo.” Teadt v Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, 237 Mich App 567, 574; 603 NW2d 816 (1999). Atrial court’s interpretation of an organization’s constitution and bylaws is also reviewed de novo. See Slatterly v Madiol, 257 Mich App 242, 250-251, 256; 668 NW2d 154 (2003). The Court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. Detroit v Ambassador Bridge Co, 481 Mich 29, 35; 748 NW2d 221 (2008). “A trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(4) when a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. When reviewing such a motion, this Court “must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact.” Manning v Amerman, 229 Mich App 608, 610; 582 NW2d 539 (1998). “[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution protect freedom of religion by forbidding governmental establishment of religion and by prohibiting governmental interference with the free exercise of religion.” Bennison v Sharp, 121 Mich App 705, 712; 329 NW2d 466 (1982). “Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch v EEOC, 565 US 171, 181; 132 S Ct 694; 181L Ed 2d 650 (2012). The United States Supreme Court has confirmed “that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.” Id. at 185. Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, “where the facts indicate that a denomination is hierarchical, ‘civil courts may not redetermine the correctness of an interpretation of canonical text or some decision relating to the government of the religious polity,’. . . but must defer to the resolution of those issues ‘by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization [.]’ ” Lamont Community Church v Lamont Christian Reformed Church, 285 Mich App 602, 616; 777 NW2d 15 (2009), quoting Smith v Calvary Christian Church, 462 Mich 679, 684; 614 NW2d 590 (2000); see also Bennison, 121 Mich App at 713. “[W]hen a denomination is determined to be hierarchical, trial courts have jurisdiction to enter a judgment, but the judgment must resolve the matter consistent with any determinations already made by the denomination.” Id. “The determination of whether a denomination is hierarchical is a factual question.” Id. at 615, citing Calvary Presbyterian Church v Presbytery of Lake Huron of the United Presbyterian Church, 148 Mich App 105, 113; 384 NW2d 92 (1986). A denomination is hierarchical if it “is but a subordinate part of a general church in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a more or less complete power of control...” Bennison, 121 Mich App at 720. “A denomination is organized in a hierarchical structure when it has a central governing body which has regularly acted within its powers while the looser ‘congregational’ structure generally has all governing powers and property ownership remaining in the individual churches.” Lamont, 285 Mich App at 618 (citation, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). Stated differently, a church organization is congregational if it is self-governing; a church organization is hierarchical if it is “part of and governed by a larger organization.” Little v First Baptist Church, Crestwood, 475 US 1148, 1148; 106 S Ct 1802; 90 L Ed 2d 347 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The trial court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit under MCR 2.116(C)(4) because LCMS was congregational. Our review of the trial court’s grant of summary disposition, therefore, begins with an examination of whether LCMS is hierarchical or congregational. According to defendant’s articles of association, its members “shall worship and labor together according to the discipline, rules and usage of [LCMS] in the United States of America as from time to time authorized and declared by the delegate convention.” Article VII of LCMS’s constitution, entitled “Relation of the Synod to Its Members,” states as follows: 1. In its relation to its members the Synod is not an ecclesiastical government exercising legislative or coercive powers, and with respect to the individual congregation’s right of self-government it is but an advisory body. Accordingly, no resolution of the Synod imposing anything upon the individual congregation is of binding force if it is not in accordance with the Word of God or if it appears to be inexpedient as far as the condition of a congregation is concerned. 2. Membership of a congregation in the Synod gives the Synod no equity in the property of the congregation. Article XIII, “Expulsion from the Synod,” ¶ 1, provides that “[m] embers who act contrary to the confession laid down in Article II and to the conditions of membership laid down in Article VI or persist in an offensive conduct shall, after previous futile admonition, be expelled from the Synod.” Article XTV grants LCMS the right to “adopt bylaws that are consistent with and do not contradict the Constitution of the Synod, which controls and supersedes such bylaws and all other rules and regulations of the Synod.” Under § 1.10.1.1 of LCMS’s bylaws, “[t]he use of the Synod’s conflict resolution procedures shall be the exclusive and final remedy for those who are in dispute.” Section 1.10.2 states, in part, as follows regarding the conflict