Failure to Accommodate Cases

JUDY SKINNER, Plaintiff v. QUINTILES TRANSNATIONAL CORP., Defendant No. COA04-15 (Filed 21 December 2004) 1. Appeal and Error— appealability — interlocutory order— denial of motion for judgment on pleadings — res judicata— substantial right ■ Although an order denying a N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) motion is interlocutory, the denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on res judicata affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable. Although another panel of the Court of Appeals has limited such interlocutory appeals to situations where the prior decision involved a jury verdict, this panel did not need to attempt to resolve this apparent conflict since it exercised its discretion to hear the appeal under N.C. R. App. R 2. 2. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata— motion for judgment on the pleadings — new legal theory The trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the contention that the final judgment issued in a prior federal case based upon the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) barred plaintiffs state claims under the doctrine of res judicata in an action alleging that defendant violated North Carolina’s Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (REDA) by discharging plaintiff in retaliation for a work injury and her attempt to secure workers’ compensation benefits, because: (1) the instant action was a relevant and material matter within the scope of the proceeding which plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could and should have brought forward for determination in her federal action; (2) each of plaintiff’s two claims are based upon her termination by defendant, and the instant action merely presents a new legal theory as to why plaintiff was terminated by defendant; (3) although plaintiff did not receive a right-to-sue under REDA letter from the N.C. Commissioner of Labor until after she filed her federal ADA action, she had a right to request a right-to-sue letter before she filed her federal action and thus could have brought her REDA claim as part of her federal action; and (4) requiring plaintiff to request a right-to-sue letter from the North Carolina Department of Labor in order to bring all of her related claims in one action does not place an unnecessarily burdensome responsibility upon plaintiff. Judge Geer concurring in a separate opinion. Appeal by defendant from order entered 4 September 2003 by Judge Stafford G. Bullock in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 September 2004. Roger W. Rizk for plaintiff-appellee. Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jemigan, L.L.P., by Rosemary G. Kenyon, J. Mitchell Armbruster and Kathryn R. Valeika, for defendant-appellant. THORNBURG, Judge. Defendant appeals from an order denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendant moved for such a judgment based on the contention that the final judgment issued in the prior case Judy Skinner v. Quintiles Transnational Corp., Case No. 1:01-CV-01123 (M.D.N.C.), entered on 19 March 2003, barred plaintiff s state claims under the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff was employed by defendant for about six years, from April 1994 until October 2000, in various administrative positions, which required extensive amounts of typing. In early 1995, plaintiff began to experience pain in both of her arms. After a medical evaluation, plaintiff was diagnosed with bilateral ganglion cysts. Defendant provided plaintiff with a new mouse, a new chair with arm rests and occasional help from an assistant. Plaintiffs pain diminished. In early 2000, plaintiff was promoted to the Information Technology Software Quality Control Department as the documentation processor. Plaintiff began to experience pain in her arms, hands and shoulders. After reporting this pain to defendant on 3 March 2000, plaintiff encountered problems with management in her department and eventually transferred to a different department. Despite repeated discussions with her managers, plaintiff was still given tasks that required extensive typing and computer work, which aggravated her condition. Plaintiff sought medical treatments and was diagnosed with ganglion cysts, torn ligaments in her right hand, tendinitis, bursitis and carpal tunnel syndrome. Plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim for her condition in March 2000. Plaintiff contacted defendant’s human resources director in an attempt to find a position that would not require typing all day. Upon the director’s recommendation, plaintiff sought training for an open Clinical Research Assistant position. On 19 October 2000, while in a training session, plaintiff was asked to attend a meeting with management. Plaintiff was informed that she was being laid off from her current position due to reduction in staff. Plaintiff was offered a new position as a Project Associate, which plaintiff felt she could not perform given the position’s requirements and her medical condition. At the conclusion of the meeting, defendant told plaintiff that she had 24 hours to make a decision concerning the Project Associate position. Plaintiff immediately went to the North Carolina Department of Labor to file an employment discrimination complaint under North Carolina’s Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (“REDA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-240, et seq. (2003). An investigator for the Department of Labor contacted defendant’s Human Resources Department to inquire about the status of plaintiff’s employment. The investigator was told that plaintiff would not be required to accept or reject the new position within 24 hours and that plaintiff would, in fact, not have to respond until someone from defendant got in touch with plaintiff. Several weeks later, sometime in November 2000, plaintiff also filed a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that defendant had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2000). On 22 December 2000, plaintiff received her last paycheck from defendant. On 18 January 2001, defendant informed plaintiff that she had been terminated after she failed to accept the offered job position. On 24 July 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, alleging that defendant had violated provisions of the ADA in that defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations for plaintiff’s disability and had discharged plaintiff without accommodating her disability. On 17 December 2001, the matter was transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, due to the fact that all matters giving rise to the action occurred in Durham County and Durham County is located in the Middle District. