Failure to Accommodate Cases

Last injurious exposure Average weekly wage calculation North Carolina Full Industrial Commission authority to amend an award

Defendant doctor appeals a medical malpractice decision. We found that the doctor failed to disclose the risks with medical treatment, the plaintiff expert was qualified to testify of the causal connection between the medical treatment and harm, the trial court properly gave informed consent jury instructions and properly excluded failure to mitigate instructions, there is sufficient evidence to suppot the jury's verdict and the trial court properly conducted the trial and the determination of expert witness. Judgment affirmed.

Opinion and Order: granting Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis granting [10] Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)(1) REPORTED OPINION The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Judge Margaret M. Sweeney. (ac7) Service on parties made.

disability discrimination claim Ohio's Civil Rights Act trial court affirmed decision of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission finding discrimination Ohio Adm.Code 4112-5-08(E)(1) employee was otherwise qualified person capable of safely and substantially performing the essential functions employer failed to grant employee a reasonable accommodation employee adequately mitigated his damages

Planned community, fiduciary duty, R.C. 1702.30(B), Fair Housing Amendments Act, reasonable accommodation, restrictive covenants.

The Rio Blanco County Department of Human Services (Department) became involved with the parents in this case as a result of concerns about the children's welfare due to the condition of the family home, the parents' use of methamphetamine, and criminal cases involving the parents. Attempts at voluntary services failed, and on the Department's petition for dependency and neglect, the district court ultimately terminated the parents' rights. On appeal, the parents contended that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify them with their children. Specifically, the parents contended that the Department did not give them sufficient time to complete the services under their treatment plans and failed to accommodate their drug testing needs. The termination hearing was not held until more than a year after the motion to terminate was filed. For nine months before the motion to terminate was filed, the Department provided numerous services to the parents, including substance abuse therapy, therapeutic visitation supervision, drug abuse monitoring, and a parental capacity evaluation. The Department also provided counseling for the children. Both parents missed drug tests and tested positive during the testing period, and both were arrested for possession of methamphetamine during the pendency of the case. The Department made reasonable accommodations to meet the parents' needs and the parents had sufficient time to comply with their treatment plans. The record supports the trial court's findings that termination was appropriate because (1) the court-approved appropriate treatment plan had not been complied with by the parents or had not been successful in rehabilitating them (2) the parents were unfit and (3) the conduct or condition of the parents was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. Father also contended that the trial court's decision to interview the 9-year-old twin children together in chambers fundamentally and seriously affected the basi

The question whether the trial court erred by overruling Appellant's motion to stay the writ of restitution pending objections is moot because the court later did grant a stay. Even if the trial court's reasons for overruling Appellant's objections to the magistrate's decision are erroneous, the errors are harmless. The overruling of the objections was correct for other reasons. The notice of termination of Appellant's lease was not defective. Appellee did not waive Appellant's lease breach, because Appellee did not accept payments from Appellant after it served the notice of termination. Appellee effectively granted Appellant the reasonable accommodation that she requested. Judgments affirmed.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 lack of informed consent negligence. The court found that Dr. Emlich was not an employee of OSUMC, and that pursuant to R.C. 2317.54, plaintiff could not prevail on a claim of lack of informed consent against OSUMC as a matter of law. Further, plaintiff provided no evidence from which to infer that OSUMC breached any duty to plaintiff with respect to telephonic interpreter services provided to plaintiff. Defendant OSUMC's motion for summary judgment was granted.

Summary judgment/Disability discrimination and failure to accomodate

Limitations agreement contained in an employment application is enforceable as a contract where it is supported by consideration in the form of the employer's promise to review the prospective employee's application.

R.C. 2307.91 et seq., Ohio Asbestos Reform Act, Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. Sec. 51, et. seq., railroad worker, competent medical authority, substantial occupational exposure to asbestos. Viewed in a light most favorable to claimant pursuant to R.C. 2307.92, the trial court properly denied railroad employers' motion for administrative dismissal of employee's claim under the Ohio Asbestos Reform Act and FELA. The Ohio Asbestos Reform Act's prima facie requirements are procedural, not substantive, in nature. Appellee, a smoker suffering from cancer who claims railroad asbestos exposure during employment is a substantial cause of his impairment, must provide substantiation from a competent medical authority. Asbestos exposure is not required to be the sole or predominant cause, but a "predominate" cause, i.e., a substantial factor. A trial court is not precluded from considering supplemental medical evidence offered to support the prima facie case as the rules of evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings.

