Breach of Contract Cases

This is a breach of contract action involving a commercial lease. The plaintiff filed suit for non-payment of rent. The defendant claimed that it was not liable because it provided notice of early termination pursuant to the terms of the contract. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, claiming that notice was not provided within the time set forth in the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm.

Trial court did not err in holding appellants' claims for negligence, tortious interference with business relationships, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were disguised defamation claims. Having filed the complaint past the one-year statute of limitations for defamation, appellants were not prejudiced by the trial court's determination that the attorney general's office had absolute privilege to publish an allegedly defamatory press release. Judgment affirmed.

Wrongful discharge based on public policy of reporting adultery libel claims against co-workers tortious interference with contract summary judgment procedure

Whether the General Assembly intended to exempt by implication the Teachers' and State Employees' Retirement System's Board of Trustees from rulemaking requirements pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, N.C.G.S. 150B, in adopting a Contribution-Based Benefit Cap pursuant to N.C.G.S. 135-5(a3).

Political-subdivision liability—Former R.C. 2744.07(A)(2), now R.C. 2744.07(B)—The right to indemnification set forth in R.C. 2744.07 may be asserted only by an employee of a political subdivision—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

The plaintiffs, K and her husband, sought to recover damages from the defendants, G, a physician, and G's medical practice, for personal injuries that K had suffered in connection with G's alleged negligence in, inter alia, failing to perform a proper and adequate episiotomy repair after the birth of the plaintiffs' son. G had performed an episiotomy to facilitate the delivery of the plaintiffs' son. After the delivery, G evaluated K and diagnosed her with a third degree episiotomy extension, which G repaired. After the repair was completed, G performed a digital examina- tion of K's rectum and determined that there were no breaks or defects in K's rectal mucosa. Although an exam of K's perineum the day after the delivery indicated no issues with the repair, K subsequently reported complications, including pain, an infection, and a rectovaginal fistula that required surgery. At trial, the plaintiffs' expert witness, Y, testified that the standard of care requires that a physician, after performing an episiotomy, correctly diagnose and repair the episiotomy and any extension thereof, which must involve a thorough rectal examination before the repair. Y also testified that G failed to satisfy the standard of care because, in failing to conduct a proper examination, G misdiag- nosed and repaired the episiotomy extension as a third degree rather than a fourth degree extension, and that this error led to the rectovaginal fistula. According to the defendants' expert, L, G complied with the standard of care, which required that the rectal exam be performed after rather than before the episiotomy repair. L also testified that G had correctly diagnosed and repaired a third degree episiotomy extension. Finally, another expert witness presented by the defendants testified that K's rectovaginal fistula was not caused by an unrepaired fourth degree episiotomy extension but, rather, an infection. The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiffs had alleged that G breached

The trial court did not err in concluding the Village and the Harrisburg defendants were entitled to immunity as employees of a political subdivision, and the trial court did not err in rendering judgment in favor of appellees. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilkins' motion for new trial.