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiffs claims. Summary judgment was granted and plaintiffs complaint was dismissed with prejudice on 19 March 2003. Plaintiff commenced the instant action on 17 January 2003, alleging that defendant violated REDA in that defendant discharged plaintiff in retaliation for a work injury and her attempt to secure workers’ compensation benefits. Defendant answered plaintiffs complaint and asserted as a defense that plaintiffs claim was barred by res judicata due to the final judgment of the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in the first case. Defendant then moved, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c), for a judgment on the pleadings based on the res judicata defense. This motion was denied on 4 September 2003. Defendant appeals. “After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (2003). The function of this section of the rule is to dispose of baseless claims or defenses when the formal pleadings reveal their lack of merit. Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974). In determining whether the trial court erred in its ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, this Court applies the following standard: A motion for judgment on the pleadings, or a Rule 12(c) motion, is proper when all the material allegations of fact are admitted on the pleadings and only questions of law remain. The movant must show, even when viewing the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that he is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because judgment on the pleadings is a summary procedure and the judgment is final, the movant is held to a strict standard and must show that no material issue of fact exists. DeTorre v. Shell Oil Co., 84 N.C. App. 501, 504, 353 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1987) (internal citations omitted). Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by res judicata and, thus, erred in denying defendant’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings. We first note that an order denying a Rule 12(c) motion is interlocutory and that there is generally no right to appeal an interlocutory order. There are two exceptions to this general rule: [F]irst, where there has been a final determination of at least one claim, and the trial court certifies there is no just reason to delay the appeal, [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (2003)]; and second, if delaying the appeal would prejudice a “substantial right.” Country Club of Johnston County, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 135 N.C. App. 159, 162, 519 S.E.2d 540, 543 (1999) (quoting Liggett Group v. Sunas, 113 N.C. App. 19, 23-24, 437 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1993)), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 352, 542 S.E.2d 207-08 (2000). Defendant notes that this Court has held that the denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on res judicata affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable. Clancy v. Onslow Cty., 151 N.C. App. 269, 271, 564 S.E.2d 920, 922 (2002). However, another panel of this Court has limited such interlocutory appeals to situations where the prior decision involved a jury verdict. Country Club, 135 N.C. App. at 167, 519 S.E.2d at 546. We need not attempt to resolve this apparent conflict, because we choose to exercise our discretion to hear this appeal pursuant to Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The doctrine of res judicata is intended to force parties to join all matters which might or should have been pleaded in one action. Clancy, 151 N.C. App. at 271-72, 564 S.E.2d at 922-23. Res judicata is a bar to subsequent action when there is a final judgment on the merits in a prior action, both actions involve the same parties and both actions involve the same cause of action. Id. at 271, 564 S.E.2d at 922. A final judgment bars not only all matters actually determined or litigated in the prior proceeding, but also all relevant and material matters within the scope of the proceeding which the parties, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could and should have brought forward for determination. Rogers Builders v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 22, 331 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1985), disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 590, 341 S.E.2d 29 (1986). It is clear that there was a final judgment entered in plaintiffs federal claim and that plaintiff and defendant are the same parties as in the federal claim. However, the two actions do not involve exactly the same issue. Thus, the question becomes whether the instant action was a “relevant and material [matter] within the scope of the proceeding which [plaintiff], in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could and should have brought forward for determination.” Id. Plaintiff contends that the instant claim is separate and distinct from the claim brought in the federal action. Plaintiff argues: (1) that claims under the ADA and REDA require proof of different facts, thus making them different claims; and (2) that plaintiff had no REDA claim to assert in the federal action because she had not received a right-to-sue letter from the North Carolina Department of Labor at the time of filing the federal action. Our courts have not adopted the “transactional approach” to res judicata in which all issues arising out of a single transaction or series of transactions must be tried together as one claim. Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 493-94, 428 S.E.2d 157, 162-63 (1993). In Bockweg, the Court determined that res judicata was inapplicable because plaintiffs sought separate remedies for distinct acts of negligence leading to separate and distinct injuries. Id. at 496, 428 S.E.2d at 164. However, “[t]he defense of res judicata may not be avoided by shifting legal theories or asserting a new or different ground for relief . . . .” Rogers, 76 N.C. App. at 30, 331 S.E.2d at 735. In the instant action, while plaintiff has brought claims under two different statutes, her claims stem from the same relevant conduct by defendant. In the first complaint, plaintiff specifically alleged that: 28. The Defendant has violated [the ADA] by retaliating against the Plaintiff for filing her initial charge of discrimination by terminating the Plaintiff. (Emphasis added). In the instant action, plaintiff alleged: 16. The [REDA] prohibits the discharge of an employee in retaliation for a work injury and an attempt by the employee to recover workers [sic] compensation benefits. The Defendant has violated the provisions of such act by terminating the Plaintiff in retaliation for her work related injury and her attempt to secure workers [sic] compensation benefits. (Emphasis added). Further, the United States Magistrate Judge, in an opinion fully adopted by United States District Judge Frank W. Bullock, Jr., spent several pages discussing the termination aspect of plaintiffs ADA claim. It is clear that each of plaintiff’s two claims are based upon her termination by defendant and that the instant action merely presents a new legal theory as to why plaintiff was terminated by defendant. See Rogers, 76 N.C. App. at 30, 331 S.E.2d at 735. However, before res judicata can bar the instant action, this Court must also decide whether plaintiff, with reasonable diligence, could and should have brought the claims included in the instant action with the first action. Plaintiff argues that she could not have included her current claims in the first action because she had not yet received a right-to-sue letter from the North Carolina Department of Labor. “An employee may only bring an action under this section when he has been issued a right-to-sue letter by the [North Carolina Labor] Commissioner.