Wage Theft Cases

Workers' compensation—Temporary-total-disability compensation—Court of appeals correctly determined that some evidence in record supported Industrial Commission's finding that claimant was medically able to perform light-duty job that employer made available to him—Court of appeals erred in determining whether job was objectively offered in good faith and in issuing writ of mandamus on that basis ordering commission to grant claimant's request or hold new hearing—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part and limited writ issued ordering commission to determine whether employer offered light-duty job in good faith and to issue new order.

Nieto worked for Clark's Market, Inc. (the Market) and accrued vacation time pursuant to the vacation policy in the Market's employee handbook. The handbook stated that an employee is entitled to payment for accrued but unused vacation time if she voluntarily resigns and gives at least two weeks' notice, but if the Market discharges an employee for any reason or for no reason, or if the employee fails to give two weeks' notice before quitting, the employee forfeits all earned vacation pay benefits. The Market discharged Nieto and refused to pay her for accrued but unused vacation time pursuant to its policy. Nieto sued for payment for accrued vacation time, alleging that the Market's policy violated CRS §§ 8-4-101(14)(a)(III) and -121 of the Colorado Wage Claim Act (CWCA). The district court granted the Market's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Nieto argued that CRS § 8-4-121 voids the Market's policy because her accrued vacation pay was earned and determinable, so she has a right to payment for vacation time under the CWCA, and the Market's policy is an illegal waiver of her right to payment. CRS § 8-4-101(14)(a)(III) explicitly includes vacation pay in the definition of wages, but it also provides that no amount is to be considered wages until it is earned, vested, and determinable. Further, nothing in the CWCA creates a substantive right to payment for accrued but unused vacation time rather, an employee's right to such compensation is determined by the parties' employment agreement. Here, the agreement conditioned payment for accrued but unused vacation time, and Nieto did not meet those conditions. Therefore, she did not assert a plausible claim that she was entitled to accrued but unused vacation time. Further, the anti-waiver provision does not create any substantive entitlement to payment independent of the parties' agreement it only applies to rights conferred by the CWCA, which looks to the parties' agreement as the sole potential

Domestic relations—Child support—Annual gross income—Income from commissions earned by a parent is included under R.C. 3119.05(D) and therefore must be treated the same as income from bonuses and overtime when calculating a parent's total annual gross income—Court of appeals' judgment reversed.

The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction over a certified question of law from the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado to determine whether there should be an arbitration-specific exception to Colorado's traditionally defined doctrine of equitable estoppel. The Court held that Colorado's law of equitable estoppel applies in the same manner when a dispute involves an arbitration agreement as it does in other contexts. The Court recognized that under Colorado law, equitable estoppel requires proof of four elements—one of which is detrimental reliance. Thus, a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement can only assert equitable estoppel against a signatory in an effort to compel arbitration if the nonsignatory can demonstrate each of the elements of equitable estoppel, including detrimental reliance.

REPORTED OPINION and ORDER: finding NCIS classified improperly Mr. Shea as FLSA exempt finding NCIS erred in good faith and with a reasonable basis, precluding liquidated damages denying plaintiff's request to reconsider grant of summary judgment to government on willfulness denying plaintiff's Motion to Compel awarding $42,750.84 in compensatory damages for July 2014 through September 2018 and awarding compensatory damages under the same methodology for overtime hours accrued after October 2018 until Mr. Shea has been classified as non-exempt. In due course, Mr. Shea may apply for an award of reasonable costs and reasonable fees for witnesses and attorneys under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment under RCFC 54(b) as specified. Signed by Senior Judge Charles F. Lettow.

motion to compel arbitration – arbitration agreement - R.C. 2711.03