Harassment Cases

Reversed and remanded as to BOLI's conclusion that Kaiser, Mitchell, and Struhar aided and abetted sexual harassment and were joint and severally liable; otherwise affirmed.

Pursuant to statute (§ 46a-58 (a)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . for any person to subject, or cause to be subjected, any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States, on account of . . . sex . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (b)), ''upon a finding of a discriminatory employment practice, the [human rights referee] may order the hiring or reinstatement of employees, with or without back pay . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (c)), ''upon a finding of a discriminatory practice prohibited by section 46a-58 . . . the [referee] shall determine the damage suffered by the complainant . . . as a result of such discriminatory practice and shall allow reasonable attorney's fees and costs.'' The named defendant, G, who is employed as a judicial marshal by the plaintiff, the Connecticut Judicial Branch, filed a complaint with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in connec- tion with her allegations that another judicial marshal, M, had subjected her to severe and pervasive sexual harassment while they were stationed together at a particular courthouse. Specifically, G alleged that the branch discriminated against her on the basis of her gender by subjecting her to a hostile work environment, failing to investigate her allegations and to take remedial steps to protect her, and retaliating against her for making her complaint by reassigning her to courthouses farther from her residence. G claimed that the branch's misconduct violated the employment discrimination statute (§ 46a-60), as well as the general antidiscrimination statute, § 46a-58 (a), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), as a predicate for G's claim under § 46a-58 (a), insofar as § 46a-58 (a) includes within its ambit

CIVIL STALKING PROTECTION ORDER - Appellate court must defer to trial court on credibility determinations and trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant engaged in a pattern of conduct which caused Appellee mental distress and thus did not abuse its discretion in granting Appellee's request for civil stalking protection order.

civil stalking protection order manifest weight of the evidence presumption in favor of judgment menacing by stalking mental distress credibility determination conflicting evidence.

Domestic violence protective order subject-matter jurisdiction civil summons competent evidence of domestic violence harassment substantial emotional distress