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-243(e) (2003). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-242(a) (2003) requires the Commissioner of Labor to make a determination on a complaint no later than 90 days after the filing of the complaint. However, this Court has concluded that the time limit is not mandatory because the statute fails to provide any ramifications in the event the Commissioner fails to take action. Commissioner of Labor v. House of Raeford Farms, 124 N.C. App. 349, 477 S.E.2d 230 (1996). “An employee may make a written request to the Commissioner for a right-to-sue letter after 180 days following the filing of a complaint if the Commissioner has not issued a notice of conciliation failure and has not commenced an action pursuant to G.S. 95,242.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-242(c) (2003). The Commissioner did not issue plaintiff a right-to-sue letter until 23 October 2002. However, plaintiff filed her complaint on 21 October 2000, and was thus entitled to request a right-to-sue letter on or about 21 April 2001, before she filed the complaint in the original federal action. While the administrative investigation process set up under REDA is a valid and useful part of pursuing employment discrimination claims, plaintiff chose the path of litigation of her claims regarding her termination when she filed her original complaint. We do not believe, in this case, that requiring plaintiff to request a right-to-sue letter in order to bring all of her related claims in one action places an unnecessarily burdensome responsibility upon plaintiff. Thus, we conclude that, with reasonable diligence, plaintiff could and should have brought the claims that make up the instant action as part of her original federal action. Defendant has shown that plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court to enter an order granting a judgment on the pleadings to defendant. Reversed and remanded. Judge GEER concurs in a separate opinion. Judge LEVINSON concurs. GEER, Judge concurring. I concur with the foregoing opinion, but write separately to address further the fact that a right-to-sue letter had not yet been issued at the time plaintiff filed her ADA suit. Plaintiffs appeal places two policy considerations squarely in conflict. On the one hand, dismissing this action based on res judicata would undermine the administrative scheme established by the General Assembly. By requiring the parties to proceed administratively before the Department of Labor prior to filing suit, the General Assembly — like Congress, before it, in enacting Title VII— recognized the value of having an administrative body investigate claims and, if appropriate, attempt to resolve them without the need for litigation. On the other hand, the common law rule against claim-splitting is well-established in North Carolina and holds that “all damages incurred as the result of a single wrong must be recovered in one lawsuit.” Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 492, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1993) (emphasis omitted). To allow a person to seek damages for a termination of employment based on one theory and then, after an adverse decision on that theory, seek the same damages under another theory raises the specter of repetitive litigation, duplicative discovery, possibly inconsistent results, and -no assurance of finality. I believe the two policies must be reconciled. The question is whether the policy underlying REDA’s administrative review process trumps traditional claim-splitting principles. In this case, as the majority opinion explains, plaintiff was permitted by state law to request a notice of right to sue in order to include the REDA claim in her federal lawsuit. If she preferred to continue the administrative process, she had the option, as defendant suggests, (a) to seek a stay of the pending action in order to allow completion of the administrative process or (b) to move to amend the complaint once the notice of right to sue was received.-Plaintiff, however, took no steps at all to try to include the REDA claim in the pending action. Significantly, the federal district court did not enter summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim until 19 March 2003, five months after plaintiff received her notice of right to sue with respect to the REDA claim. I would also observe that while North Carolina courts have not previously addressed the issue before this Court, numerous other courts have considered closely analogous circumstances and overwhelmingly have reached the same conclusion as this Court. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wyo. Dep’t of Employment Div. of Labor Standards, 314 F.3d 501, 506 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that a Title VII lawsuit was barred by res judicata since plaintiff could have requested a right-to-sue letter or sought to stay a prior Equal Pay Act lawsuit pending completion of the EEOC administrative process), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 826, 157 L. Ed. 2d 48, 124 S. Ct. 181 (2003); Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 193-94 (3d Cir. 1999) (when a jury had rendered a verdict in a case alleging that plaintiffs termination violated the FMLA, plaintiffs second action challenging the discharge under the ADA was barred by res judicata; plaintiff should have requested a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC or sought a stay of the FMLA action pending receipt of the letter); Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127 F

BAGERIS v BRANDON TOWNSHIP Docket No. 249008. Submitted September 8, 2004, at Detroit. Decided October 21, 2004, at 9:00 a.m. Christopher Bageris brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court against Brandon Township, alleging a failure to accommodate a disability under the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1101 et seq. The plaintiff, a part-time firefighter, had applied for full-time employment, but his application was denied after other applicants outscored him on examinations that included a written portion. The court, John J. McDonald, J., granted summary disposition for the defendant, determining that, although Bageris had provided his employer with a written notice of his request for an accommodation for disability before the examination, MCL 37.1210(18), the notice was ineffective because it did not describe any reason or disability requiring accommodation. The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held: MCL 37.1210(18) requires one with a disability who requests an accommodation to file a written notice of the need for the accommodation within 182 days after the person with the disability knew or reasonably should have known that an accommodation was needed. The plaintiff was able to do his fire-fighting tasks without accommodation, but claimed to need a reader to help with the examination process because of his dyslexia. In this sort of discrimination case, to be liable, the employer must have a certain level of awareness regarding the plaintiffs disability because that knowledge enables the employer