Cristina Barbuto vs. Advantage Sales and Marketing, LLC, & another. Suffolk. March 9, 2017. July 17, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Marijuana. Anti-Discrimination Law. Handicap, Employee, Termination of employment. Employment. Discrimination, Termination. Practice. Civil. Motion to dismiss. Discussion of St. 2012, c. 369, which states that there should be no punishment under State law for qualifying patients for the medical use of marijuana, and of the status of marijuana under Federal law. [459-460] In a civil action arising from the plaintiffs termination from employment after she tested positive for marijuana as a result of her lawful medical use of marijuana, a Superior Court judge erred in dismissing the counts of the complaint alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of handicap, where the plaintiff was a “handicapped person” within the meaning of G. L. c. 15IB; where the plaintiff was capable of performing the essential functions of her position with some form of accommodation; and where an accommodation that would permit the plaintiff to continue to be treated with medical marijuana in her home was not per se unreasonable, despite marijuana being illegal to possess under Federal law, and, in any event, the employer owed the plaintiff an obligation, before terminating her employment, to participate in an interactive process with her to determine whether there was an alternative, equally effective medication she could use that was not prohibited under the employer’s drug policy. [460-468] In a civil action arising from the plaintiffs termination from employment after she tested positive for marijuana as a result of her lawful medical use of marijuana, a Superior Court judge properly dismissed the count of the complaint alleging violation of St. 2012, c. 369, which states that there should be no punishment under State law for qualifying patients for the medical use of marijuana, where that statute did not create a separate private cause of action for aggrieved employees [468-470]; likewise, the judge properly dismissed the count of the complaint alleging a claim of wrongful termination in violation of the public policy of protecting an employee’s right to use marijuana for medicinal purposes, where a competent employee has a cause of action for handicap discrimination under such circumstances [470-471], Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 4, 2015. A motion to dismiss was heard by Robert N. Tochka, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Matthew J. Fogelman (Adam D. Fine also present) for the plaintiff. Michael K. Clarkson (M. Tae Phillips also present) for the defendants. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Elizabeth Milito, of the District of Columbia, & Gregory D. Cote for NFIB Small Business Legal Center. Reid M. Wakefield & Constance M. McGrane for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. David A. Russcol & Chelan Tiwari for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & others. Joanne Meredith Villaruz. Gants, C.J. In 2012, Massachusetts voters approved the initiative petition entitled, “An Act for the humanitarian medical use of marijuana,” St. 2012, c. 369 (medical marijuana act or act), whose stated purpose is “that there should be no punishment under [Sjtate law for qualifying patients. ... for the medical use of marijuana.” Id. at § 1. The issue on appeal is whether a qualifying patient who has been terminated from her employment because she tested positive for marijuana as a result of her lawful medical use of marijuana has a civil remedy against her employer. We conclude that the plaintiff may seek a remedy through claims of handicap discrimination in violation of G. L. c. 15IB, and therefore reverse the dismissal of the plaintiffs discrimination claims. We also conclude that there is no implied statutory private cause of action under the medical marijuana act and that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and therefore affirm the dismissal of those claims. Background. “We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo.” Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011). In deciding whether a count in the complaint states a claim under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), we accept as true the allegations in the complaint, draw every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff, and determine whether the factual allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief under the law. Id. As alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff, Cristina Barbuto, was offered an entry-level position with the defendant Advantage Sales and Marketing, LLC (ASM), in the late summer of 2014, and accepted the offer. An ASM representative later left a message for Barbuto stating that she was required to take a mandatory drug test. Barbuto told the ASM employee who would be her supervisor that she would test positive for marijuana. Barbuto explained that she suffers from Crohn’s disease, a debilitating gastrointestinal condition; that her physician had provided her with a written certification that allowed her to use marijuana for medicinal purposes; and that, as a result, she was a qualifying medical marijuana patient under Massachusetts law. She added that she did not use marijuana daily and would not consume it before work or at work. Typically, Barbuto uses marijuana in small quantities at her home, usually in the evening, two or three times per week. As a result of her Crohn’s disease, and her irritable bowel syndrome, she has “little or no appetite,” and finds it difficult to maintain a healthy weight. After she started to use marijuana for medicinal purposes, she gained fifteen pounds and has been able to maintain a healthy weight. The supervisor told Barbuto that her medicinal use of marijuana “should not be a problem,” but that he would confirm this with others at ASM. He later telephoned her and confirmed that her lawful medical use of marijuana would not be an issue with the company. On September 5, 2014, Barbuto submitted a urine sample for the mandatory drug test. On September 11, she went to an ASM training program, where she was given a uniform and assigned a supermarket location where she would promote the products of ASM’s customers. She completed her first day of work the next day. She did not use marijuana at the workplace and did not report to work in an intoxicated state. That evening, the defendant Joanna Meredith Villaruz, ASM’s human resources representative, informed Barbuto that she was terminated