resolution procedures: It shall be the exclusive remedy to resolve such disputes that involve theological, doctrinal, or ecclesiastical issues except those covered under Bylaw sections 2.14-2.17 and except as provided in Bylaw 1.10.3. It is applicable whether the dispute involves only a difference of opinion without personal animosity or is one that involves ill will and sin that requires repentance and forgiveness. No person or agency to whom or to which the provisions of this dispute resolution process are applicable because such person or agency is a member of the Synod may render these provisions inapplicable by terminating that membership. Section 1.10.3, however, indicates that “[t]his chapter provides evangelical procedures to remedy disputes only and does not set forth procedures for expulsion from membership [.]” It also indicates that “[w]hile Christians are encouraged to seek to resolve all their disputes without resorting to secular courts, this chapter does not provide an exclusive remedy for . . . [disputes arising under contractual arrangements of all kinds[.]” Under § 1.10.7.4, ¶ (d), the final decision of a dispute resolution hearing panel is “binding upon the parties.” LCMS’s 1983 resolution, entitled “To Reaffirm Essential Congregational Polity of the Synod,” states that “[t]he word ‘hierarchical’ is repugnant to Missouri Synod Lutherans because etymologically it refers to ‘rule by the priesthood’ ” and is defined differently by civil courts than it is in theology. The resolution further states that “[i]n past instances the Synod has utilized the legal nomenclature ‘hierarchical’ in legal proceedings in order to preserve to member congregations and others who associate together within the Synod the right to resolve disputes freely in accordance with established synodical procedures [.]” The LCMS resolution then states as follows: Resolved, That The Lutheran Church — Missouri Synod reaffirms that its synodical polity is essentially and principally congregational in nature and therefore is ordinarily referred to as a congregational polity; and be it further Resolved, That the Synod acknowledges that under the definition and application of the word “hierarchical” in civil law there are aspects in the relationships within the Synod between and among congregations (e.g. Article II, Confession; the calling of certified and endorsed pastors only; agreements to abide by adjudicatory procedures and their final determinations) which under civil law may imply, express, or evidence what the courts regard as hierarchical dimensions; and be it further Resolved, That, believing that Scripture (1 Cor. 6) requires that we make every effort to avoid disputes or to resolve them internally when they do arise, of the two constitutional methods for resolving church disputes by the civil courts, the Synod favors the “neutral principles of law” method whenever it can be applied, and that when neutral principles cannot be applied to resolve a particular controversy, the Synod declares that it is able and willing to resolve disputes internally; and be it further Resolved, That while we believe the courts should recognize that there are church polities other than “congregational” and “hierarchical,” unless and until courts do so, the present status of case law compels us to use certain legal terminology; and be it finally Resolved, That with the previously outlined explanation, the Synod declares itself as satisfied with the procedures heretofore followed by the Synod in instances involving these issues. Although its resolution and bylaws both apparently attempt to create an “exclusive,” “final,” and “binding” dispute resolution process, LCMS’s constitution unequivocally states that it “is not an ecclesiastical government exercising legislative or coercive powers, and with respect to the individual congregation’s right of self-government it is but an advisory body.” LCMS has made it clear through its constitution, bylaws, and resolution that individual congregations, including defendant, are self-governing. There is no question that at the time plaintiff was removed as defendant’s pastor, defendant was “part of’ LCMS; however, LCMS’s constitution, its controlling document, expressly indicates that defendant is not “governed by” LCMS. See Little, 475 US at 1148 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Under this plain reading of LCMS’s constitution, LCMS “is but an advisory body” and not a governing body. Therefore, LCMS is congregational in nature. Plaintiff and LCMS ask this Court to find LCMS to be a hybrid entity: generally congregational, but hierarchical in nature regarding confession, ministerial call, and its dispute resolution process. We decline to do so. We conclude that we are bound by LCMS’s unequivocal statement in its constitution that it “is not an ecclesiastical government exercising legislative or coercive powers, and with respect to the individual congregation’s right of self-government it is but an advisory body.” LCMS’s constitution provides that it “controls and supersedes such bylaws and all other rules and regulations of the Synod.” Therefore, even if the resolution indicates that LCMS has hierarchical dimensions, such an indication is in direct conflict with and superseded by the constitution’s statement that LCMS does not affect an individual congregation’s right of self-government. LCMS’s contention that its resolution is consistent with its constitution rests on the conclusory statement that its “Commission on Constitutional Matters” decided that it was. In short, LCMS’s own determination is not binding on this Court if this Court “ ‘could enforce [the documents] without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity....’” Lamont, 285 Mich App at 617 (citation omitted). Further, LCMS’s constitution declares that “no resolutio