to know what sort of accommodation or remedial action is appropriate. Without some specified showing of the reason for the requested accommodation, an employer cannot properly determine whether to grant the requested accommodation. Affirmed. Civil Rights — Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act — Accommodation by Employer — Notice. Notice of a disability by a person seeking accommodation by his employer must specify the reason for the requested accommodation, without which the employer cannot properly determine whether to provide the requested accommodation (MCL 37.1210E18]). Law Offices of Frank J. Kokenakes, PLC (by Frank J. Kokenakes), for the plaintiff. Johnson, Rosati, LaBarge, Aseltyne & Field, EC. (by Marcia L. Howe, Laura S. Amtsbuechler, and Carlito H. Young), for the defendant. Before: SCHUETTE, EJ., and BANDSTRA and METER, JJ. BANDSTRA, J. In this claim for failure to accommodate disability, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10). We conclude that plaintiff failed to adequately inform defendant of his alleged disability, resulting in no duty to accommodate. We affirm. BASIC FACTS Plaintiff began working with defendant’s fire department as a part-time firefighter in 1997. In December 2001, plaintiff applied for one of three full-time firefighter/paramedic positions that became available. The selection process involved a three-part examination consisting of practical, written, and oral portions. Plaintiff scored seventh, among as many applicants, with a combined test score of seventy-one percent. After the top applicant withdrew his name from contention, the remaining top three applicants with the highest combined scores (ranging from eighty-three to ninety-one percent) were offered the full-time positions. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that defendant violated Michigan’s Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq., by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation to plaintiff during the written portion of the examination. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that he suffers from dyslexia and that, before the written examination, he informed Fire Department Chief Robert McArthur that he needed a “reader” to assist him during the examination. Plaintiff claims that, as a result of defendant’s failure to provide the requested accommodation, he did not do well enough to be awarded a position. At his deposition, plaintiff testified that he was first diagnosed with dyslexia in junior high school. However, the report from the Livonia Public Schools regarding plaintiffs condition does not specifically state that plaintiff suffered from dyslexia. It indicates only that plaintiff suffered from a “learning disability.” Plaintiff testified that, despite the school district’s conclusion that he had a learning disability, he never followed up with a visit to a doctor regarding his condition. Plaintiff further testified that, before the firefighter/paramedic examination, the first time he informed Chief McArthur that he was dyslexic and required a reader was at the orientation for the examination. However, McArthur testified that while plaintiff informed him that he needed a reader, plaintiff never indicated that he needed the reader because he was dyslexic. Rather, McArthur testified that plaintiff told him he needed the reader because “he had difficulty taking tests, [and] that he did not like taking them____” Plaintiff testified that, two days before the examination, he followed up with Chief McArthur on his initial oral request for a reader by leaving a note on McArthur’s desk, reiterating his desire to have a reader for the examination. But McArthur testified that he never saw the note. Plaintiff also indicated that he went to McArthur’s office the following day to ask him whether a reader would be provided. Plaintiff testified that McArthur told him that a proctor would be at the examination, and that if anyone had a question about the examination, they could ask the proctor. Plaintiff also testified that McArthur told all the candidates there would be no time limit for the written portion of the examination; however, “the understanding was that the test was from [9:00 a.m.] until whenever you finished] and then whenever you finished you [could] have lunch but the practical [portion of the examination started at 1:00 p.m.].” McArthur testified that plaintiff never indicated' that merely having the proctor available during the written examination was unacceptable. Despite the presence of the proctor during the 130-question examination, plaintiff testified that he did not approach her to ask questions because he believed it would be disruptive for the other test-takers and an embarrassment to himself. Finally, plaintiff testified that his dyslexia did not affect his work as a part-time firefighter because he was able to keep a dictionary with him to aid him in filling out his job reports. Plaintiff acknowledged that at one point his reports had become so illegible that he was required to practice filling them out. Plaintiff also indicated that his dyslexia had not kept him from his daily activities. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10). Defendant argued that plaintiffs PWDCRA claim was meritless because plaintiff failed to provide any documentary evidence regarding his alleged disability before the examination. Defendant further pointed out that plaintiff was not even diagnosed with dyslexia until he was examined by an expert witness — after he filed the lawsuit. And, although plaintiff allegedly provided a note to McArthur requesting a reader for the examination, plaintiff admitted that the note did not specifically inform McArthur that the reader was necessary because plaintiff had dyslexia. In granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court first noted that although plaintiff “provide[d] his employer, Chief McArthur, with written notice of his request for an accommodation two days prior to the exam at issue ... [t]he written notice did not contain the reason or disability requiring the accommodation.” The trial court ruled that plaintiffs claim must therefore fail because plaintiff did not provide sufficient documentation of his alleged disability before the examination: It further appears undisputed that Plaintiff was not officially diagnosed as dyslexic until after the lawsuit was filed. At the time of the requested accommodation it is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to provide his employer with any documentation regarding this disability. The absence of any documentation or other documentary evidence showing Plaintiff was dyslexic is fatal to his claim under the act____ An allegedly dyslexic Plaintiff is not handicapped under the civil rights statute when Plaintiff fails to provide documentary evidence in support of the allegation. In other words, the trial court ruled that plaintiff could not maintain a claim of failure to accommodate because he had not properly notified defendant in writing of the need for accommodation. MCL 37.1210(18). STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition. Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 682; 677 NW2d 843 (2004). “A motion under MCR 2.116(0(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). In evaluating a motion brought under this subsection, we consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. “Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. Similarly, statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Golf Concepts v Rochester Hills, 217 Mich App 21, 26; 550 NW2d 803 (1996). The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 665; 685 NW2d 648 (2004). Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act. Draprop Corp v City of Ann Arbor, 247 Mich App 410, 415; 636 NW2d 787 (2001). The first criterion in determining legislative intent is the specific language of the statute. Rose Hill Ctr, Inc v Holly Twp, 224 Mich App 28, 32; 568 NW2d 332 (1997). “If the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and we enforce the statute as written.” Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). “In reviewing the statute’s language, every word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” Id. DISCUSSION The only issue properly presented to us for review is whether the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to provide sufficient written notice regarding his alleged disability and thus failed to trigger a duty for defendant to accommodate that disability. The actual written notice plaintiff alleges he provided to defendant is not contained in the record. However, plaintiff did not testify, and does not specifically argue on appeal, that the written notice he allegedly provided defendant did anything beyond requesting a reader, i.e., it did not specify any handicap necessitating that assistance. The statutory notice of accommodation provision states as follows: A person with a disability may allege a violation against a person regarding a failure to accommodate under this article only if the person with a disability notifies the person in writing of the need for accommodation within 182 days after the date the person with a disability knew or reasonably should have known that an accommodation was needed. [MCL 37.1210(18).] The trial court interpreted the above notice requirement as requiring that, in addition to a written request for an accommodation, the person requesting the accommodation must provide documented evidence of a specific disability to the employer. Therefore, the question before us is what type of written notification “of the need for accommodation” is necessary under MCL 37.12KX18). Although simply stated, the most appropriate axiom for interpreting this statute is that we “should not abandon the canons of common sense.” Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich 638, 644; 513 NW2d 799 (1994). Additionally, if a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and enforce the statute as written. Wickens, supra at 60. In this case, nothing in the plain language of the statute provides any guidance on what type of written notification is necessary to reasonably inform the employer what type of accommodation is needed or, more importantly, why the accommodation is needed. However, the PWDCRA places the burden of proof for a claim of failure to accommodate on the person with a disability. MCL 37.1210(1). In light of that and applying common sense, we conclude that an employee cannot satisfy the written notice requirement of MCL 37.1210(18) by simply stating “I need a reader because I have difficulty with tests.” Without at least a brief explanation of why an accommodation is needed, in terms of some physical or mental condition, the employer has no basis on which to make an educated decision whether a “disability” under the PWDCRA, and thus any “duty to accommodate,” is at issue. The employer would be left in an unnecessarily precarious position. Having no informed basis on which to respond, an employer could deny an accommodation and be held liable in an action under the PWDCRA for a failure to accommodate — even though the employer had no way of knowing whether the act applied or whether an accommodation was legally necessary. Our conclusion here is similar to the notice requirement for a claim alleging sexual harassment within a hostile work environment, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. An employer must have notice of the alleged harassment before liability will attach because, without such notice, the employer has no basis on which to take remedial action. Sheridan v Forest Hills Pub Schools, 247 Mich App 611, 621; 637 NW2d 536 (2001). Moreover, “[c]ourts must apply an objective standard of review when considering whether the employer was provided adequate notice.” Id. “ ‘[N]otice of sexual harassment is adequate if, by an objective standard, the totality of the circumstances were such that a reasonable employer would have been aware of a substantial probability that sexual harassment was occurring.’ ” Id. at 622, quoting Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 319; 614 NW2d 910 (2000) (emphasis in Sheridan). For instance, in Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 259 Mich App 187, 196; 673 NW2d 776 (2003), lv gtd on unrelated issues 470 Mich 892 (2004), this Court ruled that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice to her employer of alleged sexual harassment. Although the plaintiff filed various grievances and complaints alleging that a co-worker’s actions created a “hostile environment,” nothing in the written notices indicated that the alleged sexual harassment had occurred in the workplace. Id. Therefore, under the objective standard required by Chambers, supra at 319, this Court ruled that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant had notice of the alleged sexual harassment. Elezovic, supra at 196. The analogy to the notice requirement of hostile work environment/sexual harassment cases is useful because both notice requirements have the same purpose: to make an employer aware of the situation so that, if necessary, remedial action can be taken. Thus, both types of discrimination cases must be premised on the employer having a certain level of awareness regarding a plaintiffs situation because that enables the employer to know what type of remedial action to take. Under MCL 37.1210(18), the notice of a need for accommodation must allow defendant the opportunity to assess the accommodation request. Without some specified showing of the reason for the requested accommodation, an employer cannot properly determine whether to grant the requested accommodation. Our conclusion in this regard also disposes of plaintiffs claim that defendant owed him a duty to engage in an interactive process regarding his need for an accommodation. That claim, based on federal law, is premised in part on a showing that “the employer knew about the employee’s disability.” Barnes v Northwest Iowa Health Ctr, 238 F Supp 2d 1053, 1085 (ND Iowa, 2002). For the reasons stated, plaintiff cannot satisfy this requirement here and this claim is without merit. We affirm. Defendant also argued that plaintiff did not meet the definition of an individual with a “disability” under MCL 37.1103(d)(i)(A). Specifically, defendant pointed out that plaintiff testified that his dyslexia did not prevent him from performing any of his major life activities and argued that plaintiff failed to establish that his