Breach of Contract Cases

In this breach of contract action, Appellant KOL, Inc. (Dealer) seeks review of the circuit court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration. Dealer argues the circuit court erred by declining to compel arbitration on the ground that Dealer's execution of certain contracts with Respondent Casey Masters (Purchaser) after Purchaser filed this action rendered the parties' April 10, 2017 arbitration agreement moot and unenforceable. We reverse and remand for an order compelling arbitration.

In 2011, the defendant City of Providence passed an ordinance that would terminate City-paid health care benefits for retirees from the Providence police department and fire department who were eligible for federal Medicare benefits (the 2011 Medicare Ordinance). A group of retirees and two unions initiated litigation to bar enforcement of the new ordinance. After engaging in court-ordered mediation, most retirees agreed to a settlement in which the retirees would enroll in Medicare upon achieving the age of eligibility and the City would pay for certain costs associated with Medicare coverage, including penalties incurred from late enrollment in various Medicare supplemental programs such as Parts B and D. Several dozen retirees opted out of the settlement agreement, however, and instead pursued their civil claims through the litigation process. The opt-out plaintiffs' claims for violation of the Takings Clause and for promissory estoppel were dismissed on the City's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and violation of the Contract Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions went to trial. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial justice ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had not proved their claims, and entered judgment in favor of the City on all counts of plaintiffs' complaints. The plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment, arguing that the trial justice erred by dismissing their claim for breach of contract, dismissing their claim for violation of the Contract Clauses of the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions, granting summary judgment in favor of the City on their claim that the 2011 Medicare Ordinance violated the Takings Clauses of the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions, and granting the City's motion for summary judgment regarding their claim for promissory estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with respect to the claims for breach of contract, violation of the Tak

In 2012, the defendant City of Providence passed an ordinance suspending the annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) to the pension benefits for retired members of the Providence police and fire departments (the 2012 Pension Ordinance) the suspension would be in place until the then-underfunded pension fund achieved a 70 percent funding level. The City's consultants projected that the pension fund could reach a 70 percent funding level in 2036. Retiree groups and union groups initiated litigation to bar enforcement of the new ordinance. After engaging in court-ordered mediation, most retirees agreed to a settlement which allowed for a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefit. Several dozen plaintiffs opted out of the settlement agreement, however, and instead pursued their civil claims through the litigation process. The opt-out plaintiffs' claims for violation of the Takings Clause and promissory estoppel were dismissed on the City's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and violation of the Contract Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions went to trial. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial justice ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had not proven their claims, and entered judgment in favor of the City on all counts of the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment, arguing that the trial justice erred by finding in favor of the City on their Contract Clause claim and by granting summary judgment prior to trial in favor of the City on their claims for violation of the Takings Clause and for promissory estoppel. The plaintiffs also argued that some of them were absolutely immunized from any changes to their COLAs because of prior judicial adjudications. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment with respect to each plaintiff who had also been a plaintiff in prior litigation regarding their COLA benefits which had ended with either a consent judgment or an individual settlem

In 2012, the defendant City of Providence passed an ordinance suspending the annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) to the pension benefits for retired members of the Providence police and fire departments (the 2012 Pension Ordinance) the suspension would be in place until the then-underfunded pension fund achieved a 70 percent funding level. The City's consultants projected that the pension fund could reach a 70 percent funding level in 2036. Retiree groups and union groups initiated litigation to bar enforcement of the new ordinance. After engaging in court-ordered mediation, most retirees agreed to a settlement which allowed for a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefit. Several dozen plaintiffs opted out of the settlement agreement, however, and instead pursued their civil claims through the litigation process. The opt-out plaintiffs' claims for violation of the Takings Clause and promissory estoppel were dismissed on the City's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and violation of the Contract Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions went to trial. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial justice ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had not proven their claims, and entered judgment in favor of the City on all counts of the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment, arguing that the trial justice erred by finding in favor of the City on their Contract Clause claim and by granting summary judgment prior to trial in favor of the City on their claims for violation of the Takings Clause and for promissory estoppel. The plaintiffs also argued that some of them were absolutely immunized from any changes to their COLAs because of prior judicial adjudications. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment with respect to each plaintiff who had also been a plaintiff in prior litigation regarding their COLA benefits which had ended with either a consent judgment or an individual settlem

Court of Claims erred when it granted summary judgment to appellee on appellant's breach of contract claim where the evidence presented by appellant permitted the inference that appellant's academic advisor harbored an age-related bias against appellant and subsequently persuaded another member of appellant's Ph.D. committee to change appellant's grade on the comprehensive written examination from "overall pass" to "fail," as such conduct, if proven at trial, represents a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that appellant's academic advisor and committee member did not actually exercise professional judgment. Even though appellant's dismissal from the Ph.D. program resulted in the loss of his position as a paid teaching assistant ("TA"), appellee was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, as to appellant's statutory age discrimination claim because the allegations of discriminatory conduct related to appellant's status as a student and not the conditions of his employment as a TA. Appellee was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, as to appellant's statutory retaliation claim because the discriminatory practices opposed by appellant related to his status as a student and not the conditions of his employment as a TA. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part cause remanded.

The plaintiff filed this action against his employer for breach of contract by failing to provide the plaintiff with severance pay after the employer terminated the contract without cause. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, determining that it was undisputed that the plaintiff was terminated without cause, which entitled him to severance pay pursuant to the employment contract. On appeal, the defendant argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment by failing to conduct an objective inquiry as to whether cause was present to terminate the plaintiff's employment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court did not err by adopting the State Medical Board's ("board") order to suspend appellant's license to practice medicine for an indefinite period, not less than one year. The board's consideration of appellant's disclosures to third-parties that were not expressly stated in the notice, including potentially uncharged misconduct, were aggravating factors pursuant to the board's rules and did not constitute a due process violation. Statements by a member of the board when reviewing appellant's case amounted to commentary and not new evidence in violation of appellant's due process rights. The trial court did not abuse its discretion finding the board's determination that appellant committed a sexual misconduct violation was based on reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Relator seeks a writ ordering Ohio State Employment Relations Board ("SERB") to vacate the dismissals of three unfair labor practice charges relating to alleged changes in respondent employer's Family Medical Leave Act policies. We find SERB abused its discretion in dismissing two of the charges. Writ of mandamus granted in part.