UAW v GREEN Docket No. 147700. Argued January 13, 2015 (Calendar No. 1). Decided July 29, 2015. The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and others brought an action in the Court of Appeals against Nino E. Green and other members of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, the Governor, and the Attorney General, seeking a declaratory judgment that portions of 2012 PA 349—which amended the public employment relations act, MCL 423.201 et seq., to prohibit public employers from requiring their employees to join a union or pay union-related expenses—were unconstitutional with respect to employees in the classified state civil service. The Court of Appeals, Saad, P.J., and Donofrio, J. (Gleichbr, J., dissenting), held that the challenged portions of 2012 PA 349 were constitutional. 302 Mich App 246 (2013). The Supreme Court granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal. 495 Mich 921 (2014). In an opinion by Chief Justice Young, joined by Justices Markman, Zahra, and Viviano, the Supreme Court held: The Civil Service Commission lacked the constitutional authority to compel civil service employees to make involuntary financial contributions to subsidize the commission’s exercise of its constitutional duties and responsibilities. Although the commission had authority over civil service employees’ rates of compensation, conditions of employment, and grievance procedures under Const 1963, art 11, § 5, the commission’s power to regulate the conditions of employment through public collective bargaining agreements did not encompass the specific authority to tax or appropriate, which generally rested exclusively with the Legislature unless the Constitution affirmatively provided that power to another constitutional body. The funding provision of Const 1963, art 11, § 5, ¶ 10 indicated that the ratifiers understood that the commission would be adequately funded by the Legislature in proportion to the size of the civil service and, therefore, that the commission lacked the power to compel funding for its administrative operational duties from another and unstated source. Accordingly, allowing the imposition of mandatory agency shop fees on civil servants under Civ Serv R 6-7.2 was beyond the commission’s constitutional authority. Dudkin v Civil Serv Comm, 127 Mich App 397 (1983), was overruled to the extent it held that the imposition of an agency shop fee was constitutionally authorized pursuant to efficient civil service operations. Court of Appeals judgment affirmed on different grounds. Justice Kelly, joined by Justices McCormack and Bernstein, dissenting, would have reversed the Court of Appeals judgment, upheld the authority of the commission to promulgate Civ Serv R 6-7.2 as part of its power to regulate all conditions of employment in the classified civil service and to determine the qualifications of all candidates for positions in the classified service under Const 1963, art 11, § 5, and held that Const 1963, art 4, § 48 precluded 2012 PA 349 from applying to employees in the state classified civil service. Civil Service — Civil Service Commission — Constitutional Law — Agency Shop Fees. The Civil Service Commission lacks the constitutional authority to compel civil service employees to make involuntary financial contributions to subsidize the commission’s exercise of its constitutional duties and responsibilities (Const 1963, art 11, § 5). William A. Wertheimer for all plaintiffs. Michael B. Nicholson and Ava R. Barbour for International Union UAW and Local 6000. Sachs Waldman, PC (by Andrew Nickelhoff and Mami Kato), for SEIU Local 517M and the Michigan Corrections Organization. Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, PC (by Michael E. Cavanaugh and Brandon W. Zuk), for the Michigan State Employees Association. Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lind-strom, Solicitor General, and Ann M. Sherman and Margaret A. Nelson, Assistant Attorneys General, for all defendants. Amici Curiae: Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, PLC (by Michael J. Hodge and Scott R. Eldridge), for the Michigan Civil Service Commission. Dykema Gossett PLLC (by Gary P. Gordon, Leonard C. Wolfe, and Courtney F. Kissel) and Warner Norcross & Judd LLP (by John J. Bursch) for the Michigan Chamber of Commerce. Patrick J. Wright and Derk A. Wilcox for the Mackinac Center Legal Foundation. John N. Raudahaugh for Thomas Haxby. YOUNG, C.J. The Civil Service Commission’s rules allow public collective bargaining agreements that require collection of a mandatory service fee, also known as an “agency shop fee,” from union-eligible employees who opt out of union membership. Civ Serv R 6-7.2. Although we conclude that public collective bargaining is a method by which the Civil Service Commission (the commission) may choose to exercise its constitutional duties, we hold that the commission may not effectively require civil servants to fund the commission’s own administrative operations. Accordingly, we affirm, albeit on different grounds, the judgment of the Court of Appeals. FACTS AND HISTORY The legislation commonly known as the “Right to Work” laws—Public Acts 348 and 349 of 2012—were made effective March 27, 2013. 2012 PA 348 governs private employers and 2012 PA 349 governs public employers. This case concerns the constitutionality of 2012 PA 349. Section 3 of 2012 PA 349 amends the public employment relations act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq., to provide that public employers may not require their employees to join a union or pay union dues, fees, or other expenses “as a condition of obtaining or continuing public employment. . . .” MCL 423.210(3) (“[A]n individual shall not be required as a condition of obtaining or continuing public employment to do any of the following: . . . (c) [p]ay any dues, fees, assessments, or other charges or expenses of any kind or amount, or provide anything of value to a labor organization or bargaining representative.”). The commission’s current rules, however, affirmatively and expressly allow public collective bargaining agreements that provide for the collection of an agency shop fee from union-eligible employees who opt out of union membership. Civ Serv R 6-7.2 (last amended April 29, 2004) provides: Nothing in this rule precludes the employer from making an agreement with an exclusive representative to require, as a condition of continued employment, that each eligible employee in the unit who chooses not to become a member of the exclusive representative shall pay a service fee to the exclusive representative. If agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement, the state may deduct the service fee by payroll deduction. An appointing authority shall not deduct a service fee unless the employee has filed a prior written authorization or as otherwise authorized in a collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiffs, union representatives of classified civil service employees, contend that agency shop fees defray various union activity costs. In accordance with the current rules, plaintiff unions have negotiated various agreements with the state that contain agency shop fee arrangements covering the employees whom they represent. 2012 PA 349 purports to make these mandatory agency shop fees illegal. Plaintiff labor unions filed the instant complaint in February 2013 challenging the validity of 2012 PA 349, § 3. Plaintiffs alleged that, under Const 1963, art 11, § 5, the statute’s agency shop fee prohibition cannot apply to the commission because it infringes the commission’s constitutional mandate to “regulate all conditions of employment” for civil servants. The Court of Appeals in a split decision held that the Legislature possesses the authority to enact legislation concerning and restricting agency shop fees. Int’l Union v Green, 302 Mich App 246; 839 NW2d 1 (2013). In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the commission’s power to “regulate” conditions of employment is necessarily subservient to the Legislature’s power to “enact laws” relative to hours and conditions of employment. The dissent, on the other hand, would have held that agency shop fees are “conditions of employment” by virtue of being “on-duty employment concerns.” Id. at 294 (GLEICHER, J., dissenting). STANDARD OF REVIEW Questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Hunter v Hunter, 484 Mich 247, 257; 771 NW2d 694 (2009). ANALYSIS Our primary goal in construing a constitutional provision is to give effect to the intent of the people of the state of Michigan who ratified the Constitution, by applying the rule of "common understanding.” See Goldstone v Bloomfield Twp Pub Library, 479 Mich 554, 558-559; 737 NW2d 476 (2007) (“When interpreting constitutional provisions, our primary objective is to realize the intent of the people by whom and for whom the constitution was ratified. That is, we seek the ‘common understanding’ of the people at the time the constitution was ratified. This involves applying the plain meaning of each term used at the time of ratification, unless technical, legal terms are used.