dyslexia is “unrelated to [his] ability to perform” the duties of a firefighter/paramedic. Id. Further, defendant argued that even if plaintiff met the definition of an individual with a disability, his claim would still fail because he did not establish that defendant failed to reasonably accommodate his alleged disability. These arguments did not form the basis of the trial court’s ruling and, in light of our decision to affirm on other grounds, we express no opinion on their merit. On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to properly post notices regarding how to properly allege a disability and need for accommodation under MCL 37.1210(19) and argues that defendant was thus prohibited from requiring notification under the statute and common-law estoppel principles. However, these issues were not preserved below and plaintiff has failed to provide any citation of the record that would substantiate his position that notice was not posted. See Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998) (“a mere statement without authority is insufficient to bring an issue before this Court”). Moreover, it is insufficient for plaintiff “simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). Further, plaintiff argues that defendant’s actions constituted a failure to promote him because of a disability under MCL 37.1202(l)(a), but “[tjhis issue was not preserved for appeal because it was not raised in and decided by the trial court.” Fast Air, Inc v Knight, 235 Mich App 541, 549; 599 NW2d 489 (1999). The only allegation in plaintiffs complaint was a failure to accommodate under MCL 37.1210(18), and that was the basis for the trial court’s ruling. This is an issue of first impression; there is no Michigan case law interpreting what type of written notice of a “need for accommodation” is sufficient to satisfy MCL 37.1210(18). In the worst case, in the absence of a requirement that there be notice of a known disability, a plaintiff could bring a claim of failure to accommodate upon later discovering that he had a disability justifying the accommodation at the time. Further, we note that here the record does not establish that plaintiffs written request even referenced the PWDCBA. However, even if he had done so, but failed to provide any information on the condition he claimed was a disability, our conclusion would be the same.

Dolores L. Alba, administratrix, vs. Raytheon Company. Middlesex. April 5, 2004. June 1, 2004. Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Sosman, & Cordy, JJ. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Collateral Estoppel. Anti-Discrimination Law, Handicap. A Superior Court judge properly concluded that collateral estoppel barred a civil action brought under G. L. c. 15 IB which alleged that the defendant employer’s failure reasonably to accommodate an employee with a handicap led to the employee’s suicide where, in an earlier workers’ compensation case, an administrative judge made factual findings on the same question of reasonable accommodations when deciding whether the employee’s suicide was due to a mental or emotional disability caused by or arising from his employment. [840-845] Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 15, 1998. The case was heard by Janet L. Sanders, J., on a motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. James R. Tewhey for the plaintiff. James F Kavanaugh, Jr. (Stephen S. Churchill with him) for the defendant. Shannon Liss-Riordan & M. Amy Carlin for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Of the estate of Santo J. Alba. Ireland, J. The plaintiff, the administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Santo J. Alba (Alba), appeals from a judgment entered in favor of Alba’s former employer, the defendant, Raytheon Company (Raytheon). A Superior Court judge allowed Raytheon’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff’s claim of handicap discrimination under G. L. c. 151B is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the judge incorrectly decided the collateral estoppel issue, and also contends that she proffered sufficient evidence that Raytheon failed to provide reasonable accommodation to Alba to preclude summary judgment in favor of Raytheon. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. Because we conclude that the judge did not err in concluding that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.’ Background. We summarize the facts, reserving certain details for discussion in connection with the specific issues raised. Raytheon hired Alba as a sheet metal foreman in its Bedford plant in 1988. His job responsibilities increased over the years due to the restructuring of Raytheon’s work force, which required him to work longer hours. In March, 1994, Alba was hospitalized due to severe depression. He reported to his treating psychiatrists (who diagnosed him as also suffering from bipolar disorder) that he was under pressure at work. They recommended that he reduce his hours. There is some dispute as to what Raytheon was told when Alba returned to work in April, 1994. It is undisputed, however, that Alba was assured that his job was secure and that he would not be required to work more than forty hours per week. Raytheon contends that was all that was requested. For the next fifteen months, Alba did not work more than forty hours per week. On May 15, 1995, Alba was temporarily assigned to a different area of Raytheon. There is some dispute whether this required him to assume responsibilities comparable to his work as a sheet metal foreman or imposed some additional responsibilities. However, Alba did not object to being reassigned. Later that day, Alba was found dead in a Raytheon shop, the victim of a self-inflicted head injury. Following Alba’s death, the plaintiff filed a claim with the Department of Industrial Accidents (department) for benefits under G. L. c. 152, § 31 (granting benefits to a deceased employee’s spouse) and § 33 (covering employee’s funeral expenses). She also filed a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (commission). The claim before the department proceeded to a full hearing before an administrative judge in 1996. Following a six-day hearing, which included testimony from fifteen witnesses, the administrative judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, determining that she was not entitled to benefits. The decision became final when the plaintiff failed to perfect her appeal to the department’s reviewing board. The plaintiff voluntarily withdrew her charge of discrimination filed with the commission, and commenced a civil action in the Superior Court against Raytheon and one of its managers, Daniel Harry Paras, on the theory that Raytheon failed reasonably to accommodate Alba’s emotional handicap. In a three count complaint, the plaintiff, individually and as administratrix of Alba’s estate, claimed that Raytheon discriminated against Alba in violation of G. L. c. 15IB and G. L. c. 93, § 103; Paras, as Raytheon’s manager, also discriminated against Alba in violation of the same statutes; and Raytheon’s discrimination resulted in the plaintiff’s loss of consortium. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of the count against Paras, and Raytheon moved to dismiss the two remaining counts under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). A Superior Court judge allowed Raytheon’s motion with respect to the plaintiff’s discrimination claim under G. L. c. 93, § 103, and her loss of consortium claim. She denied Raytheon’s motion with respect to the plaintiff’s claim of handicap discrimination under G. L. c. 15IB, concluding that a claim under G. L. c. 151B survived the death of the alleged victim. Raytheon then filed a motion for summary judgment on the single remaining G. L. c. 15 IB claim, arguing that it had provided the only accommodation requested by Alba (namely that he work no more than forty hours per week); the plaintiff could not prove that Alba was a qualified handicapped person entitled to any accommodations; and the plaintiff was collaterally estopped, based on the proceedings before the department, from proving that Alba suffered any harm arising from his employment. Concerning Raytheon’s first argument, the judge who considered the motion for summary judgment concluded that there was “enough in the materials ... to raise a triable issue.” The judge, however, granted Raytheon’s motion on the ground that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from pursuing her discrimination claim by certain findings that the administrative judge made in the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation case.* ** The judge stated: “Through six days of hearings and fifteen witnesses, [the plaintiff] attempted to show that her husband’s suicide and the emotional problems which led to it were caused by an event or series of events occurring in the course of Alba’s employment. In deciding against her, the [administrative judge] expressly addressed what Raytheon did or failed to do in dealing with Alba’s psychological difficulties, and made findings on precisely the issues which are important to [the] plaintiff’s case now before this [c]curt. In particular, the [administrative judge] found that Alba did not request any special accommodation when he returned [to] work after his hospitalization (which was the first time that his supervisor became aware of Alba’s problem), nor did he ask that his work be restricted in any way. Moreover, the [administrative judge] found that, on the day of his death, Alba was not given increased job responsibilities. These are precisely the issues which [the] plaintiff now contends are in dispute so as to make summary judgment inappropriate. Where those issues have already been fully litigated, however, [the] plaintiff should not be afforded the opportunity to try them all over again.” Discussion. 1. Summary judgment standard. The grant of summary judgment will be upheld on appeal when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . . [The appellate court] may consider any ground supporting the judgment.” (Citations omitted.) Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991). See Champagne v. Commissioner of Correction, 395 Mass. 382, 386 (1985) (appellate court not bound by ground relied on by Superior Court). The appellate court will “resolve all evidentiary inferences in favor” of the nonmoving party. Simplex Techs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 196, 197 (1999). 2. Collateral estoppel. The plaintiff argues that the judge erred in granting Raytheon’s motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. She maintains that the administrative judge’s findings on the question of reasonable accommodation (see note 6, supra), were not essential to his determination that Alba’s injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. We disagree. We conclude that, in an action brought under G. L. c. 15IB, a party is collaterally estopped from claiming that an employer’s failure reasonably to accommodate an employee with a handicap led to the employee’s suicide where, in an earlier workers’ compensation case, an administrative judge made factual findings on the same question of reasonable accommodations when deciding whether the employee’s suicide was due to a mental or emotional disability caused by or arising from his employment. The judicial doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that “[wjhen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Martin v. Ring, 401 Mass. 59, 61 (1987), quoting Fireside Motors, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 395 Mass. 366, 372 (1985). See Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 530-531 (2002). The purpose of the doctrine is “to conserve judicial resources, to prevent the unnecessary costs associated with multiple litigation, and to ensure the finality of judgments.” Martin v. Ring, supra. The doctrine may be applied with respect to administrative agency determinations so long as the tribunal rendering judgment has the legal authority to adjudicate the dispute. Id. “The guiding principle in determining whether to allow defensive use of collateral estoppel is whether the party against whom it is asserted Tacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or [whether] other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue.’ ” Id. at 62, quoting Fidler v. E.M. Parker Co., 394 Mass. 534, 541 (1985). Before applying the doctrine, a court must answer affirmatively four questions: (1) was there a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication; (2) was the party against whom estoppel is asserted a party (or in privity with a party) to the prior adjudication; (3) was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question; and (4) was the issue decided in the prior adjudication essential to the judgment in the prior adjudication? Martin v. Ring, supra at 61-62. See Green v. Brookline, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 120, 123 (2001), and cases cited. There is no question that there was a final order on the merits by the department, and that the parties in both actions are identical. We must, therefore, consider whether the findings made by the administrative judge in the workers’ compensation case were identical to the issues raised in the Superior Court, and if so, whether those findings were essential, or treated as essential, to the department’s order. a. Identity of issues. The parties do not dispute that, in the prior adjudication, the plaintiff had to prove that Alba sustained a physical or mental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment; that there was a causal connection between his employment, that injury, and his eventual suicide; and that due to the injury, Alba was of such unsoundness of mind as to make him not responsible for his act of suicide. See G. L. c. 152, § 26A. The plaintiff’s contentions in the department proceedings were predicated on allegations that, as a result of Raytheon’s refusal to make requested accommodations and its increasing Alba’s job responsibilities, Alba suffered a work-related injury that led to his suicide. Following a six-day hearing, which included testimony from fifteen witnesses, as well as the review of medical evidence and psychiatric records, the administrative judge concluded that Alba’s death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. In reaching this conclusion, he made several subsidiary findings (see note 6, supra), including the findings that Alba