for testing positive for marijuana. Villaruz told Barbuto that ASM did not care if Barbuto used marijuana to treat her medical condition because “we follow [Fjederal law, not [Sjtate law.” Barbuto filed a verified charge of discrimination against ASM and Villaruz with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), which she later withdrew in order to file a complaint in the Superior Court. The complaint included six claims: (1) handicap discrimination, in violation of G. L. c. 15 IB, §4 (16); (2) interference with her right to be protected from handicap discrimination, in violation of G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4 (4A); (3) aiding and abetting ASM in committing handicap discrimination, in violation of G. L. c. 15IB, §4 (5); (4) invasion of privacy, in violation of G. L. c. 214, § IB; (5) denial of the “right or privilege” to use marijuana lawfully as a registered patient to treat a debilitating medical condition, in violation of the medical marijuana act; and (6) violation of public policy by terminating the plaintiff for lawfully using marijuana for medicinal purposes. The second and third claims were brought against Villaruz alone; the rest were brought against both ASM and Villaruz. After unsuccessfully attempting to remove the case to United States District Court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in the Superior Court. The judge allowed the motion as to all counts except the invasion of privacy claim. At the request of the plaintiff, the judge entered a separate and final judgment on the dismissed claims, and stayed the invasion of the privacy claim pending appeal. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal regarding the dismissed claims, and we allowed the plaintiff’s application for direct appellate review. Discussion. 1. Massachusetts medical marijuana act. Under the medical marijuana act, a “qualifying patient” is defined as “a person who has been diagnosed by a licensed physician as having a debilitating medical condition”; Crohn’s disease is expressly included within the definition of a “debilitating medical condition.” St. 2012, c. 369, §§ 2 (K), (C). The act protects a qualifying patient from “arrest or prosecution, or civil penalty, for the medical use of marijuana” provided the patient “(a) [pjossesses no more marijuana than is necessary for the patient’s personal, medical use, not exceeding the amount necessary for a sixty-day supply; and (b) [pjresents his or her registration card to any law enforcement official who questions the patient. . . regarding use of marijuana.” St. 2012, c. 369, § 4. The act also provides, “Any person meeting the requirements under this law shall not be penalized under Massachusetts law in any manner, or denied any right or privilege, for such actions.” Id. Like Massachusetts, nearly ninety per cent of States, as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, allow the limited possession of marijuana for medical treatment. See Congressional Research Service, The Marijuana Policy Gap and the Path Forward 7 (Mar. 10, 2017). See also National Conference of State Legislatures, State Medical Marijuana Laws (2017), http:// www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/9VYY-YMP8] (reporting that twenty-nine States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam allow for “comprehensive public medical marijuana and cannabis programs,” while seventeen other States allow use of “ ‘low THC, high can-nabidiol. .. products’ for medical reasons in limited situations or as a legal defense”). Yet under Federal law, marijuana continues to be a Schedule I controlled substance under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1), (c) (2012), whose possession is a crime, regardless of whether it is prescribed by a physician for medical use. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) (“The [Controlled Substances Act] designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that the drug has no acceptable medical uses” [emphasis in original]). Consequently, a qualifying patient in Massachusetts who has been lawfully prescribed marijuana remains potentially subject to Federal criminal prosecution for possessing the marijuana prescribed. It is against this unusual backdrop that we review the judge’s dismissal of every claim in the complaint except for the privacy claim. 2. Handicap discrimination. Under G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4 (16), it is an “unlawful practice . . . [f]or any employer ... to dismiss from employment or refuse to hire . . . , because of [her] handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation required to be made to the physical or mental limitations of the person would impose an undue hardship to the employer’s business.” “In interpreting the meaning of these provisions, we give ‘substantial deference’ to the guidelines interpreting G. L. c. 151B, promulgated by the MCAD, although we recognize that the guidelines do not carry the force of law.” Gannon v. Boston, 476 Mass. 786, 792 (2017), citing Dahill v. Police Dep’t of Boston, 434 Mass. 233, 239 (2001). ‘“We remain mindful that the Legislature instructed that G. L. c. 151B ‘shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes.’ ” Gannon, supra at 793, quoting G. L. c. 151B, § 9. The plaintiff alleges that she is a ‘“handicapped person” because she suffers from Crohn’s disease and that she is a ‘“qualified handicapped person” because she is capable of performing the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation to her handicap; that is, with a waiver of ASM’s policy barring anyone from employment who tests positive for marijuana so that she may continue to use medical marijuana as prescribed by her physician. She adequately states a claim for handicap discrimination in violation of § 4 (16) if the allegations in her complaint, accepted as true, suffice to make a facial showing that she is a ‘“qualified handicapped person” who was terminated because of her handicap. See Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, Guidelines: Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Chapter 15 IB § IX.A.3 (1998) (MCAD Guidelines). Where Crohn’s disease is characterized as a ‘“debilitating medical condition” under the medical marijuana act, see St. 2012, c. 369, § 2 (C), and where the complaint alleges that, as a result of this condition, combined with irritable bowel syndrome, the plaintiff has ‘“little or no appetite” and has difficulty maintaining a healthy weight, we conclude that she has adequately alleged that she has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities and therefore is a “handicapped person” as defined in § 1 (19). Where a plaintiff is handicapped and where she suffered an adverse employment action even though she was capable of performing the essential functions of her position with some form of accommodation, the plaintiff adequately alleges a claim of handicap discrimination if the accommodation that she alleges is necessary is facially reasonable. See Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. 