Breach of Contract Cases

Employee handbook unjust enrichment payment of accrued, unused PTO summary judgment

This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal by the defendant, the Rhode Island Troopers Association, from a judgment granting declaratory and equitable relief in favor of the plaintiff, the State of Rhode Island. The Superior Court declared that the Governmental Tort Liability Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 31 of title 9, vests the Attorney General with the nondelegable, nontransferable legal duty to determine whether the state should provide a defense and indemnification in a civil action brought against a state employee. The Superior Court also permanently enjoined arbitration of issues related to the Attorney General's decision to decline to provide a defense and indemnification for Rhode Island State Trooper James Donnelly-Taylor in a pending federal civil rights action brought against him in his individual capacity. After narrowing the issues on appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the trial justice's decision to permanently enjoin the arbitration proceedings, because the issues raised in this case are not arbitrable within the collective bargaining process. The Supreme Court also held that the Governmental Tort Liability Act vests the Attorney General with the authority to determine whether a state employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment and is therefore entitled to representation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed six of the eight declarations and vacated the two remaining declarations in the judgment of the Superior Court.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE – COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING AGREEMENT – UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE – WRONGFUL DISCHARGE – DISCRIMINATION – JURISDICTION: The State Employment Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over a wrongful-discharge claim brought against a public employer by an employee subject to a collective-bargaining agreement. Pursuant to R.C. 4117.11(B)(6), the State Employment Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over claim against a union for a breach of the duty to fairly represent a public employee. R.C. Chapter 4117 does not provide the exclusive remedy for a claim of disparate-treatment discrimination, which does not arise from or depend on a collective-bargaining agreement.

Res judicata

MALPRACTICE - legal where appellant discharged her attorney by letter in July 2015 and a cognizable event occurred in November 2015 when she signed a grievance against her attorney with Disciplinary Counsel, appellant's cause of action accrued and the statute of limitations began to run in November 2015 and the statute of limitations expired in November 2016 since appellant did not file her complaint until January 2017, the trial couirt did not err in finding that appellant's claim was time-barred and in granting Hurley's motion for summary judgment.

TRADE SECRETS – MISAPPROPRIATION: A company's client list and financial data are trade secrets where the client list and financial data derive independent value from not being generally known, and where the company has made efforts to maintain their secrecy. The unauthorized sharing of a company's trade secrets with an accountant, even for the purposes of due diligence for an investment in the company, and the disapproved retention of trade secrets, even for the purposes of preparing for litigation, are misappropriations under Ohio's Uniform Trade Secrets Act. A claim for misappropriation of trade secrets does not require proof of damages.

TRADE SECRETS – MISAPPROPRIATION: A company's client list and financial data are trade secrets where the client list and financial data derive independent value from not being generally known, and where the company has made efforts to maintain their secrecy. The unauthorized sharing of a company's trade secrets with an accountant, even for the purposes of due diligence for an investment in the company, and the disapproved retention of trade secrets, even for the purposes of preparing for litigation, are misappropriations under Ohio's Uniform Trade Secrets Act. A claim for misappropriation of trade secrets does not require proof of damages.

Breach of Contract,Mitigation,Settlement Offer,Accord and Satisfaction. U.S. Welding, Inc. (Welding) sought review of the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the district court's order awarding it no damages whatsoever for breach of contract with Advanced Circuits, Inc. (Advanced). Notwithstanding its determination following a bench trial that Advanced breached its contract to purchase from Welding all its nitrogen requirements during a one-year term, the district court reasoned that by declining Advanced's request for an estimate of lost profits expected to result from Advanced's breach before the contract term expired, Welding failed to mitigate. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment concerning the failure to mitigate and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court held that the district court erred by requiring Welding to settle for a projection of anticipated lost profits, rather than its actual loss, as measured by the amount of nitrogen Advanced actually purchased from another vendor over the contract term, because an aggrieved party is not obligated to mitigate damages from a breach by giving up its rights under the contract.

No error disposing case because no issue of material fact existed to challenge whether employment was governed by CBA no jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, Prospect CharterCARE, LLC (PCC), appealed from an order of the Superior Court denying its motion to vacate an arbitration award and confirming the award in favor of the defendant, Michael E. Conklin, Jr. On appeal, PCC contended that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by: (1) relying on a "concededly erroneous" factual assumption and thereby manifestly disregarding the applicable law (2) manifestly disregarding the clear and unambiguous contractual language that should have precluded any award in favor of the defendant and (3) ordering PCC to pay the defendant extended severance benefits when the defendant failed to prove that PCC had assumed liability for the employment contracts entered into between the defendant and his previous employer—PCC's predecessor entity. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator neither manifestly disregarded the law nor manifestly disregarded a contractual provision, because the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' agreement and was sufficiently grounded in the contract to be within the scope of his authority as an arbitrator. Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded that PCC had waived its argument with respect to assumption of liability under the employment contract. For these reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed the order and the judgment of the Superior Court.

Nonprofit Corporation Act, statutory interpretation, termination of membership

Buy and Sell Contract—Mineral Rights—Warranty Deed—Negligence—Breach of Contract—Statute of Limitations—Third Party—Cause of Action—Accrual Date. The Bells hired Orr Land Company LLC (Orr) and its employee Ellerman to represent them in selling their real property. Orr found a buyer and the Bells entered into a buy and sell contract with the buyer, which provided, as pertinent here, that the sale excluded all oil, gas, and mineral rights in the property. Orr then retained Land Title Guarantee Company (Land Title) to draft closing documents, including the warranty deed. In 2005 the Bells signed the warranty deed and sold the property to the buyer. The Bells didn't know that the warranty deed prepared by Land Title didn't contain any language reserving the Bells' mineral rights as provided in the buy and sell contract. For over nine years, the Bells continued to receive the mineral owner's royalty payments due under an oil and gas lease on the property. In 2014 the lessee oil and gas company learned that the Bells didn't own the mineral rights, so it began sending the payments to the buyer. After that, the Bells discovered that the warranty deed didn't reserve their mineral rights as provided in the buy and sell contract. In 2016 the Bells filed this negligence and breach of contract action against defendants Land Title, Orr, and Ellerman. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Bells' claims were untimely because the statute of limitations had run. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Bells contended that the district court erred in granting defendants' motions to dismiss because they sufficiently alleged facts that, if true, establish that the statute of limitations didn't begin to accrue on their claims until the oil and gas company ceased payment in September 2014, which is when they contended they discovered that the warranty deed didn't reserve their mineral rights. A plaintiff must commence tort actions within two years