did not request any special accommodation or ask that his work be restricted in any way when he returned to work after his hospitalization (which was the first time that his supervisor learned of Alba’s problems), and that Raytheon did not increase Alba’s duties on the day of his death. For the purposes of preclusion, the issues thus resolved by the administrative judge are identical to the issues raised by the plaintiff in her G. L. c. 151B claim. See Commissioner of the Dep’t of Employment & Training v. Dugan, 428 Mass. 138, 143 (1998) (“In some cases, even if there is a lack of total identity between the issues involved in two adjudications, the overlap may be so substantial that preclusion is plainly appropriate”). The plaintiff’s argument that the administrative judge’s findings should not be given preclusive effect because the elements of a workers’ compensation case are different from the elements of a discrimination case is without merit. That the claims are brought under different statutes is not controlling. Courts have repeatedly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to a second action asserting a different claim from the first. Green v. Brookline, supra at 124-127. See Corrigan v. General Elec. Co., 406 Mass. 478 (1990); Martin v. Ring, supra at 61; Fireside Motors, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., supra at 372. b. Necessity of contested issues to ruling in first adjudication. Massachusetts courts have “expand[ed] the applicability of [collateral estoppel] to encompass certain findings not strictly essential to the final judgment in the prior action . . . if it is clear that the issues underlying them were treated as essential to the prior case by the court and the party to be bound. Stated another way, it is necessary that such findings be the product of full litigation and careful decision.” Green v. Brookline, supra at 126-127, quoting Commissioner of the Dep’t of Employment & Training v. Dugan, supra at 144. See Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 533-534 (2002). Although in both the Dugan and Green cases the issues were neither identical nor strictly essential to the prior litigation, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied, because in both cases the party against whom the doctrine was being used defensively had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues the first time. See Commissioner of the Dep’t of Employment & Training v. Dugan, supra; Green v. Brookline, supra. Like the Dugan and Green litigants, the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, and did litigate, the relevant issues in the first proceeding. Although the administrative judge’s findings regarding whether Raytheon made reasonable accommodation for Alba were subsidiary to the determination whether Alba suffered any injury in the course of his employment, they addressed the precise theory of work-related injury pressed by the plaintiff, i.e., that the employer’s alleged failure to accommodate was what triggered the suicide. Those findings were “the product of full litigation and careful decision,” Green v. Brookline, supra, and, therefore, should be treated as essential to that determination. As such, all the elements for applying collateral estoppel are met. The judge correctly decided the issue. Conclusion. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the judge did not err in concluding that the plaintiff’s discrimination action brought under G. L. c. 15 IB was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Judgment affirmed. Because of our ruling on the issue of collateral estoppel, we do not reach the plaintiff’s argument that she presented sufficient evidence that Raytheon failed to provide reasonable accommodation to Alba to survive Raytheon’s motion for summary judgment. We acknowledge the amicus brief filed by the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association. These rulings are not challenged in this appeal. Because of our ruling on the collateral estoppel issue, we need not address the parties’ arguments concerning the survivability of claims under G. L. c. 151B. We note, however, that G. L. c. 151B itself is silent on the issue, and that G. L. c. 15 IB is not expressly referenced in the survival statute, G. L. c. 228, § 1. Given that survivability of discrimination claims may have important ramifications with respect to the policies of deterrence and remediation that underlie G. L. c. 151B, we commend the issue to the Legislature’s attention. The judge noted that, before the department, the parties fully litigated whether Alba’s suicide was due to a mental or emotional disability caused by or arising from his employment, an inquiry required under G. L. c. 152. In resolving this issue, the administrative judge made several subsidiary findings. First, he determined that, although Alba had been hospitalized for psychiatric problems in March, 1994, he returned to work with clearance from his physician and did not seek any accommodation or ask that his work be restricted in any way. Second, the administrative judge credited Paras’s testimony that he was not aware that Alba had any problems prior to his March, 1994, hospitalization, and that, when informed about the hospitalization, Paras assured Alba that his job status was secure and that information about his condition would be kept confidential. Third, the administrative judge found that although Alba was assigned to a different area of the plant on the day of his suicide, he agreed to the assignment, which was temporary and did not involve an increase in his duties. Finally, the administrative judge adopted the opinion of a medical expert hired by Raytheon that there was “no substantial evidence in the medical records to indicate that any event or series of events in [Alba’s] employment with Raytheon was the predominant contributing cause” of his suicide. The administrative judge concluded that Alba’s death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The plaintiff further contends that any finding on accommodation requests is not preclusive because the department has no authority to make such a determination under G. L. c. 151B. The plaintiff asserts that the Superior Court judge’s decision “has the effect of allowing [defendants to litigate discrimination claims [before] the [department],” and requires workers “to choose between a claim for workers’ compensation and a claim for handicap discrimination.” It is settled law that “[a] final order of an administrative agency in an adjudicatory proceeding . . . precludes relitigation of the same issues between the same parties, just as would a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.” Green v. Brookline, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 120, 123-124 (2001), quoting Taper v. North Adams Ambulance Serv., Inc., 428 Mass. 132, 135 (1998). The plaintiff’s claim of handicap discrimination in violation of G. L. c. 151B is based on her contention that Raytheon did not make reasonable accommodation for Alba’s emotional disability. To prove her case, the plaintiff must show that Alba was a “qualified handicapped person” capable of performing the essential functions of his job with reasonable accommodation; Alba requested such accommodation,