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). We identify the common understanding of constitutional text by applying the plain meaning of the text at the time of ratification. Wayne Co v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 468-469; 684 NW2d 765 (2004). Interpretation of a constitutional provision also takes account of “the circumstances leading to the adoption of the provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished.” People v Tanner, 496 Mich 199, 226; 853 NW2d 653 (2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Unless we are able to determine that a constitutional provision had some other particularized or specialized meaning in the collective mind of the 1963 electorate, we must give effect to the natural meaning of the language used in the Constitution. Mich United Conservation Clubs v Secretary of State (After Remand), 464 Mich 359, 376; 630 NW2d 297 (2001) (YOUNG, J., concurring). Technical legal terms are those that have acquired a special meaning and “must be interpreted in light of the meaning that those sophisticated in the law would have given those terms at the time of ratification.” Dep’t of Transp v Tomkins, 481 Mich 184, 191; 749 NW2d 716 (2008). The Address to the People, which was distributed to Michigan citizens in advance of the ratification vote and which explained in everyday language what each provision of the proposed new Constitution was intended to accomplish, Walker v Wolverine Fabricating & Mfg Co, Inc, 425 Mich 586, 597; 391 NW2d 296 (1986), and, to a lesser degree, the constitutional convention debates themselves are also relevant in determining the ratifiers’ intent. Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Court, 469 Mich 146, 156; 665 NW2d 452 (2003). “The Civil Service Commission is a constitutional body . . . .” Viculin v Dep’t of Civil Serv, 386 Mich 375, 393; 192 NW2d 449 (1971). It possesses “plenary and absolute powers in its field.” Id. at 398. The constitutional provision concerning the commission, Article 11, § 5, provides, in relevant part: The Commission shall classify all positions in the classified service according to their respective duties and responsibilities, fix rates of compensation for all classes of positions, approve or disapprove disbursements for all personal services, determine by competitive examination and performance exclusively on the basis of merit, efficiency and fitness the qualifications of all candidates for positions in the classified service, make rules and regulations covering all personnel transactions, and regulate all conditions of employment in the classified service. [Const 1963, art 11, § 5, ¶ 4.] Article 11, § 5 thus sets forth the “duties of the Civil Service Commission [.]” See Mich Coalition of State Employee Unions v Civil Serv Comm, 465 Mich 212, 221; 634 NW2d 692 (2001). The commission possesses authority over and exercises its duties concerning, in part, “the procedures by which a state civil service employee may review his grievance,” Viculin, 386 Mich at 393, as well as rates of compensation and conditions of employment. See Council No 11, AFSCME v Civil Serv Comm, 408 Mich 385, 406; 292 NW2d 442 (1980). The commission’s rules authorize the use of public collective bargaining agreements as a mechanism for exercising its constitutional authority over such matters as grievance procedures and rates of compensation. See, e.g., Civ Serv R 6-9.6(a) (“An exclusive representative and the employer may agree upon a procedure for the resolution of grievances of exclusively represented employees against the departmental employer..Civ Serv R 6-3.6(b) (“The rates of compensation for all existing grades within a classification of positions . . . may be established in a collective bargaining agreement. . .”). The commission retains absolute authority over the contents of a public collective bargaining agreement. Civ Serv R 6-3.1(b) (“The civil service commission retains the authority to (1) approve, modify, or reject, in whole or in part, a proposed collective bargaining agreement presented to it for review and (2) to impose on the parties and eligible employees a collective bargaining agreement as modified by the commission.”). This authority makes clear that the commission uses public collective bargaining as one important tool within its constitutional arsenal, establishing a procedure by which civil servants and the state employer may bargain over a variety of employment-related matters. This choice presumably reflects the commission’s judgment that it wishes to facilitate input from the employees’ representatives. If the commission deems public collective bargaining to be an appropriate mechanism for exercising its constitutional duties, that is its prerogative and we have no warrant to challenge this aspect of its exercise of authority. See Makowski v Governor, 495 Mich 465, 471; 852 NW2d 61 (2014), citing Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Crunch) 137, 170; 2 L Ed 60 (1803) (applying Marbury to Michigan’s three branches of government and stating that “courts may not inquire into how the executive or his officers perform their duties in which they have discretion”). Having established for the purposes of this case that the commission may authorize public collective bargaining as a tool in the exercise of its constitutional duties, we turn to the specific issue before us: whether the mandatory agency shop fee is consistent with such authorization. Although authorizing public collective bargaining agreements is within the commission’s sound judgment, we hold that the commission lacks the authority to tax or appropriate—to wit, the authority to compel civil service employees to make involuntary