Breach of Contract Cases

The named defendant, E, an employee of the plaintiff, the Department of Public Health, filed a complaint with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the plaintiff retaliated against her for a whistleblower disclosure that she had made and that allegedly was protected by statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 4-61dd). E's job duties included reviewing the qualifications of individuals who are appointed to be a municipal director or acting director of health. The department had received an appointment letter from the then director of health of Hartford, requesting approval of W as Hartford's acting director of health. Both the letter and W's resume represented that W held a master's degree in public health, which is one of two alternative statutory ((Rev. to 2015) § 19a-200 (a)) prerequisites for the appointment to the position of municipal director of health. E reviewed the request, including W's resume, and she drafted a letter approving the appointment without first verifying that W actually possessed a master's degree in public health. The Commissioner of Public Health ultimately signed the approval letter. E subsequently learned that W did not possess a master's degree in public health, and, after she notified her supervisor, B, W was removed from the acting director position. Shortly thereafter, E again failed to verify the credentials of an individual who had been appointed to serve as another municipality's acting director of health. When B learned of the repeated error, E received a letter of reprimand. E subse- quently received another letter of reprimand and multiple, unsatisfactory performance appraisals, and was ultimately demoted. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, E filed grievances challenging the fore- going, adverse personnel actions but did not raise a whistleblower retali- ation claim in connection with those grievances. All of the grievances were denied. E then filed the present whistleblower retaliation claim wit

This appeal arises from a dispute over the construction of a swimming pool. The defendant entered into a written contract with the plaintiff for the construction of a pool at the defendant's home. The plaintiff later filed a complaint alleging that the defendant failed to pay the amount due under the contract. The defendant filed a counter-complaint and alleged breach of contract, fraud and/or misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for relief from the judgment, which the trial court denied. The defendant appeals. We affirm the trial court's decision and remand for determination of appellate attorney's fees.

CONTRACTS – DISCOVERY – MOTION TO COMPEL – CIV.R. 56 – ABUSE OF DISCRETION – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – BREACH OF CONTRACT – CONTRACT INTERPRETATION – IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING – IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT – UNJUST ENRICHMENT – FRAUD: The trial court did not abuse its direction in impliedly denying plaintiff's motion to compel discovery and plaintiff's motion for a continuance under Civ.R. 56(F) and instead ruling on defendant's dispositive motion for summary judgment where plaintiff's substantial rights were not harmed by closing discovery because plaintiff stated in its memorandum in opposition to summary judgment that it had sufficient facts to survive summary judgment. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff on whether defendant breached the contract by providing notice of termination because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant provided to plaintiff the written notice to terminate required by the contract and there are no facts suggesting defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff on whether defendant breached the contract by refusing to pay amounts owed prior to providing notice of termination where there is no genuine issue of material fact that the amounts were due for services rendered prior to defendant sending notice to terminate the contract and defendant had not paid those amounts. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff on whether defendant breached the contract by not paying amounts owed under the contract during the 30-day notice period where there is no genuine issue of material fact that the termination clause keeps the contract in force for 30 days after a party provides written notice to terminate, and sets the amounts owed while the contract is in force, and the plain language of

Bench Trial Manifest Weight Contract Breach Damages. Trial court's determination to prorate damages for breach of contract was supported by the evidence.

A court may compel arbitration of disputes that are covered by a binding arbitration agreement. A statute of limitations does not automatically prevent arbitration of a claim if the arbitration agreement does not make arbitration contingent on compliance with the statute of limitations, and if the relevant arbitration rules authorize the arbitrator to determine its own jurisdiction. A party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute unless the party has agreed in writing to do so, or if an exception applies that binds the nonsignatory party to an arbitration agreement. The agency exception that can bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement does not apply if there is no principal-agent relationship between the signatory and the nonsignatory. The estoppel exception does not apply if the nonsignatory has not directly benefited from the agreement containing the arbitration provision. A court may conclude that a party has not waived its right to arbitration if, based on the relevant factors and the procedural context, the party has not acted inconsistently with that right.