Breach of Contract Cases

Granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against defendants' counterclaims for declaratory relief because each requested declaration either duplicates issues already joined by the pleadings or seeks relief beyond this Court's jurisdiction. Granting Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/Third-Party Plaintiff TMC's Traditional Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Termination against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant City Choice. Although City Choice's termination notice was clear and unequivocal; its tender of its termination notice was not the exercise or acceptance of an option, and is therefore, not subject to the "strict compliance" standard applicable to the exercise or acceptance of options; and it substantially complied with notice provisions in exercising its right to terminate, it estopped from obtaining specific performance of the contract it purported to terminate. Denying TMC's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Third Party Defendant City Select Title for Release of the Independent Consideration. TMC does not seek a simple declaration from this Court that TMC is entitled to receipt of the Independent Consideration at the execution of the final judgment in this case. Instead, TMC seeks the immediate (i.e., pre-judgment) release of the Independent Consideration. But it must instead comply with the statutory requirements for a writ of attachment. Granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 91a because the pleadings fail to state a legally cognizable claim for breach of contract or for veil piercing, and the fraud claim is adequately pleaded. This opinion addresses Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction which challenged the Court's jurisdiction over Plaintiff's third-party claims filed against multiple subcontractors who performed work on a construction project. The Court denied Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction, concluding the third-party claims met the definition of an "action arising out of a qualified transaction" under Sectio

Granting Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/Third-Party Plaintiff TMC's Traditional Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Termination against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant City Choice. Although City Choice's termination notice was clear and unequivocal; its tender of its termination notice was not the exercise or acceptance of an option, and is therefore, not subject to the "strict compliance" standard applicable to the exercise or acceptance of options; and it substantially complied with notice provisions in exercising its right to terminate, it estopped from obtaining specific performance of the contract it purported to terminate. Denying TMC's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Third Party Defendant City Select Title for Release of the Independent Consideration. TMC does not seek a simple declaration from this Court that TMC is entitled to receipt of the Independent Consideration at the execution of the final judgment in this case. Instead, TMC seeks the immediate (i.e., pre-judgment) release of the Independent Consideration. But it must instead comply with the statutory requirements for a writ of attachment. Granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 91a because the pleadings fail to state a legally cognizable claim for breach of contract or for veil piercing, and the fraud claim is adequately pleaded. This opinion addresses Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction which challenged the Court's jurisdiction over Plaintiff's third-party claims filed against multiple subcontractors who performed work on a construction project. The Court denied Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction, concluding the third-party claims met the definition of an "action arising out of a qualified transaction" under Section 25A.004(d)(1). Further, the Court found the third-party claims were neither "conjectural, hypothetical or remote" and therefore ripe. Granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment contending that Plaintiff's

summary judgment; de novo; wrongful termination; breach of employment agreement; at will employment; promissory estoppel; disciplinary policy; legitimate business reason; defamation; Greeley claim.

summary ejectment, writ of possession, holdover tenant, counterclaim, affirmative defenses, retaliatory eviction, interlocutory appeal, substantial right, jurisdiction, dismiss

Granting in part and denying in par Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 91a because the pleadings fail to state a legally cognizable claim for breach of contract or for veil piercing, and the fraud claim is adequately pleaded.. This opinion addresses Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction which challenged the Court's jurisdiction over Plaintiff's third-party claims filed against multiple subcontractors who performed work on a construction project. The Court denied Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction, concluding the third-party claims met the definition of an "action arising out of a qualified transaction" under Section 25A.004(d)(1). Further, the Court found the third-party claims were neither "conjectural, hypothetical or remote" and therefore ripe. Granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment contending that Plaintiff's tortious interference with contract, defamation, and business disparagement claims are barred by the limitation-of-liability provision in the parties' 2022 agreement. Granting a third-party defendant's special appearance arguing no personal jurisdiction over him because he did not commit any tortious acts while in Texas. Because the respondents did not plead or prove that this defendant has sufficient Texas contacts giving rise to the claims against him to support personal jurisdiction over him for any pled cause of action, the court granted the non-resident's special appearances and dismissed the claims against him without prejudice. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166(g), the Court issues this decision holding that (1) fact issues preclude the Court from determining whether the liquidated-damages clause in the parties' contract is an unenforceable penalty and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's cost-basis theory is not the correct measure of the plaintiff's actual damages. In this force-majeure dispute arising out of Winter Storm Uri, parties to a contract for the sale of

The plaintiff insured appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defen- dant insurance company on her amended complaint alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance dispute concerning underinsured motorist benefits. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improp- erly granted the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery, as the court reasonably could have concluded that bifurcation of the claims served interests of convenience and judicial efficiency and may have negated the need to litigate certain other issues. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for an order of compliance with her discovery requests, as the defendant eventually filed a notice of compliance and the plaintiff did not allege any prejudice resulting from the defendant's delay in complying with her discov- ery requests. This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred with respect to certain legal and factual determinations, as the plaintiff failed to furnish an adequate record for review. The trial court applied a proper legal standard in ruling on the counts of the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the defendant failed to act in good faith pursuant to a provision of CUTPA and that it acted in bad faith in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the court reasonably could have concluded, in light of the evidence and the related findings of fact, that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the defendant had acted in bad faith. Argued October 29, 2024—officially released October 28, 2025