financial contributions to subsidize the commission’s exercise of its constitutional duties and responsibilities. Generally, of course, the power to tax and appropriate rests exclusively with the Legislature. See 46th Circuit Trial Court v Crawford Co, 476 Mich 131, 141; 719 NW2d 553 (2006) (opinion by MARKMAN, J.); see also Const 1963, art 9, § 1 (“The legislature shall impose taxes sufficient with other resources to pay the expenses of state government.”). It has been stated: The power to tax defines the extent to which economic resources will be apportioned between the people and their government, while the power to appropriate defines the priorities of government. Partly in recognition of the enormity of these powers, the framers of our constitutions determined that the branch of government to exercise these powers should be that branch which is closest to, and most representative of, the people [i.e., the Legislature]. [46th Circuit Trial Court, 476 Mich at 141-142 (opinion by Markman, J.).] Indeed, we have recognized that this is “the most fundamental aspect of the ‘legislative power ....’” Id. at 141 (opinion by MARKMAN, J.). Therefore, in order for another constitutional body, such as the commission, to exercise the same powers that are historically vested in our Legislature, the Constitution must affirmatively provide for them. See Soap & Detergent Ass’n v Natural Resources Comm, 415 Mich 728, 752-753; 330 NW2d 346 (1982). In an unrelated, but illustrative, context, the commission actually enjoys such a narrow and highly distinctive power of appropriation. Paragraph 7 of Const 1963, art 11, § 5, expressly empowers the commission to increase civil servants’ rates of compensation by having that increase placed into the state’s annual budget. That increase becomes effective unless the Legislature vetoes the commission’s increase by a supermajority vote. In turn, when the commission opts to increase the payroll of employees in the civil service, the Constitution automatically increases the commission’s own administrative operational budget in direct proportion to the payroll increase. Const 1963, art 11, § 5, ¶¶ 7 and 10. Specifically, ¶ 10 of Const 1963, art 11, § 5 provides: To enable the commission to exercise its powers, the legislature shall appropriate to the commission for the ensuing fiscal year a sum not less than one per cent of the aggregate payroll of the classified service for the preceding fiscal year, as certified by the commission. Within six months after the conclusion of each fiscal year the commission shall return to the state treasury all moneys unexpended for that fiscal year. At the constitutional convention, this—the commission’s “privilege of a mandatory [administrative operational] appropriation”—was rightfully described as “extraordinary.” 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 639 (stating that “[t]he commission does not appear to have abused its extraordinary privilege of a mandatory appropriation” in order to raise the payroll and, by extension, its own budget). But the commission’s limited and explicit power to appropriate its own administrative funding by adjusting budgeted rates of compensation stands in stark contrast to an asserted broad and implicit power to appropriate funds from whatever source. The former has textual support in the Constitution, while the latter does not. There is simply no authority in the Constitution that would support an argument that its ratifiers commonly and reasonably understood the commission as possessing the authority that plaintiffs ascribe to it—in particular, the power to require that assessments from civil servants’ paychecks additionally subsidize the commission’s own duties and responsibilities. Reading this administrative funding provision in Article 11, § 5, ¶ 10 in context with the enumeration of the commission’s powers in ¶ 4 underscores that the ratifiers could not have contemplated that civil servants would serve as an alternative or additional source of funding for the commission’s budget. The only potential source of an authority to permit mandatory agency shop fees is the commission’s power to “regulate” the conditions of employment, which regulation is effected through public collective bargaining agreements. But the power to “regulate” does not encompass the specific authority to compel other entities, including civil servants themselves, to subsidize the commission’s constitutional operations. This authority is one of taxation and appropriation and is fundamentally legislative in character. Indeed, the presence of the funding provision of Article 11, § 5, ¶ 10 serves to confirm this analysis, which concludes that the ratifiers must have understood, consistent with separation of powers principles, that the commission would be adequately funded by the Legislature in proportion to the size of the civil service. In that paragraph, the Constitution provides the commission with the financial means “[t]o enable the commission to exercise its powers [.]” In other words, upon receiving an operating appropriation, which is scaled to one percent of the total payroll of all classified civil servants, the Constitution