113, 120 (2010). Because a reasonable accommodation claim may arise in a wide variety of contexts, courts are reluctant to set “hard and fast rules” as to when an accommodation is facially reasonable. See Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001). Generally speaking, however, a plaintiff must at least show that the accommodation is “feasible for the employer under the circumstances.” Id. at 259. The defendants argue that Barbuto has failed to state a claim of handicap discrimination for two reasons. First, they contend that she has not adequately alleged that she is a “qualified handicapped person” because the only accommodation she sought — her continued use of medical marijuana — is a Federal crime, and therefore is facially unreasonable. See Garcia v. Tractor Supply Co., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1229 (D.N.M. 2016) (“medical marijuana is not an accommodation that must be provided for by the employer”); Ross v. Raging Wire Telecomm., Inc., 42 Cal. 4th 920, 926 (2008) (California’s statute prohibiting handicap discrimination “does not require employees to accommodate the use of illegal drugs”). Second, they contend that, even if she were a “qualified handicapped person,” she was terminated because she failed a drug test that all employees are required to pass, not because of her handicap. As to the defendants’ first argument, where an employee is handicapped because she suffers from a debilitating medical condition that can be alleviated or managed with medication, one generally would expect an employer not to interfere with the employee taking such medication, or to terminate her because she took it. If the employer, however, had a drug policy prohibiting the use of such medication, even where lawfully prescribed by a physician, the employer would have a duty to engage in an interactive process with the employee to determine whether there were equally effective medical alternatives to the prescribed medication whose use would not be in violation of its policy. See Godfrey, 457 Mass. at 120 (“If the accommodation proposed by the employee appears unduly onerous, the employer has an obligation to work with the employee to determine whether another accommodation is possible”). See also Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 450 Mass. 327, 342 n.17 (2008) (when handicapped employee requests accommodation, “employer is obligated to participate in the interactive process of determining one”); MCAD Guidelines, supra at § VII.C (once handicapped employee notifies employer of need for accommodation to perform essential functions of job, “the employer should initiate an informal interactive process” with employee to “identify the precise limitation resulting from the handicap and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations”). Where no equally effective alternative exists, the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee’s use of the medication would cause an undue hardship to the employer’s business in order to justify the employer’s refusal to make an exception to the drug policy reasonably to accommodate the medical needs of the handicapped employee. See Godfrey, 457 Mass. at 120, quoting Cox v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 414 Mass. 375, 386 n.3 (1993) (“Once an employee ‘make[s] at least a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible,’ the burden of proof [of both production and persuasion] shifts to the employer to establish that a suggested accommodation would impose an undue hardship”). Because the burden of proving undue hardship rests with the employer, where an employee brings a handicap discrimination claim following her dismissal for the use of her prescribed medication, her complaint will state a claim for relief that will survive a motion to dismiss where it adequately alleges that she is a “qualified handicapped person” because she could have competently performed her job with the medication, and that allowing her to use the medication was at least facially a reasonable accommodation. Here, the defendants contend that, because the prescribed medication is marijuana, which is illegal to possess under Federal law, an accommodation that would permit the plaintiff to continue to be treated with medical marijuana is per se unreasonable. They also contend that, because such an accommodation is facially unreasonable, they owed the plaintiff no obligation to participate in the interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation before they terminated her employment. We are not persuaded by either argument. Under Massachusetts law, as a result of the act, the use and possession of medically prescribed marijuana by a qualifying patient is as lawful as the use and possession of any other prescribed medication. Where, in the opinion of the employee’s physician, medical marijuana is the most effective medication for the employee’s debilitating medical condition, and where any alternative medication whose use would be permitted by the employer’s drug policy would be less effective, an exception to an employer’s drug policy to permit its use is a facially reasonable accommodation. A qualified handicapped employee has a right under G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4 (16), not to be fired because of her handicap, and that right includes the right to require an employer to make a reasonable accommodation for her handicap to enable her to perform the essential functions of her job. Our conclusion finds support in the marijuana act itself, which declares that patients shall not be denied “any right or privilege” on the basis of their medical marijuana use. St. 2012, c. 369, § 4. A handicapped employee in Massachusetts has a statutory “right or privilege” to reasonable accommodation under G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4. If an employer’s tolerance of an employee’s use of medical marijuana were a facially unreasonable accommodation, the employee effectively would be denied this “right or privilege” solely because of the pa